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Explanatory Notes
1. The pinyin system is used for transcribing Chinese. In the quotations
from English works, except in titles of books and articles and names of
authors, other forms of romanization are always changed into pinyin.
2. A full reference to all the books and articles cited in the body of this
work and their abbreviated titles is given alphabetically in the three
subdivisions of the Works Cited sections at the end . Section one is
Abbreviations. Section two is Traditional Chinese Works Listed by
Titles. And section three is Modern Works Listed by Authors.
3. Chinese years are converted to the western calendar according to the
year to which the greater part of the Chinese year corresponds. The
conversion is based on Wan Guoding 1978.
4. Translation of Chinese official titles is based on Hucker 1985, except
for the following terms: dudu (area commander), fanzhen (regional
commands), qing (chamberlain), and zaixiang (chief minister).
5. In the transcription of Tibetan names: h becomes ng; ri becomes ny; z
becomes zh; s becomes sh.

Introduction
The conquest of the last of the Southern Dynasties by Sui in 589
brought to an end the Period of Disunion which had started with the col
lapse of Han in 220 C.E. The Sui dynasty was short-lived but laid the
foundation for the Tang (618-907), an age of outstanding political and
cultural achievement to which later generations looked back with nostal
gia.
The Sui-Tang period of over three centuries stands as a high point
in the development of Chinese civilization. It not only restored the imity of
the Chinese empire, it enlarged this concept which had been bom in early
Zhou, idealized by the Confucian thinkers of the Warring States and given
definite form in Qin and Han. At the end of Tang the pattern of unity was
again challenged, but the ideal persisted and has remained very much alive
to the present day.
The Sui and early Tang rulers greatly rationalized the government,
introducing more sophisticated bureaucratic, legal, financial and military
systems. Constmction of the canal linking north and south under Emperor
Yang of Sui and the long period of internal peace that lasted with few intermptions from the accession of Tang Taizong in 627 to the middle of the
eighth century, as well as the opening up of contacts with Western Asia,
greatly stimulated economic development and social change, preparing the
way for the momentous transformations that came to finition in the follow
ing Song period, when Chinese civilization was in many respects in ad
vance of the rest of the world.
However, in political terms, the An Lushan rebellion from 755 to
763 marked a downward turning point. The unity of the country was chal
lenged by sfruggles between the central authority and the semiautonomous provincial governors, especially those near the northern bor
ders. At the center new generations of civil service examination graduates
competed with the aristocratic bureaucrats, and weak emperors fell under
the influence of powerful eunuchs. And yet, technological progress, devel
opment of the south, and flourishing trade continued to foster urbanization
and the growth of a money economy, bringing about a commercial revo
lution that reached its height in Song.
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The triumphs and disasters of the three centuries of Sui and Tang
are also clearly reflected in China’s foreign relations. With their mixed
Chinese and nomadic ancestry, and as the direct heirs of the once alien
rulers of North China as well as the unifiers of North and South, the Sui
and early Tang rulers inherited the rich tradition of Chinese literate culture
as well as a vigorous non-Chinese, nomadic spirit.
During the preceding three centuries of political disunity, alien rule
in North China had challenged the universal rulership of traditional Chi
nese political theory. While undergoing a gradual process of sinicization,
the non-Chinese northern regimes influenced Chinese society profoundly
through their attempts to establish the political basis for a multiethnic
empire and their patronage of the foreign religion of Buddhism, while pre
serving their military vigor and alien social customs. Political disumty
within China proper encouraged the different regimes in both northern and
southern China to look more outward. The southern regimes looked to
wards the sea, increasing their maritime contacts with Southeast Asian
countries. The northern regimes looked to sophisticated trading partners
on the steppe land in the north and the Western Regions in the west.
Despite coming out of so novel a background, the Sui and early
Tang rulers were ambitious to restore a unified empire on the Han model
when Chinese rule had stretched far and wide into the surrounding regions
against far less sophisticated cultures than Sui and Tang faced. After initial
successes, the Sui attempt at landward expansion ended in disaster,
whereas in 630 Tang Taizong succeeded in conquering the Eastern Turks,
who had previously dominated the Mongolian steppe, and assumed the
title Heavenly Qaghan. This let him claim to be something more than just
a Chinese Son of Heaven extending his rule from his own Chinese inner
group to certain non-Chinese outer groups. He could now claim to be
Heaven’s ordained ruler of nomadic peoples on their own terms, like the
Turkish qaghans. For a while Taizong, a ruler with a unique breadth of
vision, attempted to bring about a real universal empire, one with both
Chinese and non-Chinese subjects directly under a Son of Heaven and
Heavenly Qaghan combined in one person.
This vision was also given substance through incorporation of nonChinese into the Chinese administrative apparatus and the use of nonChinese nomadic troops as a major component in the Tang forces that
sought to extend their conquests both east and west. By the late 650’s Tai
zong’s successor, Gaozong, had succeeded in extending Tang boundaries
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to an extent that was seldom matched before or afterwards in Chinese his
tory, and spread the name of the Heavenly Qaghan far and wide.
However, this success only compounded the perpetual problem of
how to maintain such an empire and how to preserve its rulers’ internal
security. From the 670’s on, the Tang regime had to steadily retreat from
its claims to so overextended a territory and switch the emphasis in its
foreign policy to building up strong defenses for its overextended fron
tiers. By the late 730’s China’s frontiers were defended by strong for
tresses and large armies, including many non-Chinese among both the
troops and the generals.
With the backing of the emperor, the non-Chinese generals in par
ticular were encouraged to push beyond the frontiers into the surrounding
areas, but this new form of power also proved to have been overextended
and soon collapsed. These strong frontier armies were developed at the
cost of the defenses of the capital. One of the frontier commanders. An
Lushan, half Turk and half Sogdian, took advantage of the weakness at the
center and rose in revolt in 755.
After a bitter struggle and only with the assistance of western al
lies, especially the Uighurs, who despatched troops to assist the Heavenly
Qaghan, the Tang dynasty survived, but China’s status as a great power
was much diminished. The central government maintained a weak control
over China internally, while externally it had to cope with a formidable
challenge from Tibet, which had occupied that part of Chinese territory
which allowed it to pose a permanent threat to the Tang capital, while the
Uighur empire and later the Nanzhao kingdom demanded equality with
China. As remarkable as was Taizong’s attempt to build a universal em
pire, still more remarkable was the attitude of equality towards other states
embodied in their policies and strategies by Tang rulers a century later,
which ensured Tang’s survival for another century and half
Compared to Han, whose only major organized rival was the
Xiongnu nomadic empire, Sui and Tang China faced a more complex in
ternational situation, one in which a number of states had been established
in neighboring areas. The nomadic empires centered in the Mongolian
steppe lands of first the Turks and then (from 740) the Uighurs continued
to pose a serious threat. Farther east were the forest nomad Khitan and Xi
confederations in Manchuria. These were states less formidable militarily
than were those of the steppe nomads but they could maintain their inde
pendence by alternating alliances with the Chinese and the steppe nomadic
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powers, and thus sometimes posed a threat to China’s northeastern fron
tier.
On the Korean peninsula, the situation contrasted with that during
Han times, when there was at the beginning only a loosely organized
kingdom in the north and no strong political regimes farther south. Three
kingdoms, Koguryo, Paekche and Silla, had developed during the postHan Period of Disunion, with Koguryo, the closest to China, as a signifi
cant power on the international scene. In their competition for political
supremacy these Korean states formed alliances with one another, or with
the outside forces of China or Japan. Success of China’s endeavor to con
quer the peninsula before the 670’s was to a large extent determined by the
internal struggles on the peninsula.
On China’s northwestern frontier was the Tuyuhun kingdom in
modem Qinghai. Tibet, immediately to the west of China, rose to be a
powerfiil rival in the early seventh century. Especially from the 750’s on
wards, it challenged the Chinese empire as no power from that quarter had
ever done before or was ever to do again. In the Western Regions, the oa
sis states were a bone of contention between the Turks, China and Tibet.
From the eighth century on, the Arab empire expanded to become one
more contender for control of Central Asia, exerting its impact on the po
litical situation in the region. Later in the same century the Nanzhao king
dom in the southwest evolved into a buffer state between Tang and Tibet,
further complicating the frontier situation.
These states all had particular ways of life, partly determined by
geography and natural resources. These ranged from nearly pure no
madism, to mixtures in various proportions of nomadism and agriculture,
and nearly pure reliance on agriculture, which determined, to a large ex
tent, their economic and political needs vis-a-vis China. Each presented a
unique case which had to be taken into account in the formation of China’s
policies towards them.
Beyond those regimes in direct contact with China, other countries,
ranging from Japan to Southeast Asia, India, and West Asia enlarged their
commercial and cultural contacts with China as compared with earlier
times. Interactions between China and these coimtries through diplomatic
envoys, merchants, and travelers with religious or cultural purposes gave
China under the Tang its most cosmopolitan flavor in all of premodem
history. Significant state to state relationships with such countries were,
however, few and will not often be referred to in this book. It is well
known that foreign trade flourished imder Tang and the government
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worked out a set of policies and regulations regarding foreign trade and
merchants. It is problematic to what extent either foreign or Chinese mer
chants engaged in foreign trade observed these rules, but that is more a
matter for economic historians than historians of diplomacy. It deserves
study in depth by the former, and will not be dealt with in this book.
Regardless of historical and geographical context, rulers of differ
ent types of political units, whether tribes, city-states, empires, or modem
nations, have had fundamentally the same objectives in dealing with their
neighbors—^ranging from their own security to expansion against their
neighbors—and have defended their interests by similar techniques, main
ly the use of force and the constmction of alliances.^ Traditional China
was no exception. There was, however, a whole set of particular theories
and practices developed during China’s long history of foreign contacts,
which may be analyzed under two major headings: ideological purity, and
practicality and flexibility. Any understanding of the foreign policy of im
perial China must take these into account.
In exploring Sui-Tang foreign relations, we shall seek to illustrate
the interplay of the twin aspects of ideological purity and practicality in
reaching and implementing foreign policy decisions. We shall try to de
termine when and how these principles clashed with or were reconciled
with each other, how they provided justifications for and theoretical sup
port to decisions, and how both affected the decision-making process at
moments of Chinese strength and weakness. Both aspects must be taken
into account to fully explain Chinese foreign policy.
Ideological purity refers to the traditional, ideal pattern that, from
the Chinese point of view, should govern relationships between China and
other states. It was based on a cosmological view of the state that emerged
from, and evolved in, the particular environment of China and posited a
hierarchical and fundamentally sinocentric order to the Chinese known
world. It emphasized the all-embracing mle of the Chinese emperor, the
Son of Heaven, who was supposedly the only legitimate ruler of, not only
China, but All-rmder-Heaven. This pattern was embodied in the ceremon
ial rituals used imder the tribute system. Such an ideology imposed politi
cal pressures on the Chinese rulers not only to maintain security on the
frontiers but also to exert their influence over the areas beyond the fron
tiers.

' Holsti 1983, p. 4.
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By practicality and flexibility is meant a basic pragmatism which
provided China’s imperial rulers justification, for ignoring or bypassing
considerations of ideological purity and conducting foreign relations on an
equal footing with their neighbors. It allowed for acceptance of the need to
retreat from the claims of Chinese superiority, and even permitted pay
ment of tribute to “barbarians.” Such measures could be carried out as
long as they were seen to be entirely motivated by concern for China’s
own security and stability.
More specifically, we shall examine to what extent Sui-Tang for
eign policies were unique as well as consistent with those of other periods
in traditional China’s history. We will ask what specific policies China
adopted in each situation as it arose? What were the motives and objec
tives, the strengths and weaknesses, and what were both the intended and
unintended effects of these policies?
In discussing the process of making of foreign policy, we will need
to address the following questions: How were decisions arrived at? To
what extent did the Chinese have the initiative? How did China’s internal
situation in successive periods influence foreign policy-making? What was
the relationship between the frontier defense system and foreign policy?
How and to what extent was foreign policy influenced by domestic politi
cal issues and economic pressures?
In terms of the external setting, what were the strategic interests of
Eind issues motivating foreign countries that influenced their relations with
China? How did the domestic situation in each foreign state influence its
decision-makers and hence its relations with China and other countries?
How did these foreign initiatives in turn influence China’s actions towards
these countries? Under what circumstances did China try to take the ini
tiative in international politics; under what circumstances did it simply re
spond to other countries’ actions and objectives?
Finally, we need to examine the roles and relative importance of
the various participants in decision-making. These included the emperor,
his chief ministers, certain influential eunuchs, civil and military officials
at the central and local levels, non-Chinese officials, and Chinese imperial
princesses who had been sent off to marry foreign rulers. How did the of
ten clashing, sometimes synergizing ambitions, personalities, values and
vmderstanding and assessment of reality of this congeries of officials of
various factions and their clients influence foreign policy decision
making?
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Sources
The principal primary sources for Sui and Tang history are, first of
all, the standard histories, namely the Suishu and the two Tang histories,
the Jiu Tangshu and the Xin Tangshu. Other basic works that have been
used in this study are listed below in chronological order.
The Da Tang Chuangye Qijuzhu {Diary of the Founding of the
Great Tang Dynasty), an imofficial court journal of Gaozu, compiled by
Wen Daya covering the period from 617 to 626. As a chronological re
sume of events concerning Li Yuan and his founding of the Tang dynasty
from 615 up to the assumption of the throne by the new emperor, the book
may be regarded as the first historical record of Tang.
The Zhenguan Zhengyao {Important Principles of Government
from the Zhenguan Period), a collection of Tang Taizong’s discussions
with his ministers, the memorials and suggestions from the ministers, and
administrative measures of the period, collected and edited by Wu Jing.
The book was completed around 720.'^ It was later translated into the
Khitan, Tangut, Jurchen, Mongolian and Manchu languages as a guide for
the government, and was appreciated by all subsequent non-Han conquer
ors of China from Liao to Qing.®
The Wenguan Cilin, a collection of edicts and memorials com
pleted in 658, edited by Xu Jingzong and others, is in a thousand chapters. It is lost, but some parts are collected in a Japanese edition.
The Tang Liudian, in thirty chapters, completed in 738 and pre
sented to the throne by Chief Minister Li Linfu in 739.^ It is an important
work on government institutions and contains materials on such agencies
as the Court of State Ceremonials {honglu si ) and on administration and

^ The primary sources for Tang are analyzed in a thorough and comprehensive way in the
introduction to Robert des Rotours 1932, with additional material in his 1947 work. See
also Twitchett 1992, who describes in detail the development of official historiography
during Tang. He also provides a valuable analysis of the sources for the Basic Annals and
the Monographs of the Jiu Tangshu. He does not discuss the sources of information for
the chapters on foreign countries, for which see Chapter 2 below.
^ For a detailed study of the book, see Bingham 1937, pp. 568-74; Twitchett 1992, pp.
38-42, with references to earlier literature.
“ZGZT1978, pp. 1-2.
^ Franke and Twitchett 1994, p. 33.
* Twitchett 1992, p. 98.
’ Twitchett 1992, pp. 101-3.
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taxation in the subordinated area commands and prefectures {jimi fuzhou )
imder the Ministry of Revenue.
The Tongdian, compiled by Du You from 766 to 801. An institu
tional history, it continued and enlarged the Zhengdian of Liu Zhi.® The
Tang sections in the chapters on foreign countries were presumably taken
from materials compiled in the Bureau of Historiography. It has the fiillest
account of the negotiation between Tang official Guo Yuanzhen and Ti
betan general Mgar Khri ‘bring during Empress Wu’s time.® Du You also
incorporated many materials from other sources, including a book written
by his nephew, Du Huan, who was taken captive in the famous battle at
the Talas River between Tang and the Arabs in 751 and did not return to
Tang until ten years later.
The Tang Huiyao, compiled by Wang Pu and presented to the
throne in 961 at the beginning of Song. An administrative encyclopedia, it
combines the Huiyao of Su Mian, presented to the throne in 804, and the
Xu Huiyao of Yang Shaofu, presented in 853, with the addition of a very
small amount of material for the period after 852.^^ It has the most com
plete record of the discussions held early in Taizong’s reign concerning
the resettlement of those Turks who had submitted to Tang rule.^^
The Cefu Yuangui, compiled by Wang Qinruo, Yang Yi and others
during Song under an imperial commission from 1005 to 1013. It is an
historical encyclopedia. The material concerning the Tang period was
from the veritable records and Tang histories. Therefore, it contains
more original sources than the Jiu Tangshu and the Xin Tangshu and more
complete versions of documents abridged in other sources. With its or
ganization of a variety of material imder different topics, such as the sec
tion on foreign vassals {yvaichen bu), the Cefu Yuangui is particularly use
ful for study of foreign relations. It records tributary missions from foreign
countries which other histories have chosen not to mention. One example
deals with the Turks. According to the Cefu Yuangui, during Tang
Gaozu’s reign, the Turks sent tributary missions to the Tang court almost
every year. In the basic annals of Gaozu and the accounts of the Turks in

* Li Zongye 1982, pp. 307-9; Twitchett 1992, pp. 104-7.
’ TD 190, pp. 1023-4.
'°rD 191, p. 1029; 192, p. 1034.
" Twitchett 1956, p. 51; 1992, pp. 109-16.
77fT73, pp. 1312-4.
Liu Naihe 1983, pp. 1-28; Twitchett 1992, pp. 117-8.
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the Jiu Tangshu and Xin Tangshu, on the other hand, it is reported that the
Turks made incursions across the Tang frontier almost every year, but rec
ords about the Turkish tributary missions are not complete. Some of the
Turkish missions might have just come to the Chinese court to deliver
messages, but the fact that they were still recorded as tributary missions
implies that the foreigners had to conform to the rituals of the tribute sys
tem laid down by the Chinese in order to be received at the Chinese court
at all.
The Tang Da Zhaoling Ji was compiled by Song Minqiu, whose
preface is dated 1070.^^ Some passages from the edicts included in the
collection are referred to in the two Tang official histories and in the Zizhi
Tongjian. The work is useful for studying the format and rhetoric of Tang
documents.
The Zizhi Tongjian, compiled by a group of Song historians with
Sima Guang as the chief editor from 1065 to 1084. When compiling the
Tang section (chapters 185 to 265), Sima Guang consulted all the materi
als available at the time, including the histories mentioned above and also
a great many other works. It is well recognized that the Zizhi Tongjian is
superior to all other histories of the Tang period in terms of the amount of
material consulted, analysis of original sources and clarity of expression.
The Zizhi Tongjian Kaoyi is a series of notes made by Sima Guang
while editing his history which frequently quotes from books that are now
lost and provides clues as to the sources for information in his history. The
Kaoyi consults many works which touch on Tang foreign relations, most
of which are no longer extant. For instance, it uses the Fenyangwang Jiazhuan {Family Biography of the Prince of Fenyang) (= Guogong Jiazhuan,
or Family Biography of Lord Guo), in eight chapters, a family biography
of Guo Ziyi (696-781) by Chen Hong, a long-time staff officer under Guo.
Guo Ziyi was a very important high-ranking military official involved in
many battles in alliance with the Uighurs during the campaign to suppress
the An Lushan rebellion and also participated in wars against the Tibetans.
The Kaoyi often refers to this work for its eye-witness accounts. This
work contained the only information for one episode involving the
Uighurs, and was used by the Tongjian}^ Unfortunately the work no
longer exists.

Twitchett 1992, p. 100.
'^ZZT/225, p. 7236.
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Also used by the Kaoyi is Yehou Jiazhuan {Family Biography of
the Marquis of Ye\ in ten chapters. It is a family biography of the Chief
Minister Li Mi (722-789), by his son Li Fan. Although the work contains
much unreliable information, since Li Fan intentionally glorified his father, in some matters dealing with the Uighurs and Tibet, the Kaoyi re
fers to the work as an additional contemporary record. It is also an impor
tant source for the study of the militia (fubing) system. The work does
not exist integrally, but its fragments are included in the Shuofu and other
collective works.
The Beihuang Junzhang Lu {Record of Chieftains of the Northern
Wilderness), in three chapters, also written by Li Fan, is referred to by the
Kaoyi in one or two places. The work is lost, but from the title, one can see
that it was an historical record concerning the non-Chinese chieftains to
the north of Tang.
Also referred to by the Kaoyi is the Duan Xiushi Biezhuan (=
Duangong Jiazhuan, or Separate Biography of Lord Duan), in two chap
ters, a family biography of Duan Xiushi (718-783), compiled in the Bu
reau of Historiography by Ma Yu, who was the Vice Director of the Im
perial Library during the Yuanhe period (806-819). Duan Xiushi was also
a high-ranking military official who was involved in frontier affairs, par
ticularly those involving the Tibetans. It is another case where the family
biography provided additional information. The work no longer exists.
The Tang Tongji, compiled by Chen Yue, was a chronological ac
count of Chinese history from the beginning of Tang until 823, in one
hundred chapters. But by Song there were only forty chapters left, the
work ending at the time of Empress Wu. The Kaoyi refers to this work
often. For one incident involving Tibet, it was the only source and the
Tongjian incorporates all the information it provides. Since the work is
no longer extant and not much information can be found about the writer,
we are unable to tell more about it.
The Bu Guoshi, in six or ten chapters, was compiled by Lin Eh,
who was a presented scholar {jinshi) of the time of Xizong (874-888). The
work no longer exists, but at the time when the Zizhi Tongjian was com,'*ZZrJ 231, p. 1456, JunzhaiDushuzhi 9; Mackerras 1972, p. 3; p. 156, note 159.
” Pulleyblank 1955, p. 142, note 9; Lai 1986, pp. 4-5. For more on this work, see Dien
1974.
’* Zhizhai Shulu Jieti 4.
”ZZry 205, p.6493.
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piled, it was an important source for the later part of the Tang dynasty for
which few other materials were available. It had detailed accounts of
events concerning Tibet at the end of the first Tibetan kingdom. For one
event involving Tibet, it provided the sole source and the Tongjian fol
lowed it.^°
Collected works of such Tang officials as Zhang Jiuling, Lu Zhi ,
Bai Juyi, and Li Deyu comprise another category of sources. These works
typically contain the full texts of official letters to foreign rulers on behalf
of the emperors, and memorials on foreign policy written by their sub•

*

jects.
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The writings of such officials are also included in the Quart Tangwen {Complete Tang Essays), compiled during the Qing dynasty. It is a
useful supplementary source for imperial edicts, official letters, and essays
of the Tang dynasty usually provided in more complete form than the ex
tracts quoted in the Tang histories.
In the Quan Tangshi {Complete Tang Poetry), compiled during the
Qing dynasty, are many poems lamenting the hardships of frontier sol
diers, foreign invasions and some poems commenting on Tang’s marriage
alliance policy.
There is a considerable amount of material on Tang history among
the documents discovered in Dunhuang and Turfan. I have found, how
ever, that they do not have much relevance for high level foreign affairs,
so they are not referred to in the book.
The biases in the Chinese accounts of foreign countries are obvious.^^ It was assumed that Chinese culture was superior, and therefore all
non-Chinese are referred to as “barbarians” who have to be transformed by
Chinese civilization. Nomadic peoples are constantly described as having
human faces but animal hearts, as being greedy and unrestrained in their
behavior, incapable of understanding reason—as “monkeys wearing hats,”
or “dwarf-slaves.”
Based on the idea that the Chinese Son of Heaven was to rule Allunder-Heaven, all foreign states were treated as tributary to China. Their
contacts with China were routinely recorded as journeys to pay homage

“ ZZTJ246, p. 7938.
For Zhang Jiuling and his works, see Herbert 1978; for Lu Zhi, see Chiu-Duke 1992;
for Bai Juyi and his letters to Tibetan leaders, see Kolmas 1966; for Li Deyu, see
Drompp 1986.
See examples in Mackerras 1972, p. 5; Eberhard 1982, pp. 100-4.
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and tribute to the Chinese Son of Heaven, using the rhetoric and vocabu
lary of the tribute system, and their envoys were made to conform to the
rituals required by the tribute system.
Feelings of cultural superiority and their sinocentric viewpoint of
ten hindered Chinese from understanding their neighbors and helped to
perpetuate misconceptions about and feelings of hostility toward them.
Inevitably the Chinese looked at the outside world from a Chinese point of
view. Historians usually recorded only those peoples that had direct con
tact with China and events that affected China’s foreign relations in vari
ous ways without giving due attention to record what was important to
these peoples themselves. They also showed bias in the way they justified
Chinese aggressions as defensive actions or as proper extensions of the
23
influence of the Chinese Son of Heaven.
One can never expect historians, who must necessarily select and
omit, to give a complete and objective accovmt of everything that hap
pened. It must, however, also be pointed out that in their attitudes towards
their neighbors, especially the nomads, the traditional Chinese were not
unique; nor were they worse than other peoples.^^ Furthermore, the tradi
tions established by the ancient models that they followed guaranteed a
considerable degree of objectivity and reliability to Chinese historical
writing. Histories were not freely created compositions by individual
authors, but were compiled primarily by copying and excerpting earlier
works, mainly official documents, with any comments by the historian
added separately from the main texts.^® While this “scissors and paste”
method had its own dangers and limitations, it did have the effect of
minimizing distortions created by hindsight after the event. Being origin
ally composed for practical purposes, these documents could not afford to
be too much distorted by ideological considerations. More will be said in
Chapter 2 about the ways in which the information about foreign countries
that eventually found its way into the official histories was gathered.
Nor did Confucian historians always, or typically, uncritically ac
cept Chinese aggression against foreign peoples. They often openly con
demned aggressive wars, which caused suffering to the people. Han dy
nasty records speak highly of the civilized people of Da Qin (presumably
^^Eberhard 1982, p. 116.
See examples of comments on nomads in western sources in Sinor 1990a, pp. 4-5; pp.
17-8.
“ Gardner 1938; Yang Lien-sheng 1961; Twitchett 1961; 1992; Wang Gungwu 1973.

Introduction

13

the eastern Roman empire) and these records constitute a fuller account
than any Roman or Greek account of China.^®
Nor do Confucian accoxmts hide the fact that at various times
China had to recognize neighboring peoples as equals. The Chinese ac
counts are full of episodes of tension between ideological purity and
pragmatism in foreign relations. It is wrong to say the Chinese “did not try
to understand the culture, attitudes, and beliefs of their neighbors.”^® As
Chapter 2 notes, the Chinese were interested in collecting information on
foreign countries, both for the practical and important purpose of decision
making, and out of curiosity and desire for knowledge. Subjects dealt 'with
in accovmts of foreign coimtries range from climate, geographical condi
tions and products, to social customs, defining the family, marriage and
women’s status, narratives of religious practices, political organization,
legends and traditions, and the history of a people’s contacts with China.
The Chinese official histories and numerous other historical records, in
spite of their biases and shortcomings, are invaluable not only for the his
tory of China’s foreign relations but also for the histories of China’s
neighboring peoples.
Though much less complete and comprehensive than the material
in Chinese sources, there exist important historical documents from some
of China’s neighbors that corroborate, contradict or supplement the Chi
nese historical record of relations with foreign states during Sui and Tang.
Sources of this type listed below provide a non-Chinese perspective which
cannot be neglected.
1. Old Turkish inscriptions of the eighth century. In his Tujue Jishi,
Cen Zhongmian provides armotated Chinese translations of the three most
important of these, the Tonyukuk, Kill Tigin and Bilga inscriptions. I have
also used Talat Tekin, A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic, which has an Eng
lish translation 'without aimotation of these three inscriptions and two other
inscriptions, those of Ongin and Kiili Chor. These inscriptions show the
Turkish perspectives on their history and relations vvdth China while also
reflecting the influence of the Chinese cosmic order on the Turks.^^ Mori
Masao has a study on the language and phrases of the Turkish inscriptions
and their implications. Lin Enxian has a survey of the discovery and back“ Fitzgerald 1964, p. 8; Yang Lien-sheng 1968, p. 20.
Yang Lien-sheng 1968, p. 20.
“Eberhard 1982, p. 101.
See for example, Bazin 1963.
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ground of five Old Turkish inscriptions including those from the Tujue
Turks and the Uighurs?°
2. Of Korean traditional histories in Chinese, the one most relevant
to my study is the Samguk Sagi (The Historical Record of the Three King
doms'), which was compiled in the twelfth century by Kim Pu-sik, and
covers the period from the beginning of the three kingdoms to the fall of
unified Silla in 938. While Kim drew a large amount of material from
Chinese sources he also used quite a few native records, especially in the
biographies section.^ ^ The Samguk Yusa compiled by fryon towards the
end of the thirteenth century is also an important history but it does not
have an immediate bearing on my study and it includes more myth and
other less believable tales than does the Samguk Sagi.
3. Inscriptions of the Uighurs. The Shine-usu inscription in Old
Turkish script gives an account of Moyanchuo Qaghan (reign 747-759). It
has been translated into Chinese, with annotations by Wang Jingru.^^ The
other important inscription was found in Karabalghasim. It has three parts,
one in Chinese, one in Sogdian and one in Old Turkish, and was written in
the ninth century. The Chinese part is best preserved. In my book I use the
annotated text in Haneda Tom’s comprehensive study of the Uighurs dur
ing Tang.^^
4. The major sources in Tibetan for the Tufan period (early seventh
to mid-ninth century) are in three forms: inscriptions, manuscripts, and
wooden tablets.^'* Such Tibetan documents were collected in three vol
umes by F. W. Thomas.^^ Those that are the most important to my study
of Tang-Tibetan relations, especially the study of the treaties concluded by
the two sides, are the 821/822 inscription in Tibetan and Chinese scripts,
and the Old Tibetan Annals and the Old Tibetan Chronicle found at Dunhuang. For the inscription, I use mainly the translations and annotations by
H. E. Richardson in Ancient Historical edicts at Lhasa and the Mu
Tsung/Khri Gtsug Lde Brtsan Treaty of A. D. 821-822, from the Inscrip
tion at Lhasa, the translation by Li Fang-kuei in “The inscription of the
Sino-Tibetan treaty of 821-822,” and the version in Wang Yao’s Tufan
Jinshi Lu. The works of Richardson and Wang Yao also discuss another
Mori Masao 1978, pp. 208-53; Lin Enxian 1988, pp. 314-30.
Jamieson 1969, pp. 5-17; Gardiner 1970.
Wang Jingru 1938.
” Haneda 1957.
For a summary of these sources see Wang Yao 1982, pp. 2-7; Lin Guanqun 1985.
” Thomas 1935, 1951 and 1955.
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important document, the “Ngan Lam Stag Sgra Klu Khong inscription.”
Wang Yao’s book is a study of all thirteen Tibetan inscriptions of the Tufan period still extant. He also has Chinese translations of the two Tibetan
historical works,^^ and a study of the wooden tablets of the Tufan period
37
discovered m Xinjiang.
These sources provide a non-Chinese perspective which one carmot
afford to neglect. A good example is found in the Turkish inscriptions. In
mid-seventh century the Turks were incorporated into the Chinese area
command-prefecture system. In contrast to the Chinese attitude which
treated this as a triumph for Taizong as the Heavenly Qaghan, this period
was considered retrospectively by the Turks as a time of national subjuga
tion and humiliation. The Turkish inscriptions record:
Their sons worthy of becoming lords became slaves, and their
daughters worthy of becoming ladies became servants to the Chi
nese people. The Turkish lords abandoned their Turkish titles.
Those lords who were in China held the Chinese titles and obeyed
the Chinese emperor and gave their services to him for fifty years. 38

Another example is found in the Korean history the Samguk Sagi,
in which Kim Pu-sik commented that according to Liu Gongquan (772?860?), Taizong twice showed his tremendous fear of Koguryo’s force
during battles occurring in 645. However neither the Jiu Tangshu, nor the
Xin Tangshu or the Zizhi Tongjian mention this, j^erhaps in accordance
with the traditional practice of proper concealment.^^ The Korean histories
record many more details of the internal relations among the three Korean
states. Similarly, while the Chinese paid special attention to the treaties
with Tibet, the Old Tibetan Annals and the Old Tibetan Chronicle make
no mention of these treaties, and yet contain detailed records of treaties
concluded among themselves. Such discrepancies are not difficult to un
derstand: these non-Chinese peoples had their own internal set of prob
lems; their alliances and rivals were often more immediate and important
concerns than their relations with the distant Chinese court.

Wang Yao 1979.
Wang Yao 1982; Wang Yao and Chen Jian 1986.
“The Kill Tigin Inscription.” See Tekin 1968, translation, p. 264.
SGSG 22, King Pojang 8. I cannot find any information about Liu Gongquan’s book.
The monographs of bibliographies in the JTS and ATS do not list Liu’s book.
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A comparative study of the non-Chinese sources shows that for
eign records generally corroborate but sometimes supplement the Chinese
sources. For example, the Samguk Sagi says that upon the conquest of
Paekche in 660 the Chinese planned to invade Silla, which had been an
ally of China.‘*° This Korean work also contains a letter written by the king
of Silla to the Chinese in 671, which states that in 648 Taizong had prom
ised that when Tang had subdued Koguryo and Paekche, the territory
south of P’yongyang and the land of Paekche would be given to Silla.^'
The Chinese sources nowhere refer to these matters. Whether the Korean
sources are reliable is unclear.
The numerous traditional sources are bound to contain discrepan
cies and contradictions. Both traditional and modem scholars have paid
particular attention to this question. Sima Guang’s Kaoyi was an important
irmovation in this respect, and this tradition matured during the Qing per
iod, when three Qing scholars Wang Mingsheng, Qian Daxin and Zhao Yi
made detailed texhoal studies and antilyses of the Tang histories.^^
In modem times, the Tang historical works have been given close
attention by scholars in both east and west. For Sui-Tang foreign relations,
Edouard Chavannes’ Documents sur les Tou-Kiue [Turcs] Occidentaux
and Cen Zhongmian’s Xi Tujue Shiliao Buque ji Kaozheng and Tujue
Jishi are comprehensive in their collections of materials and have detailed
annotations. On Korea, the Chosen shi, by Japanese scholars, is a collec
tion of highlights from all available materials in Chinese, Korean and
Japanese traditional sources arranged in chronological order. The editor
notes discrepancies when they occur but does not go into a detailed dis
cussion of them.
There has not been a comprehensive collection of traditional
sources on the Uighurs but important works with emphasis on annotation
are: Haneda Torn, “Todai kaikotsushi no kenkyu”; Colin Mackerras, The
Uighur Empire, and Feng Jiasheng and others, Weiwuerzu Shiliao Jian. bian. On the Western Regions, Ise Sentaro’s Chugoku Seiiki Keieishi
Kenkyu is comprehensive and critical in its treatment of primary sources.
Materials about the relations between Tang and Tibet are more
abimdant in both the Chinese and Tibetan languages than are materials
SGSG 42, “Biography of Kim Yusin, Part II.”
SGSG 7, pp. 1-7; Jamieson 1969, pp. 15-6; pp. 63-6.
Shiqishi Shangque by Wang Mingsheng; Nianershi Kaoyi by Qian Daxin; Nianershi
Zhaji by Zhao Yi.
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about the above-mentioned peoples. Several collections of Chinese
sources in official histories, Zizhi Tongjian and Cefu Yuangui are avail
able.'*^ In his Kodai Chibetto shi Kenkyu, Sato Hisashi provides a detailed
study of primary sources in both Chinese and Tibetan concerning the Tang
period. The Xin Tangshu Tufanzhuan Jianzheng by Wang Zhong is an an
notated work with references to Tibetan and other Chinese sources. Yamaguchi Zuiho in his Toban Okoku Seiritsu shi no Kenkyu has carried
further the study of the sources about the history of early Tibet, and
Beckwith in his The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia refers to sources in
Tibetan, Arabic, Old Turkish, and Chinese. While these works are referred
to in my book, I also use other modem works and note the important dis
crepancies in sources wherever necessary.

Chen Xiezhang and others 1982; Su Jinren 1982; Su Jinren and Xiao Lianzi 1981.

Chapter 1
Background: Chinese Foreign Policy before the Sui Period:
Theory and Practice
In this chapter we examine the rich traditions of foreign policy
making inherited from their predecessors by the Sui-Tang rulers. First we
look back to the distant past when Chinese civilization first took shape in
the Yellow River basin of North China. In contrast to the variety of com
peting literate civilizations that came into existence in Western Asia and
neighboring regions of Europe and North Africa during the bronze age, the
Chinese enjoyed a monopoly of literacy in East Asia until well into the
present era and, however much they may have derived indirectly from
cultures farther west before the Qin unification in 221 B.C.E.—^the first
hints of the use of metal, the cultivation of wheat and barley in addition to
millet and rice, the horse-drawn chariot—^they were not consciously aware
of the existence of organized states in other parts of the world.
It was natural, therefore, for them to assmne that they occupied the
center of the world and that they were surroimded by less favored
“barbarian” peoples. Out of this developed the traditional sinocentric
world view of orthodox Confucian thinking, which became the official
ideology of the Chinese state down to the twentieth century. This ideology
was embodied in the tribute system during Han, but by then, as we shall
see, more realistic and pragmatic competing views towards non-Chinese
peoples had also emerged—anti-sinocentric theories, realistic estimates of
China’s limitations, and exclusionary, inward-looking attitudes. More pro
found challenges to the concept of a sinocentric world order and more so
phisticated reinterpretations of this concept arose when non-Chinese dy
nasties emerged in North China during post-Han times. These contributed
an equally sophisticated but non-Chinese component to the legacy inher
ited by the Sui-Tang rulers from the Period of Disunion. We also discuss
the evolution since Han of the various non-Chinese peoples surroimding
China, presenting Sui and Tang with new as well as old problems.
Finally we survey some general policy measures the Chinese
evolved for dealing with their neighbors: aggressive military action.

Chinese Foreign Policy Before Sui: Theory and Practice

19

strengthening of frontier defenses, forming of alliances, appeasement, and
incorporation and assimilation. These had all been tried by previous Chi
nese rulers, and so were available for use by the Sui-Tang policy-makers
in their new context.
Formation and Implications of the Myth of the Chinese World Order
The hierarchical principle of the Mandate of Heaven was devised
by the early Zhou rulers to justify their conquest of Shang at the end of the
second millennium B.C.E. It called for the universal rule of the Son of
Heaven over All-under-Heaven (tianxia). “The king leaves nothing and
nobody outside his realm” (wangzhe wuwai). This universal power was
matched by the ruler’s responsibility for the welfare of the people.
Based on their aheady existing clan structure, the Zhou established
a system called fengjian in Chinese and sometimes translated into English
as “feudal,” but perhaps better (or also) described as patrimonial. The most
reliable of these so-called feudal lords (zhuhou) were established in stra2
tegic places, especially on the periphery as “a fence and screen for Zhou.”
These feudal lords were linked by blood or marriage to the Zhou house.
They had the obligation to carry out military activities ordered by the
monarch, and to provide revenue as tribute to the king. Most important of
all, their presence throughout the Zhou realm was intended to display the
power of Zhou and to contribute to the stability of the Zhou authority.
To ensure order in the political system and the umty of the Zhou
house, a set of institutions, systems, stipulations, and ceremonial rules—
“the rules of propriety” (li)—were worked out. These rules served as the
foundation for the hierarchical structure of the Zhou realm, a structure
which governed the relations of the extended family and regulated the re
lations between ruler and nobles. Within this structure, everyone was to
act in accordance with the rules of propriety in proportion to his or her
position, so that harmony could be maintained.'^
During the Spring and Autumn period (722-481 B.C.E.) these
Zhou political institutions disintegrated as a result of the increasing power*

' Gongyangzhuan, p. 4, Yin 1/6; p. 35, Huan 8/6; p. 125, Xi 24/4; p. 232, Cheng 12/1.
^Zuozhuan (Xi 24), 189:; 192.
^ A detailed study of the feudal system is presented in Creel 1970, pp. 317-87. See also
Lee 1980, chapters 1-3.
* This ideal of harmony is stated in the Zuozhuan (Zhao 26), 715::718-719.
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of the feudal states on the one hand, and the decay in the political and
military might of the Zhou monarchy on the other.
Some modem scholars hold that during this time the Chinese feu
dal states were independent of the Zhou king and dealt with one another as
sovereign equals regardless of their size. Even treaties made with
“barbarians” outside the Zhou system were negotiated on a footing of
equality since the treaties allowed these “barbarians” to retain their inde
pendence.^ The actual situation, however, was much more complex. It is
trae that forms of interaction between states were effectively as if among
sovereign equals, equal in the sense that one state could not exert authority
over the others except by force. Nevertheless, the predominant attitude
was not egalitarian. The Chinese states still attempted to maintain the old
hierarchical order, with the Zhou king as the supreme mler. He was repre
sented or supported by the strongest of the feudal lords, who, as
“hegemon” {ba), assumed the power to assemble other feudal lords in a
“treaty league” or “covenant” (meng). The dominant-subordinate form of
relationship between the Zhou king and his feudal lords was still reflected
in such a covenant. Small states were to pay respect and to serve the larger
ones, who in turn would show benevolence to the smaller ones. The ba
acted for the king and was in charge of collecting tribute for the royal
house.®
By the time of the Warring States period (480-222 B.C.E.), as a re
sult of wars, cunning diplomacy, and continuous annexations, only seven
major powers survived. Relations among these great powers were more on
an equal basis. The small states had either been “swallowed up” by bigger
ones or become dependents of them. These seven powers struggled among
themselves for supremacy, each trying to conquer the whole of the Chi
nese world by force of arms.
With the further decline of the Zhou house it was no longer
deemed necessary to claim to be supporting the Son of Heaven. Rulers of
all seven states assumed the title of king, a title which had formerly be
longed solely to the Zhou Son of Heaven. This was a sign of the more
equal basis on which they dealt with each other. In 288 B.C.E. the kings of
the states of Qin and Qi even called themselves Emperor of the West and
Emperor of the East, respectively, attempting to divide China into two
spheres of power. They soon abandoned this plan, however, because the
^ Hong 1971, pp. 26-35; Walker 1953, p. 25.
* Zuozhuan (Xi 7), 148:: 149.
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time was not ripe for so revolutionary a step. Nevertheless there was even
a suggestion, some two years later, that the king of Yan be made Northern
Emperor, the king of Qin Western Emperor, and the king of Zhao Central
Emperor.^ Had such notions taken root, China might have gone the way of
Europe or India and remained permanently divided into a pluralistic world
of competing states. But China was eventually unified under the First Em
peror of Qin in 221 B.C.E. and the ideal of unity has dominated Chinese
political thinking fi-om that time onward.
In spite of the political disunity of the Warring States period, the
idea of the absolute superiority of the Son of Heaven and the idea that
stability could only be achieved through political unification of the Chi
nese people had become so deeply rooted that the concept of equality
among sovereign states simply could not find much acceptance. The Chi
nese clung to their belief in a hierarchical order for their world and fought
among themselves for supremacy.
The dominant schools of political thought, whether traditionalist
like the Confucians or iconoclastic like the Legalists, all aimed at provid
ing recipes for unifying China under a single ruler. The Confucians were
the most wholehearted in their insistence on the need to look back to the
founders of Zhou to provide a model for the ideal pattern of relationships
between the Son of Heaven and his subjects, both Chinese and nonChinese. In such works as the Yugong, the Guoyu, the Zhouli, and the
Xunzi, detailed rules and regulations, which had supposedly existed in the
early Zhou, were set out to adjust relations between the Son of Heaven and
his subjects, including the non-Chinese, in the framework of a system of
five or nine concentric zones, from the Son of Heaven in the middle,
through the various classes of feudal lords to the outer “barbarians.”
Inhabitants of each zone were to come and pay tribute to the king
at specific intervals in what was known as the tribute system which was to
regulate relations between the Zhou Son of Heaven and his dependencies.
The lords of the outermost “barrier kingdoms or beyond” (fanguo) were to
come once in a generation. The Zhouli or Rites of Zhou, an idealized re
construction of Zhou institutions probably dating from the Warring States
period, especially canonized the ideology of the Chinese world order and*
’Bodde 1938, p. 128.
* Shangshu, “Yugong,” p. 18, sections 33-9; Guoyu , “Zhouyu,” p. 2; Zhouli Zhushu 37,
pp. 1339-41; Xunzi Jijie, “Zhenglun,” pp. 219-20. Yu Ying-shih (1986, pp. 379-80) also
has a brief discussion of the zone-system.
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established the idea of a unified Chinese empire with the Chinese in the
center and the non-Chinese constituting a defense line around it. Ficti
tious as this reconstruction may have been, there did exist during early
Zhou times a tribute system 'with court visits and payment of tribute by
dependent states to the Zhou Son of Heaven. In particular, the concept of
universal kingship was an extremely potent myth, one providing both an
explanation of actual behavior and a rationale for later rulers to appeal to
in formulating their foreign policies. It was, for example, often used as a
justification for military conquest of non-Chinese for the sake of frontier
security and for territorial expansion and cultural imperialism.
While the idea that “the king leaves nothing and nobody outside
his realm” became one basic principle, there also developed an equally
prevalent principle: “having the various states of Xia within, and keeping
the Yi and Di barbarians without” {nei zhu-Xia er wai Yi-Di).
The Chinese world order was sinocentric in nature. At one level,
sinocentrism was based on racial differentiation. The Western Zhou had a
clear sense of community. They identified themselves ■with the Xia, a
people who, according to the Chinese tradition, established the first dynasty.^^ The Zhou people, though adopting the Shang culture, political
ideas and institutions, merged the Shang into a “new” larger grouping of
people who differentiated themselves from other peoples. The Zhou re
ferred to themselves and the Shang and their Xia predecessors as the Zhu
Xia, “all the Xia,” or Hua-Xia, a name that is still used for the Chinese
people today, and which distinguishes them from non-Chinese.
As for the non-Hua-Xia people or non-Chinese, the Chinese did
not have a single term for them. Instead several words were used, the most
frequent and general ones being Man, Yi, Rong, and Di. These nonChinese lived amongst, and in areas surrounding, the Chinese states and
frequently engaged in wars ■with the Chinese. The Chinese looked down
on them in the same way as the Hellenes looked down on the barbaroi.
The word “barbarian” is therefore often used in English works to translate
these terms for non-Chinese.
® For more information on the tribute system see Zhouli Zhiishu under the titles of Dazai,
Dazongbo, Dasima, Zhifangshi, Huaifangshi, Daxingren, Xiaoxingren and Xiangxu.
Lee 1980, chapter 4.
" Gongyangzhuan, p. 239, Cheng 15/12.
Creel 1970, p. 203.
Creel 1970, pp. 197-202.
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Sinocentrism was, however, based more on cultural than racial dif
ferences. The languages of non-Hua-Xia people were different from Chi
nese. Though most of these people were eventually sinicized, their rem
nants are still sizable even today, inhabiting, as minority ethnic groups
with their own languages, the upland regions of southern, southwestern
and western China. Differences between the Chinese and non-Chinese
also existed in material culture: clothing, food, style of hair, etc.
To the Chinese, such differences were not just a matter of external
appearances, but also revealed differences in the level of civilization. The
Liji records: “Where the statutory measures and the [fashion of] clothes
had been changed, it was held to be rebellion, and the disobedient ruler
was banished.”^® In 307 B.C.E., when the king of the State of Zhao de
cided to adopt the dress of the Hu, a nomadic non-Chinese people, so as to
facilitate horse-riding, he was strongly opposed by his uncle and other
members of his court. They insisted that for Chinese to adopt the clothing
of others would be tantamount to abandoning the old doctrine and the
Way, to going against the will of the people and the wisdom of the
learned, and to departing from the Central (that is, the Chinese) States.^®
The third cultural difference was defined by the Zhou rules of pro
priety. These were believed to serve as the imderpinnings of the institu
tions of the Chinese states, providing the basis for their social organization
and their behavioral norms. They were not followed by the non-Chinese
and, according to the traditional explanation, were not required of them
since they did not qualify as civilized people. During the Spring and
Autumn period, for example, the state of Chu referred to itself as Man-Yi
and called their ruler king, and the States of Wu and Yue also took the title
of king, which would have been unacceptable for one of the Zhou states.
To the Chinese their own culture represented a higher level of
civilization. One important non-racist idea that derived from this sense of
cultural superiority was that the non-Chinese could become Chinese by
accepting Chinese culture. In the course of the Spring and Autumn and
Warring States periods, the “barbarians” who had been interspersed among
the Chinese states were either ejected or gradually became sinicized, as

Pulleyblank 1983, pp. 411-2.
Liji “Wangzhi,” BK. Ill, p. 217, No. 15.
*^5743,pp. 1806-8.
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they accepted Chinese culture and the Zhou rules of propriety. The idea
that Chinese civilization could be extended to other peoples in this way
was passed on to later times and was applied as a justification for the cul
tural assimilation of still more remote non-Chinese.
But when hostilities with them prevailed, the Chinese called the
non-Chinese birds and beasts or wolves with human faces. They applied
the sinocentric principle to draw a boxmdary between themselves and the
“barbarians”. Already in early Zhou times the Chinese considered them
selves as occupying the Central States (or Middle Kingdom) at the center
of the world. In the Zuozhuan the Central States refer to the Chinese
states as opposed to “barbarian” realms.^® Any Chinese struggle against
invading “barbarians” was by definition a just war, a war to defend inter
nal order.
After the steppe frontier was reached and the Chinese were con
fronted by the new menace of the steppe nomads, an attempt was made to
establish an actual physical bovmdary to separate what was China and what
was not. During the fourth and third centuries B.C.E., the states of Qin,
Zhao and Yan built walls against the Hu nomadic “barbarians,” and these
were partially linked and extended by the Qin dynasty after its unification.^°
The Tribute System During the Han Dynasty
After the unification by Qin, the First Emperor lost no time in ex
panding his territory by a series of military campaigns. Through his suc
cess in driving the northern nomads, the Xiongnu, beyond the Ordos Bend
of the Yellow River, and in bringing the southern and southwestern border
areas under Chinese control, it seemed that the rule of the Son of Heaven
was indeed extended to All-under-Heaven. The Chinese rulers were not,
however, able to impose the tribute system immediately as a result of this
success.

’’ For a discussion on the origin of the myth of Chinese superiority, see Wang Gungwu
1968, pp. 36-8.
In the bronze inscription dated the fifth year of King Cheng of the Zhou dynasty (ca.
1020 B.C.E.) the word “Middle Kingdoms” or “Central States” (Zhongguo) is first found
referring to the royal domain, see Tang Lan 1976, p. 60.
The word “Middle Land” or “Middle Plain” (Zhongyuan) is also used in the Zuozhuan
to refer to the Zhou realm. See Zwoz/iMan (Xi 23), 185:;187.
YQ Ying-shih 1990, p. 118; Waldron 1990, pp. 13-4.
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The total collapse of the Qin empire in 207 B.C.E. threw China
into disunity and civil wars. It was only more than half a century later that
under Emperor Wu (r. 140-87 B.C.E.) of the Han dynasty (206 B.C.E.-220
C.E.) a reunified China could resume the offensive against the nomadic
Xiongnu, and once again expand into the southwestern and southern fron
tier regions, as well as for the first time into the Korean peninsula to the
northeast.
Through the famous exploration of Central Asia by Zhang Qian
early in Emperor Wu’s reign, Chinese contacts with other countries were
greatly enlarged. Knowledge of foreign lands, gained via the transconti
nental Silk Road to the northwest and then via the maritime trade route to
the south, broadened the Chinese view of the world, but this broadening of
horizons did not alter the belief that China was the center to which other
peoples should come, and that Chinese civilization was superior to all oth
ers.

The expansion resulted, rather, in an extension of Chinese political
and cultural influence and in the development of the tribute system, which
helped consolidate the Chinese belief in the inevitability of their ideal
world order. It also contributed to the weakening of the Xiongnu. In 51
B.C.E , after the Xiongnu empire was split into rival Southern and North
ern states, the ruler of the Southern Xiongnu arrived at the Han court, and
accepted tributary status.
Based on this framework and on a whole set of rhetorical proposi
tions and vocabulary formed in pre-Qin times, the tribute system was fully
developed in the Han dynasty. States along the Silk Road as far distant as
India or Parthia are recorded as having despatched tribute-bearing envoys
to the Han court. Practices vmder the tribute system as they pertained to
Chinese relations with non-Chinese were as follows;
1) Rulers of non-Chinese states or their envoys came to the Han
court to pay homage.
2) They presented symbolic tribute in the form of local products.
3) The Chinese emperor gave them imperial gifts in return.
4) The emperor conferred on the foreign rulers titles of nobility and
bestowed seals on them and sometimes on their officials.
5) The foreign rulers sent their sons to China as hostages in return
for Chinese protection against outside aggression.
6) The foreign rulers offered military service to the Chinese in re
turn for Chinese goods.
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The essential part of the practice consisted of items 1, 2, and 3. Any state,
so long as it sent missions with gifts to the court, was recorded as a tribu
tary. The tribute system thus developed into a network embracing all for
eign states which paid official visits to Han.
To the Chinese rulers, the tribute system structured an ideal pattern
for their relations with other peoples. It was, however, not a rigid pattern.
Since the “acceptance of imperial rule” involved not only different levels
of “acceptance,” but also different categories of “rule,” which varied from
one group of people to another, different practices were applied to coun
tries according to their distance from China and their relative importance
in Chinese frontier considerations. All six practices under the tribute sys
tem were applied to the Southern Xiongnu and some oasis states in the
Western Regions during Han. Just the first two or three requirements were
21
applied to Japan.
The tribute system, which regulated Chinese relations with nonChinese, was an extension of the hierarchical system existing within China
itself. During Han, princes and nobles were given feudal titles as rulers of
their own regional and local states labeled as quasi-fiefs by the Son of
Heaven. Ceremonial rituals and various laws were imposed to control
these supposed vassals. They were to come to court regularly to pay hornage and tribute.
Han commanderies administered directly by officials
appointed by the central government were also expected to present tribute
23
to the court in addition to regular taxes.
Compared with the tribute system as it operated with foreign
countries, however, there was a distinct difference. Failure of the Chinese
local states or commanderies to present tribute, or failure to pay court vis
its at regular intervals implied an act of disobedience. In contrast, for the
non-Chinese who were outer subjects, tribute was not compulsory. Though
the absence of tribute payment could be, and was, used as a justification
for Chinese aggression against non-Chinese peoples, the Han court would
not feel obliged to launch a punitive attack if tribute was not regularly
forthcoming. This policy towards non-Chinese tributaries was based on
the maxim of “not interfering in the administration of those who had not
been influenced by the rules of proper conduct.” This policy was shaped
Yu Ying-shih 1967, p. 189. For a detailed examination of these practices, see Pan Yihong 1991, pp. 205-11.
Zhang Weihua 1980, pp. 185-244.
“ HS IB, p. 70; HHS IB, pp. 60-1.
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specifically as a response to the Xiongnu on the eve of the arrival at court
of the Southern Xiongnu ruler, Huhanye Chanyu,^^ but it became a general
policy towards all non-Chinese during the Han period.
Non-Chinese had their own motives for establishing relations with
China, even if this implied an inferior status. Through receiving official
titles from the Chinese emperor they could obtain Chinese political or
even military support to enhance their own power, especially when they
faced political rivals at home. Non-Chinese rulers also benefited economi
cally from tribute and trade with China.
The payment of tribute in return for Chinese imperial gifts served
the function of trade by political means, and appeared more like “gift
trade” to the non-Chinese. It was usually equal in an economic sense since
the Chinese tried to return gifts of the same, if not higher value as the
tribute goods offered. Imperial gifts together with other financial support
and the essential goods the non-Chinese obtained in this kind of “tribute
trade” with the Chinese compensated for the less than exalted position
they occupied in the tribute system.^® The tribute-bearing missions from
foreign countries were often accompamed by private merchants who came
seeking purely economic profits. These merchants would be provided
protection inside China and opportunities to trade in the capital.
In his book The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, Edward N.
Luttwak describes two models of empire, the “hegemonic” and the
“territorial.” The hegemonic empire is centered arotmd a central zone of
direct control, and includes 1) an “iimer zone of diplomatic control,” con
sisting of a series of client states surrounding the central zone, and 2) an
“outer zone of influence,” surrounding the irmer zone. In the outer zone,
client tribes defer to the power of the empire but are not under its direct
control. Client states in the hegemonic empire function as buffer states in
the system of imperial security. Their most important function, by vutue
of their very existence, was to absorb the burden of providing peripheral
security against border infiltration and other low-intensity threats.
The Chinese model of empire bears some resemblance to this he
gemonic system. During the Han dynasty, some non-Chinese were brought
HS 8, p. 270. The pronunciation chanyu is given in Guangyun which has three read
ings for the character chan :1. dan; 2. chan in chanyu, as in Chan Buddhism; 3. shan as a
place name, same as “abdicate”; see also Pulleyblank 1991, p. 48.
“ Rossabi 1983, pp. 3-4.
“ Luttwak 1976, pp. 19-30. Somers (1986, p. 98) gives a clear outline of these two
models.
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into the Chinese commandery-district system as part of what Luttwak
characterizes as a territorial empire; some were incorporated into the Chi
nese hegemonic empire, with each state having different responsibilities to
and connections with the Chinese suzerain, including, in some cases,
military tasks. The Chinese tribute system also served to build a model of
universal empire covering countries whose rulers sent embassies to
China’s court and received Chinese titles. Larger than Luttwak’s he
gemonic empire, this universal model embraced all kinds of states.
Other World Views—Practicality and Flexibility
While the sinocentric and hierarchical world view we have de
scribed above was generally dominant in Chinese ruling circles and espe
cially so in the writing of the Standard Histories, it is important to note the
existence of other views towards non-Chinese. During pre-Qin times
scholars and philosophers of some non-Confucian schools held different
ideas about society and the world.
The Agricultural School {nong jia) believed that rulers of worth
should cultivate their own land, eat what they produced, and prepare their
own meals while carrying on the affairs of government. Followers of this
school even saw no need for Sage Kings. Asserting that both ruler and
subject should plough together in the fields, they overthrew the order of
upper and lower classes.^^
Hui Shi (ca. 370-310 B.C.E.), the leading thinker of the School of
the Dialecticians (mingjia), talked about China as being at the center of the
world which, according to one interpretation, might suggest the idea that
the earth is spherical, and according to another interpretation, may imply
that there were vast regions beyond the bounds of contemporary geo
graphical knowledge.^® Zou Yan (ca. 305-240 B.C.E.), the leading thinker
of the School of Yin and Yang and of Five Phases, did not agree with the
sinocentric idea. He maintained that there were “nine large continents” {da
jiuzhou) in the world and each was divided into nine regions. What schol
ars called the Middle Kingdom was held to be but one part in eighty-one
29
of the whole world.
Apart from such unorthodox theorizing, in their everyday dealings
with foreigners the Chinese often recognized the limits of their strength
Fung Yu-lan 1952, p. 144.
Needham 1956, p. 192.
S/74, p. 2344; Fung Yu-lan 1952, pp. 160-1.
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and adopted pragmatic attitudes, which provided imperial rulers with jus
tification for conducting foreign relations on an equal footing with their
neighbors, or even for paying tribute to “barbarians.” They used the prin
ciple of “having the various states of Xia within, and keeping the Yi and
Di barbarians without” as a perfect ideological basis for retreat jfrom
claims of Chinese superiority and for adopting whatever measures were
expedient for achieving China’s own security and stability.
A prime example of Chinese pragmatism occurred in early Han
when the powerful nomadic Xiongnu empire challenged Chinese superi
ority and authority. The Han court, which had not yet consolidated its
power within China itself, adopted a policy of appeasement, and con
cluded peace treaties with the Xiongnu. The items in the earliest of these
treaties were:
1) A Chinese princess was to be married to the chanyu,
2) Chinese annual payments of silk, liquor, rice and other kinds of
food were to be made to the Xiongnu,
3) the Han and Xiongnu were to be “brotherly” states, and
4) the Great Wall was to be the border between Han and
Xiongnu.^°
This was the famous policy of “marriage alliance”
although the
giving of a Chinese princess in marriage was usually not its only feature.
As one can see from the agreement, it was the Chinese who paid tribute to
the nomadic Xiongnu empire. Until the beginning of Emperor Wu’s reign
(140-87 B.C.E.), heqin continued to be the main policy governing Chinese
contacts with the Xiongnu. Although the whole practice was considered
humiliating, economically costly, and unbearable by the Chinese ruling
group, it did win time for Han to recover and to build up its economic and
military strength, which in the end enabled Emperor Wu to engage in ac
tive diplomacy and military expansion aimed at defeating the Xiongnu.
Though, as supporters of the idea of the universal authority of the
Son of Heaven, Confucianists might have been expected to approve of ac
tive measures to enforce it, Han Confucian scholars in practice mostly ar
gued that a wise ruler should concentrate on defense against “barbarian”
incursions and not try to extend his rule into their territory. In 135 B.C.E.
Liu An, the Prince of Huainan, presented a memorial to Emperor Wu opYu Ying-shih 1967, pp. 41-2.
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posing a military expedition against Min Yue in the south: “From the time
of the Three Dynasties, the Hu and Yue have not gone so far as to receive
our calendar; it is not that they are strong and could not be subdued and
our awe could not control them; it is because we consider their land to be
uninhabitable and the people to be impossible to govern. It is not worth31
while to disturb China over them.”
In the Discourses on Salt and Iron which record the famous debate
on salt and iron monopoly policy in 81 B.C.E., Confucian scholars se
verely condemned the Qin and Han aggressions into foreign lands and ad
vocated a pragmatic, inward-looking attitude for two reasons. First, they
argued, these imperialistic endeavors damaged the welfare of the people,
needlessly cost human lives and suffering, exhausted the economic re
sources of the state and yet could not drive the nomads away. Second, the
conquered territories were useless either because they could not increase
government revenues or because the maintenance of Chinese control over
the areas depended on draining China’s own economic, military and po
litical power and therefore control could not be kept up permanently. Re
jecting the use of military force to subdue the non-Chinese, they insisted
on the Confucian idea: “If remote people are not submissive, all the influ
ences of civil culture and virtue are to be cultivated to attract them to be
so.

The Confucian historian Ban Gu also expressed this attitude, stat
ing that the “barbarians” were outer people and therefore the sage kings of
ancient times reared them like “birds” and “beasts,” neither making trea
ties with, nor attacking them; that since their land could not be ploughed
and made to produce food, and since one could not keep their people as
subjects, they should be guarded against and kept at a distance, and pun33
ished only when they came to invade.
When Buddhism came to China during the first century C.E. it
challenged all aspects of the native culture, including the sinocentric view.
The Buddhist concept of “madhyadesa”, referring to “middle country,”
that is India, was translated as “zhongguo,” the same word meaning

^'7/S64A,p.2777.
Yan Tie Lun Jiaozhu 1, p. 2, quoting Lunyu “Jishi;” 4, pp. 114-6; 7, pp. 262-5, and
passim. For a translation of the work, see Gale 1931.
" HS 94B, pp. 3833-4. Part of the translation is from Yang Lien-sheng 1968, p. 23.
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“Middle Kingdom” used to refer to China. This locution appears fre
quently in Chinese Buddhist writings.^
This Buddhist usurpation of the concept of centrality did not have
much direct impact on the Chinese, but because of their much expanded
contacts with foreign peoples, especially their close neighbors, the Chinese
showed great interest in the outside world from the Han dynasty onwards.
As is set out more fully in Chapter 2, information was continuously col
lected on foreign countries from Chinese envoys, Chinese frontier offi
cials, foreign envoys to the Chinese court, and monks who had traveled
abroad. Surely such intercultural links had some impact on Chinese
thinking,^^ for it is obvious that the Han and especially post-Han Chinese
were trying to expand their knowledge of the larger world, and that they
knew and spoke highly of other great civilizations in India, Persia and at
least the eastern part of the Roman empire.
Challenges to the Chinese World Order: Disunion and Non-Chinese
Rule
During the Period of Disunion, which lasted from the collapse of
the Han dynasty in 220 to the reunification by Sui in 589, China was di
vided, first into three Chinese states, the so-called Three Kingdoms, and
then after a brief period of unification by Western Jin (266-311), into a
succession of Chinese dynasties in the south and the so-called Sixteen
Kingdoms, ruled by various “barbarian” groups in the north. In 439 the
Northern Wei, founded by the Tuoba lineage of the Xianbei “barbarians,”
unified north China and eventually competed with the contemporary
southern dynasties for rule over all of China. About a hundred years later.
Northern Wei was split into two rival dynasties: Eastern Wei, (534-550)
with its successor Northern Qi (550-559), and Western Wei (535-556),
with its successor Northern Zhou (557-581). The Sui dynasty that unified
China in 589 was the direct successor of the Northern Zhou.
The long-term existence of disunion within China challenged the
idea of imiversal kingship, the basic concept underlying the Chinese world
order. There is an almost unanimous opinion in Tang historical writings
that not one of the Sixteen Kingdoms was legitimate. The period before
the Tuoba Wei’s unification was, they reasoned, simply a time of alien

^ Ziircher 1959, p. 266.
” An example of such a conclusion is found in Fitzgerald 1964, p. 9.
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usurpation, a heaven-sent punishment for the decay and lack of virtue of
36
the Western Jin rulers.
The legitimacy of the Northern Wei was a more controversial is
sue. Sui, Tang and Song scholars offered three different opinions: 1) the
non-Chinese regimes were as legitimate as native ones as long as they
cherished native Chinese culture and preserved it for posterity; 2) the
Tuoba Wei were “barbarians” who did not practice propriety and right
eousness, and therefore their rule was illegitimate; 3) legitimacy was al
ways a variable depending on whether one did or did not rule over a uni
fied empire. Any regime, be it Chinese or non-Chinese, was illegitimate if
37
it did not rule over the whole empire.
During this period the “barbarians” in North China unavoidably
underwent a process of sinicization and eventually were largely assimi
lated. All along the non-Chinese rulers utilized prevailing Chinese politi
cal theories to establish themselves and to cultivate a belief in the legiti
macy of their rule in the minds of the population at large. They also pre
served Chinese political traditions and norms. Their official histories were
compiled by Chinese historians, who followed traditional rhetoric and
patterns in recording court documents. In dealing with their neighbors, dy
nasties of non-Chinese origin like Former Qin in the Sixteen Kingdoms
period and Northern Wei accepted the tribute system, with its hierarchical
relationship between suzerain and subordinate, as the norm.
The Nomadic Legacy of the Northern Dynasties
As much as the non-Chinese rulers quickly became sinicized, they
also introduced new perspectives which enriched Chinese tradition. These
non-Chinese elements were visible in Sui’s constitutional order and con
tributed to the strength and glories of the Tang dynasty, as Chen Yinke has
38
shown in his insightful studies.
Creating a Multiethnic State
In consolidating their states, the non-Chinese rulers often resettled
large numbers of non-Chinese, either directly from the steppe or from
other parts of North China, into their territory. Especially around the Chi
nese capitals these new comers mixed -with the Chinese, thus creating
p. 3072.
See Rao Zongyi 1976; Zhao Lingyang, 1976; Wechsler 1985, pp. 16-8.
Chen Yinke 1971.
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multiethnic states. To establish their legitimacy, they promoted in their
propaganda the idea of a universal empire in which non-Chinese and Chi
nese could exist side by side. In justifying his revolt against the Western
Jin dynasty in 304, the Xiongnu leader, Liu Yuan, claimed that no ruler
could be permanent and that even though, according to some traditions,
Yu (of the legendary Xia dynasty) was said to have come from the Rong
and King Wen (of the Zhou dynasty) was said to have come from the
Eastern Yi, these sage rulers had derived their rule from Virtue {De ^S)- In
spite of defending his “barbarian” origins in this way to win over the Chi- •
nese, Liu Yuan also claimed descent from the Liu imperial clan of the Han
39
dynasty and named his rebel kingdom Han.
In trying to persuade a Jin official to join him, Murong Wei, an
other non-Chinese leader of one of the Sixteen Kingdoms, argued that his
wish was to restore the Jin regime; Chinese who shared the same aim
should support him without being troubled by the difference between Chi
nese and Yi. He too appealed to the traditions about the “barbarian” ori
gins of the sage kings, Yu and Wen, arguing that the only concern should
be about one’s intentions and that differences in customs should not stand
in the way of wirming people’s support.^° Murong Wei belonged to the
Murong lineage of the Xianbei, who founded successive Yan kingdoms
centered on Hebei. They established a dual organization, with their tribal
armies kept under the Xianbei elite and a Chinese style bureaucracy
staffed by Chinese civil officials. This was an attempt to combine the
strengths of Chinese administration with nomadic military power. While
such a dual organization was intended to preserve the ethnic identity of the
nomads, it could not prevent their eventual assimilation into -Chinese life.
It was the Western Wei dynasty (535-556) under Yuwen Tai that
made the most thoroughgoing effort to fuse the ethnic differences of nonChinese and Chinese on a basis of equality and create a truly universal
empire. Chen Yinke points out that Western Wei’s northwestern location
gave it an inferior economic and military base and weaker claim to legiti
macy as ruler of China than the contemporary regimes. Eastern Wei in the
north and Liang in the south. Yuwen Tai therefore felt it necessary to find
a new way to fuse his Xianbei tribes and other non-Chinese groups with
the Chinese to form a single entity, united by one system of beliefs and
”75101, p. 2649.
^75108, p. 2813.
Barfield 1989, pp. 104-5.
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sharing a single cultural identity. In the interests of gaining legitimacy for
his planned conquest of the south, Emperor Xiaowen (r. 471-499) of the
Northern Wei had attempted to sinicize the Xianbei aristocracy at his
court, but his one-sided reform lost the support of the Xianbei warriors left
behind on the frontier.'*^ Yuwen Tai adopted a variety of different meas
ures to achieve his new program.
The centerpiece of his plan was to take advantage of his location in
the Wei Valley, the heartland of the ancient Zhou dynasty. Though a
backwater economically and culturally in the sixth century compared to
both the lower Yangtze, where the southern, Chinese dynasties were in
charge, and the Central Plain in the lower Yellow River Valley, where the
rival Eastern Wei regime carried on the tradition of imdivided Northern
Wei, the northwest was where the institutions revered in the Confucian
classics had first taken shape. The change of the dynastic name from
Western Wei to Zhou which symbolized this appeal to Chinese tradition
did not formally take place until after the death of Yuwen Tai but was al
ready foreshadowed by his attempt to reform the administrative structure
on the model of the Zhouli^^ Yuwen Tai’s Confucian adviser, Su Chuo
(498-556), also tried to substitute the archaic style of the Book of Docu
ments (Shujing) for the “decadent” current style when composing govern
ment documents."*^
Su Chuo has also been credited with having influenced the setting
up of the military system knovm as the fubing, or “territorially adminis
tered soldiery” which incorporated a large number of the northwestern
Chinese military elite with their local contingents of soldiers into the
military forces of Western Wei. The essential aspects of the system at this
time were as follows: 1) the soldiers, who were from hereditary military
families, were exempted from taxes and corvee and expected to provide
some of their own gear; 2) each of the units was placed under one of the
ninety-six territorial military bureaus, which were ultimately under the
45
control of the central government.
Another of Yuwen Tai’s measures was to restore the surnames of
those non-Chinese who had previously vmder Emperor Xiaowen adopted
Chinese surnames. At the same time, all Chinese high-ranking military
Chen Yinke 1971, pp. 117-8.
''^252, p. 36; ZZTJ166, p. 5140.
^ Goodrich 1953, p. 2.
Goodrich 1953, pp. 50-1; Gu Jiguang 1962, pp. 50-6; Wright 1979, p. 98.
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officers were given non-Chinese surnames. All soldiers serving under a
particular officer were to assume the surname of that officer. Chen Yinke
argues that this adoption of Xianbei surnames in the military was aimed at
fusing the Chinese with the non-Chinese.'*® Another opinion is that the
primary aim was to maintain and strengthen Xianbei identity.*^ Whatever
the conscious motive, this policy had the effect of combining Xianbei
tribal tradition and Chinese military practice, thus drawing strength from
both sides. Moreover, it brought these territorially-based forces under the
control of the central government, allowing them to function effectively in
Northern Zhou’s conquest of Northern Qi, in the Sui unification of China
and in providing forces for the founding of Tang, as well as aiding in its
consolidation and expansion.*®
Non-Chinese Rulers in China and the Nomads in the Steppe
Their own nomadic heritage conditioned the approach of the
Northern rulers towards other nomads who remained on the steppe. That
they viewed the nomads as part of their own group is shown in a 429
Northern Wei discussion on the feasibility of a military campaign against
the Rouran. Cui Hao, an important Chinese adviser at the court, taking the
standpoint of his nomadic lord, rejected the traditional Chinese idea that
such a campaign was a waste since the steppe land could not be used for
agriculture and the Rouran could not be made subjects. Cui argued that
this view was a cliche from the Han period. The Rouran were rebellious
slaves and should be punished. Then their land could be opened up for ag
riculture, their nobles could marry Wei princesses and the men of lower
49
rank could be made generals.
The Northern Wei had a clear understanding of the complicated
relations among different groups of nomads, such as the Rouran, Chile or
Gaoche, and were able to take the initiative to form marriage or strategic
alliances with one against another of them at different times. In command
of superior cavalry troops, the Northern Wei rulers could inflict more ef
fective blows on their nomadic rivals than the Han Chinese rulers were

^ Chen Yinke 1971, p. 118.
Dien 1977, p. 137; Wright 1979, pp. 98-9.
For the Xianbei elements in the system, see Chen Yinke 1971, pp. 82-93; Gu Jiguang
1962, pp. 92-5.
lF5 35,pp. 815-8.
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ever able to do.^° Knowledge of the nomads’ internal organization and
strategy inherited from their non-Chinese background later helped the Sui
and early Tang rulers to stir up dissension among the nomads. They also
used non-Chinese allies in their campaigns.
The Non-Chinese Military Legacy
The military vigor of the horse-riding Tuoba ruling class was
passed on to the Sui-Tang rulers. The Northern Wei emperors before 500
all took personal command of their armies during wartime. When at peace,
they often went on hunting or inspection tours, organized regular military
parades and esteemed military skills. In the disunited China of their day,
military strength was the foxmdation on which the leaders of the Eastern
and Western Wei and later of the Sui and Tang based their power. The
military tradition was maintained in numerous families which provided
generations of soldiers to the Northern dynasties and to the Sui and early
Tang regimes. The tradition of the emperor’s personal participation in war
was continued by the Sui Emperor Yang, and by Tang Taizong. Northern
women were influenced by nomadic traditions too. Two wives of Gao
Huan, the actual ruler of the Eastern Wei, were excellent archers. Prin
cess Pingyang, the daughter of Li Yuan, organized troops and battles that
assisted her father’s founding of the Tang dynasty.®^ As witnessed by
tomb murals, Tang women played polo from horseback.
The Patronage ofBuddhism
The most obvious non-Chinese contribution to Chinese culture
during the Period of Disunion was the spread of Buddhism. When chronic
disunity undermined the orthodox status of Confucianism, Buddhism
spread rapidly to fill the resulting vacuum and took root in both North and
fVS 103. In his study of the nomadic power, Barfield (1989, pp. 122-4) discusses some
differences in the Tuobas’ approach to the nomads as compared with a Chinese dynasty.
Some of his points are not, however, accurate. For example, he says that the Tuobas’
policy did not depend on destroying their nomadic enemies. This cannot be verified. The
Tuoba did not destroy their enemies only because they were unable to. Barfield also says
that Wei tried to control the steppe by removing most of the nomadic population to
within its fi-ontiers so as to use them as a military force and that such strategy would have
been rejected by a Chinese dynasty. He forgets that the Han dynasty resettled the
Xiongnu inside or near the frontiers and used their military force to defend against other
nomads outside the fi'ontier.
^‘BS14, p.518.
^^yT558,pp. 2315-6.
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South. The Northern rulers soon became patrons of Buddhism, because,
among other reasons, it was foreign and it provided them an alternative
belief system to the Confucianism which was being urged on them by their
Chinese advisers. They used Buddhist monks as political, diplomatic, and
military advisers because the monks were totally dependent on the rulers’
favor and had no family ties. These monks were also much valued because
they often claimed to be able to prophesy the outcome of battles and the
53
success of projected expeditions.
Accounts by Buddhist travelers to the Western Regions and India,
together with other Buddhist writings, broadened the minds of the Chi
nese. The most famous travel account was by Faxian who left China by
land in 399, went to India to obtain Buddhist sutras and returned to China
by sea in 414. His book, Foguo Ji (A Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms'), is
still extant and is an important source for information about India at that
period.^^ It refers to central India as the Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo) and
comments: “In it the cold and heat are finely tempered, and there is neither
hoarfrost or snow. The people are numerous and happy.”^® Chinese schol
ars of the Qing period commented indignantly: “The book takes India as
the Middle Kingdom and China as periphery because the Buddhist monks
want to make their religion respectable. The absurdity is not worth arguing
with.”®® Other books by Buddhist monks are discussed in Chapter Two.
The religious tolerance of the Northern rulers anticipated the great
inflow of foreign religions and culture into China during the Tang dynasty.
Acceptance of a foreign religion during much of China’s middle period
proves wrong the stereotype that the Chinese were always ethnocentric.
More important. Buddhism was the first religion in China that cut through
the lines separating the classes, unifying peasantry and elite in both North
and South, among Chinese and non-Chinese. When added to the umfying
force of the written language, Confucianism and Daoism, Buddhism con
tributed to the eventual reunification of China. The Sui and Tang emper
ors, while claiming to be Sons of Heaven in Confucian terms, also relied
heavily on this alien religion to enhance their legitimacy, unlike their Han

” Wright 1959, p. 57; Ch’en 1964, pp. 78-80.
^ For more discussion on Faxian, see Ch’en 1964, pp. 89-2.
Foguo Ji, p. 6. For a translation, see Legge 1965, p. 42.
^ Foguo Ji, p. 1, quoting Siku Quanshu Tiyao.
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predecessors, whose position had been rationalized solely in terms of the
ideas and symbols of native traditions.^^
China’s Neighbors
The Qin-Han unification established the tradition of unity under a
centralized government as well as the limits of China’s geographical
reach. Sustained contact with its northern neighbors placed China in a new
environment. To the north, the rise of the nomadic steppe empire of the
Xiongnu mirrored the agricultural empire of Qin and Han. This confronted
the Chinese for the first time with an organized non-Chinese polity that
could successfully demand to be treated on a basis of equality.
In a sense this was the beginning of “foreign affairs” in Chinese
history. Though even during the Spring and Autumn period, the Chinese
states had from time to time included non-Chinese tribal units in sworn
treaties or otherwise used diplomacy rather than war in dealing with them,
this was considered just a stage in the ongoing process by which such
peoples were gradually to be absorbed and sinicized. By the time of the
Qin unification we no longer hear of “barbarian” Yi in Shandong and the
Huai valley, Di in Shanxi or Man in the former territory of Chu in the
Yangtze basin. Further south, much the same kind of process has contin
ued to the present day.
The northern steppes and the mountainous and desert lands to the
west were not, however, amenable to gradual absorption in this way and
throughout pre-modem history remained hostile to the incursion of a Chi
nese civilization based on intensive agriculture.
In his insightful study of China’s relations with its periphery, Lattimore devised a grand scheme based on ecological/environmental princi
ples, which divides East and Central Asia into five ecological regions; the
Chinese agricultural region; the Manchurian steppe, comprising both agri
cultural and forest land; the Mongolian steppe land; Chinese Turkestan’s
oases and desert; and Tibet, where both agriculture and nomadism were
practiced. The boundaries between each region were not fixed lines, but
rather zones within which could be found cultural and ecological features
of both regions. These marginal zones often became less buffers than the
locations of military and cultural competition between China and its
neighbors. China expanded into these marginal regions not just via migra-

” Wright 1959, pp. 66-70.
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tion or cultural diffusion, but also by military means. Different powers in
each region raised different challenges to China in its role as the Middle
Kingdom, and throughout its history China responded to these challenges
with different kinds of policy measures.
The Nomadic Threat from the Steppe
In China’s foreign policy the most abiding factor was the formi
dable threat of the nomadic peoples based on the Mongolian steppe.
“Barbarian” invasions from the north were a major headache for the Chi
nese even in early Zhou times. With the coming of horse-rider nomadism
to the eastern steppe during the Warring States period, China faced a more
serious and intractable northern frontier problem, and one that lasted
through late imperial times.
Modem scholars have offered various explanations for the ongoing
conflicts between nomadic and agricultural societies, the constant nomadic
raids and incursions across the frontiers of agrarian society, a phenomenon
not just limited to China.^® One underlying cause for the incessant con
flicts between pastoral nomadism and agricultural society lay in the fact
that they and the agricultural Chinese were in competition over the mar
ginal regions where either agriculture and pastoralism could be practiced.
Another was the need of the nomads for agricultural products in order to
sustain their economy and political stmcture.
Sechin Jagchid holds that nomads depended on sedentary China for
grain to supplement their diet, for silk and cotton cloth to provide beauty
and comfort, and for manufactured goods such as plows to break up the
soil or to transform into weapons. If the nomads could not obtain these
products through peaceful mechanisms of trade, bestowals, or court-tocourt intermarriage arrangements, he concludes, they would be provoked
into war. Often it was the ineffectiveness of Chinese dynasties and the
Chinese sense of cultural superiority that broke down the peaceful
mechanisms.^' Jagchid, however, imderplays the role of the military ad
vantage that the nomads enjoyed, and gives insufficient attention to the
fact that even when the nomads could obtain goods from China by peace-

Lattimore 1951, passim.
Xiao Qiqing (1972) has a clear summary of these several explanations. See also Jag
chid 1989, pp. 1-16; Waldron 1990, pp. 35-6.
“ Lattimore 1951, passim.
Jagchid 1989, p. 1; p. 165 and passim. See also Jagchid and Hyer 1979, pp. 300-1.
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ful means, they were tempted to raid the Chinese borders to seize Chinese
products.
Nor does Jagchid give due weight to the fact that the nomads were
normally more interested in trade than sedentary societies were.^^ Chinese
agreement to trade with the nomads was often obtained only under pres
sure. Such trade was not necessarily economically profitable for China’s
government. On the contrary, it tended to deplete the court’s revenues.^^ In
the tributary trade, under which foreign envoys presented tribute to the
Chinese court, which in turn gave presents to the foreigners, the amount
returned often exceeded the value of the tribute. Moreover, if trade could
not prevent the nomads from incursions, the Chinese court would have to
consider other alternatives, as happened in Han relations with the
Xiongnu.
A. M. Khazanov gives a more nuanced and balanced analysis in his
comprehensive study of pastoral nomadism. In agreement with Jagchid he
argues that “nomads could never exist on their own without the outside
world and its non-nomadic society.”^ Limited by their one-sided, special
ized economy, the nomads needed products from sedentary society for
their economic survival and for political stability, that is, for the aristoc
racy to sustain their control. To acquire these goods, Khazanov points out,
different methods were used, including sedentarization, trade and media
tory trade, submission to sedentary societies by offering military service in
return for payment of goods, and use of force whenever possible; raids and
pillage were important supplementary means of livelihood. Nomads could
also subjugate the sedentary population and make them pay tribute. Until
the modem period, sedentary states were unable to find any permanent
solution to the military problem of how to defend themselves against the
raids of nomads.^^
Thomas Barfield argues that to the nomadic peoples, trade was not
only for the sake of improving their standard of living or for establishing
themselves as the intermediaries in profitable commercial activity between
East and West, but also because Chinese goods were needed to maintain
the large ruling class and nomadic state power. Barfield observes that in
order to deal with their larger and more highly organized sedentary neigh-

Khazanov 1994, p. 202.
“ Yu Ying-shih 1967, p. 12; p. 49; pp. 60-4; Ecsedy 1968, pp. 142-5.
^ Khazanov 1994, p. 3.
“ Khazanov 1994, pp. 222-3, and chapter 4.
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bors, the nomads had to develop a new form of state organization, one
more complex than would be needed to handle livestock problems and
political disputes within a nomadic society.
Such nomadic states maintained themselves by exploiting China’s
sedentary economy, and not by exploiting the production of scattered
sheepherders. They did not attempt to conquer Chinese territory. Nor did
they have the necessary administrative institutions to govern an agricul
tural society. The nomadic rulers’ strategy was, through continuous raids
and plundering or through providing military assistance to Chinese re
gimes, to use their strength to bargain with China for large quantities of
Chinese goods as subsidies and force China to accommodate their de
mands for trade.^^
When the nomads were strong they followed an “outer frontier
strategyforcing the Chinese into accommodating their demands for
subsidies and trade; when they were weak they chose an “inner frontier
strategy” of submission to China in exchange for Chinese assistance in
accumulating goods to allow their rulers to recover their strength.^*
Barfield seems to neglect two important points: one is that the no
madic “iimer frontier” strategy also benefitted China and that is why China
accepted the nomads’ submission. The other is that there was a basic flaw
embodied in the inner frontier strategy: by receiving support from China,
the nomads could lose their independence and fail to restore their power
on the steppe. This is what happened to the Southern Xiongnu during the
Later Han dynasty. In his The Perilous Frontier Barfield applies his theory
rather mechanically to all the nomadic regimes after the Xiongnu. This
oversimplifies the complex history of China’s interactions with the no
mads.
In a more recent article based on archaeological studies, Nicola Di
Cosmo stresses that the Xiongnu maintained their empire through political
control and economic exploitation of sedentary communities and states
firom the oases of the Tarim Basin to Irmer Mongolia, northern Mongolia,
southern Siberia and Manchuria. Chinese goods further buttressed the
power of the Xiongnu aristocracy. They were threatened not only by the
Han Emperor Wu’s cessation of payment of goods, but also by his efforts

“ Barfield 1981; 1989, pp. 8-9 and passim.
Barfield 1989, p.91.
“ Barfield 1989, p. 63.
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to cut off their control over these sedentary communities in the Western
Regions and in Manchuria.®^
Khazanov, Barfield and Di Cosmo examine the nomads’ relations
with agrarian society from the nomadic point of view. In this chapter and
later chapters I focus on the Chinese side to see how in the context of the
rise and fall of the nomadic Turkish and Uighur powers the Chinese at
tempted to respond to the various strategies of the nomadic political rulership, and to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses as well as the various
effects of the strategies and policies adopted by both nomadic powers and
by China.
Xiongnu
The first organized nomadic power on the Mongolian steppe was
the Xiongnu coalition. After unifying China, the First Emperor of Qin
drove the Xiongnu north beyond the Great Bend of the Yellow River. But
with the collapse of the Qin, the Xiongnu empire eventually established
itself as a rival great power, challenging the Han dynasty’s superiority and
authority even inside the border zone. The early Han emperors followed an
appeasement policy towards the Xiongnu. By the time of Emperor Wu,
however, China enjoyed great prosperity, which enabled Emperor Wu to
engage in prolonged wars against them.
However, it was not until Emperor Xuan’s reign, after the Xiongnu
empire was split into Southern and Northern rival states, and Hiohanye
Chanyu of the Southern Xiongnu, arrived in 51 B.C.E. at the Han court,
that Han succeeded in making the Xiongnu accept the status of a tributary.
The Han court provided economic and military assistance to the Southern
Xiongnu in order to use them against their Northern cousins. The Northern
Xiongnu were severely defeated by the Chinese in 36 B.C.E. The Southern
Xiongnu had at first moved southward, close to the Han frontier, so as to
have easy access to Han resources, but returned to the steppe shortly after
43 B.C.E. and restored their former power.
Even before this time, the Han government had set up dependent
states to resettle Xiongnu who had come to the Han frontiers in the Ordos
region and in the Gansu corridor to submit. When China was thrown into
civil war at the end of Wang Mang’s rule, ambitious people in the north
west sought an alliance with the Xiongnu for assistance in seeking power.
The Xiongnu did not intend to occupy agricultural territory themselves.
69 Di Cosmo 1994.
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Instead they chose to take advantage of the situation to make raids and to
try to establish a pro-Xiongnu regime in China.
When China was reunified by the Later Han dynasty, in its early
days it did not have much advantage over the Xiongnu. In 48 C.E., how
ever, the Xiongnu empire was again split between the Southern and North
ern rivals. The Southern Xiongnu adopted a pro-Han policy and became a
Han tributary. They moved inside the Han border and, unlike what had
happened in Former Han times, they gradually lost their independence and
were never able to restore their power in the steppe. The Northern
Xiongnu met their final defeat, first at the hands of the Xianbei, another
nomadic people, and then by the joined forces of Han and the Southern
Xiongnu in 91.^°
Wuhuan and Xianbei
The Xiongnu’s hope of restoring their former greatness was
crushed by the nomadic proto-Mongolian Xianbei people, who, together
with the Wuhuan, were referred to as the Eastern Hu in late Warring States
and early Han times. Formerly subjects and foes of the Xiongnu empire,
they inhabited the area from the Mongolian steppe to east of the Greater
Xing’an Mountains. Their economy was less completely dependent on
nomadism than that of the Xiongnu and included agriculture as well as
herding of livestock. During the Han period the Wuhuan submitted to
China and were resettled on the frontier, acting as watchmen for the Chi
nese, but they rebelled from time to time. The Wuhuan actively involved
themselves in the civil wars at the end of Han. Eventually some of them
were incorporated into China; but the Wuhuan as a whole ceased to be a
real threat.^^
During the first century C.E. the Xianbei alternated their allegiance
between the Xiongnu and Han. To maintain their power; they sometimes
sought Chinese recognition and assistance and helped the Han in wars
against the Northern Xiongnu. When the Northern Xiongnu ceased to be a
major power, the Xianbei occupied their territory and incorporated over
ten thousand tents of their people. During the mid-second century, under
their brilliant war leader, Tanshihuai, the Xianbei expanded all the way
west to Central Asia, succeeding the Xiongnu as holders of the powerful
™ For a more detailed description of the Xiongnu, see YU Ying-shih 1967; 1990; Pan
Yihong 1992b.
For a detailed study of the Wuhuan in the Han period, see Crespigny 1984, chapter 9.
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nomadic empire of this region. It appears that part of the Wnhuan tribe
also joined in this western conquest.
Unlike the Xiongnu, Tanshihuai relied solely on constant raids
across Chinese frontiers and did not seek to make treaty arrangements.
Tanshihuai refused a proposal of marriage alliance from the Han court
soon after 166. The political organization of the Xianbei was still in a
primitive stage; Tanshihuai’s power derived from his ability as a war
leader rather than from a hereditary tradition. Because his authority w£is
based on his leadership in wars, he had no authority to make peace with
China. To make peace with China would terminate his power as a war
leader. His death around 180 ended the short-lived Xianbei empire. The
Xianbei disintegrated into various tribal groups, and never became a uni
fied steppe power.^^ They instead turned toward China.
Xianbei Regimes in North China
In the course of time, some of the Xianbei tribal groups succeeded
in forming political entities of a more lasting kind. In the third centtxry the
Murong in the Liao River valley served as auxiliaries xmder the Three
Kingdoms Wei and their leaders received titles of investiture from both
Wei and the succeeding Jin dynasty. During the civil wars of Western Jin,
they provided a refuge for Chinese peasants and officials and took advan
tage of the situation to form their own regime with a civil administration
run by Chinese officials, but v^th military control kept in their own hands.
After the uprising of the Southern Xiongnu leader Liu Yuan in 304, which
brought about the end of Jin rule in North China, the Murong, at first pro
fessing loyalty to the restored Eastern Jin dynasty south of the Yangtze,
began to intervene in Chinese affairs, and in 337 established the kingdom
known as Former Yan. They developed the ambition to reumte the whole
of China; but their state was soon in chaos and dissolved under the attacks
of the Jin and other non-Chinese in 370.^^ The remaining Murong royal
leaders founded three short-lived states: Western Yan (384-394), Later
Yan (384-409) in Hebei and Southern Yan (398-410) in Henan.
The Tuoba, who in the end were the most successful of the Xianbei
groups, were similar to the Murong in that they first appeared as a tribe on
the frontier, in this case on the northern border of Shanxi. For their assis
tance in providing auxiliaries to Jin, their leader received Chinese investi^ HHS 89; see also Pulleyblank 1983, pp. 452-4; Barfield 1989, pp. 87-90.
108-111.
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ture, first, as Duke of Dai in 310, then as King of Dai in 314. In the chaos
that followed the withrawal of Jin power from the north, they established a
regime in northern Shanxi. In 376 they were conquered by Fu Jian, of the
Tibeto-Burman Di nationality, whose Former Qin kingdom centered on
Chang’an briefly succeeded in reuniting all of North China.
After the disastrous failure of Fu Jian’s expedition against Eastern
Jin at the Battle of the Fei River in 383, Tuoba Gui reestablished himself
as King of Dai, and soon changed his state’s name to Wei. By 439 the
Tuoba Wei had conquered the other contending non-Chinese regimes and
achieved a more lasting unification of North China. The Tuoba were able
to create an effective military and clan organization and, with the help of
Chinese officials, learned how to exploit the agricultural lands that they
had conquered. For nearly a century they confronted successive native
Chinese states in the south.^"*
Farther west in Gansu the Qifu branch of the Xianbei established a
state known as Western Qin that lasted from 385 to 431 and the Tufa
founded Southern Liang, which lasted from 397 to 414.^^ More successful
were the Tuyuhim, a branch of the Murong Xianbei, who moved westward
and established a tribal state around Lake Koko Nor in the present Qinghai
province at the beginning of the fourth century. They had already received
some cultural influence from the Chinese. Their administration was based
on the Chinese model and made use of Chinese writing. Gradually they
incorporated the local Tibeto-Burman Di and Qiang people.
During the fifth century the Tuyuhun strengthened their power
through active interaction with both the southern and northern courts in
China, obtaining trading benefits and political support. In addition to their
adept manipulation of sedentary region politics, the Tuyuhun achieved
relative stability based on combining a nomadic economy with some agri
culture and profitable commercial links with both the Chinese and with
Central Asia.
In 444-45^ hard pressed by the Northern Wei, the Tuyuhun fled
westward and occupied a weaker oasis state, Khotan, in the Tarim Basin,
an important point on the Silk Road. Later they returned to their original
territory, but Aeir influence in the eastern section of the Tarim Basin con
tinued and enabled them to control the caravan trade routes passing
through that region. We read in Chinese sources that the Tuyuhun rulers
’“1^51,2.

’^ysi25, 126.
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relied on rich families and merchants to meet their financial needs, and
that in 553, when a Tuyuhun mission returning from Northern Qi was at
tacked by the Northern Zhou prefect of Liangzhou he captured 240 mer
chants, 600 camels and mules and silk products amounting to ten thousand
rolls/® Well protected by their distance from political and war centers in
China, they were able to maintain their state until the seventh century.
Rouran
While the Tuoba Wei rulers occupied themselves with governing
an agricultural China and became more and more sinicized, control of the
steppe was taken over by the Rouran nomads. Their founder is said to have
originally been a slave of the Tuoba. Though there is no explicit statement
in the sources to show that they were of Xianbei origin, there is evidence
that, like the Xianbei and Wuhuan, they spoke a language of the Mongo
lian type.^^ After several generations, at the beginning of the fifth century,
the Rouran leader declared himself qaghan, the title later used by the
Turks for the supreme ruler of the steppe, but also used among the Qifii
and Tuyuhim.^® They became a vigorous power, extending their control
over the Mongolian steppe and Manchuria. They also became a fierce ad
versary of Northern Wei, constantly raiding the Chinese frontier.^®
The Northern Wei won a major victory over the Rouran in 429. In
order to maintain peaceful relations the two sides arranged reciprocal
marriages: Wei sent a princess to wed the Rouran qaghan in 434, while the
Wei emperor himself married the qaghan’s younger sister. But peace did
not last long and conflicts continued until 449, when Wei won another
decisive victory over the Rouran. In 506 the Rouran asked Wei for a peace
agreement, but Wei insisted that the Rouran could expect no better fate
than to become Wei subjects.
In 520 after internal struggles among the Rouran, Anagui Qaghan
went to the Wei for protection. Following the Han pattern of resettlement
of nomads who had submitted, the Wei court resettled him and his people
outside the Wei frontiers north of Shanxi and another rival group of the
Rouran in present Gansu, both to serve as part of the defense for Wei.

BS 96, pp. 3178-87; Mole 1970, xii-xvi; his translation of the BS 96.
’’ Pelliot 1921; see also a note by Pelliot inserted in a book review in T’oung Pao 29
(1932) p. 261.
Mole 1970, xxvii, pp. 68-71.
” WS 103.
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Three years later, when the rebellion of the Six Garrisons of the Wei broke
out, Anagui and his cavalry assisted in its suppression.
As a consequence, the balance of power began to tip in favor of the
Rouran. To reward the Rouran for their assistance, the Wei court provided
rich gifts and in 528 issued an edict granting privileged treatment to Ana
gui. He personally was not expected to refer to himself as “subject” when
presenting documents to the Wei court.
Anagui reorganized his government based on the Chinese model
and the Rouran became a strong power once again. He employed Chinese
as his advisers and insisted on equal standing with Wei in the official cor
respondence between the two. In 533 Wei permitted the marriage of a Wei
princess to the qaghan’s son. The marriage, however, was called off after
the split of the Northern Wei into the Eastern and the Western Wei. En
feebled by their struggles with each other, both of the new states competed
to conclude marriage alliances with the Rouran so as to maintain peace on
their borders and concentrate their efforts against each other and their
southern enemies. The relationship between the Rouran and the Wei states
in North China became more equal, as shown by the fact that the rulers of
the Western and Eastern Wei took Rouran princesses as empresses, rather
80
than just sending their women to the Rouran.
Eastern Wei and the Rouran contracted three marriages: in 540
Eastern Wei agreed to send a princess to marry Anagui’s son; in 542 Ana
gui asked to send his granddaughter to wed the son of the powerful minis
ter Gao Huan. Wei agreed.®^ Apprehensive of the Rouran’s strength, Gao
Huan requested a Rouran princess for another son, to which Anagui re
plied that the marriage would be possible only if Gao himself wedded his
daughter. After some hesitation, Gao agreed. The marriage took place in
546. After Gao Huan’s death, following nomadic practice, Gao’s eldest
82
son married the Rouran princess.
Western Wei also contracted reciprocal marriages with the Rouran.
A Wei princess was sent to wed the brother of Anagui and in 538, at the
request of Anagui, the emperor dismissed his Tuyuhun empress and took*

fF5103;fiS98.
* Vs 103, p. 2303; BS 98, p. 3265.
This is according to BQS 9, p. 124; BS 14, p. 517-8. The BS 98 (p. 3265) does not give
these details.
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Anagui’s daughter as empress. The Rouran were still not content and
pressed the emperor to force the previous empress to commit suicide.
Just when Anagui’s power was at its height another nomadic
power rose. This was the Tujue (Tiirk) state of the Ashina clan (hereafter
referred to as the Turks), in the face of whose attack Anagui committed
suicide in 552.®^
Tujue Turks
The sudden emergence of the Turks, who had not been heard of •
previously but who subsequently gave their name to all the Turkic speak
ing peoples, is wrapped in obscurity. They are said to have once been
blacksmith slaves of the Rouran. Sometime before 546 their chief, Tumen
(Bumin), initiated trading relations with the Western Wei dynasty. When
they became stronger, the Turks broke away from the Rouran and turned
to Western Wei for political support. In 551 the two regimes, who both
considered the Rouran a major enemy, formed a marriage alliance. A year
later the Turks were able to defeat the Rouran. They asked the Western
Wei to execute all the Rouran refugees, a grisly task which Western Wei
carried out. The Northern Qi (successor of the Eastern Wei) at first
adopted a pro-Rouran policy against the Turks but soon abandoned the
Rouran, who were hopelessly weak by then.*^
In 552, Bumin set himself up as Yili Qaghan. From 562 to 576, his
younger brother Shidianmi (Istami) ruled west of Altai as the chief of the
western part of the empire. Actively engaging themselves in intermediary
trade between China and the Eastern Roman empire and in the conquest of
other peoples, the Turks built a steppe empire extending westward from
the Mongol Plateau into Central Asia, including its oasis states, and had
commercial contact with the Ephthalites, Byzantium and Sassanid Persia.
Having replaced the Rouran, they next turned to North China, posing a
great threat to the Northern Zhou (successor of Western Wei) and North
ern Qi dynastic regimes.*^
As in their relations with the Rouran, the two Northern dynasties
each had to buy off the Turks with frequent payments of silk and other

BS 13, pp. 506-7; 98, p. 3246; ZZTJ158, p. 4892.
98, pp. 3266-7.
“ B598, pp. 3266-7; 99, pp. 3285-9; Ma Changshou 1957, pp. 12-8.
“ Chavannes 1969, pp. 160-3; Ma Changshou 1957, pp. 16-20; Wright 1979, p. 107;
Sinor 1990b, pp. 295-305.
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products, and each had to compete to contract marriages with the Turks,
all for the purpose of preventing the Turks from laimching invasions and
from assisting the other power. In 561, when Yuwen Yong came to the
throne as emperor of Northern Zhou, he despatched three groups of envoys
to the Turks. In spite of interference from the Northern Qi envoys, the
missions succeeded in securing a Turkish princess for marriage to Yuwen
himself In the reigns after Yong’s death, this Turkish empress was shown
great favor and given honorific titles.
The Turks also assisted the Zhou in battles against Qi.*’ For its
part. Northern Qi had to “empty its storehouses to supply the Turks.” After
Qi’s conquest by Northern Zhou in 577, a Qi prince fled to the Turks. The
qaghan then declared him to be the Qi emperor and planned to take re
venge on his behalf After several attacks, however, the qaghan decided it
was not worthwhile to support Qi any further. Instead, he proposed a mar
riage alliance to Zhou, to which Zhou agreed on the condition that the
Turks hand over the Qi prince. The Turks felt obliged to comply. In 580
Princess Qianjin of Zhou was sent to marry Shetu Qaghan.
The Turkish problem was to last into the following Sui and Tang
dynasties until the mid-eighth century.
Gaoche
Another nomadic participant group in China’s constant competi
tions with the Rouran and the Turks were the Gaoche, meaning “High
Carts.” They belonged to the Tiele tribes, who spoke a Turkic language
but had been known to the Chinese much earlier than the Tujue. The name
Tiele can be traced back to the Dingling who first appear in the Shiji as
one of the northern peoples conquered by the Xiongnu when they first es
tablished their empire at the beginning of the second century B.C.E. From
the fourth to the sixth centuries the name appears in various forms—
Dingling, Chile, Tiele, and Gaoche. Though sometimes subjugated by
larger nomadic powers such as Xiongnu and Rouran, the Gaoche or Tiele
people had always maintained a tribal identity of their own. Their alle
giance in the competitions between China and its nomadic rivals was often
an important factor for the side they joined. During the fifth and sixth* **
"ZS9,p. 144;5599,p.3289.
** BS 99, p. 3290; SUISSl, p. 1329. Lin Enxian (1988, p. 210) says that Qianjin was first
married to Tabo (Taspar) Qaghan and then to Shetu. The supreme qaghan then was Tabo,
but it was Shetu who requested the marriage.
Pulleyblank forthcoming and 1990a.
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centuries, they established their independence from the Rouran and were
in constant contact with the Northern Wei regime, sometimes as allies
against the Rouran. When the first Turkish empire was founded in 552, the
Tiele were brought xmder its rule. The Tide tribes would later play a deci
sive role in the Sui and Tang competitions with the Turks. It was from the
Tiele that the Uighurs emerged and from the mid-eighth century replaced
the Turks as masters of the steppe.
The Western Regions
To the west and southwest of the Mongolian steppes lay what the
Han Chinese referred to as the Western Regions, which is what Europeans
used to call Chinese Turkestan and is presently China’s Xinjiang autono
mous region. From early times there had emerged in this region small oa
sis states based on a mixed economy of agriculture, animal husbandry and
trade. The region’s people had a distinctive ethnic and cultural identity.
They spoke Indo-European languages and the Chinese described them as
having deep eyes and high noses. Their towns developed as trading centers
along the two major branches of the cross-continental Silk Road that
started from northwest China, passed through the Gansu corridor, then di
vided and went north or south of the Taklamakan Desert and crossed the
Pamirs, after which they merged into routes heading toward South and
West Asia.
Never during China’s long imperial history did these oasis states
pose a threat to the Chinese in the way the nomads did, as they were never
able to form a united political entity. And yet the Western Regions were
often an important target over which China contended with other states,
first the Xiongnu, then from Sui onwards, the Turks and Tibet, and in later
times, the Mongols, and Russia.
As far as recorded history is concerned, Chinese contact with the
region started under Emperor Wu of Han with the famous expedition of
Zhang Qian to the west in about 138 B.C.E.. Zhang’s aim was primarily
military and strategic: to seek an alliance with the Yuezhi, traditional no
mad enemies of the Xiongnu who had moved to the west. The expedition
failed in its immediate goal but in the end it had more significant results.
Apart from the new knowledge that it brought, it led to Han expansion in
that direction, aimed at depriving the Xiongnu of an important resource
and making contact with the newly discovered world beyond. In 59 B.C.E.
the Han set up the Protectorate of Western Regions {Xiyu duhufu ) as its
instrument for controling the region.
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The military significance of this region was obvious. Whenever the
Chinese lost control over it, as during the interregnum between Former
and Later Han, the Xiongnu would take over, thereby strengthening them
in their competition with the Chinese. Another danger was that if the
Xiongnu occupied the area they might enter into an alliance with the
Qiang, the hostile “barbarians” living in Qinghai to the south, thereby
posing a threat to the four commanderies that Han had established in the
Hexi region in present Gansu and Ningxia.
The other significant consequence of the opening to the west was
that it potentially connected China with South and West Asia. Mainte
nance of Chinese control over the Western Regions ensured the eventual
opening of trade and diplomatic communications between China and these
newly discovered countries. The trade brought impressive economic
benefits; private merchants made handsome profits and emperors and their
ministers were provided with luxuries and exotic goods by tribute-bearing
missions to the Chinese court. Politically, the coming of foreign envoys
fi'om afar symbolized their acceptance of the rule of the Son of Heaven
whose legitimacy within China remained boimd up with the fiction that he
was a world ruler.
Maintenance of Chinese control over the Western Regions, how
ever, proved to be very costly. Nomads could more easily and naturally
exert such control with their mobile and constantly ready military force
and their geographical proximity. When China became weakened inter
nally, it often had to withdraw from this extended firontier. Economic
contact with the Western Regions mostly benefited emperors and a minor
ity of private individuals rather than the state treasuries; so even if emper
ors and their courtiers retained enthusiasm for expansion to the west, Confucian bureaucrats strongly opposed such endeavors at the time and their
criticisms were echoed by later Confiician historians. Yet the Han expan
sion into the Western Regions, together with its expansion into the Korean
Peninsula, set up a goal for later rulers to reach and a model for them to
emulate.
The oasis states in the Western Regions, through their contacts
with China and the contending nomadic powers, became experienced in
dealing with them and learned to play off one against the other so as to
maintain their own political autonomy. They often took initiatives in the
complex international environment, forming alliances or seeking military
protection, or organizing resistance to foreign control. They played active
roles which no larger power could afford to ignore. As foci where different
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cultures coming from various directions met, they were able to in turn
transmit some of these cultural elements to others while retaining their
90
own cultural identities.
During the period of Disunion, Liangzhou was an important center
for East-West communications. Located in present Gansu, west of the
Yellow River’s Great Bend, it controlled the Gansu corridor and was the
gateway to the Western Regions. When China was in political turmoil,
foreign merchants or envoys continued to arrive in Liangzhou and some
continued on into China proper under the protection of the Liangzhou re
gime. Control of Liangzhou changed frequently from Chinese to nonChinese hands before the Northern Wei’s unification of the North, but all
of its rulers tried to keep up and expand their contacts with the oasis states
in the Western Regions through peaceful embassies or military expedi
tions. The benefits Liangzhou’s rulers sought from trade with, or direct
control over, the Western Regions were not just political prestige or the
obtaining of luxury goods. These links were important for the survival or
consolidation of their regimes. The most famous expedition during this
period was the one despatched from Chang’an in 383 by Fu Jian of the
Former Qiri state, who had briefly reunited the whole of North China and
was about to lead the disastrous expedition against Eastern Jin that ended
in his do-wnfall. From his point of view, conquering the Western regions
was a necessary part of fulfilling the Mandate of Heaven that he had accepted.^^
In addition to keeping open trade and diplomatic communications
with the Western Regions, another major accomplishment of the various
regimes in Liangzhou was the establishment of direct control of Gaochang
(Karakhoja ) near Turfan, the first city on the northern branch of the Silk
Road in the Western Regions. In 344 the Zhang power in Liangzhou
(whose successor founded the Former Liang state, 354-376) established a
commandery in Gaochang. The Former Qin state (351-394) continued to
have an administration there. After Lii Guang founded his Later Liang
state (386-403), he considered Gaochang to be abase for further westward

Ise has a comprehensive study on China’s interactions with the Western Regions from
early Han to mid-Tang. For the Han period, see Ise 1968, pp. 1-21; pp. 37-89. See also
Yii Ying-shih 1990 for the significance of the Western Regions in Han’s relations with
the Xiongnu.
For a more detailed account, see Ise 1968, pp. 95-116.
^ Mather 1959, p. 1.
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expansion, appointed his son as the Protector-general of the Western Re93
gions and stationed him in Gaochang.
Another highly significant development resulting from iminterrupted communications with the Western Regions and beyond was the in
flow of Buddhism. When it was first introduced to China in the first cen
tury C.E. Buddhism spread along the routes of trade between Central Asia
and China proper, and inside China the religion moved along the main
routes of internal trade and communication.^^ Through a report by a Chi
nese monk who had traveled to Qiuci (Kucha), Fu Jian in 379 heard about
Kumarajiva, a famous Buddhist monk then living there. One of the objec
tives of Fu Jian’s expedition to the Western Regions in 383 was to bring
Kumarajiva back to China. Lu Guang, the general whom he sent to ac
complish this task, succeeded in defeating Kucha and subduing other
states. He brought Kumarajiva back with him, but learning that Fu Jian
had been fatally defeated in the Battle of the Fei River, kept the monk in
Liangzhou for seventeen years. Kumarajiva was finally brought to
Chang’an in 401, by which time he had fully mastered the Chinese written
language, which allowed him to become the greatest translator of Buddhist
texts into Chinese.®^
Since the Rouran nomadic empire by this time had already ex
tended its influence to the Western Regions as far as Ephthalites beyond
the Pamirs, the early Northern Wei rulers adopted an aggressive policy
towards the Western Regions to weaken the Rouran, but also for the sake
of political prestige and trading benefits,. In 435 and 436 Wei sent several
diplomatic missions to the region and, in 445 and 448, launched military
expeditions to subdue Shanshan (Loulan), Yanqi (Karashahr) and Qiuci
(Kucha). In 448 Wei appointed a Chinese as Commandant of Western
Rong (Xirong xiaowei) in Shanshan^ the first city state on the southern
branch of the Silk Road beyond the Yumen Pass, and ran it like a regular
tax paying commandery. During the same period. Northern Wei also
launched direct attacks against the Rouran and conducted five military
campaigns (in 444, 445, 460, 470 and 473) against the Tuyuhun, because
the Tuyuhun had contacts with the Rouran and the Liu-Song dynasty, and
they controlled the route south from the Western Regions.

’^Ise 1968, pp. 95-114.
Wright 1959, p. 32.
’’ Mather 1959, pp. 2-10; Ch’en, K. 1964, pp. 82-3.
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Northern Wei relaxed its efforts in the Western Regions after 470.
It appears that Shanshan was no longer under direct Wei control. In 471
Wei refused to assist Yutian (Khotan) against an invasion of the Rouran.
In 516 the Wei emperor sent envoys into the region to acquire Buddhist
texts, but apart from this Wei and the later Northern dynasties did not ini
tiate any activities there. In contrast, countries in Central Asia continued to
send envoys to Wei.®®
Manchuria in the Northeast
Northeast of the North China Plain is the area known in English
language works as Manchuria, at present the three provinces of Northeast
China. Like the Western Regions, Manchuria was an area of mixed
economies and ethnic groups, but it was ecologically more complex. The
Liaodong region in southern Manchuria, comprising the Liao River plain
and the Liaodong peninsula, was suitable for agriculture. Liaodong’s agri
cultural land tempted Chinese states to expand into the region, but since it
was physically isolated from China by mountains and seas, the major link
to the North China Plain being the Shanhai Pass, Chinese control in the
region was not stable. Manchuria’s open western plains were partly suit
able for pastrolism and partly for agriculture. Nomads from the contiguous
Mongolian steppe were often tempted to move down to subjugate the vari
ous native peoples. In the mountains and forests of the rest of Manchuria
lived various groups of fishing-hunting communities.
Chinese expansion into the Liaodong region was first carried out
by the state of Yan in the Warring States period and later by the Qin dy
nasty, which established a political administration over Choson, a confed
eration of walled town states in the basin of the Liao and Datong (Korean
Taedong) Rivers. In early Han a Chinese (or perhaps a Korean) known as
Wei Man, associated with the JCing of Yan, rebelled, and fled to Choson,
where he succeeded in establishing his rule.®^ In 109 B.C.E. Emperor Wu
of the Han dynasty decided to attack Choson. His strategic purpose was to

WS 102; Ise 1968, pp. 117-44.
’’ SJ 115, p. 2985, which merely associates Wei Man with Yan. Lee Ki-baik (1984, pp.
16-7) questions whether Wei Man was in fact a Chinese on the ground that his hair style
was different from that of the Chinese, and because he dressed in Choson style when he
went to Choson. He could, therefore, have been either a Sinicized Korean or a Koreanized Chinese. The distinction would not have been as important then as it would be now
to modem nationalistic Chinese and Koreans.
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“cut off the left arm of the Xiongnu,”®® that is, to cut off any possible alli
ance between Choson and the Xiongnu, who were expanding eastward in
that direction. The attack was a success and, as a result, Choson was in
corporated into the Chinese commandery-district system under four commanderies, Lelang, Zhenfan, Lintun and Xuantu,®^ all north of the Han
River.
One major unintended effect of the Han commandery system,
which eventually ended at the beginning of the fourth century, was to
stimulate the formation of native political powers. The state of Koguryo,
which straddled the present bovmdary between Manchuria and Korea,
captured Lelang, and another Korean state, Paekche, captured Daifang
commandery.^ Koguryo was a semi-nomadic state that rose around 37
B.C.E. in Manchuria. It competed with the Murong and eventually an
nexed another Manchurian regime, Puyo and Liaodong in the fourth cen
tury C.E., expanding its sphere from Manchuria to the northern half of the
Korean peninsula.
During the Period of Disunion, while China was under various re
gimes, most of the Korean peninsula was sub-divided into three states:
Koguryo, Paekche, and Silla. Paekche was established by invaders from
Puyo by the third century C.E. out of the walled to-wn states in the south
western part of the peninsula. Silla emerged as a strong power which
evolved from the state of Saro in the southeast.
Both of these states
were populated by agrarian people with economies similar to that of
China. The three Korean kingdoms, especially Koguryo and Paekche,
were continually fighting each other over territory and therefore were in
terested in gaining Chinese support in their struggles.
Through the tribute system, particularly the system of investiture,
by which political titles were bestowed by the Chinese court on foreign
’*//5 73,p.3162.
” S7 115, p. 2989; HS 6, p. 194; 95, pp. 3865-7. HS 28 (p. 1626) says that Xuantu com
mandery was set up in 107 B.C.E., which might not be correct according to other
sources.
In 82 B.C.E. Zhenfan and Lintun were abolished, and were partly incorporated into
Lelang and Xuantu. See HS 7, p. 223; HHS 85, p. 2817.
Nishijima 1983, p. 419. Daifang commandery was set up at the beginning of the third
century C.E. in the western part of Lelang.
Lee Ki-baik 1984, pp. 22-4.
WS 100, p. 2217; Lee Ki-baik 1984, pp. 36-7; pp. 40-2. Ledyard (1975, p. 234), how
ever, dates the conquest as between 352 and 372.
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rulers, these states entered into a vassal-suzerain relationship with various
regimes in China proper. Koguryo had relations with regimes in both
North and South China and received official investiture several times, the
first time from the Former Yan in 355. It had contacts with the Rouran as
well. Paekche first appears in Chinese historical records in 372, when it
sent a mission to the Eastern Jin and a Jin official title was conferred on its
king. It, too, pursued an outward-looking policy through which it obtained
political investiture from both the northern and southern regimes in the
following centuries. Silla sent its first official mission to the Former Qin in
377. It did not join the political investiture system until the sixth century
but Chinese influence is obvious in the forms of its state institutions.^
Each of the three states was in reality independent of China, ruled solely
by its own aristocracy, but in their constitutional and cultural forms all
three kingdoms showed enthusiasm for the introduction of Chinese ways.
The Western Mountain Borderlands and Tibet
Lattimore’s fifth region, Tibet, is separated from China proper by
mountainous regions that are largely unsuited either to intensive agricul
ture of the Chinese type or to the extensive pastoral transhumance prac
ticed by the nomads of Mongolia. It remained outside the Chinese sphere
of influence and is scarcely referred to in Chinese sources tmtil the Tang
period when a Tibetan kingdom suddenly erupted and became a major
power, contending not only directly with China but also with the contem
porary nomadic powers for control of Central Asia, as we shall see in later
chapters.
The intermediate lands were occupied by Tibeto-Burman speaking
peoples known collectively to the Chinese as Qiang or Di (first tone—^to
be distinguished from Di, second tone, the non-Chinese people of ancient
Shanxi), who lived in small unorganized tribal bands of hunters or small
scale pastoralists. During Han they caused trouble from time to time by
raiding their Chinese neighbors, sometimes provoked by oppressive treat
ment by Chinese officials. In the chaos at the end of Han, Qiang and Di
living in the Nanshan Mountains moved into the Wei valley in consider
able numbers and played a notable part in the “barbarian” overrunning of
North China during the fourth century. The most famous of these was
Inoue 1972, pp. 82-3; Nishijima 1983, pp. 420-8.
For a detailed study of Qiang during the Han period, see Crespigny 1984, chapters 2
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Fu Jian, a much sinicized Di whose Former Qin kingdom’s success in
briefly uniting North China has been referred to above.
There was also a considerable Tibeto-Burman element in the
Tuyuhun polity in Qinghai.
The Tibeto-Burman inhabitants of West China’s borderlands came
into their ovra with the formation of the Nanzhao kingdom in Yunnan
during Tang and the Tangut (Dangxiang Qiang) Western Xia kingdom in
Gansu and Ningxia during Northern Song.
The South and Southwest
In contrast to the “hard” intractable steppe frontier to the north, the
“soft” southern frontier, where the land was suitable for Chinese-style ag
riculture, remained open to Chinese expansion and occupation throughout
the imperial period. Sinification proceeded as in pre-Qin times, partly by
absorption of the previous non-Chinese inhabitants and partly by immi
gration of Chinese peasants from the north. The unification and expansion
of the Qin and Han dynasties meant the establishment of Chinese admini
stration in all parts of south China, along the coast as far south as Hanoi in
present northern Vietnam, and southwest into present Yunnan and Si
chuan. The territories of non-Chinese aboriginal peoples were organized
into the Chinese commandery-district system but were governed by their
own chieftains who attached themselves to Chinese local government.
They did not always submit peacefully to Chinese rule, and often caused
disturbances that had to be forcibly put down, but control over them was
regarded as a matter of internal security rather than “foreign affairs.”
Chinese expansion into these areas during Han, like the expansion
into the Western Regions, was also partly motivated by interest in making
contact with foreign countries and establishing trading relationships. The
opening to the west inaugurated by Zhang Qian brought back not only
knowledge of India but also the idea that India could be reached by way of
a southwesterly route through Sichuan. Efforts were then made to open up
contacts in that direction. By no means were moves made only by land.
The Han period also saw the beginnings of seaborne trade to India and the
West.
China’s political center moved to the south during the Period of
Disunion, with the capital of the Southern dynasties being located in Nan
jing. Ever larger numbers of Chinese farmers migrated to the south. As a
106
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result the formerly underdeveloped South China underwent a gradual eco
nomic advance with population growth, agricultural, commercial and
manufacturing development. Finally, during the Tang period, the South
replaced the North as the economic center of China.
The Southern dynasties had contacts with more coimtries in South
east Asia than had their Han predecessor. Buddhism was now a bond be
tween China and these countries, while private trade and trade through
tribute-bearing missions provided a more practical motive for contact, and
also contributed to the flourishing of seaborne trade during the Tang dy
nasty. The Southern dynasties retained some administrative control over
the aboriginal peoples in frontier regions, but as in previous times, their
administration was not stable, being affected by ethmc conflicts stated in
political and economic terms. The Chinese were not able to establish a
systematically firm control over these people imtil the early twentieth
century.
General Policy Measures Towards Non-Chinese States
To the rulers of China, the tribute system, though ideal in concep
tion, was inadequate in practice to deal with the many problems that arose
in their intercourse "with foreign states. To conclude this survey of the
background to Sui-Tang diplomacy, it is useful to summarize the various
policies, combining pragmatism with ideology, that had been developed
over the years by imperial governments to deal with such matters before
the Sui-Tang period.^The salient points of these measures are as fol
lows.
1. Aggressive military action to expand Chinese territory.
War has always been the ultimate means to settle internal and ex
ternal political conflicts in human affairs. Aggressive behavior towards
neighbors is the common experience of mankind. Chinese history is not
exceptional in this respect, but Chinese expansionist rulers did not openly
glorify conquest as a legitimate ambition for its own sake; they always
sought to give moral justification for their conquests.
The early Zhou rulers justified their overthrow of Shang with the
Mandate of Heaven doctrine. Later militant rulers such as the First Em
peror of Qin and Emperor Wu of the Han justified campaigns of expansion
by appealing to the need for frontier security. Moral justification was
For general surveys, see Yang Lien-sheng 1968, pp. 20-33; Wang Gungwu 1968, pp.
34-62.
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based on the principle that “the king leaves nothing and nobody outside
his realm” and belief that Chinese culture could convert other peoples to a
higher civilization. In the famous debate in 81 B.C.E. on the salt and iron
monopoly policy, the Legalist statesman Sang Hongyang praised Zou
Yan’s theory and claimed that it justified the Qin territorial expansion
which was aimed at extending its power over the “nine large continents”.
Another justification commonly employed was that expansion
was not to enlarge territory but to create buffer zones for national defense,
so as to prevent the disaster a barbarian invasion would cause and avoid
the resulting harm to the common people. Frontier expansion could also
attract wealth in exotic goods and horses, thus benefiting the country.^
As we have previously noted, however, the Qin and Han expansion
was severely condemned by the Confiician scholars who participated in
these debates during the Han period and by their successors in later ages.
These Confucians stressed an inward looking-attitude, arguing that impe
rialistic endeavors damaged the welfare of the people while failing to
solve the problem of incursions, and that the conquered territories were
useless, and not a source of enrichment for the Chinese nation.
2. Strengthening frontier defense.
While Confucianism tended to give more value to moral persuasion, it held that military force was legitimate if used for defense.
A
Han Confiician minister, Wei Xiang, articulated the different justifications
for using military force and favored the use of force for defense:
Forces used to settle chaos and to punish the tyrannous are righteous
forces, which will dominate All-under-Heaven. Forces used reluctantly
for self-defense are responsive forces, which will win. Forces used to
release minor grudges or resentment are resentful forces, which will suf
fer defeat. Forces used to seize territory and wealth are greedy forces,
which will meet destruction. Forces used to display great power and
numerical strength to awe the enemy are arrogant forces, which will
meet extinction. These five are not only matters of man but also the way
of Heaven.^

Yan Tie Lun Jiaozhu 9, pp. 331-2.
^^Yan Tie Lun Jiaozhu 4, p. 114; 8, pp. 285-7.
Yan Tie Lun Jiaozhu 1, p. 12; 3, p. 105.
Yang Lien-sheng 1968, pp. 24-6.
Yang Lien-sheng 1968, p. 28.
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In appealing to defense as a justification for the resort to force it
was, of cotnse, necessary to know where to draw the boundary line around
China. In the classic pre-Han document, the “Yugong” in the Shujing, the
realm subject to the Chinese Son of Heaven extends in concentric squares
of diminishing influence to the Four Seas, that is, to All-under-Heaven, in
effect, the whole world.^^^ The Qin-Han unification and confrontation
with the nomad power in the north forced a more precise definition. In the
debate on the salt and iron monopoly policy, the Confucian scholars de
fined the extent of China’s territory in ecological terms, saying that the
frontier commanderies were in the mountains and valleys, places not
suited to agriculture because their yin and yang were not well balanced;
China, the Middle Kingdom, lay in the middle between heaven and earth
where yin and yang came together and made possible abundant produc
tion. They argued that China should not exert itself beyond its natural
boundaries into these frontier commanderies.^
Defensive works defining the boundaries between Chinese and
non-Chinese were built from early times. While the First Emperor of Qin
was notorious for his military expansion he was equally known for the socalled Great Wall, which linked together earlier frontier walls built by
Chinese states bordering on the steppe in a cormected series of frontier
fortifications.^ The project was meant to erect a boundary line between
agricultural China and nomadic steppe land as well as to defend China
from nomadic invasions. This was the policy of “having all the Chinese
within and keeping all the barbarians without.” During the Period of Dis
union the alien rulers of the Northern Wei and Northern Qi continued such
construction projects for the purpose of defense. Wall building was ac
companied by establishment of garrisons, watchtowers and walled towns.
There were, however, serious difficulties vsdth the policy of build
ing and manning frontier fortifications as a means of controlling the no
mads. First, it was impossible to have a sharply defined, physical bound
ary line as we can often (though not always) do in the modem world of
nation states. The intermediary zones between China and its neighbors
were always areas for competition. In practice it was impossible to prevent
the nomads from crossing in and the Chinese from going out. Second, de
fending such boundaries placed a heavy logistical burden on the govemShangshu, “Yugong,” p. 18, sections 38.
Yan Tie Lun Jiaozhu 3, pp. 100-1.
Waldron 1990, pp. 13-29. On the policy of wall building, see also pp. 30-51.
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ment to maintain large numbers of troops on or near the frontier. Condi
tions for agriculture were harsh in frontier regions, and population was
sparse. The harsh environment adversely affected the morale of soldiers.
3. Alliance strategies.
Policy-makers in traditional China were clearly aware of the uni
versal rule: my enemy’s enemy is my friend. They were also aware of the
underlying tendency for nomadic power to lack institutional cohesion.
They therefore devised the strategy of “using barbarians against barbari
ans” or “using barbarians to control barbarians.” The objectives were to
play off one party against another so as to divide the parties and allow
China to rule or at least maintain a balance of power, or to obtain foreign
support for some specific purpose. Measures adopted to form alliances in
cluded offering political and military support, signing peace agreements,
marriage contracts, establishment of fictitious kinship relationships, offer
ing rich economic rewards, guaranteeing profitable mutual trade under the
framework of the tribute system and in border markets.
The policy of making peace agreements or marriage alliances was
often criticized by some as being as costly as the use of military force or
more so. Sang Hongyang held that “barbarians” could not be boimd by
agreements; even the Chinese states in the Spring and Autumn period
failed to keep peace agreements, let alone “barbarians.”^ They believed
that alliances with non-Chinese could only be temporary expedients. Fun
damental conflicts of interest would inevitably generate mutual distrust
and hinder any abiding alliances.
4. Appeasement policy.
The Chinese sometimes offered the above inducements in a posi
tive way to secure alliances, but when China was weak and the balance of
power had tipped in favor of the non-Chinese, the nomads in particular,
such measures were forced upon the Chinese. China had to accommodate
the demands of the nomads for payments of silk and other goods, and send
princesses into marriage with their rulers in order to have peace on the
frontiers, as the history of Han-Xiongnu relations during early Han dem
onstrated.
In effect, an appeasement policy would treat the foreign country as
an equal or superior rather than as a tributary .To pay tribute in order to
purchase peace was seen as humiliating politically, expensive financially
and ineffective compared to use of military force. Jia Yi, an early Han
Yan Tie Lun Jiaozhu 8, p. 285; pp. 305-6.
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scholar, attacked the appeasement policy as “hanging a person upside
down.” That is, the Son of Heaven as the head of the state was being made
to serve the Xiongnu “barbarians,” the feet of the state, through the policy
of marriage alliance.^ But down through history such a compromise was
made frequently and it often bought time for the Chinese to accumulate
strength to compete with some foreign power.
5. Settlement and incorporation.
The Chinese also often attempted to bring non-Chinese who had
submitted under Chinese administration, with a view to converting them to
Chinese ways, and to utilizing their military force for frontier defense. The
general spread of Chinese influence was seen not only in the establishment
of the Chinese administrative system over the non-Chinese in the south
and southwest where agriculture was a major way of life, but also in the
resettlement of the submitted nomads on Chinese land in the north. This
policy was actively adopted all through the Han dynasty but became par
ticularly important in the Later Han after the submission of the Southern
Xiongnu. It worked effectively, given the particular circumstances at that
time, but later, it led to revolts by the settled nomads against their Chinese
rulers. The resulting establishment of non-Chinese regimes inside China
brought China into the Period of Disunion, when North China was under
the control of the Five “Barbarians.”

The ideal pattern of Chinese foreign relations called for the allembracing rule of the Son of Heaven, to whom other peoples were ex
pected to come and offer tribute. This ideal pattern grew out of the cosmic
metaphor by which the early Zhou rulers justified their conquest of Shang,
the idea that the ruler of the Chinese people was endowed with a mandate
to rule the world (All-under-Heaven) as Heaven’s surrogate. Despite fun
damental challenges to these ideas during the Warring States period, this
ideology became firmly established as a potent myth in all subsequent
Confucian political philosophy. With the unification by Qin and the impe
rial expansion during Han the tribute system was institutionalized and
implemented as a regular practice.
Foreign regimes acquiesced in this system in varying degrees ac
cording to the political, economic and military benefits that it provided for
them. On the Chinese side, other more pragmatic and realistic views.
117
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which recognized that China was not after all the center of the world, or
that the Chinese Son of Heaven need not extend his rule over non-Chinese,
also developed. Han Confucian scholars severely condemned the foreign
aggressions of Qin and early Han. Pragmatism was most obvious and
dominant in foreign policy when China was in a weak position, as we see
in the policy of appeasement through marriage alliances and payment of
large subsidies to the Xiongnu in early Han.
New challenges to traditional political doctrine emerged during the
Period of Disunion, when North China came under alien rule. Although
the various non-Chinese regimes adopted prevailing Chinese political
theories as the basis for their legitimacy and treated the tribute system as
the norm in their external relations, the fact that the throne was occupied
by a non-Chinese required additional rationalization with additional em
phasis placed on the doctrine that the mandate of the Son of Heaven de
pended on virtue rather than heredity.
Tensions also inevitably arose from conflicts between the need to
maintain the loyalty of the nomadic warriors on whom the strength of the
regimes depended, and the need to encourage the agricultural economy to
provide a source of tax revenue instead of treating it simply as war booty,
and to gain the cooperation of the Chinese educated class whose expertise
was needed to administer the country. The attitude of non-Chinese regimes
in China toward rival nomadic powers who remained outside in the steppe
was also different from that of native Chinese regimes. Having come from
the steppe, and with a more intimate knowledge of it, the nomad conquer
ors continued to regard it as their own sphere and to attempt, with varying
degrees of success, to assert their hegemony there as well as within China.
After the chaotic political turmoil of the foiuth century, the Tuoba
Wei regime succeeded in uniting North China imder a comparatively sta
ble dyarchy between Xianbei rulers and Chinese bureaucrats that not only
united North China but also attempted to draw on its nomadic traditions to
exert control on the steppe. When contradictions between the sinicizing
Tuoba rulers in Luoyang and their frontier garrisons led to civil war, Yuwen Tai, the founder of Western Wei-Northem Zhou, launched his more
radical experiment, which attempted to fuse the leading Chinese and
Xianbei families within his territory into a unified aristocracy combining
military and civil fimctions.
The usurpation by Yang Jian, a member of one of these Chinese
families, made the succeeding Sui dynasty, which proceeded to reunite
North and South China after two and a half centuries of separation, more
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acceptable to the Chinese, but both the Sui and Tang ruling houses were
also heirs to this Chinese-Xianbei fusion. This mixed background con
tributed both breadth of outlook and military vigor to Sui and early Tang
in their dealings with the outside world.
Buddhism, which was actively promoted by the non-Chinese re
gimes of the North and also took root in the South, was also an important
legacy of the Period of Disimion that eventually worked as a unifying
force for China, and contributed an important ingredient to the cosmopoli
tan, open-minded atmosphere that prevailed in Tang China and strength
ened and rendered more subtle Tang’s diplomacy.
In the second half of the chapter we discussed the evolution of
Chinese foreign relations up to Sui-Tang from an external point of view.
The Qin-Han imification created a new situation in which China no longer
consisted of rival states looking inward and contending with each other.
“Barbarian” internal enclaves had ceased to have much importance. China
had come to comprise a unified empire looking outward on non-Chinese
neighbors on the periphery, thus beginning the history of China’s “foreign
affairs.”
Inescapable realities of geography meant that in some respects the
problems that faced the Sui and Tang rulers were a continuation of those
that had faced Qin and Han, but in other respects the situation had greatly
evolved and become much more complicated. The most formidable and
persistent problems facing Chinese regimes from Qin-Han onward came
from the nomadic peoples of the North, beginning with the Xiongnu and
ending at the time of the founding of Sui and Tang with the Turks. West of
the steppe land were the oasis states of the Western Regions, whose stra
tegic importance to China lay, as in Han times, in their potential role as
allies and bases for outflanking the nomadic powers and for controlling the
overland trade routes providing access to Western and Southern Asia.
East of the steppe were the Liaodong area in southern Manchuria
and the Korean peninsula. Here significant changes had taken place be
tween Han and Sui-Tang. Like the expansion into the Western Regions,
the Han expansion in this direction was carried out for the military pur
pose of outflanking the Xiongnu. Those more southerly parts of the Ko
rean peninsula not conquered by China were inhabited by unorganized
tribal peoples. Withdrawal of Chinese colonial occupation from the north
at the end of Han was followed, however, by nomadic invasions and the
emergence of well-organized territorial states occupying most of the pen
insula. By the sixth century the Korean peninsula was divided between
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three competing kingdoms, all more or less influenced by Chinese civili
zation.
Directly to the west of China and south of the main trade routes to
the Western Regions, Tibet remained outside the Chinese sphere of influ
ence vmtil the Tang period, while the intermediate lands continued to be
occupied by Qiang and Di tribesmen as during Han. The Tuyuhun, a
branch of the Xianbei who established themselves in Qinghai in the fourth
century and absorbed Qiang and Di elements, were the main power in that
region at the beginning of Sui and they acted as an intermediary in bring
ing Tibet onto the political scene as a rival of China during the following
century.
Dioring the Period of Disunion, a succession of native Chinese dy
nasties continued to rule in the south. The Chinese population in the south
swelled with the influx of refugees and this led to economic advance in the
Yangtze valley, foreshadowing its replacement of the North China plain as
the economic center during Tang. The graduad sinification of the aborigi
nal peoples of South China, where the land was suitable for Chinese-style
agriculture, proceeded as it had in pre-Han and Han times. The nonChinese peoples did not always submit peacefully but, unlike the situation
in the north, no organized non-Chinese state had yet appeared to confront
the advancing Chinese before Sui times. The Southern Dynasties also ac
tively encouraged overseas trade and so contributed to the flourishing of
seaborne trade during the Tang dynasty.

Chapter 2
How Foreign Affairs were Handled During Sui and Tang
The basic structure of the bureaucracy by which China was gov
erned in imperial times took shape during Qin and Han. Its institutions and
their functioning during that period have, been well described by Wang
Yu-ch’uan and Hans Bielenstein. Between Han and Tang these institu
tions had imdergone much evolution and elaboration. The more ample data
from the Tang period have also been thoroughly analyzed and discussed
by such scholars as Des Rotours, Sun Guodong, and Xie Yuanlu. 2
After a brief discussion of the general decision-making process of
the Tang government and the checks and balances built into the process
for ensuring accuracy and effectiveness, this chapter focuses on the way in
which Tang dealt with official business involving relations with foreign
countries. Who were the individuals and groups principally involved in
making policy on such matters? What bureaucratic apparatus on the cen
tral level was responsible for handling foreign affairs? How was informa
tion on foreign countries collected and utilized in coming to decisions?
How did this information provide basic materials for the compilation of
accoimts of foreign countries in the national history? Answers to these
questions show that China had developed a sophisticated set of principles
and institutions for dealing with foreign coimtries, assuring frontier secu
rity and securing the rule of the Son of Heaven.
The Decision-Making Process
There was no special office in traditional China for foreign policy
decision-making. Foreign affairs were largely concerned with frontier se
curity, and frontier policies were part of the general decision-making proc
ess. The procedure for decision-making in foreign affairs started with the
gathering of information from various sources. Based on their assessment
of that information, officials would put forward proposals in the form of
memorials. On the central level, the memorials would be studied by Chief
* Wang Yti-ch’Uan 1949; Bielenstein 1980; 1986.
^ Des Rotours 1932; 1947-48; Sun Guodong 1957; Xie Yuanlu 1992.
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Ministers, and a decision would finally be arrived at through a sequence of
deliberation, drafting, sanction by the emperor, and final scrutiny xmtil the
decision was proclaimed in an imperial edict or an instruction from some
lesser authority and implemented.^
The above decision-making process took definitive shape at the
central level during Tang under Taizong but all its main characteristics
were inherited from Sui. Three kinds of conferences were held to discuss
the feasibility of proposals on such important matters as succession to the
throne, appointments, financial policies, military affairs, frontier policies
etc.

The first was the regular audience at which the emperor met his
high officials. At the beginning of the dynasty, the most important of these
was the Consultant Assembly {changcan), held every day or every other
day and participated in by officers of the fifth rank and above. After the
time of Gaozong, the importance of this large assembly decreased and a
smaller meeting between the emperor and his Chief Ministers and other
select officials after the court assembly was finished became more impor
tant. These smaller meetings were sometimes already being held in Taizong’s time. From Suzong’s time onward it became the regular practice to
hold these meetings in the Yanying Hall {Yanying diari), a venue that had
already sometimes been used in Xuanzong’s time. Often other officials in
addition to the Chief Ministers would participate in such meetings. After
mid-Tang the emperor also held irregular meetings with the Hanlin aca
demicians.^
The second kind of deliberative conference was a formal meeting
of Chief Ministers among themselves. These were first held in the Ad
ministration Chamber {zhengshi tang) and called the Zhengshi Tang
meeting, and then moved to the Office of the Secretariat (zhongshu sheng)
in Empress Wu’s time. From Xuanzong’s time the Zhengshi Tang became
an office for the Chief Ministers, and was renamed the SecretariatChancellery {zhongshu menxia)', therefore the meeting was also renamed.
An important change was the participation of the eunuchs during the postAn Lushan period, when the eunuchs’ power increased in the court.

^ Xie Yuanlu 1992, pp. 3-6. For the procedure in Taizong’s time, see Wechsler 1974, pp.
95-8. The procedure during the Ming period was similar, see Lo Jimg-pang 1969, pp. 70-

2.
^ Xie Yuanlu 1992, pp. 53-76; Twitchett 1992, pp. 35-8.
’ Sun Guodong 1957, pp. 58-9; pp. 81-3; Xie Yuanlu 1992, pp. 77-88.
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The third, less frequent, type of deliberative meeting was the Court
Conference (Jingyi) participated in by civil and military officials of the
ninth rank and above.
To ensure an effective government the court implemented an
elaborate, multi-channel system for communication between the central
and local governments. The system enabled local officials to send their
memorials, reports and other documents through Territorial Representa
tives (chaoji shi)' or via the postal service to the central government.
After the An Lushan rebellion, the Capital Liaison Office of Vari
ous Regions (zhudao jinzouyuan) was set up in order to make the trans
mission of reports and information more efficient. An agency known as
Touring Brokerage (xunyuan) was established after 758. It was not only
charged with administering the salt monopoly but also functioned as a
chaimel to inform the central government of local political, administrative
and social conditions.® In addition, a system for soliciting opinions
(qiuyan) and for presentation of imsolicited memorials allowed officials at
all levels and common people to present their opinions to the court.® A
parallel mechanism for communication between the central and local gov
ernments was provided by the system of censors or special commissioners
dispatched by the court down to the local areas, whose tasks were to in
vestigate local conditions, to supervise local official administration, and to
verify and confirm the information presented through other channels.^®
Decision-Makers
As in all other periods, the decision-making group wdthin the cen
tral government of the Tang dynasty was composed of four levels.
1. The emperor. He was the final authority and source of all laws,
the head of state; his legitimacy was based on the belief that he was the
Son of Heaven, given the Mandate to rule by Heaven. More practically,
his power was based on his possession of military force and his command
of economic resources. In reality, however, his power was limited by his
personal capability and by the technical impossibility for one man to han
dle the affairs of a government of large scope, by public opinion, and by*
* Xie Yuanlu 1992, pp. 99-103.
^ A delegate from each prefecture was sent to the capital annually to participate in the
New Year’s audience and report on local conditions. See Hucker 1985, p. 118.
* Xie Yuanlu 1992, pp. 128-42.
’ Xie Yuanlu 1992, pp. 161-71.
Xie Yuanlu 1992, pp. 146-58.
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the concept of propriety, all these obligations serving as a kind of unwrit
ten constitution. Even the most independent-minded or willful emperor
was constantly receiving advice from his ministers, as well as from his in
ner circle of relatives and attendants, and he was morally obliged to at
least listen to such people.^ ^
In their decisions involving foreign policies, the emperors were in
fluenced by a variety of motives. Their primary responsibility was to
maintain internal and external order so as to ensure the stability and secu
rity of the whole nation. A second major objective was preservation of the
state’s political prestige. Prestige yielded a power that could not only awe
neighboring peoples into submission but also command the respect and
obedience of the emperors’ own Chinese subjects. Their claim to sover
eignty required that neighboring countries should recognize their posses
sion of the Mandate of Heaven and their right to rule All-under-Heaven. A
third motivation was economic. The trade that accompanied tributebearing missions brought into China nomadic specialties such as horses
which were needed not only to satisfy the personal appetites of the ruler
but also for national defense. On the other hand, tribute from foreign
countries, consisting t)q)ically of exotic luxury goods, mostly went into the
personal treasuries of the emperors, who would distribute it to favored in
dividuals. Tribute did not benefit the state finances. Indeed, emperors were
often chided for being excessively attracted by exotic products.
2. The Chief Ministers (zaixiang). Together with the emperor, they
formed the core group in decision-making and administering all aspects of
state affairs. In place of the Chancellor of early Han times, standing over
against the emperor as the head of the bureaucracy, the Sui-Tang had a
committee of Chief Ministers. At the beginning of the Tang dynasty, the
heads of the three Departments, Director of the Department of State Af
fairs (shangshu ling). Secretariat Director (zhongshu ling) and Director of
the Chancellery (shizhong), were ex officio Chief Ministers. The Three
Departments had originated in Han as agencies within the emperor’s inner
court that had taken over functions of the regular outer bureaucracy and
eventually moved out and become recognized as the most important for
mal parts of the bureaucracy. Instead of dealing with one chancellor the
Tang emperors now dealt with a group of Chief Ministers, which provided
more flexibility in adjusting the balance between different interests and
points of view and in making decisions. The actual power to make particu
Wang Yu-ch’Oan 1949, pp. 138-41; pp. 161-2; Lo Jung-pang 1969, p. 44.
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lar decisions varied and alternated under different circumstances between
the throne and the bureaucracy.
After the emperor Taizong, as Crown Prince, held the title of
shangshu ling, this position fell into abeyance and was not filled. Until
705, the deputy heads of the Department of State Affairs (pnye) took this
official position’s place as ex officio Chief Ministers, after which they too
ceased to fimction and the title of puye was attached to a sinecure for per
sons of high rank. It was also customary throughout the dynasty to appoint
one or more other high officials, including, most commonly, the head of
one of the six Ministries (bu) of the Department of State Affairs, to serve
12
as ad hoc Chief Ministers.
3. Remonstrance officials, whose responsibilities included scruti
nizing and commenting on decisions (shenyi fengbo). They held such of
fices as Supervising Secretary (Jishi zhong) under the Department of State
Affairs, Policy Adviser (sanqi changshi). Grand Master of Remonstrance
(jianyi dafu). Rectifier of Omissions (Jbuque) and Reminder (shiyi). The
last four were divided between the Chancellery and the Secretariat. They
were also admitted to the conferences held between the emperor and his
Chief Ministers. Compared with Han, the Tang remonstrance system was
more formalized; the number of officials increased, and they enjoyed rela
tively more independence. However, on occasions when they, as com
paratively low-ranking officials, attempted to confront those in power, in
cluding the emperor himself, their position could become quite precari13

ous.

4. Assistants, who did not participate in the deliberations of poli
cies but played important roles in recording the activities of the emperor,
transmitting {chuanda) and promulgating (banbu) orders. These assistants
held such positions as Imperial Diarist {qiju lang and qiju sheren) and Sec
retarial Receptionist (tongshi sheren).^^
The official histories contain materials on policies and decisions,
major participants in the deliberations, and major conflicting opinions. We
also on occasion have contemporary correspondence or documents sent
from the Tang court to frontier officials and to foreign rulers, as for ex
ample, in the collected works of Zhang Jiuling, Bai Juyi and Li Deyu, that
Des Rotours 1932, pp. 5-6; p. 10; Wang Yu-ch’uan 1949, pp. 43-6; Sun Guodong
1957, pp. 19-24; pp. 60-5; Xie Yuanlu 1992, pp. 6-10.
Xie Yuanlu 1992, pp. 35-52.
Sun Guodong 1957, pp. 25-9.
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provide us with more detailed information. Li Deyu’s works, in particular,
provide us with a detailed, step by step, day-to-day account of how the
court dealt with the Uighurs between 841 and 845 and how the key deci
sions were made.^^
In addition to the above groups, officials throughout the empire
could present memorials and reports to the central government with pro
posals for action. These would be examined and deliberated upon and de
cisions reached. In the formulation of foreign policy, although frontier of
ficials were not formally included in the decision-making bodies, they of
ten played an important, sometimes decisive, role. They were familiar with
frontier affairs and handled much of the actual contact with the nonChinese. It was often they who made proposals, whereupon they might be
invited to participate in the deliberations at court and have their proposals
approved at the central level. The emperors often consulted the frontier
officials for detailed information and advice on strategy. Many of them
were promoted to the central level, taking up various positions such as
Minister of War, and often becoming Chief Ministers. Examples of the
important roles played by frontier officials will be seen in the following
chapters.
Tension between the emperor and his bureaucracy was the normal
state of affairs. Although emperors had to rely on their bureaucrats for
administration and needed the information and advice that they provided
in making decisions, no emperor was content to be reduced to merely a
figurehead. The bureaucracy, on the other hand, attempted to restrict the
power of the throne the better to exert its own influence. In policy matters
it was often influenced by ideals and interests that were different from
those of the emperors. From the Han period onward, the Confucian prin
ciple that a wise ruler should not be an active administrator but rather
should content himself with being a perfect moral leader who would select
wise and virtuous men and listen to their advice in state affairs prevailed
within the Chinese bureaucracy.^^ Through the civil service examination
system which began in the Sui dynasty and was further developed
throughout the Tang period, Confucianism sent down deeper roots. Mem
bers of the bureaucracy also had their own family connections and eco
nomic interests, often as local landlords, which influenced their attitudes
toward government policies. Moreover, as everywhere, bureaucratic rouDrompp 1986.
** Wang Yu-ch’iian 1949, pp. 162-4.
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tines could create intolerable delays in the handling of the day-by-day
business of government, and activist emperors tried to circumvent them.
The bureaucracy always tended to act as a check on the power of
the emperor and this was a continuing source of conflict between the
throne and the bureaucrats. Such tension could be constructive, conducive
to well-thought-out plans and effective government; but it could also lead
to destructive power struggles.
Having the heads of the Three Departments as Chief Ministers
participating in decision-making lessened the tensions between the em
peror and bureaucracy. This prevented any monopoly of power on one
side. Instead of dealing with one chancellor the Tang emperors now dealt
with a group of Chief Ministers, who provided more alternatives and
flexibility in making decisions. The actual decision-making power oscil
lated irregularly under different circumstances between the throne and the
bureaucracy.^^ An emperor with a strong personality, such as the Sui Em
peror Yang and Tang Taizong, was usually prepared to enforce his will.
The personal character, abilities and experience of each emperor very
much influenced which chief ministers he selected and his subsequent re
lations with them. A weak emperor could let the power slip into the hands
of his ministers. When Xuanzong lost interest in government, first Li
Linfu and then Yang Guozhong were able to exercise dictatorial power.
To strengthen their own power, emperors tended to develop an
“inner court” (neiting), relying on imperial relatives, personal secretaries
or eimuchs, as opposed to the “outer court” (waiting) of bureaucrats. This
distinction has been well described by Wang Yu-ch’iian for the Han per
iod.^® Former Han empresses and empress dowagers, along with their
male relatives (waiqi), often formed a powerfiil group behind and around
the throne. This was also true during Sui and Tang.
Sui Wendi’s Empress Dugu was a powerful influence behind her
husband and Tang Taizong’s brother-in-law, Zhangsun Wuji, was a
prominent figure who became deeply involved in the question of succes
sion to the throne, only to be defeated by Gaozong’s Empress, Wu Zetian.
She in turn, first dominated her husband and then supplanted her sons and
made herself the first and only female emperor in Chinese history. Para
doxically (from the point of view of traditional Chinese patterns of behav
ior) she despised her own male relatives as much as she did the members
” This was a general feature of China’s political history. See Lo Jung-pang 1969, p. 45.
'* Wang Yii-ch’Oan 1949, pp. 166-73.
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of the Tang royal family, which no doubt was a factor in frustrating her
attempt to replace Tang by her own Zhou dynasty.
Female influence on the throne continued when Empress Wu’s el
der son, Zhongzong, replaced her in 705, only to be dominated by his own
Empress Wei, and when Wu Zetian’s daughter. Princess Taiping, was
deeply involved in the coup that placed Wu Zetian’s second son, Ruizong,
on the throne in 710. Ruizong’s son, Xuanzong, succeeded in eliminating
Princess Taiping. But during the latter part of his reign Xuanzong came
under the influence of his favourite concubine, Yang Yuhuan, whose
cousin, Yang Guozhong, became Chief Minister \vith nearly dictatorial
powers. Yang Guozhong’s rivalry with An Lushan contributed greatly to
the disaster that ended Xuanzong’s reign. Female influence in government
continued under Suzong but became less important as the later Tang em
perors fell under the domination of eunuchs.
Former Han emperors’ frustration v^th the bureaucracy and need
for more informal advice and assistance led them to rely on private secre
taries \vithin the palace. In the course of time these secretaries in turn
moved outside the palace and created the most important functioning of
fices of the regular bureaucracy, replacing the previous “outer” bureau
cratic offices, which often survived in name but with reduced or purely
honorific functions.
The same tendency to rely on private secretaries repeated itself
during Tang. Empress Wu used the Scholars of the Northern Gate (Beimen
xueshi) to help her reach decisions, and also had a female private secre
tary, Shangguan Wan’er, granddaughter of a disgraced and executed Chief
Minister, who rose from being a palace slave and not only composed gov
ernment documents for the empress but gained a name for herself as a
poet. She later became deeply involved in court politics under Zhong19

zong.

The founding of the Hanlin Academy was a more substantial and
long-lasting innovation of this kind during Tang. It began under Xuanzong
as a miscellaneous assembly of persons ■with special skills whom the em
peror wished to have constantly by him within the palace for his personal
edification and entertainment, including not only literary stylists who
could compose official documents, but also poets, calligraphers, experts in
religion, and even chess players. After the An Lushan rebellion it devel”77S'51,p.2175;Guisso 1979, p. 322.
Twitchett 1979, p.450.
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oped into an important consultative body. See especially Chapters 4 and
10 for the role of Lu Zhi as a Hanlin Scholar advising Emperor Dezong.
As during the Later Han period, hovvrever, it vv^as the eunuchs who
emerged as the most serious challenge to the role of the regular bureau
crats as partners of the emperor in governing the coimtry. Formally ex
cluded from participation in governmental matters under Taizong, their
influence grew in an informal way under Xuanzong. During the An
Lushan rebellion soon after Suzong assumed the throne at Lingwu, his
eunuch adviser, Li Fuguo, dominated the court in exile and continued to
do so after the return to Chang’an. Lfnder Suzong’s son, Daizong, a
eunuch was put in charge of the palace armies and, though the eimuchs
lost this authority briefly at the end of his reign, it was restored to them
vmder Dezong and remained vvdth them until the end of the dynasty.
Another eimuch institution that seems to have begun under Dai
zong was the office of Comissioner of Palace Secretary (shumi shi), origi
nally set up as a messenger service for transmitting documents between
the palace and the outer court. In the ninth century it grew into a full
blown Palace Secretariat {shumi yuan) which became a deliberative body
on a par with the Chief Ministers. After the slaughter of eunuchs at the
end of the dynasty it was transformed into a supreme coimcil for military
affairs and, as such, became part of the regular bureaucracy from the Five
Dynasties through Song and Yuan.
Within the bureaucracy, officials’ family backgrounds, education,
experiences in government, official status, and factional relationships all
influenced their assessments of particular kinds of situations. In his histo
rian’s comment at the end of the Monograph on the Xiongnu in the Hanshu, Ban Gu remarks that while Confucian officials stick to the policy of
marriage alliances, military officers advocate punitive expeditions. They
both see one-side and its temporary advantages but do not thoroughly understand the Xiongnu. The historian’s comment in the Jiu Tangshu also
holds that Confucian officials talk mostly about marriage alliances and
generals only want to conquer by force. This is oversimplified smce
neither Sui nor Tang, set a distinct line between civil and military officials.
The same persons often acted in both capacities at different stages of their
Wang Gungwu 1963, p. 89 n. 9; Twitchett 1979, p. 20; Dalby 1979, pp. 633-4; Xie
Yuanlu 1992, pp. 22-3.
“/7S94B, p.3830.
JTS 196B, pp. 5266-7.
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careers. Chief Ministers in particular were often pragmatic men, some with
practical experience in both military and civilian administration.
Although, in Confucian theory, officials supposedly gave disinter
ested advice to the emperor as individuals, we may be sure that during Sui
and Tang, as in all periods of Chinese history, connections based on kin
ship, marriage, local origins, and patronage, as well as class interests, also
affected the advice given. These factors are usually difficult for the histo
rian to sort out. For some brief remarks on the notorious Niu-Li factional
struggles in the ninth century, which had an influence on foreign policy,
see Chapters 9 and 10.
Central Government Offices for Dealing with Foreigners
Specialized central government offices handled the formal side of
intercourse with foreigners and their states. These offices mobilized the
large bureaucratic machine to tightly control the activities of foreign offi
cial visitors to China. The most important of these specialized bureaus was
the Court of State Ceremonials {honglu
a section of the Ministry of
Rites (libu) in the Department of State Affairs (shangshu sheng) in Tang.
It was in charge of foreign guests to China and functioned roughly as what
would in modem times be termed a department of protocol.
This office had its origin in the Zhou Senior Messenger {da xingren), assisted by the Junior Messenger (xiao xingren). The Messengers
were to make arrangements for the visits and receptions of feudal lords at
the royal court.^^ The name honglu was first used in 104 B.C.E. under the
Han Emperor Wu to designate the office responsible for diplomatic rela
tions as well as for reception of Chinese princes and lords and for their in
vestiture.^® The office remained in existence imtil the Qing period.
Specifically, the Court of State Ceremonials during the Sui dynasty
was “responsible for managing the reception at the court of tributary en
voys.”^® It was incorporated into the Court of Imperial Sacrifices

Hucker 1985 translates honglu si as Court of Dependencies for the Sui period and as
Court of State Ceremonials for the Tang. This seems confusing and unnecessary.
“ Zhoulizhushu 37, pp. 1328-9; pp. 1344-5; Hucker 1985, p. 466.
“ HS 19A, p. 730; HHSzhi 25, pp. 3583-4; TD 26, p. 153; Hucker 1985, p. 264.
Hucker 1985, p. 264.
Hucker 1985, p. 264.
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(taichang si) in 582 and was restored in 592. There were three branch
30
offices tinder it:
1. Office of Receptions (dianke shu; dianfan shu under Emperor
Yang), responsible for attending to the needs of important foreign visitors;^^
2. Ceremonial Office (siyi shu), responsible for the funerals of of
ficials;^^
3. Office of Daoist Worship {chongxuan shu), responsible for reg
istering and monitoring the activities of all Daoist monks and nuns in the
capital area.^^
During Emperor Yang’s reign (605-616) the Hostel for Tributary
Envoys (sifang guan) attached to the Court of State Ceremonials was acti
vated from time to time as required by the situation. It was the agency re
sponsible for the greeting of foreign rulers and envoys, their preparation
for presentation at court audience and the handling of their tributary
gifts.^
We have more specific information on the responsibilities of the
Court of State Ceremonials during Tang. The Chamberlain {qing) of the
Court of State Ceremonials and his assistants took charge of receiving
guests and arranging funeral rites of Chinese officials and foreign rulers
who had received Chinese official titles. The Tang Court of State Cere
monials differed from the Sui institution in that it had only two branch of
fices: the Office of Receptions {dianke shu) and the Ceremonial Office
{siyi shu). Their tasks included the following:
1) to assign to each of the Chinese princes and non-Chinese chiefs
a proper rank for court audience, and to distinguish between the eldest son
and the other sons when the heirs of the previous two dynasties and the
princes and chiefs of non-Chinese states received their appointments and
their titles of nobility, and to confer official titles on the foreign rulers;
2) to arrange transportation for foreign envoys to come to the
capital, to register tributary goods and Chinese imperial presents, and to

SUIS 28, p. 792; TD 26, p. 153.
^‘’SC//S28,p.777.
SUIS2S, p. 798; Hucker 1985, p. 504.
Hucker 1985, p. 449.
” Hucker 1985, p. 196.
” SUIS 28, p. 798; Hucker 1985, p. 446.
For more details see Iwami Kiyohiro 1990.
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draw up reports on behalf of foreign envoys if the envoys had some mat36
ters to be presented to the emperor.
The Office of Receptions was responsible for keeping records of
feudal princes and of non-Chinese who had submitted, to be used for or
ganizing their reception, banquets in their honor, their preparation for
court audience and for providing accommodation and looking after foreign
rulers when they fell ill or died while in China. The Ceremonial Office
was responsible for funerals of Chinese officials as well as foreign rulers
who had received Chinese official titles. In 754, the Foreign Relations
Office {libin yuan) was brought under the supervision of the Court of State
Ceremonials; it is not clear under which office this unit had previously
been placed or when it had been set up. It was to give banquets and ar39
range accommodations for foreign envoys.
The Court of State Ceremonials normally employed twenty inter
preters or translators.^^ One important duty of the office was to collect in
formation on foreign states. It made inquiries from foreign envoys con
cerning the geographical conditions of their countries, their customs, local
products, distance from China, and the names of their rulers, after which it
made maps and pictures of foreign peoples and sent reports to the Bureau
of Historiography.'*^
The Court of State Ceremonials was headed by a Chamberlain,
honglu qing, rank 3b in the Tang period. A major part of his duties was to
visit foreign lands to cultivate good relations and for such ceremonial pur
poses as to confer official titles, express condolences at the death of for
eign rulers, escort Chinese imperial princesses to establish or maintain
marriage alliances, and to handle frontier affairs in general. For example,
in 841 the court sent the Chamberlain of the Court of State Ceremonials,
Zhang Jia, as Frontier Patrolling Inspector (xunbian shi) to investigate the
situation of the Uighurs.^^
The Chamberlain of the Court of State Ceremonials sometimes
even participated in frontier warfare, perhaps because the holders of this
position often dealt with non-Chinese and had expertise in foreign affairs.
^®7ZD18,p. 13;rD26,p. 153;77S44, pp. 1885-6;
”riD 18, pp. 16-7;7re44,p. 1885; .HIS 48, p. 1258.
^*771544, p. 1885;Z7548,pp. 1258-9.

48, pp. 1257-8.

THY 66, p. 1151; p. 1152; Xie Haiping 1978, pp. 310-1.
““ TLD 2, p. 28.
7XD51,pp. 29-30; TTIS 43, p. 1836; ATS 46, p. 1198; 777763, p. 1089.
ZZ77246, p. 7953.
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One example is found in the career of Xiao Siye. Xiao was a descendent of
the royal Xiao family of the Latter Liang dynasty (555-597). At an early
age he went into exile among the Turks to accompany his great-aunt. Em
press Yang of the Sui dynasty. He returned to China in 635 and was put in
charge of Turkish affairs. He was appointed Chamberlain of the Court of
State Ceremonials with a concurrent position as the Aide (zhangshi) of the
Protectorate of Chanjoi. In 661 he led the Uighurs who had previously
submitted to China to participation in the war with Koguryo. In 679, when
the Turks who had earlier submitted to Tang rebelled, Xiao Siye led troops
to suppress them. He failed and was exiled to the deep south.^^
The position of Chamberlain of the Court of State Ceremonials
was often filled by officials like Xiao Siye who had gained expertise
through either diplomatic or military contact with the non-Chinese.
Around 619, Zheng Yuanshu, who had a military background, was as
signed a mission to the Turks to persuade them to break with the anti-Tang
forces. He was detained by them for some time, the Turks suspecting him
of being involved in an attempt to poison the qaghan. Upon his return to
China he was appointed Chamberlain of the Court of State Ceremonials,
sent on several difficult peace-preservation missions to the Turks, and
nearly died on several occasions. He played an important role in carrying
out the Tang appeasement policy towards the Turks.^'*
In 714, Wang Jun, who was Vice Minister of the Court of State
Ceremonials and Vice Commander-in-chief of the Shuofang Army, was
made concurrently Protector-general of Anbei in command of several
frontier armies.'^® Guo Zhiyun, a capable frontier military official, was re
warded with the position of concurrent Chamberlain of the Court of State
Ceremonials in 718 after his battles with the Tibetans.'^® Wang Zhongsi,
whose father was a capable military official, rose to prominence due to his
successes in frontier administration and in battles with the Tibetans and
the Turks. In 746 he held unprecedented military power as the Military
Commissioner of Hexi-Longyou and Shuofang-Hedong, and was ap
pointed Chamberlain of the Court of State Ceremonials. He soon resigned

*^JTS 63, pp. 2405-6; ATS 101, p. 3952; ZZTJ200, p. 6323.
^ JTS 62, pp. 2379-80; XTS 100, p. 3938.
*^JTS 93, p. 2986; ATS 111, p. 4154; ZZ77211, p. 6696.
''*yrS103, p.3190.
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from the post of Commissioner of Shuofang-Hedong, and remained on the
frontier defending against the Tibetans.'*^
The title of Chamberlain of the Com! of State Ceremonials was
sometimes given to non-Chinese who had submitted to China. These nonChinese would be expected to contribute their special knowledge and ex
perience to the conduct of China’s foreign relations. A Turkish chief,
Ashina Sheer, submitted to Tang in 635, and then joined several Tang
military campaigns. In 645, following his participation in the war with
Koguryo, he was given concurrent title as Chamberlain of the Court of
State Ceremonials, while his major responsibility still remained military as
commander of expeditions against non-Chinese.^® After the same war with
Koguryo a Korean general who had submitted was also given the title of
Chamberlain of the Covut of State Ceremonials.^® In 732, the nephew of
the King of Silla was given the title of Supernumerary Vice Minister of the
Court of State Ceremonials but remained a member of the imperial guard
at the Tang court.®® Geshu Han, of non-Chinese origin, was made Cham
berlain of the Court of State Ceremonials in 747, due to his military expe
rience in frontier affairs, especially in dealing with the Tibetans.®^
In addition to the Court of State Ceremonials other offices did
52
work pertaining to foreign affairs.
A. There were four such bureaus under the Department of State Af
fairs.
1. The Treasury Bureau (jinbu) under the Ministry of Revenue
(hubu) was in charge, among other responsibilities, of tribute trade (hushi)
53
and of rewards to foreign guests.
2. The Ministry of Receptions (zhuke bu) in Sui, called the Bureau
of Receptions {zhuke si) during Tang, was under the Ministry of Rites. Its
job was to take care of the reception of foreign dignitaries at court.®^ The
bureau was a supervisory office ranked above the Court of State Ceremo-* **

'"JTS’103, p. 3199.
** JTS 109, pp. 3289-90; XTS 110, pp. 4114-5.
*^JTS\99K p. 5323.
THY95, p. 1712. From the context it seems that the year should be 734.
JTS 104, p. 3212; JiTS 135, p. 4570.
“ See also Xie Haiping 1978, pp. 314-5.
FLD3,pp. 48-9;775'43,p. 1828;^46,p. 1193.
^ SUIS 27, p. 753; TLD 4, p. 55; p. 57; JTS 43, p. 1832; XTS 46, pp. 1195-6; Hucker
1985, p. 181.
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nials.^® The office remained as an agency for reception of foreign delega
tions during the Ming-Qing period under the name of ihuke qingli si.
3. The Bureau of Operations {zhifang si) was imder the Ministry of
War (bingbu) during both Sui and Tang. It was in charge of frontier de
fense matters, preservation of maps of foreign states and drawings of for
eign peoples. These maps and drawings were made by the Court of State
Ceremonials and by this office itself. The Ministry of War, like the Minis
try of Rites, was imder the Department of the Sate Affairs.
4. The Transit Authorization Bureau (simen) was under the Minis
try of Justice (xingbu) and responsible for inspecting the luggage of for.

58

eign guests.
B. The Department of Chancellery {menxia sheng) during Tang
conveyed greetings to foreign tributaries in accord with imperial orders.
C. The Vice Directors (zhongshu shilang) of the Department of the
Secretariat were to receive correspondence and memorials from foreign
states and to report them to the throne. They also received gifts and passed
them on to the appropriate agencies.^° Copies of the correspondence and
memorials were to be sent to the Bureau of Historiography. The Secre
tarial Receptionists (tongshi sheren) were to introduce personages during
court audiences, and to receive tribute and presents to the throne. The
Secretariat had a unit known as the Hostel for Tributary Envoys which had
belonged to the Court of State Ceremonials in the Sui period. The Hostel
was responsible for the greeting of foreign rulers and envoys and was
staffed with Secretarial Receptionists.®^
D. Under the Palace Domestic Service {neishi sheng), the Palace
Treasury {neifu ju) was in charge of the emperor’s personal money and
This is according to Yan Gengwang 1969. The traditional view is that the Ministry of
Rites, under the Department of State Affairs, and the Court of State Ceremonials ranked
parallel to each other and that their duties overlapped. Yan disagrees with this, and argues
that the Ministry of Rites’ duties were supervisory, and that the Court of State Ceremon
ials was assigned specific tasks. He demonstrates that after the An Lushan rebellion the
responsibilities of various government offices began to blur together.
Rossabi 1975, p. 63; Hucker 1985, p. 181.
*’n,D51,pp. 29-30; JTS 43, p. 1836;2;TS46, p. 1198.
J7S43,p. 1839; ATS 46, p. 1201.
”riD8,p. 10; J7S’43,p. 1843; ATS47, p. 1205.
“rZ,D9,p. 13;JTS43,pp. 1849-50; 2TS 47, p. 1211.
THY63,p. 1089.
“ TLD 9, pp. 20-l;,OT43, p. 1850;ATS47, p. 1212.
Hucker 1985, p. 446.
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goods and was to give imperial gifts to foreign chieftains upon their depar
ture.®^
E. Placed under the Directorate for Imperial Manufactories {shaofu
jian) during Tang, the Directorate of Tributary Trade (hushi jian) super
vised trade carried on by tributary delegations. It was under the Hostel for
Tributary Envoys during Sui.®® From Han times on, border markets had
carried on trade with non-Chinese, but under the supervision of local govenunents rather than the central government. The Sui founded this office
and Tang continued it, primarily out of strategic and military rather than
economic considerations. Its task was to supervise the cross-border trade
in horses and other animals, including examining the animals, making rec
ords and transferring them to the capital and other places.®®
Seaborne trade had also been under the supervision of local gov
ernments from Han times onward. As long as the imperial court could ob
tain exotic goods from overseas through tribute offerings and official pur
chases, that is, through purchase of goods from foreign maritime mer
chants by local officials on behalf of the imperial court, it did not seem
necessary for the central government to exercise any direct control over
maritime trading activities. From 714, the central government appointed a
Maritime Trade Commissioner (shibo shi ), who was a court envoy, to
south China to purchase goods for the court. Overseas trade was, however,
still under the supervision of the local government. Normally, the post of
commissioner was concurrently held by the prefect of Guangzhou, a major
port city.®^ During the Song dynasty, when overseas trade proved to be so
highly profitable to the court that it rivalled other sources of tax revenue,
the government set up its own offices in the major sea ports, directly con
trolling the trade.®®
Sources of Information on Foreign Countries
From the Han dynasty onwards the Chinese showed great interest
in collecting information on foreign countries. The information was col
lected from various sources. It formed the basis for the making of foreign
policy and it also provided rich basic materials for the compilation of ac“ TLD 12, pp. 42-3; JT544, p. 1872;2OT47, p. 1224.
“77X44, p. 1895;.Y7X48, p. 1272; Hucker 1985, p. 259.
“71Z)22,pp. 29-30.
“ Wang Zhenping 1991, pp. 11-38.
“ Shiba 1983.
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counts of foreign peoples in the Standard Histories from the Shiji onwards.
The sources of information from the period between Han and Tang include
the following:.
1. Chinese envoys to foreign places.
Reports from these envoys were the basis for decision-making. In
the Former Han period, it was the report from Zhang Qian, the famous
Han envoy to the Western Regions, that made Emperor Wu’s several great
expeditions to Central Asia possible, and aroused the Emperor’s interest in
opening up a route from Southwest China to India. His report is mcorporated in the chapter on Dayuan (Ferghana?^°) in the Shiji and in the chap
ter on the Western Regions in the HanshuJ^ In 97, Gan Ying, a Han envoy
to Parthia, went as as far as the Persian Gulf and brought back information
that was later included in the chapter on the Western Regions in the Hou
Honshu
During the period of the Three Kingdoms, the Sun-Wu regime,
with its capital at present Nanjing, took an active interest in the sea routes
to the south. Around 227, Zhu Ying and Kang Tai were sent on a diplo
matic mission to southeast Asian countries. Kang Tai wrote two traveler’s
accounts, Wushi Waiguo Zhuan {Account of Foreign Countries of the Wu
Period) and Funan Ji {Record of Funan; Funan refers to Cambodia). Zhu
Ying wrote Funan Yiwu Zhi {Accounts of Exotic Things of Funan). All
three books are lost, but they provided the basic materials for the account
of Southeast Asian countries in the Liangshu. During the Northern Wei,
under Emperor Taiwu (r. 424-452), Li Ao was sent as an envoy to Koguryo. While in P’yongyang, he inquired after the local situation.^^
Early Sui’s strategy to defeat the Turks was designed primarily by
Zhangsun Sheng, who went on a mission to escort Princess Qianjin to the
®’&/116,pp. 2995-6.
™ This is the rather late, traditional, identification of Dayuan based on the Beishi. Pulleyblank 1966, p. 22-6, has proposed to interpret Dayuan as a transcription of *Taxwar,
that is, the underlying form of the name of the Tochari, who are referred to in Greek
sources as invaders of Bactria and from whom the later name, Tocharestan, for that re
gion was derived. If this is correct, the Dayuan visited by Zhang Qian was not a place but
a nomadic people, like the Yuezhi. At the time of Emperor Wu’s expeditions against Da
yuan in 104 and 102 B.C.E., they seem to have been located in present-day Uzbekistan.
This footnote was kindly provided for me by Professor Pulleyblank.
Hulsew6 1979, p. 8.
'^HHSSS, p. 2910.
^ Xiang Da 1957, pp. 566-8.
ITS 100, p. 2215.
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Turks at the end of Northern Zhou and stayed with the Turks for more than
a year, during which time he obtained invaluable first-hand information
about the Turks’ internal situation/^ After his diplomatic mission to Chitu
(in modem Malaya) in 608, Chang Jun and others compiled a book Chituguo Ji {Record of Chitu) Early in Taizong’s reign Tang Jian went to the
Eastern Turks and upon his return Taizong discussed the situation there
with him/^ In 641, Chen Dade, Director of the Bureau of Operations, re
turned from Koguryo. His mission had been to collect information on that
country. Through distribution of gifts, Chen was able to find guides to
show him around and he acquired information about mountains and rivers
there.^®
Also during Taizong’s time, a military officer, Wei Hongji, the
great grandfather of the famous historian Wei Shu, went on an embassy to
the Western Turks, but was trapped there for three years. Ever loyal to the
coxirt, he wrote a book, Xizheng Ji {Record of the Western Expedition), on
his own clothes which he tore into pieces to make individual pages. The
book was about the various products and customs of the states on the route
from Tang to the west. When asked about foreign countries by Taizong on
his return, Wei presented the book. Taizong was pleased and rewarded
79
him with a promotion.
The military official Wang Xuance went on three diplomatic mis
sions to India between 643 and 657 and compiled Zhong Tianzhuguo
80
Xingji {Record of Travelling in Middle India).
After the Western Regions were brought under Tang control in the
time of Gaozong, the court sent special missions to the Western Regions to
collect information on local customs and products and, as a result, the Bu
reau of Historiography produced the Xiyu Guozhi (Accounts of the States
of the Western Regions) with maps and perhaps other illustrations.®^
Gu Yin, who went as an assistant to a diplomatic mission to Silla
around the middle of the Dali reign (766-778), wrote a book entitled Xin-

SUIS 51, pp. 1329-31; ZZTJ175, pp. 5450-1.
JTS 46, p. 2016; XTS 58, p. 1505.

■^J7:S58,p.2307.
’‘ATS220, p. 6187; ZZTJ 196, pp. 6169-70.
’’ JTS 185A, p. 4795; XTS 100, p. 3944.
Cen Zhongmian 1966, pp. 300-3.
“Y75'58,p. 1506.
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luo Guoji {Record of Silla). This book was referred to by the twelfth cen
tury Korean historian Kim Pu-sik when he compiled his Korean history.
Unfortunately, all these books have been lost in the course of time. .
Nevertheless they must have provided much information that was useful to
contemporary Chinese governments in both their diplomatic and military
dealings with foreigners and for the compiling of official histories. In 787
when the emperor Dezong asked officials to present opinions on a policy
toward Tibet, Cui Huan, who had been to Tibet earlier, reported informa
tion on the number of Tibetan troops and horses, which he had obtained
while in Tibet by bribing the local servants.®^ The collection of informa
tion continued to be a major mission for Chinese envoys to foreign coun
tries in later times.®**
2. Chinese frontier officials.
Frontier officials made regular reports and suggestions to the cen
tral government or provided their own surveys of foreign countries. Often
it was their proposals that eventually became the policy of the court. An
example during the Han dynasty is found in Han management of the
Western Regions by General Ban Chao, who was in the Western Regions
first as Han commissioner then as the Protector-general during 73-102,
and by his son Ban Yong, who was there as the Aide of the Western Re
gions (Xiyu zhangshi) in 123-127. The two played an important role in
maitaining Han administration in the area, and their reports were incorported in the Hou Honshu. The Protector-general of the Western Regions
(Xiyu duhu) must also have been responsible for collecting the informa
tion contained in the chapter on the Western Regions in the Honshu on
distance from China, local population and numbers of troops of different
peoples.®® It was from Ban Yong’s report that the chapter on the Western
Regions in the Hou Honshu drew a large proposition of its data. One can
assume that the information was collected not just for the compilation of a
history book. It was essential for the central authority to have a clear un
derstanding of the Western Regions in order to design its policy there.
The Sui Emperor Yang sent Wei lie and Du Xingman to the West
ern Regions. They went as far as Persia. In his Tongdion Du Yu cites a
’‘^XTSSS, p. 1508; 220, p. 6205; Gardiner 1970, p. 15.
“77S12, p. 356; 196B,p. 5251.
^ For the examples of Song, see Franke 1983, pp. 137-9; for the examples of Ming, see
Rossabi 1975, pp. 15-6.
Biographies of Ban Chao and Yong, HHS 47; Hulsewe 1979, p. 9-11.
*®///7S88, p.2913.
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passage from the book of Wei lie called Xifan Ji {Record of Western Bar
barians).^^ When Pei Ju served as a Sui official in Zhangye, an important
trading center in modem Gansu, he collected information from foreign
merchants and compiled a book entitled Xiyu Tuji {Illustrated Record of
the Western Regions). It was this book and the suggestions Pei made to the
court that helped encourage Emperor Yang’s ambition and adventures in
the Western Regions. He also wrote another book, Gaoli Fengsu {Customs
ofKoguryd)^^
During the Tang period, soon after a coup d’etat took place in
Koguryo in 642, Zhang Jian, the Commander-in-chief of Yingzhou, located close to Koguryo, reported the event to the Tang court. After the
Tang conquest of the Western Turks, Wang Mingyuan was sent to set up
prefectures in Tuhuoluo (Tokharestan, now northern Afghanistan). In 661
he presented to the throne the Xiyu Tuji {Illustrated Account of the West
ern Regions) and made a proposal for the establishment of area com
mands, prefectures, districts and garrisons in the area, which the court ac
cepted. His book is not exant.
In Xuanzong’s time Gai Jiayun, the Protector-general of Anxi,
wrote a book entitled Xiyu Ji or Xiyu Zhi {Record of the Western Regions).
Gai was of military background, with a career in the northwestern regions.
A passage about the Kirghiz in his lost book is quoted in the Tang Huiyao^^ In the famous battle at the Talas River between Tang and the Arabs
in 751 Du Huan, a nephew of Du You, was taken captive and did not re
turn to Tang until ten years later. He wrote a book under the title Jingxing
Ji {Record ofPlaces Passed Through) about his experience. The book was
later lost but some passages were quoted by Du You in his Tongdian.
Jia Dan held various positions such as Chamberlain of the Court of
State Ceremonials, Military Commissioner, and Chief Minister in 793-805
imder Dezong. He remained interested in geography throughout his career
and wrote several geographical works. When foreign envoys arrived or
Chinese envoys returned, he would ask them about the topography of the
place with which they were associated. One of his books contained a de-* **
*^5t//S83,p. 1841; p. 1849; p. 1857; TD 193, p. 1039.
**SL7567,pp. 1578-81;77S46,p.2016;Y7S58,p. 1506.
*’ZZ77196, p. 6181.
TD 193, p. 1044.
THY 100, p. 1785. Ise 1968, pp. 300-7.
TD 191, p. 1029; 192, p. 1034.
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93

tailed study of the routes between Tang and foreign countries. Another
94
had the title Tufan Huanghe Lu {Record of Tibet and the Yellow River).
In 843, when the envoys of Kirghiz arrived at the Tang court, the Chinese
were not clear who they were since communication with China had been
interrupted for sometime and the pronunciation of their name as tran
scribed in Chinese had changed. It was Jia Dan’s work, Siyi Shu
(Discussion of the Four Barbarians), that provided the court with clarifi..
95
cation.
At least six works on the Nanzhao kingdom were written by local
officials and by Chinese envoys to Nanzhao. One of them, Manshu, is still
extant. The military commissioner, Wei Gao, wrote a work on the southwestern frontier defense concerning Nanzhao. When Li Deyu was made
Military Commissioner of Xichuan in 830, he made special efforts through
personal interviews and investigations to collect knowledge on the fron
tier, and compiled a book called Xinan Beibian Lu (Notes on Southwestern
Border Defense)^^ These works became the major sources for the compi
lation of the “Account of Nanzhao” in the Jiu Tangshu and Xin Tangshu
and for Zizhi Tongjian. Some of these lost works are quoted in Sima
Guang’s kaoyi.
3. Chinese Princesses in the Marriage Alliance System.
From the limited sources we have concerning the roles of these
Chinese princesses, we see that they provided useful information to the
Chinese court in addition to the other important functions they performed
in the marriage alliance system.
During the Former Han dyansty, for example, the Han Princess
Jieyou who had married Wusun royality in the Western Regions, and her
maid Feng Liao, both played an active role in strengthening Han relations
with the Wusun. Through their reports or letters they often kept the court
informed of the local situation.®® In 615, when the Sui Emperor Yang was
on his northern tour, the Turkish Shibi Qaghan planned a sudden attack.
The Sui Princess Yicheng, who had married the qaghan, sent a report to

” JTS 138, pp. 3782-7; XTS 43B, pp. 1146-55; 58, p. 1506; 166, pp. 5083-5.
®'‘Y75 58,p. 1506.
’’ THY 100, p. 1785; Pulleyblank 1990b, p. 103.
^ For a study of these works, see Xiang Da 1957, pp. 136-54. For an English translation
of the Manshu, see Luce 1961.
” Backus 1981, pp. 123-4.
AS96B; Li Hu 1979.
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Sui, although it arrived too late.®^ In 677 the Tibetan btsan-po died but it
seems that the Tang court was not informed of this until two years later in
679 when Princess Wencheng, who had married into the Tibetan royal
family in 641, reported the matter through her envoys.In 717 Princess
Jincheng, who had married the Tibetan king in 707, sent a memorial to the
Tang emperor Xuanzong explaining the situation in Tibet and the neces
sity for the two sides to conclude a peace treaty.
4. Foreign merchants and envoys.
As mentioned above, when Pei Ju was in Zhangye, he collected in
formation from foreign merchants about their homelands’ customs and
geography. This information and his policy suggestions encouraged Em102
peror Yang’s ambitions in the Western Regions.
Information from foreign envoys may not have been directly useful
for decision-making, but it was certainly given great importance by the
Chinese court. Japanese envoys arrived at the Sui court in 600. Emperor
Wen asked the official in charge to inquire after the customs of Japan, and
the envoy’s detailed answer was incorporated into the Suishu. Cunosity
was surely one motive but acquisition of reliable knowledge of foreign
lands for making foreign policy would have been the primary motive.
During the Tang period, continuing a tradition that must have gone
back to much earlier times, the various government agencies that dealt
vdth envoys from foreign countries were required to make regular reports
to the Bureau of Historiography, as follows:
•

Appearance at court of tribute-bearing missions from foreign countries:
Whenever such a foreign mission arrives, the Court of State Ceremoni
als should examine them on the natural conditions and customs of their
country, on their dress, and the products brought as tribute, and on the
distance and route by which they have come. These facts are to be re
ported together with the names of their leaders.

” SUIS 4, p. 89; ZZTJ182, p. 5697.
The Chinese sources record the death of the btsan-po as occurring in 679, see JTS
196A, p. 5224; ZZTJ202, p. 6393; CFYG 979, p. 11498. The Tibetan source records the
year as 677, see Beckwith 1987, p. 43. The discrepancy might be due to the fact that
Princess Wencheng’s envoy reached the Chinese court in 679, and the Chinese historians
then recorded that as the year when the death of btsan-po occurred.
‘“'ATS216A, p. 6082.
*®^St//S67,pp. 1578-81;/re 46, p. 2016; ATS'58, p. 1506.
'®^SC//S81,p. 1826.
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The invasions and submissions of barbarians: The Department of the
Secretariat should record and send their memorials and reports [to the
Bureau]; the Ministry of War should record and send military reports [to
the Bureau]; on the day when armies return, generals should fully record
and report [to the Bureau] the cities and fords that have been captured,
officials and commoners who have been wounded and killed, and animals and goods that have been plundered. 104

The Court of State Ceremonials also regularly questioned foreign
envoys about their countries and at court audiences the emperor himself
would put questions to them.^°^ Although it is not clear how strictly the
rules for reporting information were enforced and although after the An
Lushan rebellion the collection of material of all kinds by the Bureau of
Historiography apparently ceased to function well, the accounts of for
eign countries in the Standard Histories, presumably based partly on such
materials, show that the historiographers did receive such reports. Also,
we read that in 843, when Kirghiz envoys arrived at the Tang court, the
Court of State Ceremonials interviewed them about the geography and
customs of their nation. As a result, a painting of these envoys and an ac
count of the Kirghiz nation were produced.
5. Buddhist travelers.
Buddhist travelers’ accounts are a rich source of information on
foreign countries. The early Tang famous monk Xuanzang left for India
around 629 via the Silk Road. Upon his return to the Tang capital over ten
years later he was interviewed by Taizong. Greatly impressed, the emperor
commissioned him to write an account of his experiences and what he had
seen and heard. It can be assumed that the information firom Xuanzang
helped Taizong in his expansion into the Western Regions, which began in
earnest during the 640’s. The book entitled Da Tang Xiyu Ji {Record of the
Western Regions in the Tang Dynasty) was dictated by Xuanzang to Bianji. The book was completed in 646 and contains invaluable information
about Central Asia and India, providing basic materials for the account of
108
the Western Regions in the Xin Tangshu.
104

63, p. 1089. Translation of the first paragraph is based on Twitchett 1992, p. 27.

He omits the second paragraph in his translation.
For example, see ZZTJ 202, p. 6368.
Twitchett 1992, p. 29.
Drompp 1986, p. 286.
Sato 1958, p. 128; Ch’en, K. 1964, pp. 235-8.
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Many Buddhist travelers wrote accounts on foreign countries be
fore Tang. Although they may not have provided direct assistance in the
decision-making process on the central level, they contributed to the en
richment of Chinese knowledge of the outside world, and to the compila
tion of the accounts on foreign coimtries in the official histories. Faxian
and his book on his travels to India are mentioned in Chapter 1. There
were other books by Buddhist monks who traveled abroad in the Period of
Disunion, such as
1) ShishiXiyu Ji {Records of the Western Countries by a Buddhist
Monk), which probably contained a brief account of the Indus valley, a
fuller description of Buddhist holy places in the Ganges valley, and an ac
count of Central Asia, by an unknown monk, probably before Faxian;
2) Waiguo Shi {Matters Concerning the Foreign Kingdoms), a de
scription of kingdoms in North India by Zhi Sengzai, a monk probably
from the Yuezhi in the Jin period (265-420);
3) Foguo Ji {Record of the Buddhistic Kingdoms) by Zhu Fawei,
who may have lived in the Jin period;
4) Youxing Waiguo Zhuan {An Account of Travels in Foreign
Countries) by Shi Zhimeng, who left Chang’an in 404 via the Western
Regions to India and arrived back in China in 424;
5) Waiguo Zhuan {Account of Foreign Countries ) by Shi Tanjing
or Tanwujie, who left China around 420, traveled for about twenty years
from the Western Regions to India and returned to China by sea;
6) Liguo Zhuan {The Account of Countries Passed) by Shi
Fasheng, probably from Gaochang in the Song period (420-479).
These books are no longer extant but some were still available in
the Tang period and there are quotations from some of them in existing
works.
Under the Northern Wei regime, the court sent an envoy. Song
Yun, and others, including a monk, Huisheng, to Central Asia to obtain
Buddhist sutras. They left China around 518 and returned in 522. Both
Song Yvm and Huisheng wrote works on their travels. Although they are
now lost, there are extensive quotations in the still extant Luoyang Qielan
Ji {An Account of Buddhist Monasteries of Luoyang) written in 547.
Huisheng’s report was used in the compilation of the chapter on the West
ern Regions in the Weishu and Beishi^^^ There were other early Buddhist
Petech 1950, pp. 5-6; Xiang Da 1957, pp. 570-7.
WS 102, p. 2279; Chavannes 1903; Luoyang Qielan Ji Jiaozhu, pp. 251-66.
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travelers, of whom Chavannes gives a list in an appendix to his translation
of the account of Song Yun’s journey. 111
In addition to Xuan2ang, another famous Tang Buddhist traveler
was Yijing. He left Canton for India in 671 on board a Persian ship, re
turned to Canton in 689, and wrote two important historical works in ad
dition to his translations of Buddhist sutras, Nanhai Jigui Neifa Zhuan (A
Record of the Buddhist Kingdoms in the Southern Archipelago), and Da
Tang Xiyu Qiufa Gaoseng Zhuan {Biographies of Eminent Monks of the
Tang Who Sought the Dharma in the Western Regions).Other surviving
accounts of Buddhist pilgrims include a work in Chinese by Huichao, a
Korean monk who went to India via sea and returned to China by land in
729, and a work by Wukong who left Chang’an in 751 and returned to
China in 790 by land.^^^
6. Miscellaneous works.
Works in this category, like the Buddhist travelers’ accounts, may
not have direct bearing on the making of foreign policy, but they were im
portant sources for the compilation of official histories. During the Period
of Disimion the Chinese interest in geography and in foreign lands pro
duced a large number of books on the subject, as shown in the Monograph
on Bibliography in the Suishu. Most of them are not exant but materials
from some are scattered in other books, from which one can get a hint of
the wide scope of their authors’ interests.
The eighteenth century scholar Wang Mo printed a collection of
surviving fragments of geographical works of the period from Han to Tang
under the title Han-Tang Dili Shuchao {Excerpts of Han-Tang Books on
Geography). In his original table of contents he included about 40 titles by
envoys or generals on campaign and quoted in accounts of foreign coun
tries, and works on the four “barbarians”. Unfortunately none of these
works was included in the work as finally printed.^
There seems to have been an explosion in books on geography
during the Period of Disunion, dealing with both China itself and also with
foreign couutries. Lu Cheng in the Southern Qi period (479-502) compiled
the Dili Shu {The Book of Geography) in 149 chapters based on 160 other
works. Ren Fang in the Liang period (502-557) wrote Di Ji {Record of
Chavannes 1903, pp. 430-41.
Ch’en, K. 1964, pp. 238-9.
Chavannes 1969, pp. 141-2.
Han-Tang Dili Shuchao, pp. 19-20.
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Land) in 252 chapters, adding more works to Lu Cheng’s. Only a fifth of
these two works were extant by early Tang.^
Interest in exotic things also stimulated the production of books.
For example, the monograph on bibliography of the Suishu lists over ten
works on exotic things, such as Jiaozhou Yiwu Zhi {Exotic Things of
Jiaozhou) by Yang Fu of the Han dynasty, and Nanzhou Yiwu Zhi {Exotic
Things of Nanzhou) by Wan Zhen, a local official of the early part of the
third century under the Sun-Wu regime.
Prior to Tang several works
were written about the southwest, including Yunnan.^
In the monographs on bibliography in Sui and Tang official histo
ries, one finds many interesting titles of works concerning non-Chinese.
One book entitled Beihuang Junzhang Lu {Record of Chieftains of the
Northern Wilderness) was by Li Fan (d. 826), the son of Chief Minister Li
Mi under Dezong.
The works recorded in these bibliographies also in
clude the titles mentioned above by Zhu Ying and Kang Tai, and the Bud
dhist travelers Pei Ju, Jia Dan etc.
In addition to the above-mentioned literary sources, historians used
documerits of the following kinds in compiling accounts of foreign coun
tries in the Standard Histories.
1. Edicts and orders issued by the Chinese court and letters sent by
China to foreign rulers.
2. Biographies of officials involved in foreign affairs and expedi
tions to foreign countries, and documents contained in their collected
works.
3. Correspondence from foreign countries. It is not clear who com
posed letters sent by foreign rulers to the Chinese court and whether they
were originally written in Chinese or were translated into Chinese either at
their point of origin or after arrival at the Chinese court. One speculation is
that the foreign rulers had them written by Chinese who were living at
their courts or by their own people who had learned Chinese. For example,
in Taizong’s reign, following the marriage of Princess Wencheng to the
Tibetan king, Tibet sent young people to Tang to study, and invited Chi
nese scholars to Tibet to compile official reports to send to the Tang em-

Xiang Da 1957, p. 565.
Xiang Da 1957, pp. 568-70.
"’Xiang Da 1957, pp. 138-9.
"* JTS 130, p. 3623; NTS 58, p. 1508.
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peror on behalf of Tibet/In 647, when the Uighurs were brought under
the Chinese administrative system, they asked for scholars to compose official letters for them.
Korea and Japan adopted not only the Chinese
bureaucratic system but also the Chinese script.
On the other hand, in the Chinese court there were Official Inter
preters (yiguan). It is possible that, at least on some occasions, they trans
lated foreign correspondence into proper Chinese both in language and in
rhetoric. An example is the letter sent by the Turkish qaghan Qimin to the
Sui Emperor Yang in 607. The letter may have been translated from
Turkish into Chinese since some sentences bear similarities to the phrases
in the Turkish inscriptions. 121
The question of the proper modes of address for a foreign ruler to
use in addressing the Chinese emperor was a vital consideration from the
Chinese point of view.
Some letters of foreign rulers demonstrate a
strong tendency to insist on equality with China, the most famous example
being the letter by the Japanese ruler to Emperor Yang of the Sui period,
which began: “The Son of Heaven in the land of the rising sun sends this
letter to the Son of Heaven of the land where the sun sets.” Upon read
ing it. Emperor Yang was displeased and instructed the Chamberlain of
the State Ceremonials: “From now on, do not present letters from the Man
and Yi (barbarians) which do not have proper etiquette.” Letters from
Tibet quoted in the Tang histories also contain examples of language that
Chinese rulers found unacceptable. Other letters from foreign rulers, how
ever, were written in accordance with Chinese rhetorical forms, the most
obvious cases being when the foreign rulers refer to themselves as vassals.
Within the Bureau of Historiography, the works based on the ma
terials collected went through a series of stages of composition. During the
Tang dynasty these were the Court Diary (qiju zhu). Administrative Rec
ord {shizheng ji), Daily Calendar (rili). Veritable Records (shilu) and Na
tional History (guoshi), each being a digest of the material produced at the
previous stage.
Although these works are largely no longer extant, the
last two categories were the principal direct sources for the existing Stan“''77S 196A, pp. 5221-2; Y7S'216A, p. 6074.
ZZTy 198, p. 6245.
Mori Masao 1967, pp. 441-76.
Kaneko Shuichi 1974; 1988; Wang Zhenping 1994.
’^Wright 1979, p. 139.
*^Sf//S81,p. 1827.
Twitchett 1992, p. 33.
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dard Histories of Tang, the Jiu Tangshu and the Xin Tangshu, as well as of
the Tang section of Zizhi Tongjian.

The Sui-Tang period is noted for its innovations and improvements
in the structure of government. Foreign policy was not made in isolation
by a separate corps of diplomats lacking meaningful contact with those
engaged in domestic policy-making. Indeed, no real distinction was made
between domestic and foreign affairs. A larger group of officials than in
Han times participated in decision-making for both domestic and foreign
policy. Conferences were held regularly between the emperor and his of
ficials and among the Chief Ministers. Responsible officials deliberated on
all important decisions and checks and balances were put in place to en
sure accuracy and avoid errors. An elaborate communication system
linked the center to the most remote offshoots of the empire. Although not
part of the central decision-making body, frontier officials often played a
very important, sometimes decisive, role in making proposals and con
tributing their local knowledge and experience to decision-making.
During the Tang period, as in other times, tensions often existed
between the emperor and his ministers as a result of their conflicting inter
ests and different points of view. As in other times, the Tang emperors of
ten relied on their inner court of imperial relatives, personal secretaries and
eunuchs, to strengthen their power and bypass the bureaucracy. Moreover
the composition of the inner court changed over the course of the dynasty,
most notably with the growth in the power of the eunuchs after the An
Lushan rebellion.
Traditional historians often commented that under the imperial
system Confucian officios tended to promote a peaceful policy whereas
military men often advocated aggression, but this simple conclusion does
not seem to apply to the Sui and Tang period, during which there was
much fluidity of movement between civil and military posts and the same
persons often acted in both capacities at different stages of their careers.
There was no specific office in the central government for foreign
affairs. This did not mean that foreign affairs were not important, but
rather that as a would-be imiversal state the government of China had to
integrate foreign with domestic affairs. The need to foster such integration
was not peculiar to imperial China. When the issues are crucial enough,
even modem states must judge their foreign affairs in term of domestic
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needs and make their domestic policies adjust to the requirements of their
foreign involvements. Few governments are fortunate enough to be able to
make their foreign policies adjust to their domestic needs.
The government distributed relevant work to various offices that
took charge of foreign diplomatic delegations from their arrival at the bor
der to their audience with the emperor and their safe departure from China.
The most important office was the honglu si, with its chief officers se
lected for their background or expertise in dealing with non-Chinese. Bor
der markets for trade with non-Chinese were all under the supervision of
local governments rather than the central government. All these offices
were supposed to ensure the smooth working of the tribute system, and to
exercise a tight control over official contact with foreign countries.
It has often been claimed that the ethnocentric Chinese were not
interested in foreign countries but there is abundant evidence, and not just
during Sui-Tang times, for the opposite conclusion. In dealing with fron
tier issues the Chinese simply could not afford to be ill-mformed about
foreign countries, and from the Han dynasty onwards Chinese govern
ments attached great importance to the collection of information on their
neighbors. Large amounts of data were regularly collected from Chinese
envoys sent abroad, frontier officials, Chinese princesses in marriage alli
ances and from foreign envoys to China. During Tang this information
was gathered in the Bureau of Historiography. Buddhist travelers and
scholars and officials interested in foreign lands also produced a variety of
works that enriched Chinese knowledge of the world and broadened the
minds of China’s ruling elite.
These materials were organized by the bureaucracy into forms eas
ily available to the decision-makers, and they were in fact used in deci
sion-making. Happily for the modem historian, these materials were also
the primary sources for the compilation of the accounts of foreign coun
tries in the dynastic histories and encyclopaedias which have come down
to us. While persistently maintaining the official rhetoric of sinocentrism
and Chinese cultural superiority, the Chinese realistically understood the
importance of knowledge of their neighboring peoples and made efforts to
increase such knowledge.

Chapter 3
The Sui Dynasty: A United Empire Restored and Lost
In 581 the Regent, Yang Jian, forced the child Emperor Jing of
Northern Zhou to abdicate his throne and inaugurated the Sui dynasty,
with its capital in Daxingcheng, near Chang’an. Though it began auspi
ciously by conquering Chen, the last of the Southern Dynasties, in 589 and
reuniting the whole of China for the first time since the fall of Western Jin,
the Sui dynasty lasted for only two generations. In this chapter we first
discuss the generally successful, pragmatic foreign policy of the founding
ruler. Emperor Wen, who aimed at consolidating his frontiers, and then the
transition under the second ruler. Emperor Yang to an overambitious, ag
gressive policy aimed at foreign conquest, which led to disaster.
Emperor Wen
Yang Jian was a native Chinese whose forefathers had served nonChinese regimes for six generations during the Period of Disunion. His
wife was from a Xianbei aristocratic family, and his daughter was the em
press of the Emperor Xuan of the Northern Zhou. The new Sui Emperor
Wen, Yang Jian’s posthumous title, soon engaged himself in a whole set
of complex tasks to consolidate the dynastic power. The situation was not
unfavorable: Northern Zhou had conquered its rival. Northern Qi, just four
years earlier, and had thereby unified the whole of north China. Although
a usurper of Northern Zhou’s throne, Yang Jian had already defeated his
major opponents before 581 and had imder his control the powerful mili
tary machine and the loyal and effective bureaucracy of that semi-nomadic
and semi-Chinese regime.
Yet the tasks of consolidation were formidable: from the point of
view of geopolitics, three regions of China — Northwest China, the North
China Plain, and the Lower Yangtze — were the most important areas for
any dynasty of unification to control.^ In 581 Sui dynastic power was not
yet firmly established in any of these regions: South China was still vmder

’ Somers 1986, pp. 976-8.
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the last of the Southern Dynasties, Chen; Northwest China was menaced
by incursions from the nomadic Turks and the Tuyuhun kingdom, and on
the borders of the North China Plain there was a potential threat from
Koguryo, which occupied Liaodong and the northern half of the Korean
peninsula. In the realm of foreign affairs the whole of Emperor Wen’s
reign was devoted to consolidation. Assisted by his advisers, mostly mili
tary men of action with a pragmatic assessment of the situation, the Em
peror followed a policy aimed at security and defense. One umque adviser
was his wife. Empress Dugu. With no official appointment she exercised
her influence from the “inner court” on all matters of state policy and her
role was so important and lasting that she and the emperor together were
referred to as “the two sages.”^
Military and Frontier Organization
While retaining ihcfubing system, inherited from Western Wei and
Northern Zhou, Emperor Wen reorganized his military forces so that the
central government had stronger control. He restored the Chinese sur
names of the generals and reorganized the Sui troops into twelve umts,
consisting of the palace armies and the fubing, stationed in the capital and
in nearby regions. He transformed the fubing into militiamen who were
liable for service from the age of twenty-one to sixty (using the Chinese
method of reckoning age, which makes a person one year old at birth).
Fubing came from both hereditary military families and from ordinary
families. They would perform military duties periodically, as guards in the
capital or at the frontier posts, and participate in expeditions. When off
duty, they engaged in agriculture at home. These militiamen were given
land under the equal field system, but were exempt from tax and corvee
labor and were expected to provide part of their own equipment.
In reforming local government Emperor Wen reduced the three
levels of the local administrative apparatus into two: “prefecture” (zhou)
and “county” (xian). To ensure secure and trouble-free frontiers, Sui fol
lowed the Northern Zhou practice of establishing “regional military com
mands” or “area commands” {zongguan fu) in areas of major strategic im
portance. During the Tang dynasty some of these regional military com
mands had their own fubing.
The regional military commanders (zongguan) exercised military
^ Wright 1978, pp. 71-3; 1979, pp. 63-6.
^ Gu Jiguang 1962, pp. 98-115; Wright 1979, pp. 100-2.
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authority over a cluster of neighboring prefectures. These commanders
were ranked military officials, and sometimes were made concurrently
civil governors of the prefectures in which they were stationed. They were
classified in four grades, as grand regional military commanders, first
class, second class, and third class depending on how many prefectures
were imder their command. By the end of Emperor Wen’s reign there were
about 36 regional military commands, eight in the north and northwest to
defend against the Turks, and seven in the northeast to cope with the Turks
and Khitan, a Mongolian speaking people in Manchuria.'^ One major re
sponsibility of these regional commanders was security in their jurisdic
tion. The degree of stability directly affected relations with neighboring
non-Chinese.
Since the northern frontiers were often subject to nomadic raids,
the court would appoint high-ranking officials, some of non-Chinese ori
gin, with superior military ability and good knowledge of frontier affairs
to be regional military commanders. For example, Helou Zigan, of Xianbei origin, who served as Yunzhou zongguan, first made his name among
the Turks.^ Of Du Yan, his successor, it was said in one Chinese source:
“When the Turks came to raid, Yan captured and executed them. The
northern barbarians were afraid and the barbarian horses did not dare to
come to the frontier.” Zhou Yao, of Xianbei origin, was the Youzhou
zongguan-, he took care to repair the fortifications and kept close watch to
safeguard the frontiers. As a result, the frontier people enjoyed peace. Qifu
Hui, of Xianbei origin, served as Liangzhou zongguan, guarded the fron
tiers closely and sent reconnaissance forces so far out that the Turks were
awed by his name and stopped raiding.^ Wei Chong, experienced in deal
ing with the non-Chinese, was made Yingzhou zongguan in the northeast.
His good treatment of the Khitan and Mohe, a Tungusic tribe in Manchu
ria, made them -willing to fight for Sui; he attracted the Xi, a Tungusic
tribe in Manchuria, to come to pay tribute, and led troops to drive away
the invading Koreans. Q During his career he accumulated knowledge about
Korea and left a written work on Korea which was later presented by his

* TD 32, p. 185; Cen Zhongmian 1957, pp. 7-10; Wright 1979, p. 100.
^Sf//S53,p. 1353.
®5C//555,p. 1372.
’SL7S55, p. 1376; p. 1378.
*5C//S 47, p. 1270.
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son to the Tang emperor Taizong before the campaign against Korea.

g

Zhangsun Sheng and his Divide and Rule Turkish Strategy
The nomadic Turkish power, known in history as the First Turkish
empire (from mid-sixth century to 630), formed the most severe threat to
the newly founded Sui dynasty. Emperor Wen had first to deal with the
Turks before he could launch any major campaigns into the South to
complete China’s domestic unification.
Soon after assuming the throne Emperor Wen discontinued the
payment of silk products to the Turks, probably because of his belief that a
unified north could now risk defying the Turks. The Turkish Shabolue
(Ishbara) Shetu Qaghan, felt humiliated. His wife, the Northern Zhou
Princess Qianjin, also resented Sui and wanted to use Turkish forces to
take revenge for Sui’s usurpation of the throne from the Zhou house. In
581 the Turks joined forces with a former Northern Qi officer, Gao Baoning, to attack Linyu Fortress. Gao Baoning had been the Prefect of
Yingzhou before Sui and had maintained close contact with the Khitan and
Mohe people in Manchuria. In the following year the Turks invaded,
penetrating inside the Great Wall.^°
While Emperor Wen generally followed a defensive strategy—
improving fortifications along the Great Wall, and stationing troops along
the northern frontiers^ ^—a policy to divide the Turks was also devised.
The architect of the policy was Zhangsun Sheng (542-609). Until his death
Zhangsun Sheng was Sui’s expert on Turkish affairs, and played a crucial
role in the formulation and implementation of policies towards the Turks.
Zhangsun Sheng was a native of Luoyang, his family originally
being a branch of the Tuoba royal clan of Northern Wei. His daughter was
the famous future Empress Zhangsun of the Tang emperor, Taizong, and
his son became the highly prestigious minister Zhangsun Wuji vmder Tai
zong. As a young man Zhangsun Sheng was not very impressive in literary
attainments but was excellent in martial arts, especially archery, making
him a typical Northern military man.
In 580, at the end of Northern Zhou, he went on a mission to escort
the Zhou Princess Qianjin to the Turks for a marriage alliance. In their fre
’J7S77, p. 2670.
SUIS 84, pp. 1865-6; ZZTJ175, p. 5450; p. 5456.
" Cen Zhongmian 1958, pp. 45-50; for the work on the Great Wall in 581, 582, 586 and
587, see p. 58.
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quent diplomatic exchanges at that time both Zhou and the Turks selected
men with good military skills in order to impress the other side. Zhangsun
was selected for this mission because of his talent in the martial arts, and
because of this talent the Turkish qaghan showed him great favor and in
vited him to stay over until the next year. Not forgetting the information
gathering side of his mission, he made friends with the qaghan’s younger
brother, who had had disputes with the qaghan, so that he could obtain in
valuable first-hand information about the local geography and the Turks’
internal situation. With such information China might be able to exploit
the deep internal divisions among the Turks.
After the Turkish invasion of 581 Zhangsun Sheng presented a
memorial to the court regarding the Turks. Even now the memorial re
mains our best source for the complicated internal conflicts within the
Turkish empire then. The Turks were not as centralized as the Xiongnu
had been. By 581 the Turkish empire had two qaghanates: the Eastern
Turks were under Ishbara Qaghan, who had his headquarters in the Otuk^
Mountains, and the Western Turks were under Datou (Tardu). In addition,
there were other qaghans, nominally subordinate to one or the other of
these, but who were disaffected because of disagreements over the suc
cession. Each of them was militarily powerful. On the surface all these
chieftains maintained a show of unity, but underneath they were riven by
suspicions and ill feelings. The subjects of the Turks who had been con
quered and incorporated into their khanates were living under heavy op
pression and, being nomads themselves, were quick to rise in revolt when
the opportunity presented itself.
Based on his observations, Zhangsim suggested a policy of playing
off the Turkish qaghans against one another. In accordance Avith the bal
ance of power principle of making alliance with the far and attacking the
near, and abandoning the strong and joining the weak, his strategy was to
make Ishbara the target and to ally Sui with the other qaghans. This, he
assured the court, would weaken the Turks and, within ten years or so,
China could take advantage of the situation and “empty the country at one
stroke.” Greatly pleased with the memorial, the emperor summoned him
into the court for discussions, during which he analyzed the situation in
12
detail, using maps. Emperor Wen accepted all his suggestions.
Zhangsun Sheng’s policy was subsequently put into practice. Sui
•

SUIS51, pp. 1329-31; ZZTJ175, pp. 5449-51. For discussions of the political organi
zations of the Turks, see Ma Changshou 1957, pp. 23-9; Barfield 1989, pp. 132-6.
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sent envoys to the Western qaghan and Zhangsun himself went to the Xi
and Khitan people, who were under the control of the Turks, to persuade
them to enter into a friendly relationship with Sui and to guide him to Ishbara’s brother. Soon some results were achieved. In 582, Ishbara
launched a major attack on the Sui frontier, but had to abandon his plan for
further penetration because the Western qaghan decided to withdraw.^'*
Although Zhangsun Sheng had envisaged a period of ten years be
fore Sui’s final strike, the emperor in 583 decided to start a major war
against the Eastern Turks, claiming in his edict that the Turkish empire
was on the edge of collapse, with all its subjects in the west and northeast
rebelling. While the battles went on, Zhangsun Sheng continued to work
on the Turkish leaders to stir up further internal conflicts among them.
Natural disasters added to the great difficulties that the Turks faced. The
junior qaghans xmder Ishbara went to the Western qaghan for protection.
They also sent envoys to the Sui court, suing for peace and requesting Sui
military assistance, but Emperor Wen refused their petition.^® The hostility
between the Eastern and Western qaghans soon came into the open. 16
Unlike the Han dynasty, which had to wait for the Xiongnu empire
to be split by internal struggles before it could take advantage of the situa
tion, the Sui possessed better knowledge of the Turks, and this let them
risk taking the initiative so as to drive a wedge into the Turkish ruling
groups, and this succeeded in bringing the Turkish problem under control.
The Eastern Turks as Tributaries of Sui
In 584 the Eastern Qaghan, Ishbara, decided to make peace with
Sui, and his wife. Princess Qianjin, asked to change her surname to Yang,
the Sui royal family name, as a gesture of submission. This kind of sub
mission, in Barfield’s words, was part of the “inner frontier” strategy of
the nomads, and aimed at using Chinese support to help them recover their
strength. Yang Guang, the future Emperor Yang, proposed that Sui should
seize the opportunity to attack the Turks, but Emperor Wen chose to make
peace. This cautious decision may have been based on the consideration
that Sui had yet to accomplish the unification of China, and needed to use
the Eastern Turkish force to deal with the Western Turks.
SUIS 5l,p. 1331; ZZ7J175, p. 5451.
'*SUIS 51, p. 1331; ZZ77175, p. 5459.
SUIS 51, pp. 1329-32; 84, pp. 1867-8; ZZTJ175, pp. 5463-5.
Ma Changshou 1957, pp. 26-7.
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Ishbara, in his request for a peace settlement in 584, insisted on
equal footing with the Chinese, referring to himself as “bom from Heaven,
the Sage xmder Heaven, the great Turkish Son of Heaven” in his letter to
Sui, and saying: “Our sheep and horses are the emperor’s domestic live
stock, and your silk products are our property. There is no difference be
tween you and us.”^^ The Chinese, for their part, addressed Ishbara merely
as qaghan, and the envoy managed to demonstrate Chinese superiority by
persuading the qaghan to perform the kowtow when he received the sealed
letter from Emperor Wen, and to accept the status of vassal of the Chinese
emperor. Princess Qianjin was granted the royal Yang surname and was
given the title Princess Dayi, interpreted as meaning “sacrifice ties of
blood to righteousness.” 18
Having accepted Ishbara as an outer subject under the tributary
system. Emperor Wen, as suzerain, took on the responsibility for assisting
Ishbara politically, economically and militarily. In exchange, he was able
to use the Eastern Turks for frontier defense, particularly as a deterrent
force against the Western Turks. Then, in 585, when Ishbara was faced
with repeated incursions from the Western Turks and from the Khitan, he
requested permission to migrate south of the Gobi Desert to the Chinese
frontier north of the Yellow River. The emperor permitted this, and sent
troops to assist him. Ishbara, now strengthened, launched a successful at
tack against his rivals. When his people were attacked by the Aba (Apar)
tribe, Sui sent troops in upon Ishbara’s request and inflicted a defeat upon
the Apar.^^
After this victory Ishbara presented a letter acknowledging himself
as a Sui vassal and offering to send hostages and aiuiual tribute to the Sui
court. Still, he expressed the vsish to maintain his own culture, that is, not
to change the Turkish dress, hairstyle and language. Greatly pleased. Em
peror Wen, in his edict, claimed that China and the Turks were no longer
two countries merely bound by a peace agreement, but that the relationship
was now one of unity between a ruler and subject. He ordered that the
news be spread widely throughout the country and that a ceremony be held
at the ancestral temple to announce the Turkish submission. In their re
lations with the Eastern Turks thereafter, the Chinese followed the cereSUIS 84, p. 1868; ZZTJ176, pp. 5475-6.
'* SUIS 51, p. 1332; 84, pp. 1868-9; ZZTJ 176, pp. 5475-6.
” SUIS 54, 1368; 84, p. 1869; ZZTJ 176, p. 5482.
SUIS 84, pp. 1869-70; ZZTJ, 176, p. 5483.
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monial practices of the tribute system. In 586 the Sui calendar was intro
duced to the Turks^^ as a symbol of their acceptance of Chinese rule. The
following year, the Chinese agreed to Ishbara’s request to hunt inside the
Sui frontier. 22
Even after Ishbara’s death in 587, the Eastern Turks continued to
act as a force against the Western Turks, which was exactly what the Chi
nese had hoped for. In 587 the new qaghan, Chuluohou, fought victori
ously under the Sui banner against Abo (Apa), a former Eastern junior
qaghan now with the Western Turks. After capturing Apa, Chuluohou re
quested the Sui court to decide on his treatment. Some ministers proposed
that he be executed. However, Zhangsun Sheng and Gao Jiong, another
major adviser to Emperor Wen, opposed this high-handed attitude. They
suggested that Sui spare Apa’s life. Emperor Wen agreed, hoping thereby
to “cause the people from far away to come.”
Chuluohou died during his western campaign in 588, and was suc
ceeded by Dulan Qaghan, who kept up a close tributary relationship with
Sui, and took Princess Dayi as his wife. Border markets were set up at the
Turks’ request.^'* With the northern frontiers under control, the Sui
switched forces to the south and succeeded in conquering the Chen regime
in 589, thus completing the unification of China.
Dividing the Eastern Turks and Attacking the Western Turks
Tributary relations between Sui and the Eastern Turks entered a
rocky period in 593 when a Chinese called Yang Qin fled to the Turks and
told them the false story that Liu Chang, with his wife who was a Zhou
princess, was planning to rebel against Sui power. He asked Princess Dayi
to assist by sending troops to attack the Sui borders. Dulan Qaghan, be
lieving this, stopped sending tribute and began making forays across the
border. Zhangsun Sheng went to. the Turks twice and finally was able to
25

seize Yang Qin.
The court now planned to get rid of Princess Dayi, in part also beSUIS 1, p. 23; ZZTJ176, p. 5485.
“ SUIS 84, p. 1870.
^ SUIS 51, p. 1332; 84, pp. \%1Q-\\ZZTJ 176, pp. 5489-91.
SUIS 84, p. 1871;
99, pp. 3295-6.
“ This is according to the record in SUIS 51, pp. 1332-3; ZZTJ 178, pp. 5542-3. SUIS 84
and BS 99 have a different account. They say that Yang Qin went to the Turks before
Sui’s 589 conquest of Chen, and that Dulan Qaghan caught Yang Qin and informed Sui
of the incident.
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cause she had attempted to make an alliance with the Western Turks. This
made Emperor Wen suspect her political intentions. Ever since the be
ginning of the Sui period the Princess had actively involved herself in
politics, at first remaining loyal to her family, the Zhou ruling house. After
the Sui conquest of Chen she wrote a poem lamenting her sorrow as a
princess of an eliminated dynasty. Her attitude eventually cost her her life.
A woman participating in an international marriage alliance had the diffi
cult task of reconciling her several tasks as diplomat, hostage, intermedi
ary and informant. Such a woman was constantly in danger, and her life
could easily be sacrificed when the two countries to which she was linked
turned into enemies.
The opportunity to dispose of Dayi arose in 593 when the Turkish
Rangan Qaghan (personal name Zamqan, called Tolish Qaghan) asked for
marriage with a Sui princess. He was Chuluohou’s son,^^ and a potential
rival to Dulan Qaghan. Taking advantage of this request, Sui asked him to
persuade Dulan to kill Princess Dayi, which he did. Dulan then himself
requested the hand of a Sui princess in marriage.
When court discussion favored giving permission to Dulan, Zhangsun Sheng objected on the groimds that Dulan’s submission to Sui was
simply because of his ill feelings toward the Western Turks, that a Sui
marriage with Dulan would strengthen his position vis-a-vis other Turkish
rulers and that Dulan would eventually rebel against Sui. Instead, Zhangsun Sheng favored granting Zamqan’s request for a marriage alliance since
Zamqan did not possess a strong force and would, therefore, be easy to
deal with. Moreover, Sui could entice him to move down to the south, and
use him for defense against Dulan Qaghan. Emperor Wen agreed. 28
With Zhangsim Sheng’s plan carried out, a close relationship was
established between Sui and Zamqan. Following the marriage between
Zamqan and Princess Anyi in 597, Emperor Wen deliberately granted fa
vorable treatment to Zamqan with the intention of further stirring up hos
tilities between him and Dulan. Zamqan and his people moved south to the
old headquarters of the Turks in the Otiikan mountains. Now, although
Dulan suspended tributary relations with Sui, Zamqan Qaghan formally
became a Sui vassal. The Chinese were quick to use his people as a ready
“ SUIS 84, pp. 1871 -2; 5S 99, p. 3296.
SUIS 51, p. 1333; ZZTJ178, p. 5543. SUIS 84 (p. 1872) says that Rangan was the son
of Shetu. This is probably wrong, see Cen Zhongmian 1958, p. 512.
SUIS 51, p. 1333; 84, p. 1872; ZZTJ 178, pp. 5542-3.
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force to watch over the frontiers and guard against any incursion by Dulan.^^
In 599 when Dulan Qaghan was making ready to invade China,
Zamqan reported this to the Chinese, who readied a campaign against Du
lan. Hearing this, Dulan allied himself with the Western Turks to attack
Zamqan. When Zamqan suffered defeat at the hands of Dulan, he consid
ered taking refuge with the Western Turks, but Zhangsun Sheng succeeded
in persuading him to go to Sui. Greatly pleased. Emperor Wen conferred
on Zhangsun Sheng the title of general commissioned v^dth special power
30
to protect the Turks.
Emperor Wen then conferred on Zamqan the title of Yili zhendou
Qimin Qaghan (hereafter Zamqan is referred to as Qimin) and built the
town of Dali for his branch of the Turks in Shuozhou. After Princess Anyi
died. Princess Yicheng was sent to wed Qimin, and 20,000 Chinese
troops were stationed to help Qimin Qaghan guard against the Western
Turks.^^ Zhangsun Sheng proposed that the Turks under Qimin should be
resettled in Wuyuan with the Yellow River to the north serving as a natu
ral line of defense against the incursions of Dulan Qaghan. The area was
turned over to Qimin and his people for pasture. In 602 walled towns
were built in Jinhe and Dingxiang northeast of the Ordos for the Eastern
Turks,^ and it appears that Qimin moved to this area.^^
It may seem strange that a Chinese government would build towns
for the nomadic Turks. In fact Sui was just following the practice of
Northern Wei which built the walled towns known as the Six Garrisons on
its frontiers to settle the nomads. Northern Qi and Northern Zhou both also
built garrison towns.^® The walled towns Sui built for Qimin and his
people were intended to function as garrisons under the supervision of
Chinese officials leading their own military forces.
The Eastern Turks under Qimin Qaghan assisted Sui in achieving
victories over other Turkish powers. In 600, when Dulan was killed by his
^’5MS51,p. 1333; 84, p. 1872; ZZTV178, p. 5558.
SUIS 51, pp. 1333-4; ZZTJ178, pp. 5563-4.
SUIS 51, p. 1334; 84, pp. 1872-3; ZZTJ 178, pp. 5568-9.
SUIS 74, p. 1697; ZZTJ 178, p. 5569.
SUIS 51, p. 1334; 84, p. 1873; ZZTJ 178, p. 5569.
^ ZZTJ (179, p. 5572) gives the year as 600. I follow Cen Zhongmian’s opinion that the
building of towns was begun in 602, see his 1958, pp. 83-4; 1964, p. 12.
Cen Zhongmian 1958, pp. 83-4.
Gu Jiguang 1962, pp. 58-61.
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own men and a time of civil strife ensued among his people, Qimin’s men
were despatched to entice those Turks to Sui, and many more Turks
submitted to Sui. In the following years, at the suggestion of Zhangsun
Sheng, Sui launched major attacks on the Western Turks in alliance with
Qimin Qaghan and his force. After the Western Turks suffered a severe
defeat Zhangsun Sheng advised Qimin to despatch his envoys to the Tiele
and other Turkish-speaking tribes who had been under the rule of the
Western Turks in order to try to win them over. The envoys were success
ful and soon the Tiele and more than ten other tribes rebelled and came
over to Sui. As a result, Tardu’s rule over the Western Turks suffered a
major defeat in 603 and he fled to the Tuyuhun in present Qinghai. With
the submitted nomads brought under his sway, Qimin’s power increased,
37
but until his death in 609 he remained a Sui ally.
The Non-interventionist Policy Towards the Tuyuhun Kingdom
A buffer state between China and the Western Turks, the Tuyuhun
kingdom was not a serious threat during early Sui. After 576 the Tuyuhun
suffered internal political instability, which undoubtedly weakened its bar
gaining position in dealing with China. In 581, when the Tuyuhun qaghan
Liikua (or Kualii) raided the frontier, Sui launched a successful military
expedition against him, after which the qaghan fled, but thirteen noble
princes came to submit. Emperor Wen appointed one of them the Prince of
Henan, entrusting him with command of the Tuyuhun who had submitted.
Liikua attacked the Sui frontier again in 583. Sui responded with force,
which further weakened the qaghan’s power.
From then on Emperor Wen followed a policy of non-intervention,
avoiding Chinese involvement in the affairs of the Tuyuhun. Unable to
deal with Liikua’s tyranny, the Crown Prince of the Tuyuhun plotted
against his father and applied through the Chinese frontier authorities for
assistance, but Emperor Wen refused. When the plot was discovered and
the prince was put to death, a Chinese frontier official proposed to inter
vene but the emperor again refused. In 586, in fear of being killed by his
father, the new Crown Prince planned to take fifteen thousand households
to submit to Sui. Declining the request. Emperor Wen made a long speech
38
on filial piety to the envoy of the Prince.
Although we know that Emperor Wen held filial piety in high es” SUIS 51, pp. 1334-5; 84, pp. 1873-4; ZZTJ179, pp. 5571-2; p. 5590; p. 5600.
SUIS 83, pp. 1842-4; Mole 1970, his translation of SUIS 83.
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teem and that his favorite handbook of public and private morality was the
Classic of Filial Piety, the Tuyuhun prince’s disloyalty to his father does
not seem to have been the primary reason for the refusal; it seems that the
emperor was aware of the chaotic situation among the Tuyuhun and there
fore did not regard them as a threat. In 588 another Tuyuhun noble prince
proposed to submit with a thousand households, including that of the
qaghan’s sister. Emperor Wen ordered that no military protection should
be provided them on their way; China should just pacify them when they
arrived, but not entice them to submit.
With the death of the Tuyuhun qaghan Liikua in 591, their rela
tions with Sui took a turn for the better. The new king, Fu, decided to
abandon his father’s hostile attitude and sent a mission to Sui, follovvdng
the generally expected procedure to declare himself a subject and offer lo
cal products and women for the Sui harem. Emperor Wen refused the
women with the remark: “This is not completely sincere; the strategy is
just an expedient plan.”^° Nevertheless he sent a diplomatic mission in 592
to reciprocate for the Tuyuhims’ visit and four years later formed a mar
riage alliance by sending Princess Guanghua to Fu. Fu died the next year.
His brother Fuyun succeeded him and, follovvdng the old practice of the
levirate, married Princess Guanghua. Tribute-bearing missions were sent
regularly, but their purpose was not so much to demonstrate subordination
as to inquire about conditions in China.^^
A War of Deterrence Against Koguryd
Having achieved relative security on the northwestern and northern
frontiers and having conquered the South, Emperor Wen looked to the
northeast, to the threat of the Korean kingdom of Koguryo.
In the eyes of the Sui Chinese, Koguryo was potentially the most
threatening among the three Korean states. It occupied the Liaodong re
gion, which had formerly been under Chinese control. In early Sui, the
major powers with an interest in Manchuria besides China were the Turk
ish empire and Koguryo. It was a sensitive issue which of the three could
command the allegiance of other less well organized tribes, the Mongolian
Wright 1978, p. 65.
SUIS 83, p. 1844. 1 do not agree with Mold’s translation of this passage in SUIS 83
which mistakenly states that Fu requested Chinese women for his own harem and that
Emperor Wen saw this strategy as “hasty” rather than expedient. See Mol6 1970, p. 43.
5C//5 83, p. 1844.
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speaking Khitan and Shiwei and the Tungusic tribes of Mohe and Xi,
which had formerly been controlled by either the Turks or Koguryo. The
Chinese also feared Kogury6‘s influence in the Hebei region where sepa
ratist sentiments had surfaced from the time of Northern Qi/^ Campaigns
into the border regions of the Northeast were thus a necessary step for the
extension of imperial rule in North China and as an important coercive
measure for the full consolidation of dynastic power.
Relations between the newly established Sui dynasty and Koguryo
began peacefully. Soon after Emperor Wen came to the throne in 581,
Koguryo sent a tributary mission to the court and King Fyongwon was
appointed Commandery Duke of Liaodong (Liaodong jun gong) and General-in-chief.^ He dispatched seven tributary missions to Sui during the
four years from 581 to 584.'^^ But Koguryo turned hostile to Sui when the
Eastern Turks accepted a tributary relationship with Sui and the Mohe and
Khitan people sent envoys to China. Part of the Khitan who had submitted
to Koguryo now left to seek support from the Sui court.^® Koguryo sent a
tributary mission to the Southern dynasty in 585,^^ and stopped its mis
sions to Sui between 585 and 590. After the Sui conquest of Chen in 589,
fearing a Sui invasion, it started preparations for war.
Other “offensive” activities engaged in by Koguryo listed in an
edict of 597 by Emperor Wen include the following: 1) harassing the
Mohe and preventing the Khitan from commxmicating with Sui, 2)
smuggling precious goods to bribe Chinese crossbowmen so as to induce
them to assist in secret military preparations, 3) isolating Sui envoys and
prohibiting them from learning the true situation in Koguryo, 4) sending
cavalr5mien to attack and kill people on the Sui borders, and 5) despatch
ing envoys as spies to gain information about Sui.
To what extent these accusations were true is difficult to decide,
but from the Sui point of view Koguryo posed a threat. The edict accused
42

Wright 1979, pp. 143-4.
Somers 1986, pp. 981-2.
44
SUIS 1, p. 16; CFYG 963, p. 11336. SUIS 81 (p. 1814) says that the title of King of
Koguryo was conferred on him, see also BS 94, p. 3115. The title of king might not have
been given at this time, for after his death his son inherited all his titles and requested
Tang to confer on him the title of king. See below.
^ For the tribute missions from Korea, see Table 2.
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5675 84, p. 1881.

C56, p. 112.
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of King P‘‘y6ngw6n of being insincere in submission to the Chinese em
peror, and after reiterating the claim that all under heaven were subjects of
the Chinese Son of Heaven, the edict ordered Koguryo to reform its con
duct. It warned of a “punitive” attack. The warning seems to have had
some effect because the King P'yongwon was preparing to send, in Chi
nese wording, “an acknowledgement of guilt,” but he died before he could
carry out his intention. His son succeeded to the throne as King Yongyang.
Emperor Wen sent an embassy to give him official titles. Upon his request
Sui conferred on him the title of king.'*®
In 598 King Yongyang led the Mohe in raids on Liaoxi. These
became the direct catalyst for Emperor Wen’s decision to launch a military
expedition, which he justified in terms of Chinese suzerainty over Kogu
ryo. Only Gao Jiong, a major adviser to the emperor, raised objection to
the decision to go to war. Despite that he was appointed de facto commander of the campaign, with the Prince of Han in nominal charge.
Thirty thousand troops were despatched, some by land and some by sea,
and an edict was issued to deprive King Yongyang of his titles. Before
they reached the Liao River, however, the Chinese were already suffering
logistical difficulties and were being devastated by a serious plague. Much
of the navy was lost in violent storms.
The expedition cannot, however, be seen as a total defeat; the Ko
rean troops were not strong enough to continue resistance, and King
Yongyang sent an embassy offering “acknowledgement of guilt.” He is
recorded by the Chinese historian as having referred to himself as “your
subject in Liaodong who is but excrement.”
Emperor Wen was more than happy to withdraw the Chinese
troops.®* When Paekche offered assistance in the Sui campaign against
Koguryo, Emperor Wen did not seem interested in an alliance, since the

'“SL75 81,pp. 1815-6;
94, pp. 3116-7; ZZ77178, pp. 5559-60.
There are discrepancies concerning the dates of the edict and of King P’yongwon’s
death. Some sources record that the king died in 590 without mentioning the edict, see
SUIS 1, p. 35; BS 11, p. 416. SGSG records that the edict was issued in 590 and the king
died in the same year, see SGSG 19, pp. 7-8. CFYG has a different account. While vol
ume 963 (p. 11336) states that the king died in 590, volume 996 (p. 11695) states that in
597 Emperor Wen issued the edict to Gao Tang, the King.
'”SI7/S81,p. 1816.
SUISAX, p. 1182; ZZTJ178, p. 5566.
SUIS2, p. 43; 65, p. 1525; 81, p. 1816; ZZTJ 178, p. 5560; pp. 5561-2.
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crisis was over. For Emperor Wen the immediate objective of the war
was to deter Koguryo from making incursions across the borders. The em
peror appears to have made a realistic assessment of the situation. Al
though he talked about asserting China’s claim to superiority, he under
stood clearly that he was not able to extend Chinese power into Korea.
The other two Korean kingdoms, Paekche and Silla, were not of
much importance to Emperor Wen. They were only accessible by sea from
the Chinese mainland. To maintain its own power against the expansion of
the other two states, Silla kept a friendly relationship with China. This
emerged as Silla’s long-term strategy, through which it eventually founded
the first unified Korean state in the mid-seventh century. During the Sui
period, Paekche sometimes allied itself with Koguryo and had frequent
contact with Japan. It also sent tributary missions to Chen in 584 and
586,^^ but this did not seem to bother Sui at all. In 589 when Paekche of
fered Sui congratulations on the conquest of Chen, Emperor Wen declined
54
a frequent tributary relationship with this Korean state.
Advance on the Southern Frontier
The conquest of Chen was accompanied by submission of the abo
riginal tribes in the far south and southwest. Knowing that Chen was
^
56
crushed, the southern tribal chiefs hastened to make their submission.
Sui established prefectures under Chinese officials but kept the tribal
groups under their chiefs. In the following years (590, 597 and 601) sev
eral rebellions by aboriginal tribes in Lingnan and the southwest were
suppressed either by military force or peaceful means.
In 602 the Chinese sources record that a native people in Jiaozhou
made troubles, whereupon Emperor Wen appointed a capable general, Liu
Fang, to lead a military expedition. Jiaozhou, the modem HanoiHaiphong, had from Han times been an important seaport for communica
tion with Southeast Asia. During the Han dynasty the Chinese had admin
istered the region, but in the sixth century, when the southern Chinese dy
nasties were too weak to maintain control, a local satrap of mixed Vietnamese-Chinese stock set up his own dynasty. Liu Fang’s campaign suc
cessfully destroyed his mle and established Sui administration there, but
“5L781,p. 1819; 2ZrJ 178, p. 5562.
”CS6,p. lll;p. 113.
*^SL7S81,p. 1819.
Wright 1979,p. 111.
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the Chinese did not want to stop with this. A widely held opinion at the
court was that the emperor should push further south to Linyi, the King
dom of Champa, in the southern part of present Vietnam, for the land there
was known among the Chinese to be rich in “unusual treasures.” Emperor
Wen consented. After all there was not much risk involved and there was
a possibility of much gain.
Emperor Yang
In 604 Emperor Wen died, and his second son, Guang, succeeded
to the throne. He is known to history as Emperor Yang. With their Conftician criteria and in the usual style of praise and blame, traditional Chinese
historians portrayed the two Sui emperors as almost complete opposites:
the first emperor being serious, hardworking and prudent in governing, a
successful founder and good ruler; the second being licentious, irrespon
sible in performance of his duties and profligate, a tyrant, a bad last ruler,
whose extravagance in huge projects internally and obsession with con
quest externally ruined the dynasty.®^
In challenging the traditional view Arthur Wright in several works
points out that the image of Emperor Yang was severely distorted by the
biases and stereotypes of the Confucian tradition and by the Tang histori
ans who, in compiling the Sui History, tried to denounce Emperor Yang so
as to justify the Tang victory over Sui. In Wright’s view. Emperor Yang,
though a supremely egotistical monarch, was a poet with a romantic mind
and a ruler with political and economic vision as demonstrated in the
58
building of the transport canal linking North and South China.
Although Wright does present two very different images of the two
emperors, when discussing foreign policy he concludes: “There was, in
fact, no sharp break in the foreign policy of the two Sui emperors. In both
emperors’ reigns there were two kinds of operations beyond the borders:
those started out of a desire for loot or out of personal curiosity, and those
aimed at assuring the geopolitical dominance of the new empire in Eastern
Asia.” He concludes that the first kind was unacceptable by Confucian
historians and they criticized Emperor Yang for that, whereas the second
“was justified in terms of the old tradition of a central political and cultural* **
** SUIS 82, pp. 1831-33; Wright 1979, p. 109.
See SUIS (2, pp. 54-5; 4, pp. 94-6) for the historians’ judgment on the characteristics
and government of the two emperors; see also Wright 1978, p. 163.
** Wright 1960, 1978, 1979.
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order whose superiority in all realms excused not only its defense but the
conquest of lesser peoples.”®^
This conclusion, however, is oversimplified. It is true that Confucian historians did not reject totally the use of military force in frontier af
fairs for the achievement of peace for All-xmder-Heaven, but they did draw
a line between the Chinese iimer group, and the non-Chinese outer group,
and between defense—^military campaigns to drive away or defeat frontier
enemies—and expansion—establishment of Chinese rule over the land
inhabited by non-Chinese. They held that any military campaigns which
increased taxes and burdens on the people should be restrained.
As we have seen. Emperor Wen was primarily interested in secur
ing his frontiers and took a cautious approach to any initiative that ap
peared dangerous. The only military campaign which was carried out for
economic gains and political ambition was the invasion of Champa, but
Champa was so far away from the Sui capital that Emperor Wen may have
thought that there was not much risk involved. Since the Chinese troops
were already in Jiaozhou, just one step further was needed and Champa
could be taken "without too much additional cost.
In the history of Chinese dynasties it generally took at least two
generations to reach a fully stable and politically integrated regime, and
as a second ruler Emperor Yang assumed the immediate task left by Em
peror Wen to complete the consolidation of dynastic power. In internal
affairs he continued public works, reinforcing the Great Wall, rebuilding
Luoyang as his Eastern Capital, and constructing transport canals. Even
before the conquest of the south. Emperor Wen had restored a Han dy
nasty waterway between Chang’an and the bend of the Yellow River at
Tongguan, and taken other steps to facilitate the transport of grain from
the east into the capital region "within the passes.
Emperor Yang embarked on a more ambitious plan to create a wa
ter route, the Bian Canal, linking the Eastern Capital to the Yangtze Val
ley, partly for his own comfort and pleasure in traveling to Yangzhou,
where he plaimed to build a third southern capital, Jiangdu, but more im
portantly for the transport of grain from south to north. Though he was
later much criticized for the hardships which this enterprise imposed on
the male and female laborers who were conscripted to build the canal, the
Bian Canal played a vital role in supplying the central government in
Wright 1978, p. 182; 1979, p. 138.
“ Somers 1978, p. 199.
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North China throughout Tang and Northern Song and must be recognized
as a lasting achievement of the second Sui ruler.
Another major canal project was the building of the Yongji Canal
linking the Yellow River with Zhuojun in the vicinity of present Beijing.
This was undertaken, as we shall see, in preparation for the first military
62
campaign against Koguryo.
In his reform of the military organization. Emperor Yang abolished
the regional military commands and brought all the units formerly under
them into the direct control of the twelve guards and commands in the
capital.®^
Under the pretext of defense. Emperor Yang embarked on a course
of expansion. He engaged China in foreign adventures not just for the sake
of securing his frontiers and controlling hostile external forces but also
because he let himself be lured on by the desire to obtain vdder knowledge
of the world and riches in foreign lands, to restore the glories of the Han
empire and to dedicate himself to the imperial purpose of establishing an
all-embracing rule as the Son of Heaven. His foreign policy objectives
were, therefore, much more complex than those of his father and led to
expansion beyond the limits of China’s strength, and this led directly to
the collapse of the dynasty.
Keeping the Eastern Turks as Sui Tributaries
When Emperor Yang succeeded his father, he inherited not only a
relative stable political situation and a prosperous economy in China but
also had the Eastern Turks rmder Qimin as a military force at his disposal
as a counter to the much weakened Western Turks. In 605 the Khitan
raided Yingzhou in the northeast. Sui used twenty thousand Eastern Turkish cavalry troops against them in a successful campaign. When the
Eastern Turk Qimin Qaghan made repeated requests to be allowed to
adopt Chinese dress and hair style, even though his ministers suggested
granting permission since it would be tantamoimt to a proof of successful
sinicization. Emperor Yang refused. In his letter to Qimin he explained to
the qaghan that since the north of the Gobi Desert had not yet been made
tranquil, expeditionary forces still had to be sent from time to time to quell**
** Bingham 1941, pp. 15-18, citing Chi Ch’ao-ting 1936.
“ SUIS 6S, p. 1595; Wright 1979, pp. 134-8.
“ TD 32, p. 185, Wright 1979, p. 102.
^ JTS 75, pp. 2631-2; ZZTJ180, pp. 5621-2.
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disturbances, and that as long as Qimin was sincere and obedient, it was
unnecessary to change dress. To retain the good will of the Turks, Em
peror Yang continued to grant Qimin the favor under the tribute system of
not using his personal name when addressing him as a subject, and of
giving him a rank above that of the Chinese princes. Emperor Yang also
ordered the building of houses and a walled town for Qimin at Wanshou
65
Fort, between Jinhe and Dingxiang.
The balance of power between the Sui Chinese and the Eastern
Turks changed gradually in favor of the latter during Qimin’s later years.
Some Chinese ministers began to express their worry. Gao Jiong was con
cerned that the emperor gave too much favor to the Turks, and feared that
Qimin, now with inside knowledge about China, might cause trouble in
the future. Gao lost the imperial trust toward the end of Emperor Wen’s
reign. Emperor Yang employed him but he did not have much influence.
When he expressed his concern to another minister over the Turkish issue
and over other court decisions, he was reported to be slandering the em66
peror and was executed together with two others in 607.
Around 608 Duan Wenzhen, Minister of War, pointed out in a
memorial that it was not advisable for Sui to accept Qimin as a subject,
provide him "with economic and military aid, and place the Turks inside
the Great Wall. He suggested that Sui should move the Turks beyond the
Great Wall, and establish frontier garrisons so as to prevent a dangerous
situation from developing. But the emperor was not persuaded. In 609
Qimin Qaghan died and was succeeded by his son Shibi Qaghan. In accor
dance with Turkish practice. Emperor Yang permitted him to marry Princess Yicheng who had formerly been married to Qimin. Relations with
Shibi were peaceful until 614.
Southern Expeditions
Soon after Emperor Yang succeeded to the throne, the expedition
into Champa achieved some success in 605. Then Sui divided the area into
three prefectures which were later changed into “commanderies” (jun).
The three commanderies, however, were lost during the turmoil at the end
“ SUIS 84, pp. 1874-5; ZZTJ180, p. 5627; p. 5632; 181, p. 5641; CFYG 974, pp. 11440-

1.

“ SUISAl, p. 1184; ZZTJm, pp. 5632-3.
SUIS 60, p. 1459; ZZTJ 181, p. 5661, CFYG 990, p. 11632. Concerning the year of the
memorial, see Cen Zhongmian 1958, p. 93.
“ SUIS 84, p. 1876; ZZTJ 181, p. 5647.
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of Sui, and the king of Champa restored his territory as a kingdom.
The victory over Champa stimulated Emperor Yang’s ambition. In
607, he sent an envoy overseas vvith the purpose of “seeking and inquiring
about foreign customs.”^° The envoy went either to the islands called Liuqiu (J. Ryukyu), present-day Taiwan, or to some other islands in the East
China Sea. He was sent there a second time vsdth the mission to pacify the
natives, but the king of Liuqiu refused, upon which Emperor Yang re
sorted to a military expedition in 610. We are not sure if this was a success
or a failure,but we know that Emperor Yang in the end gave up the at
tempt to bring Liuqiu into the tributary system. A diplomatic mission was
also sent to Chitu (in modem Malaya) in 608, which was cordially re
ceived. When the Chinese envoys returned, the prince of Chitu went with
them to China for a visit, and the Chinese historian routinely records that
in 610 Chitu presented tribute. More tributary missions came to Sui un73
der Emperor Yang than during Emperor Wen’s reign.
Pei Ju as Foreign Policy Adviser
Early in his reign Emperor Yang also showed his interest in the
Western Regions by sending envoys there. They went as far as Kashmir,
Kesch, Bohara and Persia. After their return Emperor Yang assigned Pei
Ju (546-627) to be in charge of trade at Zhangye, an important trading
center in modem Gansu.^^
Pei Ju was the most important adviser to Emperor Yang on frontier
affairs, although Zhangsim Sheng continued to be entmsted with Turkish
affairs until his death in 609. Pei Ju was a native of modem Shanxi. His
forefathers served Northern Wei and Qi. At an early age Pei Ju was rec
ognized as a highly learned man. He started vsdth a clerical appointment,
went on campaigns in the south and had the experience of dealing with the
aborigines there and of being an envoy to the Turks.
SUIS 31, p. 886; ZZTJ 190, p. 5965. Arthur Wright (1979, p. 109) does not mention
the establishment of the commanderies and concludes that the Chinese administration
there was short-lived. His conclusion is based on SUIS 83. It is not clear whether the king
kept part of his territory and other parts were brought under the Chinese commandery or
whether the king was under the control of one of the commanderies.
™ SUIS 81, pp. 1824-5; ZZTJ 180, p. 5627.
” Wright 1979, pp. 138-9.
^ SUIS 3, p. 75; 82, pp. 1834-5.
^®Cf S’C//581,82 and 83.
SUIS Z3,p. 1841; p. 1849; p. 1857.
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Unlike Zhangsun Sheng, who was pragmatic and cautious, Pei Ju
was an ambitious expansionist, became an influential advocate of an ag
gressive frontier policy, and a theoretician providing Emperor Yang with
justifications for expansion. BCnowing that the emperor was interested in
foreign expansion, Pei Ju while in Zhangye made special efforts to gather
information from foreign merchants. The information covered a wide
range of subjects from the political situation and geographical conditions
to local customs, food, clothing style and the likenesses of foreign rulers
and common people.
He compiled a book entitled Xiyu Tuji or Illustrated Record of the
Western Regions based on this information. He also worked out maps
showing the southern and northern branches of the Silk Road in the West
ern Regions leading all the way to West Asia. In the preface to the book he
stated that the Han dynasty had opened up the route to the Western Re
gions and extended its control over the area. Now China’s force could
reach as far as the Western Regions, but the Western Turks and the Tuyuhun now controlled most of the people there and prevented them from
coming to China to pay tribute. He suggested that Sui should entice all
these people to give their allegiance to Sui so that the Turks and Tuyuhun
could be eliminated.
The emperor was greatly pleased and had discussions with Pei Ju
which lasted for several days. Pei Ju stressed that the Western Regions
were rich in precious goods and that the Tuyuhvm could be easily swal
lowed up. The emperor then put Pei in charge of the opening up of the
Western Regions and appointed him Gentleman Attendant at the Palace
Gate (huangmen shilang), which allowed him to participate in court deci
sion-making.^®
Pei Ju’s role in foreign policy-making became so important that
Sima Guang, assuming his most severe style, blamed Pei Ju for encourag
ing Emperor Yang to emulate the achievements of the expansionist First
Emperor of the Qin dynasty and Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty. He
concluded “that in the end the Central Kingdom was weakened and
thereby brought to ruin was entirely because of the siren songs of Pei
Ju.” It is not very fair to blame Pei Ju alone for the disasters in frontier
affairs; Pei Ju understood the emperor’s bent and said what Emperor Yang
wanted to hear. Since his strategic plans did support Emperor Yang’s
SUIS 67, pp. 1578-81; TTS 63, pp. 2406-7.
Wright 1979, p. 127.
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ambitions, as we will see in the following section, sxirely the emperor must
share the blame for the resulting debacle.
Defeat of the Tuyuhun Kingdom and Opening the Western Regions
On the Western front, a firm decision was taken to persuade the
Tiele to attack the Tuyuhim. The Tiele had formerly been vmder the rule of
the Western Turks. In 605 in the context of a temporary decline in Turkish
power, the Tiele rose in rebellion against the Western Turks. They estab
lished a qaghanate of their own. The power and influence of the Tiele
qaghanate expanded over various oasis states in the Western Regions. In
607 the Tiele launched an attack on the Sui frontier. After one encoimter,
the Tiele offered to make peace with Sui. Seeing this as the opportunity to
put his larger plan into effect, Pei Ju went to the Tiele and succeeded in
persuading them to wage war on the Tuyuhun.^^
Because of their location in Qinghai the Tuyuhun were a potential
obstacle on the flank of China’s route to the Western Regions. They also
raided Zhangye from time to time. Moreover, the Tuyuhun had intermarried with the son of Qimin Qaghan of the Eastern Turks. So close a
relationship was considered a threat to China. Even though the Tuyuhun
qaghan Fuyun sent his son. Shim, perhaps persuaded by the Chinese Princess Guanghua, to pay homage to the court when Emperor Yang as
sumed the throne, the Emperor nevertheless decided to destroy the Tuyu
hun kingdom.
The Sui court detained prince Shun. Following the Tiele’s victory
over the Tuyuhun in 608, Emperor Yang took personal command in a suc
cessful campaign against the Tuyuhun in 609. The Tuyuhim territory was
incorporated into the Chinese empire as the Commanderies of Xihai and
Heyuan, under which were established counties, garrisons and frontier
posts. A Chinese general in charge of exiled convicts employed on mili
tary farms was stationed at Heyuan to guard against the Tuyuhun in order
to ensure that the routes to the Western Regions would remain open.
Emperor Yang appointed Shun as the king of Tuyuhun and sent
him back with the minister who had accompanied him to China. But the
minister was killed on the way and Shun returned to the Sui court. The
SUIS 83, pp. 1844-5; 84, pp. 1879-80; ZZTJ180, p. 5635.
™S[//S39,p. 1149.
™5t//S84, p. 1877.
Yamaguchi 1983, pp. 658-9.
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qaghan Fuyun and his people took refuge among the Black Dangxiang, a
81
tribe of the Tibeto-Burman Qiang people.
At this time the rising Tibetan kingdom was in the process of ex
tending its power over the tribal states in its northeast. It has been claimed
that to gain Tibetan support for himself, Fuyun was influential in obtaining
the submission of the country of Fu, another Tibeto-Burman petty king
dom in the region, to Tibet, and so played a role in the establishment of the
Tibetan kingdom. In any case the Tuyuhun acted as a bridge to link
China and Tibet and later became deeply involved in relations with China
and the Tibetan kingdom.
In 608 a general was sent to subjugate Yiwu (Kami), a major city
state in the Western Regions northwest of the Yumen Pass. Qimin and his
cavalry were expected to join but they failed to show up. The Chinese
army went ahead anyway and succeeded in taking over Yiwu. A garrison
of over a thousand soldiers was built there to serve as a base for trading
with the Western Regions. In 609 Sui set up the commanderies of Shan83
shan and Jumo in the Western Regions.
In the same year Pei Ju succeeded in enticing envoys from twentyseven oasis states to Wuwei (in present Gansu) where the emperor granted
them an audience after his campaign against the Tuyuhun and made a lav
ish display of the riches of China. Among these states was the Gaochang
kingdom. It had been under the control of the Turks and then of the Tiele.
It now sought a Chinese connection. Its king went to the Sui court and
even followed Emperor Yang on his Korean expedition. As a reward Sui
sent Princess Huarong to marry the king in late 612. The Sui court also
set up the Commandant of Western Regions {Xiyu jiaowei) to receive envoys from the Western Regions. 86
The Sui expansion into the Western Regions attracted tribute
bearing missions to the Sui capital to trade with China. These not only
brought exotic luxuries for the emperor and the upper class but their com
ing also enhanced the political prestige of Sui as a unified empire with no
SUIS 63, 1504; 83, p. 1845; ZZTJ181, p. 5641; pp. 5643-5; Ise 1968, pp. 152-3.
Yamaguchi 1983, pp. 669-71. Beckwith regards the embassies of Fu to Sui in 608 and
609 as the first contacts of Tibetans with the outside world (1987, p. 17). According to
Yamaguchi, however, at that time Fu was not yet a part of the Tibetan kingdom.
SUIS 65, pp. 1533-4; 67, p. 1581;
181, p. 5642; p. 5645.
“ SUIS 67, p. 1580; ZZTJ 181, pp. 5644-5.
“ SUIS 83, p. 1847; ZZTJ 181, p. 5666.
*®SL7S83,p. 1841.
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less a reach than the Han dynasty.®^ The political prestige of restoring the
outer boundary of Han may have been achieved, but trade through tribute
missions was hardly profitable.
The Chinese historians writing the Sui history complained that en
voys of the various countries of the Western Regions came and left con
tinuously, wearing out the prefectures on the way for the cost of their re
ception which amounted to hundreds of millions. Commanderies in the
northwest also had to bear the heavy burden of providing grain to maintain
garrisons in the former Tuyuhun territory.®® We should note that it was the
local government that had to bear the cost of accommodation of these en
voys and of maintaining the frontier posts. However, Ise holds that the
figures quoted above may be exaggerated. To pay for the supply of the
garrisons Sui opened garrison farms on the frontiers and taxed the nonChinese in Qinghai who had submitted.®® The cost, nonetheless, was great
and emphasizing such costs was always the focal point in the criticisms
mounted by Confucian-minded scholar-officials of any emperor’s attempts
at expansion.
Success in Subduing the Western Turks
Sui’s victory over the Tuyuhim and its success in the Western Re
gions were accompanied by success in weakening the Western Turks,
who, having survived the defeat of 603, were now under Chuluo Qaghan.
His lands were in the Hi Basin and his power was on the rise. His mother
was Chinese and had been at the Sui court from about 603. In 608, on Pei
Ju’s advice. Emperor Yang sent an envoy to Chuluo and succeeded in per
suading the qaghan to join the Chinese in an attack on the Tuyuhun and to
send a tributary mission to Sui. The envoy said that it was Chuluo’s
mother who was urging the qaghan to submit to Sui.
But it appears that Chuluo did not participate in the campaign.
When Emperor Yang, on his tour to the west in 610, asked Chuluo to pay
a visit to him, Chuluo refused to do so. Emperor Yang was fimous at this
act of outright disobedience, but had no way to deal with the problem until
a timely falling-out among the Western Turks provided the Chinese with
an opportunity to attack. When, in 611, the tribal leader Shegm of the

Ise 1968, pp. 160-4.
“ SUIS 24, p. 687; ZZTJ181, p. 5645.
Ise 1968, pp. 155-6.
SUIS 84, pp. 1876-8; ZZTJ 181, pp. 5636-7.
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Western Turks sent an embassy to Sui requesting a marriage alliance, Pei
Ju suggested that the request be accepted, so as to divide and rule. His
scheme succeeded in making Shegui launch attacks against Chuluo, who
then had to come in person to pay his respects to Emperor Yang at the end
of the year.^^
The following year saw the incorporation of Chuluo’s people into
the Sui hegemonic empire. They were divided into three groups: a) more
than 10,000 “physically weak” people led by Chuluo’s brother, were set
tled in the commandery of Huining, b) some stronger forces were stationed
in Loufan for frontier defense, and c) Chuluo, in command of 500 calvary
men, escorted Emperor Yang on his tours of inspection, and joined in the
military campaigns against Koguryo. In 614 Sui gave the hand of Prin
cess Xinyi to Chuluo in marriage accompanied by a gift of a large amount
of silk. Emperor Yang even expressed his intention of helping Chuluo re
cover his territory, no doubt with the long-term aim of making Chuluo re
sponsible for frontier defense. The plan aborted, however, with the col
lapse of Sui.®^
Three Wars of Aggression Against Koguryd
After his success on the northern and northwestern frontiers. Em
peror Yang directed his troops to the northeastern side. In 607, when Em
peror Yang went on a tour of inspection to the residence of Qimin Qaghan
of the Eastern Turks, he found that Koguryo had an embassy there. Such a
liaison between two of China’s strongest potential enemies alarmed Em
peror Yang.
Pei Ju, who was with the emperor on the tour, reminded him that
Koguryo had been an integral part of China from antiquity down to the
time of the Han and Jin dynasties, but that now it was not conducting its
affairs in a manner proper to a subject and was acting like an outer land. It
was not proper, he said, that Sui allow this once “civilized” land to revert
to control by “barbarians.” He advised Emperor Yang to order the Kogu
ryo king’s attendance at court and to threaten that if the king did not obey,
Sui would launch an attack.
The emperor followed this advice and delivered a warning to the
king of Koguryo that if the king did not come to the Sui court, Sui would
” SUIS 84, pp. 1878-9; ZZTJ181, pp. 5654-5; CFYG 990, p. 11633.
” SUIS 84, p. 1879; ZZTJm, p. 5658.
’^517/5 84, p. 1879.
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lead the Turks into the land of Koguryo In spite of the demand. King
Yongyang did not go to the Sui court and only sent a tributary mission in
609.
Emperor Yang decided to go to war. In an edict issued in 612 Em
peror Yang claimed that Koguryo had once been a “civilized” area but was
now occupied by “barbarians.” Then he accused King Yongyang of refus
ing to come in person to the Sui court, fomenting troubles on the frontiers,
preventing other people from coming to the Sui court, imposing cruel laws
and heavy taxes on his people and having a government manipulated by
powerful ministers and clans.®^
In dramatic contrast to the cautious policy of Emperor Wen, Em
peror Yang’s reign was marked by three large-scale expeditions aimed at
conquering Koguryo, and in all three the emperor took personal command.
Chuluo of the Western Turks and a ruler of the Mohe who had come over
to Sui also participated in these campaigns. As mentioned above, con
struction of the Yongji Canal from the Yellow River to Zhuojun was car
ried out to supply the planned expedition against Koguryo. A serious flood
of the Yellow River in 611 compoimded the hardships endured by the con
script laborers and led to desertions and banditry that eventually grew into
the peasant uprisings that flourished in the Hebei region until the early
years of Tang.^^
Having assembled his forces at Zhuojim for his first offensive.
Emperor Yang asked one of his officers: “The population of Koguryo is
not equivalent to one of our commanderies. Now that I am leading so
massive an army to attack them, do you think we will succeed?” The reply
was that Sui would win but the emperor should not campaign in person.
This displeased the emperor, who was still full of confidence. Another of
ficial holding a minor position strongly opposed the war and was almost
98
put to death for his pains.
In 612 an imprecedentedly large force said to total 1,133,800 men
set out both by land and sea. Their goal was P’yongyang, the capital of
Koguryo. The Sui force crossed the Liao River and besieged a Koguryo
stronghold but was unable to take it and had to withdraw. It is reported* **
^SUISei, p. 1581; 84, p. 1875; ZZrJ 181, pp. 5652-3.
SMS 4, pp. 79-81; CFYG 117, pp. 1395-7.
** SMS 81, p. 1822; 84, p. 1879.
’’ Bingham 1941, pp. 39-41.
** SMS 78, p. 1770; ZZTJ181, p. 5659.
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that of the 305,000 troops that had crossed the Liao River only 2,700 re
turned. The only success of the campaign had been the capture of a Koguryo stronghold on the west side of the Liao River where Sui set up the
commandery of Liaodong and Tongding Fortress.^^ So meager a result
would seem to suggest that it was time for Emperor Yang to cease further
campaigns against Koguryo, but his ambition would not allow him to give
100
up.
.
. ;
Another expedition was launched in 613. Once again a court minis
ter remonstrated that China was exhausted and the emperor should not go
personally, but the emperor refused to listen.The campaign soon had to
be halted when Yang Xuangan rose in rebellion. The campaigns against
Koguryo had imposed an extremely heavy burden on the people, causing
popular resentment and leading to banditry and violent disturbances inside
China. Many men refused to go to war and deliberately injured themselves
so as to avoid conscription.^
Taking advantage of the tense situation, Yang Xuangan, who was
in charge of supplies for the campaign, rose in revolt and headed for the
eastern capital Luoyang. Yang Xuangan was the son of Yang Su, a close
adviser of Emperor Wen who had helped Emperor Yang to the throne but
had then fallen out of favor and been put to death. The Chinese troops of
the Koguryo expedition had to retreat to suppress the rebellion. Husi
Zheng, the Emperor’s Vice Minister of War, who was implicated with
Yang Xuangan’s clique, fled to Koguryo. Though it was finally sup
pressed, the rebellion was the beginning of a series of uprisings that finally
^
103
led to the total collapse of the dynasty.
Oblivious to the danger inherent in the disturbed situation inside
China, Emperor Yang decided on a third expedition in 614. It received so
little support that during the discussions on the campaign, nobody dared to
speak out for several days. China was now suffering from so much internal
turbulence that many troops failed to arrive at the Liao River on time.
Nevertheless, the Chinese forces brought enough pressure to bear as to
oblige, Koguryo to sue for peace. It sent an embassy in the seventh month
of 614, offering to surrender and to hand over Husi Zheng. Emperor Yang
SUIS SI, p. 1817; ZZTJm, pp. 5659-66.
Bingham 1941, p. 42.
SUIS 50, p. 1320; ZZTJ182, p. 5669.
'“ZZT/197, p.6216.
Wright 1979, pp. 144-5.
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accepted this, but insisted on the king’s coming to court personally. Upon
receiving the king’s refusal, Emperor Yang prepared for a fourth expedi
tion. However, this last expedition soon collapsed because of the rap
idly deteriorating situation in all parts of China.
Many factors contributed to the Emperor’s almost insane obsession
with the conquest of Koguryo. When he began, the national economy was
sound and his military force was strong. A recent study shows that the fig
ure of 1,133,800 men given for the size of the army employed in the first
expedition could be true, if the fitting, conscripts and non-Chinese are all
counted.
So ambitious and supremely egotistical a monarch must have
felt he had to ivin to rehabilitate his reputation and his self-esteem.He
also believed frontier defense was an adequate justification for such a war:
Koguryo posed, he insisted, a threat to Sui border security and challenged
China’s superiority by its unsubmissive attitude.
An ideological justification for the war was sought in the tradi
tional view of the Son of Heaven being the ruler of the world. In his per
sistence in taking personal command of the campaigns against Koguryo
the emperor was driven by his conception of the majesty and cosmic cen
trality of the empire, by his urge to restore the glory of the Han and by his
image of himself as destined to great victories against all who resisted the
benevolent transforming influence of the Central Kingdom.
It was not only the emperor personally who was inspired by the
idea of conquest so as to establish a world empire on the Han model; such
a belief was held firmly and supported actively by some of his officials as
well. Pei Ju was one such official, and not the only one. By the end of
Emperor Wen’s reign, increased prosperity in China encouraged talk of
defeating Koguryo to become prevalent inside and outside the court. Such
“public opinion” pushed Emperor Yang into the position of a promoter of
foreign expansion. Although some officials objected to the invasion, their
voices were too few and faint to have any effect on the general fever for
war.

108

Externally, the situation on the Korean peninsula at this time
seemed to have reinforced Emperor Yang’s ambitions. The three Korean
SUISA, pp. 84-8; 81, p. 1817; ZZTJIU, pp. 5689-92.
Asami 1985.
Wright 1960, p. 58.
Wright 1978, p. 194.
'®*5’L7S75,p. 1721.
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states were engaged in competition with one another, and both Paekche
and Silla hoped that Sui would assist them against Koguryo. This provided
a convenient pretext for Sui aggression.
In 607 Paekche sent an envoy to Sui, repeating the request made in
Emperor Wen’s time that China join Paekche in attacking Koguryo. While
Emperor Wen had not been interested in exploiting the competition among
the Korean states. Emperor Yang asked Paekche to “watch over” Koguryo.
In 611, before Emperor Yang launched the first campaign against Kogu
ryo, Paekche again despatched an envoy to ask for details of the plan. Em
peror Yang sent an envoy to Paekche with the information. Paekche, how
ever, was also aware of the danger of Chinese aggression and therefore
tried to keep secure by maintaining a delicate balance between China and
Koguryo. In 612 Paekche despatched troops to its border with Koguryo,
ostensibly to provide assistance to the Chinese but in fact as a precaution
against a Chinese invasion. Despite its bellicose posturing, it maintained
peaceful relations with Kogiuy6.^°^
Silla consistently allied itself with China, since it had been vmder
pressure from both Koguryo and Paekche. In 608 the king of Silla sent a
letter to Sui, asking for troops to attack Koguryo, and in 611 a Silla envoy
arrived at the Sui court requesting Chinese military assistance. Emperor
Yang agreed.
A complication in the situation on the Korean peninsula was Ja
pan’s involvement in Korean affairs. In the fourth century Japan had a
foothold known as Kaya (Japanese Mimana) on the peninsula between the
territories of Paekche and Silla.
While Paekche usually aligned itself
with Japan and Kaya, Silla and Koguryo were often hostile to Kaya. In
562 Silla destroyed Kaya. For a time Japan continued to make attempts to
restore its power base. In 600 it took over five walled towns from Silla but
that success did not last long, for Silla soon retook the towns after the
Japanese left. The Japanese threat helped to push Silla toward China.
One should point out, however, that in both Korean and Chinese
sources concerning the Sui period, there is no reference to either Paekche

"”SUISSl,p. 1819;
"®5G5G4,p. 10.

zzry 181, p. 5666.

There is controversy about Kaya’s role. Ledyard (1975) argues that it was a source of
either infiltrators or conquerors of Japan from Korea, while Edwards (1983) argues
against that view.
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or Silla actually joining the Chinese campaigns against Koguryo. At this
time China was not entirely clear about Japan’s impact on the international
scene in East Asia, although it had felt challenged by Japan when the
Japanese envoys first came to the Sui court and presented a letter which
began: “The Son of Heaven in the land of the rising sun sends this letter to
the Son of Heaven of the land where the sun sets.” This displeased Em
peror Yang, who instructed that such letters were not to be presented to
him in the future.^ According to the Japanese sources, the Japanese em
peror in his next mission to Sui sent a letter to Emperor Yang with the
words “the Eastern Heavenly Emperor respectfully says to the Western
Emperor” etc., but there is no record of this in Chinese sources, so we do
not know how the Chinese reacted to it.^
The situation on the Korean peninsula at this time was totally dif
ferent from the situation during early Han, which was why Emperor Yang
failed where Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty had succeeded. Koguryo
was not a loose confederation of walled towns, but a militarily strong state
with an effective ruling council. It was suspicious and fearful of Chinese
expansion as well as conscious of China as standing in the way of its own
expansion. At first it offered submission in response to Emperor Wen’s
deterrent threats. Its submission to Emperor Wen may have reflected both
its perception of Sui military power and its fear of Sui retaliation. How
ever, the effect of a deterrent may depend on its not actually being used,
since the effectiveness of deterrence depends mostly on the threatened
state’s perception of it. When Emperor Wen actually launched his attack
and failed, the Koreans saw that Sui was unable to mount an effective
campaign, and therefore they put up formidable resistance to Emperor
Yang’s invasions.
Emperor Yang did not have a good understanding of his enemy nor
of China’s own strength. He and his supporters failed to see that China’s
economy was still far from adequate to support an all-out expedition at
such a distance. When it did go to war, the Sui court had to resort to meas
ures such as taxing the rich merchants in proportion to their property. Lo
cal officials resorted to still more outrageous methods to raise funds. The
burden of heavy taxation and demands for labor pushed people into slav
ery and banditry.^The Sui military force, large as it was, was not effecSUIS 81, p. 1827; Wright 1979, p. 139.
Nishijima 1983, p. 436.
SUIS 24, pp. 672-3; pp. 687-8.
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tive. Yet Emperor Yang held to the wrong perception that Koguryo, a
small coxmtry equivalent only to a commandery in China, could easily be
subdued. In fact China was imable to muster the resources to carry out an
effective campaign in a strongly defended land a thousand miles away
from the Sui capital, whose terrain and climate were also hostile to the inj
116
vader.
The Siege of Yanmen
The outlook in 615 was gloomy. Following his Korean campaign
in 614 the tireless Emperor Yang, perhaps worried about the growing
power of the Eastern Turks, went on a hunting trip to the north where he
was besieged in Yanmen town by the Eastern Turks under Shibi Qaghan.
Turkish hostility had been stirred up by actions of Pei Ju. Just a
year before, seeing that the Eastern Turks were growing in strength, Pei Ju
devised a strategy to foment discord among Shibi’s people in order to
weaken him. This proved to be unwise, for Sui at this time needed the
military assistance of the Eastern Turks to deal with the Koreans. Nonethe
less, at Pei’s suggestion, the Sui court offered a Chinese princess to
Shibi’s younger brother and proposed to confer the title of southern
qaghan on him, but the brother was afraid to accept this rank, apparently
fearing he was not strong enough to challenge his elder brother. When
news of the Chinese plan reached Shibi, he quite naturally resented it.
Pei Ju then suggested that the court should get rid of Shi Shuhuxi,
a capable assistant to Shibi of Sogdian (i.e. non-Turkish) origin. Shi Shu
huxi and his men were deceived into coming to trade, only to be killed in a
Chinese ambush. Shibi thereupon suspended tributary relations vvdth Sui
and decided to retaliate. Shibi planned a sudden attack in 615, when the
Sui emperor was on his northern tour. The Sui Princess Yicheng, who had
first been married to Qimin and then to Shibi, sent an envoy to Sui to re
port the plan, but obviously the report arrived too late.
The Turks not only besieged Emperor Yang in Yanmen, they cap
tured thirty-nine of forty-one walled towns in the commandery of Yan
men. The emperor was so frightened that he could only hold his son and
cry until his eyes were swollen.^ He remembered Zhangsun Sheng with a
sigh: “If Zhangsun Sheng were here, the Xiongnu (the Turks) would not

Jamieson 1969, pp. 32-4.
SU1S4, p. 89; 67, p. 1582; ZZTJ \%2, pp. 5697-8; Bingham 1941, p. 59.
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have been allowed to go so far!” To meet the crisis, the emperor’s ad
visers urged him to order the recruitment of rescue troops throughout the
empire and to announce the abandonment of the costly campaign against
Koguryo. A court minister suggested that, since according to the practice
of the Turks, the qatun (wife of qaghan) participated in military discus
sions, Sui should obtain the help of Princess Yicheng. She did not disap
point the Sui court. She gave false information to Shibi that there was an
emergency on his own northern border, so Shibi finally withdrew his
troops.
The immediate crisis was over, but the emperor then went back
on his word and talked again about resuming the campaign against KoguV 120
ryo.
The Turkish attack was the final straw. Coming after the unsuc
cessful campaigns against Koguryo and the turmoil inside the country
caused by various internal uprisings, the Sui dynasty went into a sudden
and steep decline and soon after met its end.
The Foreign Policies of the Two Emperors Compared
The differences between the foreign policies of the two emperors
resulted from the evolution of the political and economic situation in
China. As the founder of the dynasty Emperor Wen devoted himself to
reuniting the whole of China, restoring the economy and securing the
frontiers. Emperor Yang inherited his father’s achievement. With China
reunified, the dynasty secure, the frontiers with the Turks and the Tuyuhun
imder control, Koguryo suing for peace, and China’s economy and popu
lation recovering. Emperor Yang had not the same concerns as those of his
father. He was tempted by adventurous ideas and inspired by the ambition
of restoring the Han boundaries through military conquest.
Differences in the personalities of the two emperors also were re
sponsible for their differing decisions in policy. The prudent Emperor Wen
was more realistic in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of both China
and its rivals; he was ready to draw back when he ran into obstacles. The
flamboyant Emperor Yang, on the other hand, was so overconfident that
even when China was clearly being devastated by huge internal construc
tion projects and external wars, he would not become discouraged. The
restlessness of Emperor Yang, always going about on tours and engaging
"*SC//5 51, p. 1336.
SUIS 63, p. 1492; JTS 63, p. 2399; ZZTJ182, pp. 5698-9.
SUIS 67, pp. 1572-3; ZZTJ 182, p. 5700.
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in military campaigns, can also be seen as reflecting the nomadic side of
his inheritance.
Each of these two rulers played equally decisive roles in the mak
ing of foreign policy. It is also true, however, that we can discern a coher
ent working procedure pervading the whole process of foreign policy de
cision-making during the Sui dynasty. Officials in various capacities pre
sented suggestions in their memorials; court discussions were held; poli
cies deliberated and finally decided upon. Both emperors relied on their
circle of advisers and Zhangsun Sheng and Pei Ju were responsible for
many decisions in the foreign policy of both rulers.
Yet both emperors also rmdoubtedly held tightly the power of final
decision-making. Being northern military aristocrats, they did not care too
much about having the image of a wise Confucian ruler sitting at the top
and leaving details to their servants; they had to be in control. The power
ful position of the emperor was carefully preserved in the reform of gov
ernmental institutions under the reign of Emperor Wen. The Sui court set
up various offices on the central level: the three central ministries
(sansheng), the Department of State Affairs (shangshu sheng) with its six
administrative boards, the Chancellery {menxia sheng) and the Secretariat
(neishi sheng, later Neishu sheng), the Censorate {yushi tai), the Inspec
torate General of Water Works (dushui tai, later dushui jian), and the nine
courts.
But the office of Chancellor (chengxiang) was missing, and that
position was the summit and pivot of the Han bureaucratic apparatus. Its
holder functioned as de facto chief of government, as supreme arbiter and
spokesman for bureaucratic interests as a whole. By not reestablishing this
office. Emperor Wen was able to act as his own chancellor and Emperor
Yang followed the same practice.
Power was thereby concentrated in
the hands of the emperor, and although each of the two emperors relied on
his group of advisers, the advisers could not form a unified force able to
challenge the emperor. Their competition for the support of the emperor
weakened their position as a group. For instance, under Emperor Wen,
Gao Jiong was accused by the empress of not exerting all his efforts in the
command of the war against Koguryo,^^^ and under Emperor Yang power
struggles among the bureaucrats ruined several of his advisers.
The despotic style of both emperors was shown clearly in their
Wright 1979, p. 82.
'“ZZry 178, pp. 5566-8.
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willingness to treat their officials with punitive or even vindictive severity.
Emperor Wen was especially likely to vent his anger by ordering the
whipping and beating of offending officials at court.
But in decision
making Emperor Wen showed more willingness to listen to suggestions
and to accept remonstrance. As the founder of a new dynasty such forbear
ance was needed to win the hearts of all in both the north and the only re
cently conquered south. Emperor Wen often expressed his wish to har
monize his policies with “public opinion.”^ Knowing very well his own
limitations as an administrator, Emperor Wen followed the advice of his
ministers in such major issues as the conquest of Chen, the pacification of
the south, the formulation of tax policy, and formulation of law.
Emperor Yang showed a more despotic attitude when he said:
By nature I do not like remonstration. When those in high and
prestigious positions present remonstrance in order to make a
name for themselve, I cannot bear it. As for those in low and
humble positions, I will treat them with some tolerance but I
will still cast these [memorials] down on the ground. You should
know this!
His despotism reached its height during the Korean campaigns. He never
listened to any objections to the war. As mentioned earlier, in 614 when he
assembled his ministers for deliberation about the war, for several days no
one dared to say anything. The anti-war proposal of Yu Shiji, a policy ad
viser, was raised only when the emperor was caught in the siege by the
Turks at Yanmen. Yu urged the emperor to abandon the Korean cam
paign.
When Emperor Yang asked for opinions about resuming the
campaign, Su Wei, another adviser, still did not dare to tell him the truth
explicitly. He implied that the war should be abandoned by reminding the
emperor of his promise during the siege and suggesting that the huge
number of bandits and rebels could be pardoned and be sent on the Korean
campaign. Even this angered Emperor Yang. Other advisers, such as Pei
Yvm, knew that Emperor Yang was determined to resume the war and
therefore tried to hide the fact that China was in chaos and in no position

Somers 1978, p. 204.
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Short-lived as it was, the Sui dynasty restored Chinese unity. The
government maintained centralized control over the fitting military system
and developed “regional military conunands” in areas of major strategic
importance, following the Northern Zhou practice. It bequeathed to its
successor, Tang, the basic institutional framework for its government. The
building of the Bian canal linking north and south was a lasting contribu
tion to economic development.
The Sui was initially successful in dealing with the Turks, whose
nomadic empire posed a formidable challenge on their northern frontier.
The Sui rulers’ nomadic heritage gave them a better understanding of their
nomadic rivals than their Han predecessors had possessed. The Sui rulers
understood that the Turks’ lack of a well established rule of succession
made it hard for them to maintain a unified leadership. Rather than wait
for an internal split to appear spontaneously. Emperor Wen’s capable for
eign policy adviser, Zhangsun Sheng, familiar with Turkish affairs, ac
tively stirred up divisions among the Turks and thereby succeeded in
making the Eastern Turks accept tributary status in 584.
Such a relationship benefitted both Sui and the Turks, for both
could join forces against their common enemy, the Western Turks. The
Eastern Turks obtained Chinese support and large amounts of material aid,
while Sui could use the Eastern Turks as a frontier defense force. More
importantly for Sui, peace in the north enabled Emperor Wen to carry out
his successful conquest of the Southern Chen regime.
When the Eastern Turks under Dulan Qaghan again became hostile
in 593, Zhangsun Sheng’s strategy of divide and rule was again put into
practice and Sui formed an alliance with Dulan’s rival, Qimin Qaghan.
The tributary relationship between Sui and Qimin enabled them to join
forces to inflict a severe defeat on the Western Turks in 603.
Emperor Wen’s cautious pragmatism also showed itself in his
policies of non-intervention towards the Tuyuhim. Koguryo, Sui’s major
rival on the northeastern frontier, with its territory extending to the
Liaodong peninsula, its tendency to ally itself with the Turks, its ambition
to rule over Manchuria, and its potentially disturbing influence in the He
bei area, required more serious attention. For its part, Koguryo was deeply
127 SUIS4\,p.
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concerned with Sui’s ambition to expand in its direction. Emperor Wen’s
unsuccessful military campaign against Koguryo in 598 was, however,
primarily aimed at posing a deterrent so as to maintain security on the
frontier rather than at extending his territory, and could be said to have
achieved its objective from that point of view.
Emperor Wen’s sanctioning of an expedition against Linyi after re
establishing Chinese control over Jiaozhou in Northern Vietnam was more
adventurous, but probably did not involve great diversion of resources or
risk of serious loss.
In contrast to his father. Emperor Yang was enthusiastic from the
beginning for expansion to restore the political prestige and imperial glo
ries of the Han dynasty. Such an ambition was partly due to his flamboy
ant personality, but it can be attributed even more to the internal economic
recovery of the country, the ideological pressure to extend the sphere of
rule of the Son of Heaven and the precedent of Han’s achievements. His
foreign policy adviser, Pei Ju, dutifully offered encouragement. Under
Emperor Yang the peaceful tributary relationship with the Eastern Turks
lasted till 614 and the absence of trouble on the northern frontier left him
free to undertake a series of moves to recreate the Han empire.
He abandoned his father’s non-interventionist policy towards the
Tuyuhun and took personal command in a campaign that subjugated them
and brought them into the Sui commandery system in 609. In 609 Sui also
established two commanderies in the Western Regions, thus ensuring its
control over the area, and in 611 it succeeded in subduing the Western
Turks.
In the northeast, abandoning his father’s cautious pragmatism and
without a rational and sound assessment of the situation. Emperor Yang
took personal command in three campaigns against Koguryo in 612, 613
and 614, all of which ended in failure.
While Sui overextended itself and exhausted its strength in a futile
attempt to subdue Koguryo, the Eastern Turks imder Shibi Qaghan grew
strong. Pei Ju attempted to counter this by reviving the divide and rule
policy but this time it backfired. His attempt to win over Shibi’s younger
brother failed and only aroused the resentment of the Qaghan, who laid
siege to Emperor Yang at Yanmen while on a tour of inspection. The em
peror survived the crisis but as he planned yet another Korean expedition,
the turmoil inside the country steadily increased and the Sui dynasty was
replaced by Tang in 618.

Chapter 4
Tang’s Internal Evolution and its Foreign Policy
Before discussing in detail the relations between China and its
principal foreign rivals during Tang, we need to take an overview of the
internal evolution of China during these centuries. We must understand the
changes that took place in the internal power structure to understand the
ways in which these changes influenced the formation of policy and the
making of particular decisions dealing with external problems as they
arose.
Gaozu: Dynastic Consolidation
Even more than Emperor Wen of Sui, Gaozu, the dynastic founder
of Tang, displayed a cautious, pragmatic realism in his conduct of foreign
affairs. Unlike Yang Jian, who was already at the center of power when he
took the ambitious step of usurping the throne, Li Yuan was merely a
provincial governor who, despite his aristocratic background, would
probably have never conceived the ambition to supplant the Sui dynasty if
it had not been for the anarchic breakdown that resulted from Emperor
Yang’s obsession with conquering Koguryo.
While the standard account pictures him as having to be reluctantly
pushed into taking up arms by his brilliant son, Li Shimin, the role of the
future Taizong may have been exaggerated by historians endeavoring to
glorify the latter’s achievements. Nevertheless, the standard accoimt seems
in general consistent with Gaozu’s character as reflected in the decisions
he took in dealing with foreign powers. As we shall see, while he was in
command of affairs, Gaozu showed little compunction in adopting a sub
missive attitude towards the Turks and in giving up pretensions to suze
rainty over Korea. During this period it was his ministers and not the em
peror himself who wanted to insist on the traditional ideal of extending the
authority of the Chinese Son of Heaven beyond the frontier.
Building Frontier Defenses
Following Sui practice, Gaozu kept twelve large standing armies in
the capital region. These were staffed with soldiers recruited imder the
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fubing system. Keeping the two levels of local government, the prefecture
and county of the Sui system, Gaozu also reestablished zongguan fu
(“local regional commands” or “area commands”) in frontier regions and
interior areas of strategic importance. The label for these changed to dudu
fu (“area commands”) after 624. The area commanders {zongguan or
dudu) were placed over the civilian administration of the area and were
responsible for such military matters as taking care of “the walls, moats,
soldiers, horses, armor and weapons, food supplies and defense arrange
ments etc. in the prefectures.” Depending on the number of prefectures
under them, these dudu fu were later classified as grand, first, second and
third class, respectively.
Gaozu often appointed as area commanders former anti-Tang lead
ers or former Sui officials who had submitted to Tang, thus also incorpo
rating the military forces under them directly into the Tang chain of com
mand. For example, Zhang Changxvm, a former Sui official in Wuyuan,
attached himself to the Turks at the end of Sui, but he soon surrendered to
Tang with the territory he controlled, and was appointed the Fengzhou
zongguan} Yang Gongren, a former Sui official, submitted in 619, and
was appointed the Liangzhou zongguan as he had been the Prefect of
Ganzhou in the northwest and was familiar with frontier affairs. Soon af
ter, he was brought to Chang’an and became a Chief Minister from 619 to
626.^ Gaozu used the same winning-over policy for non-Chinese leaders.
In 618 Gaozu set up Yanzhou where the Mohe lived west of the Liao
River, and in 621 the Mohe leader was appointed Yanzhou zongguan. He
led his troops into battles against anti-Tang forces.^
Gaozu’s appeasement policy towards the Turks could not entirely
stop border incursions. It was left to the area commanders or local officials
to handle such incursions, using the troops already under them. In any
event, during that early period Tang was imable to organize major cam
paigns beyond the frontier. Kang Le has suggested that Tang held its ma
jor military forces in the capital region and that frontier area commands
were only responsible for providing information and for temporarily
checking invading forces. Battles with major invaders were fought mainly
‘ TD 32, pp. 185-6; ZZTJ185, p. 5795; 190, p. 5977; Wechsler 1979, pp. 174-5.
^JTSSl, p. 2301.
^ JTS62, pp. 2381-2; ZZTJ\%1, p. 5847; Wechsler 1979, p. 172. For former Sui officials
made zongguan, see ZZTJ 187, pp. 5851-2.
“ JTS 199B, p. 5359; ZZTJ 189, p. 5906.
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by the troops sent out from the capital region.^ Careful examination of the
period of Gaozu, however, shows that although it is not clear how large
the garrisons under their command were, the area commands often played
important roles in driving back the Turks. In some cases, however, gen
erals of expeditionary armies (xingjun) were stationed on the frontier for
defense.^
In 623, Dou Jing, Aide (zhangshi) of the Superior Area Command
of Bingzhou, presented a proposal to strengthen the frontiers by opening
up garrison fields in Taiyuan. Despite rejection by the court, Dou Jing
persisted and sent up several memorials arguing for garrison fields, and
was eventually siimmoned to the court to debate with the Chief Ministers.
0
The debate ended in his favor.
After Tang brought all China under its control in 625, Gaozu made
plans to build ships for battles on the Yellow River, and to dig tunnels on
the northern frontiers to block invasions by the Turks.® The practice of
using the term shu, as used for communications between equals, to refer to
letters to the Turks was given up in 625, when China was preparing to at
tack the Turks. Gaozu ordered substitution of the terms zhao or chi, “to
order” or “an order” from the emperor to his subjects. He also decided to
restore the Twelve Armies of the capital region, which had been estab
lished in 619 and disbanded in 623. Their reestablishment ultimately
aimed at defeat of the Turks. ^ ^
The militia system was further rationalized and improved \mder the
second emperor, Taizong. The militiamen were organized into “assaultresisting garrisons” or “intrepid militias” (zhechong fu). Each militia con
sisted of 800, 1,000 or 1,200 men. These militias were heavily concen
trated in the metropolitan area, and a small proportion of them were based
in the frontier regions. For example, Liangzhou had seven units, and thus
7,000 militiamen; Shazhou had three, Guazhou one, and Ganzhou two (all
of them in present Gansu). In addition to these militiamen serving in the* *
^KangLe 1979, p. 19.
* See the chronological summary of the battles during Gaozu’s reign in Cen Zhongmian
1958, pp. 118-71.
’ZZrJ 187, pp. 5860-1.
‘ 771S 61, p. 2369; ZZTJ190, p. 5974.
®CFR?990, p. 11634.
ATS 215A, p. 6032; ZZTJ 191, p. 5996; CFYG 990, p. 11635.
" ZZTJ 191, p. 5995; CFYG 990, p. 11635.
Gu Jiguang 1955, p. 7659.
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frontier garrisons, soldiers were recruited by other methods for the same
purpose and there were also long-service garrison troops. For major mili
tary frontier campaigns, expeditionary armies would be organized consisting of militiamen, conscripts and non-Chinese troops. 13
Taizong: Expansion
The transfer of the throne from Gaozu to his second son, Li
Shimin, known to history as Taizong, was dramatic. In the sixth month of
626, a band led by Li Shimin ambushed and killed the heir apparent, Li
Jiancheng and his younger brother at the Xuanwu Gate of the Imperial
Palace. Three days later he became the heir apparent and within two
months he made Gaozu abdicate the throne.
There can be no doubt that, unlike his father, Tang Taizong was a
man of large vision as well as driving personal ambition, the latter quality
demonstrated by his ruthless elimination of two of his brothers and seizure
of power. After completing the consolidation of Tang dynastic power
within the country, he undertook to expand its frontiers to those of the Han
empire by conquering the Turks, establishing Chinese control over the
Western Regions and extending Chinese rule over Liaodong and North
Korea. Taizong was not uniformly successful in his undertakings, notably
in his campaigns against Koguryo, and he himself did not live to see theirsuccess, which was achieved, however incompletely, under his successor,
Gaozong.
These efforts all seem to be a continuation of Emperor Yang’s ex
pansive policies. Yet, instead of being criticized by traditional Chinese
historians, Taizong has been held up for admiration as one of the greatest
emperors in Chinese history. He has maintained this image among modem
Chinese in general as well as among Chinese and Western scholars. He is
given credit not only for wise and effective government but also for his
conquests that made Tang China into a cosmopolitan world empire.
What made him different from Emperor Yang? The answer seems
to be simple: he succeeded in making China internally united and exter
nally powerful, while Emperor Yang was not only defeated abroad but
also destroyed his own dynasty’s internal stability and left China in chaos.
It has been argued that Taizong’s rule constituted a model of good
government, in which the emperor encouraged scholar-official participa
Pulleyblank 1955, pp. 61-8; Wechsler 1979, pp. 207-8.
Li Shutong 1965, pp. 153-91; Wechsler 1974, pp. 67-78.
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tion in government. Taizong is credited with paying special attention to
their advice, criticisms and remonstrance. His government has become
famous for the emperor’s deep personal rapport with a group of capable
administrators.^^ The formalization of the system of the Three Depart
ments, Department of State Affairs, Secretariat and Chancellery, as the
governing body under Taizong, it is held, prevented both the emperor and
16
his Chief Ministers from monopolizing power.
This idealized image of Taizong has, however, been challenged as
misleadingly turning him into a larger than life figure, and in any event as
appropriate only to the first years of Taizong’s reign.^^ As Wechsler con
cludes, from the late 630’s on, Taizong was not as willing as before to
heed opinions from such officials as Wei Zheng, especially on important
issues.

18

Taizong nevertheless was a capable military leader with a compre
hensive vision. Early in his reign, Taizong’s policy was generally cautious,
and he was unwilling to stretch his forces too far and wide. When some
officials in their memorials advocated that the mler must be the sole
authority and power, that he should not delegate any authority to imderlings, and should engage in aggressive wars designed to cow the
“barbarians” into submission, Taizong approved the opposite policy, rely
ing instead upon the advice of Wei Zheng to “stop wars, promote the val
ues of peace, spread virtue and extend kindness. If the Middle Kingdom
was in peace, people from far away would submit willingly.” 19
In 630, when his ministers proposed an attack against Linyi be
cause of the latter’s insubordinate language in its memorial to Tang, Tai
zong refused, claiming that war was an ill-omened instrument to be used
only as a last resort. He pointed out that the repeated and unsuccessful
campaigns of Emperor Yang had only resulted in stirring up his own peo
ple against him and in bringing about his own death. It was a waste of ef
fort, said Taizong, to launch an expedition just to punish objectionable
language. In 631, when Kang (Samarkand) asked to submit to China,
Taizong did not give permission on the grounds that if the request were
Wechsler 1979, pp. 190-1.
Sun Guodong 1957, p. 23.
‘’Wechsler 1979, p. 191.
'** Wechsler 1974, pp. 149-51.
*V7S71,p. 2558.
^°XTS 222C, p. 6298; ZZTJ193, pp. 6078-9.
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accepted, Tang would have to come to the rescue whenever Kang was in
danger.^^ Taizong made it clear that Tang did not have the ability to
stretch its resources that far.
None of this means that Taizong did not have any political ambi
tions to build an empire, though not necessarily one slavishly imitating the
Han model. Taizong was a product of his time, and presented a new image
of a ruler which combined Chinese and non-Chinese attributes. He was
motivated both by the Chinese belief in the legitimacy of the Son of
Heaven to rule All-under-Heaven, and by a desire to be looked up to as a
ruler of the non-Chinese as Heavenly Qaghan. He envisioned a grand em
pire on this dual basis, and step by step he carried out his design. He ac
cepted Wen Yanbo’s idea to use the jimi system as a way to gradually
sinicize the nomads into the Chinese way (Chapter 5). Taizong also en
listed non-Chinese generals and nomadic military forces into the Tang
armies. Without this policy, Tang success would not have been possible.
Always a capable ruler, Taizong kept firm hold on his authority to
formulate foreign policy. After the conquest of the Eastern Turks he
steadily carried forward his long range plan of empire building. On
China’s northwestern frontiers, Taizong established Yi2hou in Hami in
630. Foiu: years later in 634-635, Tang launched a military expedition to
subdue the Tuyuhun and convert their state into an outer subject on the
route to the Western Regions. Although Taizong made peace v^ath Tibet, a
new rival force, by forming a marriage alliance in 640, in 639 he ordered
an attack on Gaochang, and upon its success in 640 he established Xizhou,
Tingzhou and the post of Protector-general of Anxi, thus creating a foot
hold in the Western Regions. This set the stage for the later Tang victory
over the Western Turks, whose territory was west of the Altai Mountains,
with its influence extending into the Western Regions.
From 644 imtil the end of his reign five years later, Taizong
launched military expeditions every year. In 644 the Protector-general of
Anxi attacked Karashahr. In the northeast, Taizong ordered three major
expeditions against Koguryd in 644-645 tmder his personal command, and
in 647 and 648. All were aimed at establishing Chinese control over the
Korean peninsula. In the year 646 Tang conquered the Xueyantuo and im
posed the jimi system over all the Tiele people on their steppe land, which
meant that Tang administration extended to north of the Gobi Desert. In
648 after a Tang military success over Kucha, the nearby oasis states gave
ZZ77193, p. 6091.
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their allegiance to the Tang court. The Western Turks under Helu also
submitted to Tang. Taizong was then able to move the seat of the Protec
torate of Anxi further west to Kucha and to establish the Four Garrisons in
the Western Regions.
Although his reign ended with his failure to conquer Koguryo Tai
zong was on the whole successful in achieving the objectives of his for
eign policy. This was due to the strength of the militia system, his success
in getting the cooperation of nomadic allies, and his own superior leader
ship. Growing up as a military man and well experienced in political af
fairs before he became emperor, he was a master of strategy, cautious and
skillful, and showed a much better imderstanding of the external situation
and sounder assessment of events than his predecessors. Seeing the inter
nal political weakness within the Turkish rulership, he knew when to take
advantage of it. He first made an alliance with the Xueyantuo and then
broke that alliance when the time was ripe. His persistence in launching
campaigns to penetrate the Western Regions made possible the eventual
conquest of the Western Turks during Gaozong’s reign.

The Making of Foreign Policy under Taizong
Chief Ministers under Taizong were mostly pragmatic men, and
some had practical experience in both military and civilian administration.
Taizong intentionally excluded imperial relatives from top positions with
the one exception of his brother-in-law, Zhangsvm Wuji. These men
were not isolated from reality, sitting in the court with knowledge only of
beautiful prose and calligraphy. They actively participated in state affairs,
and their opinions were not necessarily dependent on their official posi
tions, civil or military.
Zhangsun Wuji, for example, was an able military strategist, but
often followed a cautious line. Before the final conquest of the Eastern
Turks, he favored keeping the peace agreement, whereas Xiao Yu, with
both military and civilian official backgroimd, advocated military action.
Wen Yanbo, with experience as a civilian official, was expansionist when
he rejected Gaozu’s idea that China should not make Koguryo a tributary.
In the debate on how to settle the Turks after 630, he proposed a plan of
gradual sinicization of the nomads aimed at expanding Chinese influence
through peaceful means.
^ For these chief ministers, see Wechsler 1979, pp. 193-200; see also Guisso 1978, pp.
167-98, for a list of chief ministers from 618 to 705.
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Fang Xuanling, a member of the first generation of civil service
examination graduates, was opposed to the wars against Koguryo but he
had very practical views on the comparative feasibility of war or peace in
dealing with the nomads. In his historian’s comment in the Zhoushu he
says that since the situation changed frequently and the balance of power
did not remain the same, in choosing between subjugating “barbarians” or
appeasing them, and in in choosing between going to war or forming a
marriage alliance, the best strategy was to adapt plans to the actual situa
tion.^^ Zhang Liang, with both military and civilian experience, strongly
opposed Taizong’s campaign against Koguryo when he was Minister of
Justice with the status of Chief Minister in 643. But when his opinions
24
were rejected he became one of the commanders in the campaign.
Among officials outside the Chief Minister rank, there were also military
officials, such as Jiang Xingben and Yuchi Jingde, who opposed the war
25
against Koguryo.
It is true that military officials were often inclined toward military
solutions. Military action was their profession, and promotion for them
depended on their military success. As we shall see (Chapter 5), in a court
discussion on whether to attack the Turks, Chief Minister Du Ruhui,.
speaking as the Minister of War, insisted on a bellicose attitude. Chief
Ministers Li Shiji and Li Jing were of primarily military background. Both
Li Shiji and Li Jing were supporters of the war against Koguryo (Chapter
6). They exerted a strong influence on Taizong.^®
Among Taizong’s Chief Ministers, the most Confiician-minded
was Wei Zheng.^^ As a firmly Confucian scholar-official he consistently
opposed the policy of extending Chinese rule over non-Chinese. In the de
bate on how to resettle the Turks, he and many others drew a clear line
between the “civilized” Chinese and the “savage barbarians,” and insisted
that the Chinese were the roots of All-under-Heaven while the
“barbarians” were merely like branches and leaves. He opposed Taizong’s
decision to make Gaochang a Chinese prefecture and upheld the Confu
cian principle of opposing war.
It is interesting to note that Wei Zheng also opposed Taizong’s ef-

^ ZS 50, p. 921. Biographies of the four are in J7S61, 63, 65, 66; Y7S91, 96, 101,105.
^“j7:S69,pp. 2514-5.
^JTS 59, p. 2334; 68, p. 2500.
Biographies are in JTS 67, 69; XTS 93, 94.
Wechsler has a detailed study on Wei Zheng, see his 1974.
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forts to entice foreign countries to come to pay tribute to the Tang court,
for he held that political prestige gained from the tributary practice would
not benefit China economically and would in fact exhaust China’s re
sources. He believed, on the other hand, that trade between the nonChinese and frontier Chinese people should be encouraged, since it bene28
fitted the common people.
Chu Suiliang was another Confucian-minded scholar-official who
took over the role of Wei Zheng after Wei’s death and became a Chief
Minister in 644. He was opposed to the establishment of a prefecture in
Gaochang and to war against Koguryo. But Taizong did not follow his
opinions oh all these matters.
Under both Gaozu and Taizong, frontier officials played an impor
tant role in the formulation of foreign policy. In 622 Li Daen, the Daizhou
zongguan, suggested an attack on Mayi, an important frontier town then
under Turkish control. Gaozu followed his advice. In 623 Dou Jing, a
member of the famous northwestern aristocratic Dou family, as Aide of
the Superior Area Command of Bingzhou, presented a memorial suggest
ing opening up garrison fields in Taiyuan to support frontier defense pur
poses. He persisted with several memorials and was eventually summoned
to the court to debate with the Chief Ministers. The debate ended in his
favor. In Taizong’s time, when he was the Area Commander of Xiazhou,
he sent spies into the Turks lands to divide them and enticed them to
submit to Tang. In the debate on how to settle the Eastern Turks after 630
30
he participated in the court discussion.
In the 643 discussion on whether to carry out the marriage promise
made to the Xueyantuo, Taizong followed the opinion of Qibi Heli to ref
use the marriage. Qibi was then a general in the capital, but as a former
chief of the Qibi tribe and having just returned from the capture of the
Xueyantuo, he had actual knowledge of the internal situation among the
Xueyantuo.
In 644, when the Protector-general of Anxi, Guo Xiaoke, proposed
an attack on Karashahr, Taizong agreed.^^ In the late 640’s Taizong
adopted an aggressive policy towards the non-Chinese in the region of
Nanning. This was suggested by the Area Commander of Suizhou, Liu

J7:S71,p. 2548.
ZZTJ190, pp. 5950-1.
^°J7:S61,p.2369.
JTS 198, p. 5302; ATO221A, p. 6229; ZZTJ 197, p. 6211.
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Boying, who in his memorial proposed that Tang send out an expedition
ary force to chastise the Man peoples so that Tang could establish com
munications along the route through the Erhai Lake region in Yunnan to

India.^^
The emperors often consulted the frontier officials for detailed in
formation and recommendations on strategy. In 623 Gaozu asked the for
mer Bingzhou zongguan Liu Shirang, of military official backgroimd,
about frontier defense, and acted upon his advice. Before his campaign
against Koguryo Taizong summoned Zhang Jian, the Area Commander of
Yingzhou, and Cheng Mingzhen, the Prefect of Mingzhou, to the court, to
tap their first hand knowledge of the geographical conditions of Liaodong
and their opinions on military strategy.^ Early in Taizong’s reign Cui
Dunli often acted as Chinese envoy to the Turks and then was appointed
the Area Commander of Lingzhou. After he became the Minister of War,
he went as commissioner to the Uighurs several times. Because he knew
the situation among the nomads very well, his proposals were often
adopted.^®
The important role of the frontier officials can be also seen in the
fact that their administration often affected relations with nearby nonChinese. They would often make their own decisions without previous
permission from the top. Whether successfiil or not, these decisions often
had lasting consequences for the relations of China with its foreign neigh
bors. These frontier officials continued to play important roles during sub
sequent reigns.

Gaozong and Empress Wu: from Expansion to Defense
After his death in 649, Taizong was succeeded by his son Gao
zong. From 660, however, Gaozong’s empress, Wu Zetian, became the
actual ruler because of the emperor’s poor health. She took part in court
audiences, albeit from behind a screen. On his death in 684, Gaozong was
succeeded by the elder of his two surviving sons by Wu Zetian, later
known as Zhongzong. A brief power struggle then ensued between Wu
Zetian and the new emperor’s consort. Empress Wei, also a strong and
ambitious woman who dominated her husband. When Zhongzong began

Backus 1981, p. 17.
” JTS 69, p. 2523; ZZTJ190, p. 5968.
JTS 83, p. 2776; p. 2784; ZZTJ 197, p. 6213.
”j7S’81,pp. 2747-8.
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to give high offices to his wife’s relatives, Wu Zetian accused him of
planning to hand over the empire to them and, using her authority as Em
press Dowager, deposed him and placed her younger son, the later Ruizong, on the throne. Ruizong was not allowed to function as emperor, but
was kept sequestered while the Empress Dowager, now dispensing with
the pretence of a screen, presided openly over the court. In 690 she pro
claimed herself emperor of the Zhou dynasty (690-705), the only female
ruler in name as well as fact in Chinese history.
During the early part of his reign Gaozong faithfully continued his
father’s expansionist policy, carried on by the momentum of China’s pre
vious military successes. This policy was in accord with Gaozong’s own
personal interests and ambitions. As the third choice for succession to the
throne, and being in no way as strong as his father, Gaozong felt keenly
the need to live up to his father’s reputation and to prove himself a worthy
oe
ruler. He succeeded in extending the boundaries of the Chinese empire
to the farthest limits that it ever attained in the course of history, with his
conquests of the Western Turks in 659, Paekche in 660 and Koguryo in

668.
Gaozong and Empress Wu made serious efforts to live up to the
ideal of a universal empire. The jimi fiizhou system was extended to the
Western Regions and the Korean peninsula. Military actions were resorted
to whenever rebellions by subject peoples took place. The trans-ffontier
administrative system was improved through various adjustments and
through the establishment of six major Protectorates surrounding China.
However, this expansion placed a heavy burden on China’s re
sources which were overextended and unable to sustain control over so
wide a territory. Empress Wu, while supporting the expansionist policy
after 660, when she took actual control of the central power, gradually
changed to a policy with more emphasis on defense than expansion.
From 670 the newly enlarged Chinese empire was forced into re
treat when it was severely defeated by Tibet in the battle at Koko Nor.
While the court persisted in competing with Tibet for control over the
Western Regions, from this time on China imder Empress Wu turned away
from aggression and concentrated more on defense, accepting the reality
that China was in no position to maintain its administration in its overex
tended territory.
The Protectorate of Andong on the Korean peninsula was withGuisso 1978, pp. 109-10.
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drawn back into Liaodong in 676. In 679 the Eastern Turks broke away
from Chinese control and in 682 revived their empire. Empress Wu re
cognized the qaghan’s rule and accommodated the Turkish demands for
material goods and a marriage contract so as to appease and prevent them
from attacking, so that Tang could concentrate on dealing with the Khitan
invasion of Hebei in 696-697.
And yet Empress Wu was by no means a weak ruler. She demon
strated a firm attitude in competing with Tibet over the Western Regions,
and did not hesitate to resort to military force in frontier defense. At the
same time, though it hardly reflects on Empress Wu personally, the fact
that she was a usurper and a woman imdoubtedly weakened her position in
dealing with external affairs. The Turkish qaghan made it an excuse for
using arrogant, insulting language and the Khitan used a demand for the
restoration of Tang as propaganda in their invasion (Chapter 8). In the end
she was forced to give up her plans to establish her own dynasty and fi
nally, as an old woman, to abdicate in favor of her deposed son.
One major development in the shift of China’s foreign policy from
aggression to defense was the establishment of permanent armies on the
frontiers. Previously under Taizong, militiamen would only serve in the
frontier garrisons for a period of time. There were also long-service garri
son troops composed of Chinese and of nomads who had submitted. For
major military frontier campaigns, expeditionary armies would be organ
ized consisting of militiamen, conscripts from other areas, and non-Chin37

ese troops.
With the more frequent warfare in Gaozong’s and Empress Wu’s
time such an arrangement was not sufficient. From the later part of the
reign of Gaozong onwards, the court started to build up larger and perma
nent defensive units on the frontiers with such labels as “armies” (jun) and
“fortresses” (cheng). These units were intended to be permanently ready to
do the jobs formerly performed by expeditionary armies. In 677 the first
permanent armies were established in China’s northwest under the names
of Heyuan, Jishi and Momen. Their primary responsibility was to defend
against the Tibetans.^^ The Protectorate of Anxi in the Western Regions in
640 had 1,000 troops and the size of the permanent garrison reached

” Pulleyblank 1955, pp. 61-8; Wechsler 1979, pp. 207-8; Lai 1986, pp. 50-1.
Pulleyblank 1955, pp. 67-8.
Pulleyblank 1955, p. 68; p. 147, note 30. For more details, see Lai 1986, chapters 4
and 5.
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30,000 by 692.'^° The Protectorate of Andong set up in P’yongyang after
the conquest of Koguryo in 668 was manned by 20,000 troops.'^^
The armies in the northwest fimctioned effectively to defend China
against the Turks, other nomads and the Tibetans up to the time of the An
Lushan rebellion in 755. During his seven year-tenure as the Commis
sioner of the Heyuan Army (ca. 677-684), Heichi Changzhi set up garri
sons, watchtowers, opened garrison fields and led attacks against the Ti
betans in Qinghai. The Tibetans, according to Chinese sources, “were
afraid of Changzhi and did not dare to raid again.”^^
Between 701 and 706, when Guo Yuanzhen was Area Commander
of Liangzhou, he set up the Fortress of Herong in the south and the Baiting
Army in the north to defend against the Tibetans and Turks, and ordered
the Prefect of Liangzhou to open up garrison fields. Thus, an area that was
previously troubled by the Turks and Tibetans enjoyed peace and order.
Guo’s good government won the support of both Chinese and nonChinese.^^ Before the end of Empress Wu’s reign in 705 more armies were
set up on the northeastern and northern frontiers to form the basic defense

line."^
Chief Ministers with Experience in Frontier Affairs under Gaozong
and Empress Wu
Neither Gaozong nor Empress Wu had the kind of experience
Gaozu and Taizong had had in military affairs or the same degree of actual
contact with the social reality of China. Internal disputes within the leader
ship during their reigns also sometimes damaged Tang frontier policy, as
we shall see in the cases of Liu Rengui and Li Jingxuan in 678 concerning
the campaign against Tibet, and Pei Yan and Pei Xingjian in dealing with
the Turkish rebellion in 681. Despite these limitations, Gaozong and Em
press Wu had some capable Chief Ministers and well-established political
institutions inherited from earlier reigns.
Empress Wu relied on a group of Northern Gate scholars {Beimen
xueshi), her personal secretaries, for decision-making while at the same
time her own intelligence and skillful mastery of court politics were also

*°XTS 221 A, p. 6222; p. 6232.

^'ZZr7201,p.6357.
JTS 109, p. 3295; Sato 1958, p. 334; for military farms, see pp. 367-8.
JTS 97, p. 3044; ZZTJ201, pp. 6557-8.
^ For the locations, names and dates of these armies, see Pulleyblank 1955, Map II.
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assets. Most scholars recognize that her leadership brought innovations
and improvements into the bureaucracy. There has been controversy
among modem scholars whether and to what extent Empress Wu deliber
ately adopted policies seeking support from groups formerly excluded
from the mling aristocracy. It does seem clear, however, that the reign of
Gaozong and Empress Wu saw a broadening of the ruling class’s social
backgroimd, and Empress Wu showed an obvious talent for choosing ca
pable officials.
During this period, the court increased the number of non-Chinese
generals appointed,'*^ but the constant interactions with foreign countries
also brought forth a group of experienced and talented Chinese frontier
officials and generals. Some of them were promoted to be chief ministers
and in that position they continued to perform their duties on the frontiers.
Some holding such dual appointments did not participate in decision
making at court while others contributed to decision-making at the central
level.'^® The following are some examples.
Cui Dunli was experienced in frontier affairs when he was ap
pointed Minister of War under Taizong. His proposals were often adopted
by the court. In 653, under Gaozong he was made Chief Minister. He
had a family background in frontier affairs. His grandfather Cui Zhongfang had been a Regional Military Commander (zongguan) during the Sui
period.^®
Ren Yaxiang, as the Protector-general of Yanran, participated in
military expeditions against the Western Turks in 657, and was promoted
to be Minister of War. He became a Chief Minister in 659. In 661 he was
one of the commanders of the expeditions against Koguryo and died while
49

on active service in the army the followmg year.
Liu Rengui, of poor and lowly background, rose to be Chief Minis
ter in 665 primarily due to his performance in dealing with Korea. He
continued to be in charge of campaigns against Silla and in defense against
Tibet.^°
Cui Zhiwen, with an aristocratic family background, started as a
Zhang Qun 1986, pp. 236-7.
^ For a list and brief summary of the careers of the chief ministers during 681-705, see
Guisso 1978, Appendix B.
JT5 81, pp. 2747-8; AYS' 106, p. 4044.
SUIS 60, pp. 1449.
JTS 194B, p. 5187; ZZ77200, p. 6324; p. 6327; Twitchett 1979, p. 254.
JTS 84, pp. 2789-96; AYS' 108, pp. 4081 -5.
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frontier officer. While holding a minor position in Ling2hou he presented
fifteen memorials to the court around 664, proposing to move the Tide
tribes back north of the Yellov^ River because they could not live peace
fully with the agricultural Chinese. Eventually the court agreed with him,
and according to the Chinese sources, the nomads were also grateful to
him because they were moved to good pasture land. When Cui was the
Prefect of Lanzhou his good government attracted the Dangxiang people
to submit. He was made Chief Minister in 679. 51
Wei Daijia, from an official family, distinguished himself for his
bravery on the battle field. He was then appointed as a fi'ontier official. He
was made Chief Minister imder Empress Wu in 685, and continued to lead
military campaigns against the Turks. Aware of his lack of literary ability,
he requested demotion and expressed the wish to continue his military ca
reer, to which Empress Wu agreed. After he suffered a defeat in the war
52
with the Tibetans in 689 he was exiled and died soon after.
Lou Shide, of obscure family background, got his examination jinshi degree before the age of 20. He later volunteered for service in the
army sent against the Tibetans and acted as envoy to Tibet. He distin
guished himself through military achievements and good government as a
frontier official. In 693 he was made Chief Minister and continued to use
his expertise as commissioner for frontier garrison fields and as a general.
As a result of defeat in battle against Tibet in 695 he was demoted but was
soon reestablished as Chief Minister. 53
Wang Xiaojie, of an obscure family background, was promoted to
Chief Minister in 694 after his success in recapturing the Four Garrisons.
An excellent general, he continued to command in battles, and died fight
ing against the Khitan in 697.^
Tang Xiujing, of official family background, was known for his
literary and military abilities. He obtained his examination mingfing de
gree before the age of 20 and became a military officer, participating in
several battles against the Turks. He opposed the court’s plan to give up
Fengzhou, and it was on his advice that China recovered the Four Garri
sons. He once served as Vice Protector-General of Anxi and had a good
mastery of the frontier situation, being familiar with all the strategic points

JTS 185A, p. 4791; JCTS 106, p. 4040.
JTS 77, pp. 2671; JCTS 98, p. 3904.
” JTS 93, pp. 2975-6; XTS 108, pp. 4092-3.
^ JTS 93, pp. 2977-8; XTS 111, p. 4148.
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along northwestern frontier. Even before he became Chief Minister in 703
he was often asked to participate in court discussions with the Chief Min
isters concerning the Western Regions because of his expertise on the
subject. Empress Wu once remarked to her Chief Ministers: “Xiujing has
profound knowledge of frontier affairs; ten of you are not his equal.”
During later reigns he continued to be a Chief Minister.®^
Xuanzong: from Defense to Aggression
In 705, already in her eighties, Empress Wu was forced to abdicate
the throne in favor of her son. Emperor Zhongzong. The Li royal family
restored the name of the Tang dynasty. Political authority was, however,
in the hands of Zhongzong’s consort. Empress Wei, and her daughter. The
throne passed to Ruizong, Empress Wu’s other son, after a bloody coup in
710, and two years later Ruizong abdicated in favor of his third son Li
Longji, the major leader in the coup. The new emperor, known posthu
mously as Xuanzong, and informally to posterity as Minghuang, the Bril
liant Emperor, ruled from 712 to 756, a long and eventful period which
was the high point of the Tang dynasty in terms of internal peace and
prosperity. It is also remembered as a golden age for its achievements in
arts and literature, but despite the political sophistication of its institutional
arrangements, the reign ended in the catastrophe known as the An Lushan
rebellion, which changed China drastically and permanently.
During the early years of Xuanzong’s reign. Chief Ministers Yao
Chong and Song Jing urged caution in foreign policy. But Xuanzong dis
played his ambition for military success as early as 714 in supporting the
recapture of Yingzhou in the northeast from the Khitan by force, and in
proposing to assume personal command in a campaign against Tibet. In
716 a Hu (Sogdian) suggested to the court that the countries “south of the
sea” (Southeast Asia) were rich in marvelous treasuries and profitable for
trade and asked that he should be sent to go and obtain them. He also pro
posed to go to Shiziguo (modem Srilanka) to acquire medicines and
women doctors who could be brought into the imperial palace. Xuanzong
was tempted. He ordered a censor to accompany the Sogdian on such an
expedition but changed his mind when the censor memorialized against
the plan, arguing that to compete with merchants for profits was not the
kingly way. Such caution was increasingly atypical. Minghuang’s norJTS 93, pp. 2978-80; Y75 111, pp. 4149-51.
^*ZZ77211,p.6718.
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mal tendency was to support aggressive actions by his generals.
Throughout his reign Xuanzong followed the policy of reinforcing
frontier defenses as his main strategy for dealing with foreign issues. Sev
eral important changes were made in the frontier system. Despite tempo
rary adjustments, there was a steady rise in the number of armies and in
their complement of troops. By 722 the total number of frontier soldiers
was said to be 600,000. Chief Minister Zhang Yue proposed a cut of
200,000 on the grounds that there was no severe foreign threat at the time.
When the emperor expressed his doubt about this, Zhang, well experi
enced in military and frontier affairs, insisted that he had been on battle
fields for a long time and understood the situation of the Chinese armies
well. Excessively large numbers of troops were, he pointed out, often kept
by generals for their own private use. Xuanzong was finally persuaded to
follow his suggestion.^^ For 742 alone, however, altogether forty-seven
frontier armies are listed by name.®®
A second major change was the recruitment of permanent, profes
sional soldiers both as palace guards and as frontier troops.®® Thsfubing
system, already in decay, continued to exist in name but ceased to fimction
in practice. On the frontier, while some troops were still recruited from the
ranks of militiamen for an average period of service of three years, the
government also recruited permanent soldiers who would live with their
families on the frontiers to meet the needs of frequent military expedi
tions.®® By 742 the total number of troops under the ten Military Com
missioners had again grown to around 500,000.®^ These permanent armies
worked garrison fields to support part of their needs. In the Western Re
gions merchants were taxed to partly supply the garrisons. The bulk of
the expenses of frontier armies, however, was borne by the central gov
ernment. Around 713 the annual frontier expenditure was approximately
2,000,000 strings of cash. By 741 it had already reached 10,000,000. By
755 it had again increased to 14 or 15 million, and constituted a heavy financial burden.

63

” JTS 97, p. 3053; ATS 125, p. 4408; ZZTJ2U, p. 6753.
Pulleyblank 1955, p. 68.
JTS 91, p. 3053; Y7S’ 125, p. 4408; ZZTJIM, p. 6753.
“ Pulleyblank 1955, pp. 69-70.
This is according to ZZ77215, pp. 6847-9.77S38 (pp. 1385-9) has different figures. It
says the frontier troops numbered roughly 490,000 in total.
“ Ise 1968, pp. 446-50.
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Third, with the decline of the Turks, many non-Chinese came to
submit to Tang. They were incorporated into the Chinese armies to serve
in frontier garrisons and participate in military expeditions.^ At the same
time the court, having learned from earlier experience, was on guard
against nomads who had submitted, fearing possible rebellions. For ex
ample, on the northern frontiers, the Tianbing Army, first set up in 699,
was reestablished in 717 in Taiyuan in order to meet the perceived need to
guard against the Tiele Turks, who had recently surrendered and were
scattered north of Taiyuan. Soon after, the Tiele Turks were organized into
Chinese-style military formations, and the Tianbing Army was charged
65
with direct supervision of these non-Chinese armies.
The large number of non-Chinese in the Tang armies can be seen
in an edict issued in 714 announcing Xuanzong’s taking over personal
command of a campaign against the Tibetans. It states that there were
200,000 non-Chinese soldiers in this army.®®
After their submission, the Khitan were organized into the Jingxi
Army in 716 and their chief was appointed Military Commissioner
(jinglue dashi). At about the same time the Xi were organized into the
Baosai Army and their chief was appointed Military Commissioner.®^
This increasing reliance on non-Chinese troops and generals, on
the one hand, shows the growing influence of the non-Chinese component
of Tang society, and on the other, the weakening of the Chinese compo68
nent of the military.
The fourth and the most important change was the organization of
frontier armies into various “regional commands” (fanzhen or fangzhen)
under military commissioners (Jiedu shi) on the northern, western and
southwestern frontiers. This was intended to increase the effectiveness and
coordination of these armies in military manoeuvres. The Military Commissionership eventually became a very powerful post. Its holder was to
supervise one of the large frontier armies and coordinate its subordinate
units during wartime.
^ Zhang Qun 1990, pp. 2-3.

“ TTS 99, p. 3090;XTS 127, p. 4442; ZZ77211, p. 6728; CFYG 992, pp. 11651-2; Zhang
Qun 1986, pp. 238-9.
^CFYG 118,p. 1407.
XTS 219, p. 6170; p. 6174; ZZ77221, p. 6720. It is not clear when the Baosai Army of
the Xi was established, but in an edict of 718 (CFYG 986, pp. 11583-4) the army is men
tioned.
** Zhang Qun 1986, pp. 245-6.
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Between 710 and 733 nine regional commands were organized. In
the far south a Lingnan jinglue shi was set up. The post was lower in rank
than a jiedu shi but the responsibilities were similar.®^ In 756, during the
An Lushan rebellion, Lingnan was promoted to be a regional command
under a jiedu shiJ^
A military commissioner assumed more military power and was in
control of larger standing armies and wider areas than an area commander
or protector-general. Among the six major protectorates, the ProtectorsGeneral of Beiting and Anxi were changed to Military Commissioners of
Beiting and Anxi. The Protectors-General of Chanyu and Anbei were
brought under the Military Commissioner of Shuofang. Andong was under
Pinglu, and Arman under Lingnan.^^ In the Western Regions, the Military
Commissioners of Anxi and Beiting by 714 had altogether 44,000
troops.^^ In 742 the Military Commissioner of Fanyang, on the frontier
facing the Khitan and Xi, had the largest command with a force of
91,400.^^ The power of the Military Commissioner grew to the point that
he was given authority to handle financial and supply problems and also
had responsibility for civil affairs.
It should be noted here that from Taizong’s time on, China had
been divided into ten administrative regions called “circuits” {dad), each
comprising a cluster of prefectures. Initially, there was no permanent of
fice in a circuit. Each was supervised by a commissioner sent out from the
capital at irregular intervals to inspect the operation of local governments
and ensure the good performance of local officials. The number of circuits
increased to fifteen by 733, and permanent officials were appointed in the
following year with the title of “investigation commissioner” {caifang shi),
soon renamed “surveillance commissioner” (guancha shi)J^ The Military
Commissioner of Shuofang was concurrently given the post of Surveil-

Twitchett (1979, pp. 365-7) lists nine frontier commands, not including Lingnan. Ise
(1968, pp. 446-7) gives ten, including Lingnan. This is because Lingnan by 733 is
lumped in with the other nine military commands, but its commanding officer is referred
to as a jinglue shi rather than a jiedu shi. See JTS 38, pp. 1385-9.
™ZZrj218, p. 6984.
JTS 38, pp. 1385-9; ZZTJ215, pp. 6848-51.
Ise 1968, pp. 266-8.
^ For the names of the regional commands and number of troops, horses and clothing,
see Ise 1968, pp. 446-7. Note that Ise relies on JTS 38 (pp. 1385-9), whose figures are
different from those in ZZTJ 215, pp. 6847-9.
Twitchett 1979, p. 205; pp. 402-4; Mucker 1985, pp. 487-8.

154

Chapter 4

lance Commissioner for Guannei circuit in 734 and again in 746, thus
having responsibility for civil affairs in the area; the Military Commis
sioner of Jiannan weis simultaneously the Surveillance Commissioner of
two circuits/^
The changes in the frontier system concentrated huge power in the
hands of Military Commissioners, which so improved the efficiency of the
frontier forces that passive defense gave way to aggressive defense and
then to expansionist expeditions such as the aggressions of Zhang Xuanbiao against Tibet (Chapter 7), Du Xian, Liu Huan and Gao Xianzhi
against the Western Regions, and An Lushan against the Khitan in the
northeast (Chapter 8).
The famous Tang Chief Minister Du You of the eighth century
placed the blame for Tang aggression on the frontier generals, remarking
that it was frontier generals, Geshu Han, active on the Tibetan frontiers,
Gao Xianzhi, An Lushan in the northeast, and Yang Guozhong in the
southwest, who competed in striving to engage China in expansive campaigns in order to obtain favors from the court. But it is clear that Xuanzong himself cherished dynastic ambitions inherited from his ancestors.
He displayed a quite uncompromising attitude, hoping to restore the
boimdaries set up under the early reigns, although in the northeast, Xuanzong pragmatically accepted the fact that it was impossible for China to
exert any greater degree of control on the Korean peninsula.
These changes also directly affected the power structure of the
ruling group at the central level. During Xuanzong’s reign, among the
thirty-six Chief Ministers at least twelve of them had also held the position
of Military Commissioner at one time in their careers. Du Xian was Pro
tector-General of Anxi before he became Chief Minister.In 735 Chief
Minister Zhang Jiuling, famous for his belief that the court should be in
the hands of scholar-officials rather than military men, strongly opposed
Xuanzong’s intention to promote Zhang Shougui to be Chief Minister
based on the merit he displayed as Military Commissioner.
Xuanzong agreed, but the next year, when Zhang Juling also op
posed the promotion of Niu Xianke, another capable Military Commis-

Twitchett 1979, pp. 367-9.
’*rZ)185,p. 985.
^ The calculation is based on Pulleyblank 1955, Appendix V, and on the biographies of
these chief ministers.
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sioner, to Chief Minister, Xuanzong did not accept his advice/® Between
736 and 752 Chief Minister Li Linfu exercised the role of de facto dictator,
since Xuanzong was no longer interested in government. Well aware of
the power of the Military Commissioners and the importance of control
ling the military, Li himself assumed the title of Military Commissioner of
Longyou and Hexi in 738, and controlled the military of both places
through his deputies until 740. The reason for this short tenure is not clear;
it may have been the result of a power struggle in the court.^®
In 746 and 747 as part of his great purge of his political rivals Li
Linfu removed from their official posts two Military Commissioners,
Huangfii Weiming and Wang Zhongsi, who had a close relationship with
the crown prince, the future Suzong, accusing them of plotting to enthrone
the crown prince, whose appointment he had opposed. Then, in order to
prevent Military Commissioners from gaining more power and exerting
political influence through military success, Li Linfu persuaded the em
peror to appoint non-Chinese generals who distinguished themselves in
battles as Military Commissioners. He argued that these non-Chinese of
humble origin as a consequence had no political coimections at court to
challenge the emperor’s power and were better fighters. Xuanzong let him
have his way. Eventually, except for Jiannan, all the Military Commis
sioners were non-Chinese, including the half Turkish and half Sogdian An
Lushan, his cousin An Sishun, the half Turkish Geshu Han, the Korean
general Gao Xianzhi, and Abusi, who was of Turkish origin.®^
It has been suggested that Li Linfu specially favored An Lushan’s
advancement so as to use An’s support against his political rivals. After
the death of Li Linfu in 752, Yang Guozhong assumed the role of dictator
at the court. Yang rose to power because his cousin Yang Yuhuan
(Consort Yang) was the most favored concubine of Xuanzong. As a politi
cal rival of Li Linfu, Yang Guozhong could not command much respect
from An Lushan. In order to put An under control, Yang intentionally
supported Geshu Han as An’s rival. An Lushan, by then the Military
Commissioner of three regional commands, and enjoying great favor from
the throne, became involved deeply in court politics, which eventually led

Twitchett 1979, pp. 407-8. For a specific study of Zhang Jiuling, see Herbert 1978.
™ Pulleyblank 1955, pp. 94-5.
Pulleyblank 1955, pp. 89-92.
** Pulleyblank 1955, p. 95.
Zhang Qun 1986, pp. 247-52.

156

Chapter 4

to his rebellion in 755.

Suzong and Daizong: The An Lushan Rebellion and Its Aftermath
Late in 755, An Lushan led an army of 150,000 men, including
Tongra, Xi and Khitan, from his base in Fanyang on the pretext of having
received a secret edict to remove the Chief Minister, Yang Guozhong. He
soon captured Luoyang, whereupon he abandoned his pretence of serving
the Tang dynasty and declared himself Emperor of Great Yan. The follow
ing summer, after a temporary stalemate at Tongguan, the defile where the
Yellow River cuts through into the Central Plain, the rebels penetrated into
Guanzhong. When Chang’an was about to fall to the rebels, Xuanzong
abandoned the capital to take refuge in Sichuan. On the way occurred the
famous incident at Mawei post station where his troops mutinied, killed
Yang Guozhong and forced the emperor to put to death his favorite con
cubine, Yang Yuhuan.
The Crown Prince, the future Suzong, remained behind in Guan
zhong to organize resistance to the rebels. He was persuaded by Du Hongjian. Deputy Commander (liuhou) of Shuofang, and other officials to make
his headquarters at Lingwu, the seat of the Military Commissioner of
Shuofang, and to assume the throne there and seek an alliance with the
Uighurs.*^ He followed this advice, and proclaimed himself emperor.
When the news reached Sichuan, Xuanzong abdicated in his favor.
An Lushan’s army occupied Chang’an. In 757 An Lushan was
killed by his son. An Qingxu, who was himself later killed in early 759 by
another rebel leader, Shi Siming. Shi Siming, also of non-Chinese origin,
had been left in charge of An Lushan’s base in Hebei, surrendered to Tang
in late 757, but rebelled again the following year. He, in turn, fell out with
his son, Shi Chaoyi, and died in 761 at the hands of one of the latter’s offi
cers. The rebellion continued imder Shi Chaoyi and was only finally sup
pressed with the assistance of foreign troops, especially the Uighurs, in
763 under Suzong’s successor, Daizong.
The An Lushan rebellion drastically changed China. China not
only lost its control over the Western Regions but also suffered losses to
Tibet within its own territory. By 763 Tibet had annexed the Hexi and
Longyou areas in modem Ningxia and Gansu. From these areas they con
stantly raided the Tang borders and posed a direct threat to the Tang capi
tal. Defense of the frontier with Tibet took on a new urgency. Tibetan ocJTS 108, pp. 32S2-3;XTS126, pp. 4422-3; ZZTJ2XZ, pp. 6980-2.
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cupation of the Gansu corridor also cut off communications between
China and the Western Regions. China’s control over the Western Regions
was in effect ended. The other two major foreign powers were the Uighur
empire in the north and the Nanzhao kingdom in the southwest.
China’s foreign policy thereafter centered around maintaining a
balance of power amongst these four powers. Preoccupied with internal
struggles with the provincial governors and severely limited by the lack of
economic resources, Tang’s rulers became much more pragmatic in deal
ing with these powerful neighbors, making alliance with one or another of •
them, and adopting measures that put China in an equal or even inferior
position to one or more of them.
A formerly centralized China was changed into a decentralized
state with the power of the court severely undermined. In settling the An
Lushan rebellion, the court compromised with the rebel forces in the Hebei
region and appointed former rebel leaders as Military Commissioners un
der four regional commands covering areas in present Hebei, part of Shan
dong and Henan. These were at the time called Youzhou or Lulong,
Chengde, Weibo, and Xiangwei (incorporated by Weibo in 775). Known
as the three commands of Hebei, the Military Commissioners there only
nominally recognized the authority of the Tang central government.
Though accepting titles from Tang as symbols of legitimacy, the
generals governed their territories in practice as independent fiefdoms, ap
pointing their own officers and civil officials, collecting taxes and passing
on their power to their descendants. They formed alliances among them
selves, intermarried, and even preserved a lingering allegiance to the
memory of An Lushan and his successors. Until 819 the Pinglu Army,
which had been stationed on the frontier in southern Manchuria under An
Lushan at the outset of the rebellion but had remained loyal to Tang and
crossed into the Shandong peninsula, played the same semi-independent
role ■within its territory and remained outside the effective control of the
Tang court.
In the rest of the coutry, regional commands also became perma
nent during the post-rebellion period, forming a new tier of pro'vinces be
tween the central government and the prefectures, controlled by either
military or civil commissioners appointed by the central government but
often acting with a good deal of autonomy. In Henan and Shaannan
(comprising the valley of the Han river, controlling a vital supply line
bringing tax grain to the capital). Military Commissioners, mostly generals
with their troops •withdra'wn from frontier commands in the far west, had
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been set up during the rebellion to contain the rebels and prevent them
from penetrating into the still undisturbed grain producing areas farther
south. After the rebellion was over these troops remained in place and
were sometimes as difficult for the Tang government to control as the
former rebels.
Dealing with the provinces continued to be a distraction when de
fending against foreign threats all through the post-An Lushan period.
Throughout this time the court relied mostly on the provinces of the
Yangtze and Huai valleys for its tax revenues. The military forces directly
under its control were the armies of the northwest and those of the prov
inces loyal to the court. Doubts about the loyalty of all provincial generals
led to emphasis on the Palace Annies which came increasingly under the
control of eunuchs. The court also tried, as the occasion arose, to make
alliances with the autonomous Military Commissioners and play off one
against another.*'*
At the center, the Tang emperors of the post-An Lushan period
were more out of touch than were their strong predecessors with the coun
try as a whole. They turned to those closest to them in their irmer court for
support and advice in decision-making. Breakdown in the recruiting of the
regular bureaucracy led to reliance on the Hanlin scholars (see below on
Lu Zhi). It was, however, the eunuchs whose role was especially enhanced
as a result of the rebellion and who eventually, as in Later Han and Ming
times, came to be the dominant force in the Tang government.
The rise of the eunuchs began when Suzong assumed the throne
during the rebellion and was enhanced by the continuing mistrust between
Suzong’s successors and the military. As Crown Prince, Suzong had had
to live a sequestered life because of fears that he might become the focus
of a plot by power seekers at court to replace his father prematurely.
Moreover, when he assumed the throne at Lingwu, there were few experi
enced civil officials at hand on whom he could rely to set up his admini
stration. It was natural that he should turn to his exmuch, Li Fuguo, who
had been his constant companion in earlier times.
Reliance on evmuchs increased after the establishment of two new
Palace Armies in 757. Suzong was trying to reverse the situation under

For more on the provinces during the latter half of Tang, see Wang Shounan 1969;
Pulleyblank 1976, pp. 49-60; Twitchett 1976 has an extensive bibliographical note on the
subject; Peterson 1979, pp. 484-560.
“ Pulleyblank 1976, pp. 54-5 ; Zhang Qun 1986, pp. 302-6.
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Xuanzong, when the capital’s defenses had become weak. These Palace
Armies were first placed under the command of the Prince of Jianning, but
when he fell victim to palace intrigues, Suzong entrusted Li Fuguo with
the command.®® Li Fuguo became so powerful that he controlled personal
access to the emperor, participated in much government business, and was
appointed Minister of War in 761. At the time of Suzong’s death, he inter
vened with the palace guard to foil a plot by the empress and to secure the
succession of Daizong as the next emperor.
Earlier, in 758, another eunuch, Yu Chaoen, had been appointed
“inspector of the armies” {guan junrong shi) to coordinate the joint forces
of nine Military Commissioners in the ill-fated campaign to besiege An
Lushan’s son. An Qingxu at Anyang. The appointment of eunuch supervi
sors (jianjun) to accompany generals in the field and report to the throne
on their conduct, a function that early in the dynasty had been performed
by censors, had begun in the time of Xuanzong and had become a regular
practice by this time. Reporting directly to the emperor, the function of the
eunuch supervisors was to watch over the Military Commissioners and
deter ambitious generals from becoming too powerful, but at the same
88

time this planted seeds of mistrust.
Yu’s position, which placed him over nine generals, was unprece
dented. Besides being symptomatic of the emperor’s mistrust of military
men, it reflected the increasing independence of the generals who had been
installed as Military Commissioners in command of their own territories.
It is not surprising that Yu was not on good terms with the two most im
portant commanders responsible for the campaign, Guo Ziyi and Li
Guangbi, and that disunity in the command structure led to a complete de
bacle.®® Instead of discrediting the practice of involving eunuchs in mili
tary command, however, the behavior of the generals, who retreated in
disorder, each to his own home base, served to emphasize the unreliability
of the professional military command.
Another illustration of the lack of trust and understanding between
the military governors and the court is the case of Pugu Huaien. Of Uighur
background, he played an important role in the suppression of the An

** Liu Yat-ming 1970, pp. 311-2.
184, pp. 4759-61; ATS208, pp. 5879-82; ZZTJ221, pp. 7073-4; 222, p. 7115; pp.
7123-5; Dalby 1979, pp. 572-3.
** Liu Yat-ming 1970, p. 97.
JTS 184, pp. 4763-5; XTS 207, pp. 5863-6; ZZTJ220, p. 7061.
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Lushan rebellion, but due to personal rivalries and for other reasons, he
kept his troops inactive during the Tibetan invasion of Chang’an in 763,
and a year later rose in rebellion, joining forces with the Uighurs and Ti
betans (Chapter 9).
Although at his succession in 762 Daizong got rid off Li Fuguo, he
entrusted another eunuch, Cheng Yuanzhen, with equally great power.
Cheng’s bad relations with generals Guo Ziyi and Li Guangbi severely
weakened Tang’s ability to resist the Tibetan invasion in 763 (Chapter 10).
Although under considerable pressure, Daizong eventually dismissed
Cheng Yuanzhen from all his posts in 763, he entrusted yet another
eunuch, Yu Chaoen, with command of the Palace Armies and the Shence
Army, a fateful move that in the long run became the foundation of eimuch
power.
Incorporation of the Shence Army into the Palace Armies was a
major step taken by Daizong’s court to strengthen its control over the
military. The Shence Army had been established in Longyou on the
northwestern frontier during Xuanzong’s reign, and moved into the inter
ior during the An Lushan rebellion. At the time of the Tibetan invasion of
Chang’an in 763, it was stationed at Shaanzhou, where the emperor sought
refuge. In the absence of a regular general, the army was then under Yu
Chaoen as the eimuch inspector. He came to the rescue of the emperor and
gave him protection until he was able to return to the capital. The Shence
Army was then incorporated into the Palace Armies with Yu in command.
In 765, Yu Chaoen placed units of the Shence Army west of the capital to
guard against another Tibetan invasion.
The court now had stronger Palace Armies at its disposal, but the
military power in the hands of the eunuchs was also greatly increased. In a
power struggle, Yu Chaoen was murdered in 770 at the instigation of the
Chief Minister Yuan Zai, in cooperation with the emperor. Command of
the Shence Army was at first given to another eunuch but, when he too
was purged, it passed temporarily to non-eunuch officers.®^
Daizong was never a strong or capable ruler. He was very much
interested in Buddhism, perhaps disillusioned by the turbulent politics and
chaos in China. Whenever Tibetans raided, he would order monks to recite
the Sutra of the Benevolent King in the hope of warding them off His in-

77S 11, p. 274; ZZTJ223, pp. 7155-6.
” XTS 50, p. 1332; Des Rotours 1947-48, pp. 850-2; Liu Yat-ming 1970, pp. 328-34;
Dalby 1979, pp. 573-4. For more on the Shence Army, see also Lai 1986, chapter 6.
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terest in Buddhism was shared by some of his Chief Ministers, including
Yuan Zai, who exercised a dominant role in the court between 762 and
777. Daizong’s government was preoccupied with the urgent financial
problems of the post-rebellion period and, in external affairs, was limited
by the growing strength of the frontier peoples. The best it could do was to
try to maintain the Uighur alliance and to defend the frontiers with what92
ever means were available.

Dezong: Increasing Influence of the Inner Court and Military System
When he came to the throne in the middle of 779, Dezong was de
termined to reverse the trends of the previous reign. He carried out a series
of reform measures to restore the power of the central government. He
instituted the “double-tax” system designed by his Chief Minister Yang
Yan, a financial specialist, and adopted a firm policy towards the semiautonomous provinces. To control the unruliness of foreigners at the capi
tal, he ordered that all envoys who had remained in Chang’an and were
being housed and fed at Chinese expense should be sent back, and that all
the Uighurs and various Hu (referring mostly to Sogdians) who were at the
93
capital should wear their own costumes and not dress as Chinese.
Dezong’s personal resentment at the humiliations he had suffered
at the hands of the Uighurs as Crown Prince, was one of the main factors
in a major change in his foreign policy: to abandon the Uighur alliance and
make peace with Tibet, a policy that was also designed to enable him to
divert northwestern frontier troops into the interior to deal with the rebel
lious provincial governors (Chapter 10). Dezong’s firm policy towards the
northeastern provinces had touched off a series of internal wars that lasted
from 781 to 786 and troops were badly needed there. However, the re
moval of these troops to the interior placed a heavy burden on the finances
of the court, since these armies, now removed from their home bases, had
to be supplied by the central government.
Moreover, as Lu Zhi, then a yoimg Hanlin academician (Hanlin
xueshi), pointed out, with the frontier troops in the east and the Shence
Army being away from the capital to suppress the rebels, Chang’an was
vulnerable. He suggested the recall of the Palace Armies back to the capi
tal to defend against a possible Tibetan invasion, but Dezong did not heed

ZZTJ12A, pp. 7196-7; Dalby 1979, pp. 578-9.
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his advice. The dangers in the situation were not long in materializing.
In late 783 when the soldiers of the frontier province of Jingyuan
arrived at Chang’an on their way south and found that they were not
treated as well as they expected, they rioted and made Zhu Ci their leader.
Zhu Ci was a former Military Commissioner of Jingyuan and brother of
Zhu Tao, the rebellious Military Commissioner of Youzhou. When the
court discovered that Zhu Tao had sent a letter to Ci asking him to join the
rebellion, it detained Zhu Ci in Chang’an. Vulnerable in the capital, Dezong fled northwest to Fengtian. Zhu Ci occupied Chang’an, proclaimed
himself emperor, and pressed on to Fengtian.®^
Dezong asked the Tibetans for assistance. They came but returned
home again before recovering Chang’an (Chapter 10). He also summoned
the detachments of the Shence Army still stationed at the capital but none
came. It emerged that the commissioner of the Shence Army, Bai Zhizhen,
had been corruptly enrolling merchants and shopkeepers who enjoyed the
privileges of guardsmen but did not undergo military training and contin
ued with their former occupations. When called to arms in the emergency,
they ran away. On his way to Fengtian Dezong was accompanied by only
a small group of officials and two eunuchs who managed to organize an
. 96

escort.

During his exile, with only a small group of officials around him,
Dezong relied on the Hanlin scholar, Lu Zhi, as a personal adviser and
secretary. With his insights into the situation and sound analyses of politi
cal and economic matters, Lu Zhi assisted Dezong in settling the crisis. He
played such an important role in court business that he was referred to as
an “inner Chief Minister” and overshadowed the titular Chief Ministers of
the outer court. After the emperor’s return to the capital, Lu Zhi was pro
moted to a high official post and was appointed Chief Minister in 792, af97
ter which his influence over the emperor declined.
Before the rebellion of the Jingyuan troops was over, Li
Huaiguang, one of the generals recalled from the campaign against the re
bels in the northeast to rescue the emperor, rebelled (Chapter 10). All this
shook the emperor’s confidence in the Military Commissioners. After the
crisis, Dezong made major changes in the military system. In 786, he

Twitchett 1962, pp. 94-5.
ZZTJ228, pp. 7351-8. For Zhu Ci’s revolt, see Peterson 1979, pp. 505-7.
^ Liu Yat-ming 1970, pp. 127-31; Dalby 1979, pp. 586-7.
^ For more on Lu Zhi see Twitchett 1962; Chiu-Duke 1992.
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again put eunuchs in control of the Shence Army. From then on, eunuch
control of the Shence Army became permanent.®® Under eunuch control,
the Shence Army played a major role in frontier defense as well as in
guarding the emperor and his court. Detachments were regularly des
patched, along with contingents recruited from provincial military com
missioners, as Troops for Autumn Defense to reinforce the permanent
garrisons on the frontier at the time of harvest when there was greatest
danger of Tibetan raids. Shence detachments were also stationed perma
nently at strategic walled towns inside the frontier occupied by provincial
armies. Eight Shence garrisons near the capital formed a third iimer line of
defense outside the city itself, where the main body of the Palace Armies
99

was stationed.
The hardships and dangers of his exile during Zhu Ci’s rebellion
had a traumatic effect on Dezong, and his main concern during the re
mainder of his reign was emichment of his treasury by regular or irregular
means so as never to be in want again. In dealing with provincial gover
nors, he returned to the laissez-faire policies of his predecessor, relying on
eunuch supervisors to exert what control they could over the military
commissioners whose appointments were within the scope of the court’s
effective authority.
Abortive Reform under Shunzong
Towards the end of Dezong’s reign, a reform-minded group of
young men, including the famous writers Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi,
gathered aroimd his Crown Prince, the future Shunzong, determined to
deal with the twin problems of provincial militarism and eunuch influence
at court so as to reverse the trend towards dynastic decline. Unfortunately,
before he came to the throne in 805 Shunzong suffered a stroke that ren
dered him mute and incapable of effective participation in government.
Though the reformers briefly attained power, the eunuchs were able to re
sist their attempt to take control of the Palace Armies and to engineer
Shunzong’s abdication in favor of his son, known to history as Xianzong.
The significance of this brief episode was controversial at the time
and will probably always remtiin so, given the limitations of the sources,
which are heavily weighted on the side of the winners and vilify the re
formers as a low-minded clique interested only in their own power. What
Liu Yat-ming 1970, pp. 127-31; Peterson 1979, p. 512; Dalby 1979, pp. 583-7.
^ Liu Yat-ming 1970, pp. 376-82.
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seems clear is that the power of the eunuchs was entrenched and their de
termination to hold on to it was enhanced. Their position was not seriously
challenged again imtil the Sweet Dew incident in 833.
This also had a demoralizing effect on the civil bureaucracy, which
was divided at the time between the supporters of the reform group and the
majority which was left out of the conspiracy. The majority felt threatened
by the reformers’ subversion of regular procedures and preferred to ac
commodate themselves to the eunuchs and cooperate with them to main
tain the status quo rather than support radical change. This split may have
sown the seeds of the factionalism that infected court politics for the next
several decades, and which had repercussions on foreign policy from time
to time.^°°

Temporary Recovery under Xianzong
Xianzong came to the throne towards the end of 805. Yoxmg and
forceful, he was determined to restore central authority over the independ
ent military commissioners. Between 806 and 819 he engaged in a series
of confrontations with the autonomous provinces, and succeeded for the
moment in hiaking even Hebei accept court appointees. A modus vivendi
was established with the provinces that, on the whole, maintained internal
peace in the country until the army mutinies and peasant revolts of the last
three decades of the ninth century.
Xianzong concentrated his attention and economic resources on
dealing with internal problems. In foreign policy, the court carried out ne
gotiations for peace with Tibet (Chapter 10). The Uighur problem was not
so urgent as in Daizong’s time and Xianzong was able to decline a new
marriage contract with them until 820 when he was finally persuaded by
his ministers to an agreement: from a long-term point of view it seemed
important and advantageous to continue the alliance relationship (Chapter
9).
Xianzong’s reign was looked upon as a period of recovery and re
surgence, but it was also marked by entrenchment of the power of the
eunuchs. It was during his reign that the position of Palace Secretary
(shumi shi) was formally established. Since it was held by eunuchs they
now formed a consultative body parallel to the Chief Ministers.
Eventually, the emperor was either murdered by eimuchs or died of
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a drug overdose.
Decline and Disintegration
From the next emperor, Muzong, to the end of Tang in 907 the
Tang dynasty went from decline to disintegration. In 821 the central gov
ernment appointees were driven out in Hebei, which returned to semiautonomous status and remained so to the end of the dynasty.
The
eunuchs became so powerful that they intervened in almost all the succes
sions rmtil the end of Tang, and continued to exert their influence in mili
tary and political affairs. Under these circumstances the abilities and per
sonalities of individual emperors were of less importance for foreign pol
icy than in earlier times.
Wuzong’s reign (840-846) coincided with the collapse of the
Uighurs and the opportunity it provided to abolish the Manichean temples
throughout the country which the Uighurs had sponsored. This was
probably a stimulus to the persecution of Buddhism carried out later by
that Daoist inclined emperor but this did not have any direct bearing on
dealings with foreign countries.
Factional struggles within the bureaucracy became serious from the
820’s on, with rival groups seeking support from the eunuchs. The infa
mous Niu-Li factional struggles had a direct bearing on the formation of
foreign policy at the time of the Wei2hou Incident of 831 (Chapter 10) and
when the Uighur power was in disintegration during the early 840’s
(Chapter 9).
The Shence Army, as the main military force under direct control
of the central government, deteriorated during the later years of Xianzong’s reign. It enjoyed special privileges and higher pay, but was badly
disciplined and lost its fighting spirit. Already in 812 Chief Minister Li
Jiang had pointed out that the purpose of the Shence Army was to guard
against Tibet, but because it was under the control of eunuchs who refused
to cooperate with the military commissioners, it was ineffective. He pro
posed to turn the command of the imits of the Shence Army over to the
military commissioners where they were stationed. His proposal was
blocked by the eunuchs, but over time the provincial armies gradually ab
sorbed the Shence detachments into their own and became the major force

Dalby 1979, pp. 634-5.
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for defense of the northeastern frontier.
From the 820’s peace was maintained on the frontiers to a large
extent more due to decline of both of the major foreign powers, than be
cause of the conclusion of marriages with the Uighurs and a peace treaty
with Tibet. During the 840’s, when the Uighur empire disintegrated, the
court under Wuzong and his capable Chief Minister Li Deyu made efforts
to exacerbate the collapse, but Tang China at this time did not have the
strength to recover its influence on either the steppe lands or in the West
ern Regions. When the Tibetan kingdom also collapsed during the 840’s,
the Nanzhao kingdom in the southwest increased its expansion at Tang’s
expense. Tang was for most of this time on the defensive.
From the mid-ninth century on, army revolts and peasant rebellions
broke out, reaching their height in the rebellion of Wang Xiairzhi and
Huang Chao in 874-884. Although the government vmder Xizong (r. 873888) was in the hands of loyal and capable men, Tang’s foundations were
mortally shaken. During the popular rebellions the court had to rely on
provincial military commissioners, who now became regional warlords.
One of them overthrew the Tang dynasty in 907. China entered another
period of disunion known as the period of Five Dynasties and the Ten
Kingdoms.

When the Tang dynasty began, it faced challenges both from
within and without. Gaozu had to follow a cautious foreign policy, buying
time for the consolidation of the dynastic power. This was changed to an
expansive policy imder Taizong, when China was at peace within and the
economy had recovered. He set about restoring the glories of the Han em
pire and went beyond that to envision a world empire with both Chinese
and nomadic peoples as equal subjects. The expansion reached its climax
vmder Gaozong. Sickly physically, he fell vmder the influence of his em
press, Wu Zetian, who became his assistant, and eventually usurped the
throne after his death. Handicapped by her position as a woman and a
usurper, and faced with the growing power of foreign rivals, she retreated
from expansion to defense. Her grandson, Xuanzong, a capable and ambi
tious ruler with the advantage of having inherited a prosperous and peace
ful country, again engaged China in expansion westward, but his capacity
to carry out an ambitious foreign policy was more limited than Taizong’s
For Details on the decline of the Shence Army, see Liu Yat-ming 1970, pp. 403-13.
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owing to his lack of experience outside the palace. In the end he handed
over power to Li Linfu in order to enjoy the good life as de facto retired
emperor.
During much of this time the Tang decision-making group had ca
pable ministers, often combining military as well as civilian experience.
The militia system was an important factor in Tang’s early successes. Its
deterioration under the stress of constant wars, especially the long-drawnout Korean campaigns and those caused by the emergence of Tibetan
power in the northwest, led to an emphasis on building strong defenses
and increased reliance on frontier armies, eventually including many for
eign troops and foreign generals, the most ambitious of whom. An Lushan,
rose in rebellion against the court in 755.
The post-An Lushan period contrasts sharply with the first half of
Tang in foreign policy. The weakened Tang empire had to follow reactive,
pragmatic and compromising, non-aggressive, policies towards the power
ful Tibetan kingdom and the Uighur empire. The emperors’ personalities
and attitudes were still important at times, especially in the reigns of Suzong, Daizong, Dezong, and Xianzong, but militarism in the provinces and
growing eunuch power at the center complicated the decision-making
process and left the central government weak and incapable of responding
aggressively to new opportunities, such as those provided by the collapse
of the Uighurs and Tibetans in the 840’s.

Chapter 5
Tang and the First Turkish Empire: From Appeasement to
Conquest
After the siege at Yanmen, Sui was on the verge of total collapse.
A series of internal rebellions quickly turned into a turbulent civil war pit
ting members of the ruling class against each other, and with different
parts of the country under the control of local Sui generals sometimes
facing rebel leaders, all of them soon contending for the greatest of all
Chinese political prizes, the chance to replace a dynasty which had evi
dently lost the Mandate.
Those nearest the northern frontier naturally sought the support of
the Eastern Turks, just as Turkish leaders had sought Chinese eissistance in
their own power struggles.^
Freed of interference from a strong Chinese power, both the East
ern and Western Turkish qaghanates soon recovered their positions of
dominance in their respective regions. The Eastern qaghanate under Shibi
Qaghan expanded to bring into its sphere of influence the Khitan and Shiwei in the east and the Tuyuhun and Gaochang in the west. The Western
Turks again expanded all the way to Persia, incorporating the Tiele and the
various oasis states in the Western Regions, which one after another be
came their subjects, paying regular taxes to the Western Turks.
After an initial period of appeasement, Tang succeeded in conquer
ing the Eastern Turks in 630 and the Western Turks in 659. This chapter
examines the reasons for Tang’s military success, and how Tang tried to
bring the Turks under Chinese administration so as to build a genuinely
universal empire.

’ Liu Wuzhou, on the northern edge of Shanxi and Liang Shidu, north of Chang’an on
the Ordos frontier, received the title of qaghan from Shibi Qaghan of the Eastern Turks.
To all intents and purposes, they became subjects of the Turks, even though they each
assumed the title of emperor of China. Wang Shichong, who held Luoyang also made
alliance with the Turks. The Turks also wished to confer the title qaghan on Guo (later
Li) Zihe at Yulin, at the southward bend of the northern loop of the Yellow River, but
Guo was afraid to accept it. See their biographies in JTS 55,56; XTS 85, 86, 87.

Tang and the First Turkish Empire: From Appeasement to Conquest

169

The Rise of Li Yuan and the Initial Alliance with the Turks
In the fifth month of 617, Li Yuan, the Duke of Tang, joined the
many members of the Sui ruling class who were rising in revolt against
Emperor Yang. Li was garrison commander of Taiyuan with control over
the fubing and new conscripts in the area. A contingent of Western Turks
imder Shi Danai were included in the Tang army. Danai and his people
had been previously settled in Loufan in northern Shanxi during the Sui
period.^
Like most other northern warlords, Li Yuan had been obliged to
make peace with the Eastern Turks and form an alliance with their power
ful regime. This policy was suggested by Liu Wenjing, an important planner of Li’s revolt and subsequent founding of the Tang dynasty. An un
derstanding with the Eastern Turks was necessary to prevent them from
invading, to try to stop them from supporting other rebel leaders, and to
obtain their cooperation in the wars for the establishment of Tang power.
Li Yuan personally wrote a letter to Shibi Qaghan, which proposed
that either the Turks join forces with Li to suppress other rebels and
maintain Sui, in which case the captured children, women and goods
would all go to the Turks; or, he suggested, the Turks could just make
peace with Li himself, in which case Li Yuan would provide generous
gifts so that the Turks would receive benefits without having to make any
effort. The letter was signed as qi, a term used by an inferior to a superior.
When his officials objected to this wording and suggested that, since the
Turks did not read Chinese, Li Yuan should change the word qi into shu, a
term used between equals, Li Yuan did not accept, saying that the Turks
knew the rituals of the Chinese, and that:
Even if I show respect to them they will still not believe me. If there is
neglect and rudeness, their suspicion will be even deeper. The men of
ancient times had a saying, “To bend before one man and stand above
ten thousand.” What do the barbarians beyond the frontiers amount to in
terms of this analogy? They merely amount to one ordinary person.
Moreover, the word qi is not worth a thousand measures of gold. Even
4
that I am willing to give away. Why should one worry about one word?
By now, however, Shibi Qaghan had completely lost interest in the Sui
^ ATS 110, pp. 4111-2. See also Bingham 1941, p. 98.
^ JTS 57, p. 2292; ZZTJ184, p. 5737.
* Da Tang Chuangye Qijuzhu 1, p. 7.
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regime. He agreed to assist Tang on the condition that Li Yuan declare
himself emperor. Li Yuan was too cautious to accept the condition, but
offered a compromise: he declared Emperor Yang a retired emperor, and
proclaimed a new Sui emperor. The red flag of Sui was changed for his
retinue to a combination of crimson and white to show his difference from
Sui. Shibi then despatched an envoy to Li Yuan with horses that were to
be sold in China. With the Turks friendship secured, Li Yuan and his
troops advanced to Chang’an. Simultaneously he sent Liu Wenjing to the
Eastern Turks to ask for more horses and some troops, intending to use the
Turkish force to intimidate his rivals. Shibi willingly sent two thousand
horses and five hundred cavalry.^
Some historical records suggest that, like other rebel leaders, Li
Yuan had accepted the status of vassal to the Turks, and that after his de
feat of the Eastern Turks, Li Shimin, the second emperor of Tang, re
marked how he had finally taken revenge and wiped out the great shame
and humiliation that his father suffered as a subject of the “barbarians.”
Chen Yinke agrees with this suggestion and conjectures that Gaozu ac0
cepted the title of qaghan from the Turks.
Though generally accepted, this idea has been challenged by other
modem Chinese scholars. Li Shutong concludes that Li Yuan did not ac
cept the status of vassal to the Tvurks. He believes that Xu Jingzong, the
early Tang historian, on the basis of whose work the Tang official histories
were compiled, intentionally distorted his narrative to depict Li Yuan as a
weak, incompetent character so as to contrast the father with Li Shimin,
the son, who he depicted as a strong, capable and successful leader.
Li Shutong examined the various Tang sources and based the
above judgment on the Da Tang Chuangye Qijuzhu, or the Diary of the
Founding of the Great Tang Dynasty, an unofficial court journal of Gaozu’s reign, compiled by Wen Daya, covering the period from 617 to 626.
There is nothing in this book flatly stating that Gaozu accepted the status
of subject of the Turks, nor is there any record of his being given any title
by the Turks.^
Could Wen Daya have deliberately omitted information of this
* Da Tang Chuangye Qijuzhu 1, pp. 5-11; JTS SI, p. 2292; ZZTJ 184, pp. 5737-8; pp.
5740-1; p. 5742; p. 5749.
* Chen Yinke 1973, pp. 69-80.
’ Li Shutong 1965, pp. 214-46; 1968. For a detailed study of Wen Daya’s book, see the
pioneering work in English by Bingham 1937 and a suimnary of studies on the book by
Twitchett 1992, pp. 38-42.
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kind? Li Shutong does not think that Wen Daya had any motive to do so,
but we have to recognize that Wen Daya did make one thing clear: Li
Yuan used the term qi as an inferior to a superior in his letter to the
qaghan. This can, however, be interpreted as merely an expedient to gain
time.
Whatever his deeper motives may have been, the existing evidence
of Li Yuan’s conduct in dealing with the Turks does at least show that he
felt he had to adopt a very humble attitude towards them, even if some
doubt may remain as to the extent to which he actually did intend to yield
to them at the time. This policy proved to be both necessary and wise.
With the Turks as peaceful allies, Li Yuan was able to eventually proclaim
the foimding of the Tang dynasty in the fifth month of 6l8 and himself as
its first emperor, with his capital in Chang’an. Even so, several more years
of fighting were required before Tang finally succeeded in defeating or
winning over all the other contenders for power and bringing the whole of
China under its control.

Gaozu’s Appeasement Policy in the Face of Turkish Aggression
During his reign from 618 to 626, Li Yuan, also known to history
by his posthumous title Gaozu, was preoccupied with consolidating Tang
dynastic rule, and to that end he had to adopt very pragmatic policies to
ward the non-Chinese on the frontiers, particularly the Turks. A military
man who had achieved his position by force and strategy, he knew very
well that the formalities and rhetoric of the tribute system to mark the su
periority of China over its neighbors were meaningless when China was in
fact in a weak position. The new emperor’s style of government was
highly personal and informal, unlike that of a “proper emperor.” He often
invited his officials to sit beside him on the imperial dais, and he granted
Q
the Turkish envoy the same favor in 618. His small group of advisers,
mostly pragmatic politicians like Gaozu himself, helped him in decision
making and contributed to his distinctive style.^
Gaozu consistently followed a policy of appeasement towards the
Eastern Turks. The situation during Gaozu’s time parallels the situation in
early Han when China also had to appease and pay tribute to the Xiongnu
in order to prevent them from causing trouble. Gaozu treated the Turks as
“an equal adversary” (diguo), and regularly made large payments in goods
’^ZZTJIS6, p. 5816.

® For an introduction to his advisers, see Wechsler 1979, pp. 170-4.
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to them.
Up until 625, in all letters from the Tang court to the Eastern
Turks, the Chinese used the term shu, symbolizing the equality of status
between the two states.^° In 618, when Gaozu sent a diplomatic mission to
the Turks, it carried with it women performers as gifts.^^ The following
year, when he learned that presents from Tang had not arrived on time, the
qaghan planned a major campaign against Taiyuan with his vassal, Liang
Shidu, but Tang immediately forwarded the delinquent payment, and thus
headed off the invasion. In the same year Shibi requested Tang to kill the
Western Turkish leader Chuluo, who had submitted to Sui and been reset
tled in China. Gaozu did not at first agree to the request but later, when
several ministers pointed out that if Tang refused, Chuluo himself might
survive, but only at the expense of Tang’s incurring the hatred of the
whole Eastern Turkish qaghanate, Gaozu yielded to the inevitable.
The appeasement policy was necessary since the Turks were not
only themselves a rival to Tang but also provided support to other antiTang forces, thus posing a further threat. After the death of Shibi in 619,
the Turks became more hostile under the new qaghan, Chuluo, who was
Shibi’s yotmger brother. Chuluo was married to the Sui Princess Yicheng,
who remained loyal to the Sui house. Apparently imder pressure exerted
by Chuluo, Tang in early 620 abandoned Fengzhou and conceded Wuyuan
and Yulin to the Turks. Ten thousand Turkish households then moved
south of the Yellow River.^^
In 620, at the request of Princess Yicheng, Chuluo received the
remaining members of the Sui royal family, the empress of Emperor Yang
and Emperor Yang’s grandson, Yang Zhengdao, escorted by Dou Jiande,
an anti-Tang military leader. Chuluo established Yang Zhengdao as King
of Sui and settled other Chinese who had come to the Turks in Dingxiang

xrs 215A, p. 6030; ZZTJ 191, p. 5996; CFYG 990, p. 11635; Mori Masao 1967, pp.

178-9.
'^ZZTJlZe, p.5814.
ZZTJ 187, pp. 5847-8.

TD 199, p. 1077; ZZTJ 187, p. 5865; CFYG 999, p. 11721. XTS 215B (pp. 6056-7)
records that it was the Western Turks who asked Tang to kill Chuluo. Hou Linbo holds
that the XTS is correct. Hou 1976, pp. 37-9. Whatever was the case this event shows the
humble attitude and pragmatic values of the Tang court.
The date here given for this is according to Cen Zhongmian 1958, p. 133. The Chinese
sources do not give a definite date. See XTS 215A, p. 6029; CFYG 990, p. 11633.
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on the northern frontier. Apparently Chuluo did so partly because Wang
Shichong, who was holding out as defender of Sui in Luoyang, had sent an
envoy to the Turks to persuade the qaghan to do so. Wang had earlier
formed a marriage alliance and trading relations with the Turks.
However, Chuluo also sent 2,000 cavalrymen to assist Tang in
fighting against Liu Wuzhou, another rival of Tang, and left several hun
dred of his men with the Tang general in Taiyuan and in the northern out
posts as garrison troops. The Turks seemed to be using the strategy of
playing off the rival forces in China against each other so as to profit
themselves. Soon, Liang Shidu advised Chuluo Qaghan to go beyond such
balance of power moves and to launch a major attack on the Tang capital
so that he could establish a nomadic regime inside China just as the no
madic Tuoba people had done in the fourth century. Fortunately for Tang,
18
the plan did not proceed due to Chuluo’s death.
Chuluo was succeeded by another brother, Xieli Qaghan, who also
took Princess Yicheng as his wife. Like Chuluo he was aggressive towards
Tang, treating the Tang Chinese with disdain, and imprisoning their envoys when they refused to kowtow at the Turkish court. The Chinese
records say that Xieli Qaghan addressed Tang envoys using arrogant lan
guage, and made endless demands for presents from Tang. Whenever Xieli
Qaghan made such demands, he sent letters using the term “order” (chi').
All the prefectures along the frontiers bowed before his commands.^° Xieli
also continued to support the Sui royal house. Moreover, since parts of the
buffer zone along the frontier between China and the Turks were still xm21
der anti-Tang regimes, Tang was exposed to easy attacks from the Turks.
From 619 to 626 the Turks raided Tang frontiers every year.
In 623, when Xieli Qaghan was besieging the town of Mayi, a site
of strategic importance since Han times and which was under Tang con
trol, he made a proposal for a marriage contract. Gaozu agreed on the
condition that the Turks abandon the attack. The qaghan decided to with
draw but when Princess Yicheng persisted in her pleading for an attack.
JTS 54, p. 2239; 194A, p. 5154; XTS 85, p. 3700; 215A, pp. 6029-30; ZZTJ 188, p.
5878.
‘^A75'215A, pp. 6029-30; ZZTJ 188, p. 5884.
”775 194A, p. 5154; Y75215A, p. 6029; ZZTJ 188, pp. 5884-5; p. 5898.
** 775 56, pp. 2280-1; A75 87, pp. 3730-1; ZZTJ 188, pp. 5895-6.
”775 194A,p. 5155;A75215A,p. 6030; ZZ77189, p. 5912.
“ JTS 83, p. 2775;XTS 111, pp. 4132-3; 215A, p. 6030.
^‘KangLe 1979, p. 17.
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the qaghan gave in to her. Later, however, he returned the captured Mayi
to Tang while negotiating for a marriage. It is not clear whether any
marriage agreement was actually concluded during Gaozu’s reign. We
merely read several times in the sources of a marriage contract being discussed. Perhaps the Sui Princess Yicheng was concerned that her posi
tion would be in danger once a Tang princess came and therefore disrupted
negotiations, delaying any actual contract.
In 624 all the major remaining anti-Tang forces inside China were
eliminated, except that the Turks still had Yuan Junzhang and Liang Shidu
on their side. Both Xieli Qaghan and Tuli (Tolish) Qaghan (Shibi’s son)
invaded Chinese territory. Li Shimin, the future Tang Taizong, devised a
strategy to drive a wedge between the two qaghans by claiming that he had
formed a brotherly relationship with Tolish. The Turks retreated for a
time, but before long Xieli resumed his incursions.^^ Traditional Chinese
historians suggest that imder the threat of a Turkish invasion anxiety
mounted to such an extent that Gaozu even considered abandoning
Chang’an and moving the capital to a less exposed place. He gave up the
25
plan only after strong and persistent objections from Li Shimin.
Lfnder these circumstances, Gaozu had to follow an appeasement
policy. But all this apparently peaceful diplomatic activity between Tang
and the Turks did not mean that the Tang rulers had given up the tradi
tional tribute system and accepted the principle of real equality among
sovereign states. The Cefu Yuangui records Turkish missions coming to
the court of Tang at this time as paying tribute.
In 622, the Turks attacked Taiyuan, but then expressed interest in a
peace settlement. While many court officials were in favor of making
peace, at the suggestion of the Chief Minister, Feng Lun, Gaozu instead
decided to mobilize Tang forces for an attack and to make peace only after
a victory. The plan was carried out. After attacking the Turks, Gaozu sent
an envoy to the Turks with an offer of peace and rich goods. The Turks
^^ZZTJm, p. 5973.

Kuang Pingzhang 1935, pp. 24-5.
JTS 194A, pp. 5156-7; JTO 215A, p. 6031; ZZTJ191, pp. 5991 -3.
“ JTSXTS215A, pp. 6031-2; ZZTJ 191, p. 5989. Li Shutong (1965, pp. 55-60; p. 89)

thinks that even though some suggested the removal of the capital, the narrative of
Gaozu’s agreement and Li Shimin’s objection was a forgery by the Tang historian Xu
Jingzong, who took every opportunity to make Gaozu look weak and incapable in con
trast to Taizong, whom he described as firm, strong and successful. Li Shutong may be
too harsh on Xu; if Xu did falsify his narrative, he surely did so at Li Shimin’s order.
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retreated.^®
In 624, Xieli despatched his uncle to pay a court-visit to Tang,
proposing that the Tang emperor should rule the Middle Plain while the
qaghan would occupy the territory north of the Gobi. Each would have
jurisdiction over his own part and the Turks would not invade unless pro
voked by the Chinese. The Chinese records go on to say that the Turkish
envoy asked that “the Turks should be the outer subjects of Tang for all
generations.” This last request does not seem to be consistent with the
rest of the proposal. It is not unlikely that it was added by the contempo
rary Chinese historians and never shown to the Turks.
While following an appeasement policy towards the Eastern Turks,
Gaozu tried to make the Western Turks an ally. In 620, when the envoy
from the Western Turks arrived, Gaozu granted him favorable treatment
with rich gifts in the hope of persuading the Western Turks to join in at
tacks against the Eastern Turks. But when Xieli heard about the Western
Turks’ agreement to cooperate with Tang, he quickly made peace with his
Western rivals and thereby stopped the latter from implementing their
plan. In 625, when the Western Turks despatched an embassy to Tang re
questing a marriage alliance, on the advice of Pei Ju, the famous Sui spe
cialist on the Western Regions who had transferred his allegiance to Tang
and become a Chief Minister, Gaozu agreed to the request, knowing that it
would be viewed as a military threat by the Eastern Turks and serve as a
28
deterrent to them.

Using the Tuyuhun Against Li Gui
Once the Sui dynasty lost its grip on China, the Tuyuhtm under
Fuyun Qaghan returned to Qinghai and reestablished their state. Remain
ing consistent with his pragmatic policy, Gaozu chose to make peace with
the qaghan. In 618 he sent an envoy to Fuyun, to try to persuade him to
attack Li Gui, who had set himself up as a rival emperor at Liangzhou, and
promised to send back Prince Shun who had previously stayed at the Sui
court and was now in Chang’an.
Fuyun gladly agreed and launched a successftxl attack on Li Gui.
JTS 62, p. 2380; 63, p. 2397; ZZTJ190, pp. 5954-5.

980, p. 11510.
This is according to ZZTJ 191, p. 5995, which follows the Veritable Records (Shilu) of
Gaozu. See also XTS 100, p. 3934; THY 94, p. 1693; CFYG 987, p. 11495. Other
accounts say that Feng Lun gave the advice, cf. JTS 194B, pp. 5181-2; XTS 215B, p.
6057; TD 199, p. 1077.
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He then sent repeated missions to Tang asking for his son’s return. Gaozu
sent Shun back but that freed Fuyim to repeatedly raid Tang’s frontiers
between 622 and 626, sometimes three or more times in a single year.
Tang was too much occupied then by wars with regional warlords at home
and by Turkish problems to react. In most cases, it had to leave the frontier
authorities to deal with their own defense.
Taizong’s Conquest of the Eastern Turks in 630
A few days after Li Shimin assiuned the throne, the Eastern Turk
ish cavalry galloped down south and appeared on the banks of the Wei
River, just over ten miles west of the Tang capital. This attack was
laimched at the advice of Liang Shidu. Knowing of the succession struggle
inside Chang’an, Liang Shidu hoped to take advantage of the situation. It
has also been suggested that previously Li Jiancheng had been in com
mand of the defense of the northern frontiers against the Turks, and that
his death had weakened the morale of the northern troops, who failed to
30
effectively resist the Turkish invasion.
Faced by the formidable Turks, Taizong had to enter into a cove
nant with Xieli Qaghan before the Eastern Turks finally -withdrew. The
basic terms of the treaty were a Tang promise of rich gifts, and a pact of
mutual non-aggression.^^ This incident was referred to by the Tang Chi
nese as the “Shame of the Wei River,” which Taizong was determined to
avenge. Despite remonstrance that weapons were forbidden near the em
peror, Taizong personally supervised archery training for the palace
3
troops, calling on the soldiers to prepare against Turkish invasion.
Fortunately for Tang, both the Eastern and Western Turkish pow
ers were now beginning to decline. Aroimd 627 the Tiele tribes, including
the Xueyantuo, the Uighurs and others, rose in rebellion against their East
ern Turkish overlord. In 628 the Khitan and Xi also rebelled.^^ In 628 the
•

•

•

^»

Western qaghanate was in turmoil. The Xueyantuo tribe, under their chief
Yi’nan, left the Western Turks and went over to the Eastern Turks. Soon
realizing that the situation of the Eastern Turks was as precarious as that in
JTS 198, p. 5298; CFYG 970, p. 11396; Mole 1970, xviii; p. 49. For the raids, see

ZZ77190, 191.
Li Shutong 1965, pp. 297-304.
JTS 194A, pp. 5157-8; JCTS 215A, pp. 6032-4; ZZTJ 191, pp. 6018-20; Li Shutong
1965, pp. 259-66.
ZZTJ 192, pp. 6021-2.
Ma Changshou 1957, p. 44.
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the west, Yi’nan rebelled and made himself independent of the Turks. The
Uighurs joined the Xueyantuo.^ Both the Xueyantuo and the Uighurs
were Turkish speaking peoples, who belonged to the larger confederation
known as the Tiele.
Within the ranks of the Eastern Turks, Xieli Qaghan and his
nephew Tolish Qaghan fell out amongst themselves. When the Xi people
and other tribes, who were under the direct control of Tolish Qaghan, left
him to submit to Tang because of the heavy and endless burden of taxation
Tolish imposed, Xieli held Tolish responsible for their defection. And
when Tolish failed to suppress the Xueyantuo and Uighur uprisings, he
was again severely reprimanded by Xieli. As a result, Tolish refused to
obey an order to provide troops to Xieli, and began to make plans to
35
submit to Tang.
At his own headquarters, Xieli Qaghan alienated himself from his
own people by relying mostly on non-Turks, including a Chinese and
various Hu (Sogdians). These advisers introduced complicated rules and
regulations into the Turkish administration and kept their people con
stantly at war. Moreover, several years of famine as a result of bad weather
forced Xieli to increase taxes in order to sustain enough revenue to support
his regime. The political and economic problems engendered by this
aroused great resentment among the Turks themselves as well as among
their subjects, the Tiele tribes in the north and northwest, and among the
36
Khitan, Mohe and Xi in the east.
The Chinese soon learned of this situation. In 627 Yuan Junzhang,
the surviving warlord of northern Shanxi, switched his allegiance from the
Turks to Tang because of the weaknesses he saw within the Turks. As
Chinese who had gone over to the Turks at the end of the Sui period re
turned to China, they brought ever more information about the internal

JTS 194, p. 5158; 199A, p. 5344; XTS 217B, p. 6134; ZZTJ 192, p. 6045. Ma Changshou is of the opinion that the Xueyantuo were divided into two major groups, subject to
the Eastern and Western Turks, respectively. Those in revolt in 627 were subjects of the
Eastern Turks. See Ma Changshou 1957, p. 53, note 1. Cen Zhongmian holds that the
Xueyantuo went to the Eastern Turks during Gaozu’s reign and rebelled in 627. See Cen
Zhongmian 1964, pp. 50-1.
JTS 194A, p. 5158; p. 5160; A7S'215A, p. 6034; p. 6038; ZZTJ 192, p. 6049.
JTS 194A, p. 5159; XTS 215A, p. 6034; ZZTJ 192, p. 6037; Ma Changshou 1957, pp.
39-44.
”ZZry 192, p.6035.
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troubles and natural disasters that the Turks were suffering.
Although many at his court suggested an attack against the Turks,
Taizong hesitated. Though he was boimd by the peace agreement con
cluded with the Turks in 626, he knew this was a chance that should not be
lost. In the court discussions Chief Minister Xiao Yu advocated an offen
sive, whereas Zhangsun Wuji, also Chief Minister and brother-in-law of
Taizong, suggested that Tang wait for the situation of the Turks to decline
further. Taizong decided to wait. When an envoy returned from his mis
sion to the Eastern Turks, Taizong consulted with him about the situation
there.^° It was obvious by now that the Turks were in great difficulties.
Taizong continued his patient waiting even when another envoy returned
from his mission to the Turks and confirmed the Turks’ desperate situation.

41

Meanwhile Tang tried to sow further dissension among the Turks
by allying itself with all the rivals of Xieli. One important step was that, at
the end of 628, Taizong supported the Xueyantuo, the rivals of the Turks,
by investing Chief Yi’nan with the title of qaghan, setting him up as a po
tential ally against the Turks. Later, in 629, when Yi’nan’s brother came to
pay respects, Taizong treated him favorably and bestowed a knife and a
whip on him, symbols of the power to punish criminals in the Xueyantuo
qaghanate.^^
In 628, after being attacked by Xieli, Tolish asked for Tang mili
tary aid. Du Ruhui, Chief Minister holding the office of Minister of War,
insisted that Tang should take advantage of this opportunity to attack the
Turks regardless of any previous treaties with the “barbarians.” Taizong
decided to support Tolish. He ordered a garrison in Taiyuan to prepare to

^*ZGZr8,pp. 24a-24b.
” JTS 65, p. 2447; Y75 105, p. 4018; ZZTJ192, p. 6037.
““ 775 58, p. 2307.
ZZTJ 192, p. 6046.
It is not clear when the investiture took place. It was either at the end of 628 or in 629.
For 628, see JTS 199B, p. 5344; ZZTJ 193, pp. 6061-2; THY 94, p. 1689; 96, p. 1726;
For 629, see XTS 217B, pp. 6134-5; CFYG 964, p. 11337. Cen Zhongmian prefers the
second date. He argues that it was after Yi’nan established himself as qaghan in 628 that
Taizong invested him with the title. See Cen Zhongmian 1958, p. 181; 1964, pp. 52-3.
However, it is possible that Taizong bestowed the title in order to help Yi’nan establish
his power. ZZTJ and THY say that Yi’nan was supported as qaghan but was afi^id to take
up the title. Plaiming to attack Xieli, Taizong therefore sent an envoy to invest him with
the title.
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assist him.'^^.
In 628, one tribe of the Khitan, formerly xmder the rule of the
Turks, offered to submit to Tang. Xieli proposed to hand over Liang Shidu
in exchange for the Khitan, but Taizong refused. Preparations were already
underway to inflict a major defeat on Liang Shidu, and Tang succeeded in
doing so.'^
In 629, Tang started to make war on the Eastern Turks despite
Xieli Qaghan’s offer to become a Tang subject and request for a marriage
contract. It was hoped that the Turks could be destroyed once and for all.'^®
By the end of 629, Tdlish came to Tang for refuge. In 630 Tang won a
victory over the Turks under Xieli and captured the Sui empress who had
once conspired against Tang and Yang Zhengdao. Xieli despatched an en
voy to the Tang court, admitting, in the words of the Chinese account, his
“guilt” and asking to “surrender as an iimer subject together with his
land.”
The Chinese accoimts go on to say that the court accepted the sur
render, and sent a friendly envoy to the Turks, but that since Xieli was
only pretending to be humble and was merely waiting for an opportunity
to flee to the north of the Gobi desert, the Tang generals on campaign, Li
Shiji and Li Jing, made their own decision: they would wait for the Tang
envoy to arrive at the Turks’ encampment, and when the Turks let down
their guard, the Tang troops would launch a sudden attack to eliminate
them. The plan went well. The Chinese troops captured Xieli and killed
the Sui Princess Yicheng, who had been married to four Turkish qaghans
in succession. This Chinese woman who sacrificed her life in the political
struggle, in a very real sense was also the last casualty of the Sui dynasty.
Thus ended the Eastern qaghanate.'^®

Taizong as Heavenly Qaghan
Following the conquest of the Eastern Turks in 630, the chiefs of
the non-Chinese peoples in the northwest requested that Taizong assxune
the title of Heavenly Qaghan {tian kehan), which he did.'^^ There is an
opinion that the Heavenly Qaghan system functioned as an international
XrS2\5A, p. 6034; ZZTJ192, pp. 6049-50.
^ J7S56, p. 22Z\-,XTSZ1, p. Z13\,ZZTJ 192, p. 6050.
ZZTJ 193, pp. 6065-6.
^ ZGZY2, pp. 14a-15a; JTS 194A, p. 5159; XTS 215A, p. 6035; ZZTJ 193, pp. 6066-7;
pp. 6070-3.
^^2777193, p. 6073.
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institution which maintained peace within the world known to the Chinese
and which persisted till 781, a generation after the An Lushan rebellion.
According to this thesis, the Heavenly Qaghanate’s mission was to resist
first Turkish and then Arab aggression in Central Asia. It could do so be
cause under that system the Chinese emperor had the legitimacy to regu
late relations among the participating states, both Chinese and nonChinese, to settle their disputes and conflicts, to organize military cam
paigns with troops from all the states to assist one of the states in an emer
gency, and to bestow political titles on the rulers of other states.'*®
It is, however, an open question whether such a neatly organized
international system ever actually existed.^® The practices mentioned un
der the Heavenly Qaghan system were also the norm under the tribute
system, which already governed Han relations with the oasis states in
Central Asia. Even under that early version of the tribute system the Pro
tector-general of the Western Regions was Han’s representative and was
given explicit responsibility for protecting Western Region subordinates,
mediating disputes among them and attacking those who did not act in ac
cordance with Chinese moral principles. In return for this, the oasis states
had to provide military and labor services to the Chinese, in addition to the
payment of tribute. During the Tang dynasty, the conquest of the Eastern
Turks brought various non-Chinese tribes and small states into the Chinese
sphere and subjected them to some degree of control by China. Whenever
the Chinese exercised their hegemonic power over small states, they al
ways adopted such practices whether there was an effectively functioning
Heavenly Qaghan system or not.
Yet it should be noted that Taizong’s assumption of the title of
Heavenly Qaghan did strengthen his legitimacy as a ruler and no doubt
had a psychological appeal to the nomads and other inhabitants of the
Western Regions. It symbolized his aspiration to be looked on as both the
Chinese Son of Heaven and the qaghan of the steppe, rather than simply as
a Chinese emperor. No doubt it was the non-Chinese side of his back
ground that enabled him to have a vision of world empire with the agricul
tural Chinese and nomadic non-Chinese as equal subjects, “each having an
equal share and neither dominating the other.”®®
Modem scholars have pointed out that during the Period of DisunLuo Xianglin 1955, pp. 209-43.
Zhang Qun 1986, pp. 342-66.
Pulleyblank 1976, pp. 37-8.
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ion the Chinese elite in the north had been profoundly affected by the
centuries of alien rule, and the Sui-Tang rulership displayed distinctive
features engendered by that experience. Chen Yinke’s studies demonstrate
that the Sui-Tang system grew out of the system of the Northern dynasties
and that the origins of the Tang royal house combined key traits of both
Chinese and “barbarians.”^^ It is widely recognized that Tang’s vitality
was based on its eclectic tendency to draw strength from all available
sources, Chinese and non-Chinese.^^
Taizong’s success in leadership can be attributed at least partly to
the non-Chinese influences that he inherited, and it was such influences as
well as Taizong’s imderstanding of steppe politics, “his use of personal
charisma, bluff, nomadic ceremonies and battle tactics” that made him
able to rule over both China and the steppe as the accepted ruler of both
societies. The new concept of synthesizing Chinese and non-Chinese
into one dualistic political entity won respect from the nomads, who ac
cepted Taizong as Heavenly Qaghan. On his death, the nomadic generals
Ashina Sheer and Qibi Heli even asked to follow their deceased master to
the grave, but this was not allowed. As we shall see, it was that sort of
special relationship between the Heavenly Qaghan and the non-Chinese
that brought the Uighurs and oasis states to offer their aid when the An
Lushan rebellion broke out.^
Indeed, Taizong’s background as the scion of the intermarriage of
Chinese and non-Chinese families gave him a distinctly non-Chinese aura.
Even while still just a prince, Taizong formed a relationship of sworn
brotherhood with a Western Turkish prince and with Tolish Qaghan of the
Eastern Turks, which shows that he could interact personally with the
Turks on their own terms, no matter what his motives may have been.^^
As noted in Chapter 1, ever since non-Chinese first established
their regimes inside China during the fourth century, the problem of how
to combine rule over both Chinese and nomads had been faced by the
Northern dynasties, the most thorough-going attempt at a solution being
that of Yuwen Tai of Western Wei. The Sui and Tang royal houses were
direct descendants of the northwestern aristocracy formed by the inter-

Chen Yinke, Sui-Tang Zhidu Yuanyuan Luelungao, see his 1971.
Twitchett and Wright 1973, p. 1.
” Barfield 1989, p. 140; p. 144.
^ Ise 1968, pp. 546-8.
^^JTS 194A, p. 5156; 194B, p. 5183.
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marriage of Chinese men with the daughters of non-Chinese leading fami
lies at that time. The advantage from the Chinese point of view for the off
spring of such marriages was that they bore Chinese family names.
As successor to the Northern dynasty rulers, Taizong could take on
the role of being a true ruler of a universal empire in a way different from
pre-Northem dynasty rulers. On various occasions Taizong expressed this
aspiration. Thus, he once said:
The Yi and Di are also just human beings, and their natures are not dif
ferent from those of the Chinese. A ruler’s concern is that the benefi
cence of his virtue may not extend to them, and he should not suspect
them because of racial differences. If the beneficence of his virtue har
monizes them, then the four barbarians can be made into one family; if
suspicions are many, even family members cannot avoid being enemies.

56

On another occasion he said;
The emperors from ancient times all appreciated the Chinese and depre
ciated the barbarians. Only I view them as equal. That is why they look
upon me as their parent.^^
Before and during his reign, Taizong actively enlisted non-Chinese gener
als into the Tang armies, granting them military titles, the royal Li sur
name, or marriages, and used nomadic forces to help fight Tang’s battles,
all practices that were continued by later rulers, as we shall see in this and
later chapters.
It is clear that Tang China as a whole was very cosmopolitan. For
eign influences can be seen in every aspect of its culture—music, dance,
literature, painting, medicine, knowledge of geography and calendar
making, food, costume, hairstyle, etc.®® It was a time when different relig
ions flourished.®® While in 624 and 626, Fu Yi, the Grand Astrologer
(taishi ling), presented memorials attacking Buddhism as a foreign relig
ion that was not beneficial to the common people and was harmful to the
197, pp. 6215-6.
” ZZTJ198, p. 6247.
** Many works note this feature. See for example, Xiang Da 1957, pp. 1-116; Schafer
1963, pp. 28-39; Lin Enxian 1972; Twitchett and Wright 1973, p. 1; Xie Haiping 1978,
pp. 383-446.
Xiang Da 1957, pp. 89-95; Xie Haiping 1978, pp. 366-83; Leslie 1981-83.
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stateit is interesting to note that, developing the concept of
“madhyadesa” as mentioned in Chapter 1, the leading Tang Buddhist
scholar, Daoxuan (596-667), in his essay, the Shijia Fangzhi, argued that it
was not China but Middle Tian2hu, India, that was the center of the world.
He concluded that it was due to their lack of knowledge, caused by the
confining nature of their Confucian ideas, that some scholars held that
Luoyang was the center.®^ His argument was, of course, designed to refute
the claims of Confucian scholars and to advance the position of Buddhism
in a Chinese society, in which sinocentrism was still dominant. That such
arguments needed to be made even after Taizong had created the new and
larger ecumiene, may be taken as a measure of the incompleteness of that
ecumene’s dominance.

Debate on the Policy of Resettling the Turks
Taizong’s ambition to be a Heavenly Qaghan and his vision of a
multi-ethnic empire were also reflected in his decision on the resettlement
of the Turks. The victories over the Eastern Turks in 630 raised an imme
diate question as to how to resettle the 100,000 or so Turks who had sur
rendered. It was not a new issue, but it was a difficult and constant one
that faced Chinese rulers fi:om the Han onwards.
The Former Han government established the system of dependent
states (shuguo) in which to resettle the nomadic Xiongnu who had submit
ted. Within each dependent state the highest office was in the hands of a
Chinese, under whose direction the Xiongnu military force and political
organization was placed. During Later Han the Southern Xiongnu moved
inside the Chinese frontier. Although their political structure remained in
tact they were kept imder close Chinese supervision.
During the Wei and Western Jin periods still more nomads were
resettled in the interior of China. All these nomads periodically staged re
bellions against Chinese rule. The most severe one was led by Liu Yuan, a
Xiongnu descendant in 304. It ended the Western Jin regime and began the
period of “barbarian” rule in North China.^^ Sui attempted to return to the
policy of bringing the Turks who had submitted inside the frontier.
Chinese relations with the nomads displayed an abiding pattern on
both sides. When the nomads were strong, they followed “an outer frontier

“ THY47, pp. 835-6; ZZTJ191, pp. 6001-2.
Shijia Fangzhi, p. 949.
“ For a study of the settlement policy before Tang, see Pan Yihong 1992b, pp. 41-56.
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strategy”, as described by Barfield, forcing the Chinese to meet their de
mands for subsidies and trade; when they were weak they chose an “inner
frontier strategy” to submit to China and utilize Chinese assistance so that
they could accumulate goods and recover their strength.^^ The nomads’
inner frontier strategy, however, had certain inherent problems. It could
result in increasing reliance on China and finally lead to their losing the
chance to recover their own power and to perpetuate their identity.
For their part, the Chinese understood these nomadic strategies.
From Han onwards, they realized that resettlement was always problem
atical. Resettlement was applied only to some nomadic peoples for some
varying length of time, and there were always other nomads beyond the
borders ready to entice the resettled nomads to leave China. Since the re
settled nomads usually lived in border areas without a large Han Chinese
population, there was little to prevent these nomads from rising in revolt or
returning to the steppe and recovering their state power.
But despite the constant rebellions by nomads who had submitted,
the imperial courts persisted in their settlement policies, since the
“submission” of the nomadic peoples could be taken as confirmation of
the benevolent and virtuous rule of the Son of Heaven, a factor that served
to strengthen the legitimacy of the Son of Heaven. The Chinese rulers
could not, therefore, afford to refuse the nomads’ “submission” and subse
quent resettlement, particularly when this was less costly than engaging in
wars for the purpose of keeping peace on the frontiers. Also, the Chinese
rulers wished to utilize the considerable military force of the nomads for
their own purposes.
The Tang court held heated discussions on the matter, which went
on for several years. After three centuries of alien rule, now that China was
at last unified under a Chinese regime, the issue of redefining Chineseness
inevitably arose. In this debate four opinions can be discerned.
1. The opinion that the nomads should be sinicized or assimilated.
Many court officials held that the court should scatter the Turks among the
Chinese prefectures and coimties, make them take up agriculture and
change their customs so as to convert the formerly dangerous nomads into
Chinese subjects. This would increase China’s population while the region
north of the Great Wall would become an empty land. The sinicization of
the nomads during the previous three centuries of foreign rule in North
China must have been in the minds of the advocates of this policy, but it
“Barfield 1989, p. 63;p.91.
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was hardly realistic to suppose that China had the power to empty the
Mongolian steppe and keep it from filling up again with other nomads
from farther away.
2. The opinion that drew a clear line between the Chinese and nonChinese, insisting on the principle of “having the various states of Xia
within and keeping the Yi and Di barbarians without.” Holders of this
opinion urged that the Turks should be settled outside China under Chi
nese supervision and their power be kept fragmented. Yan Shigu, Vice Di
rector of the Secretariat (zhongshu shilang), maintained that the
“barbarians” had always been in the outermost zone and it was impossible
to suddenly change their customs. One ought to control them, he said, in
accordance with their own customs. He suggested that the Turks should be
settled north of the loop of the Yellow River, that different chiefs should
be appointed separately for each tribe, from high to low, that all their terri
tories should be separately delineated by the Chinese, and that separate
administrations should be set up for each region.
Dou Jing, now Area Commander of Xiazhou, held that since
“barbarians” were like animals, they could neither be disciplined by rules
nor taught by benevolence and righteousness. China, he said, would not
benefit by gaining their allegiance, but in so far as the nomads had submit
ted, it was open to the court to grant them favors at its discretion, such as
giving them the title of “wise king” (xian wang, the nomads’ own rank),
and providing them with wives from the imperial clan. He said that China
should divide their land and split up the tribes in order to weaken their
power, should control them, but with a loose rein, and should turn them
into outer subjects defending Chinese frontiers.
Du Chuke, Supervising Secretary (jishi zhong), observed that
“barbarians” were difficult to hold by virtue but easy to control by force. If
the court accepted their surrender, he said, and settled them south of the
Yellow River, they would definitely cause troubles.
Li Baiyao, Vice Minister of Rites {libu shilang), recommended that
the court take advantage of the Turks’ lack of unity and set up chiefs for
each separate group, thereby ensuring that no one group would become
dominant. Each group would have to continually protect itself against the
others and would have no time or strength to challenge China. China
should establish a Protectorate in Dingxiang town to supervise them.
All these men, except for Dou Jing, were civil officials with no ex
perience dealing with nomads. Their cautious, hostile and conservative
views towards the Turks were no doubt derived from their reading of ear-
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her history and their wish to reestablish a clear distinction between Chi
nese and “barbarians.”
3. The opinion that the Turks should be sinicized gradually. Chief
Minister Wen Yanbo, who was once captured and taken to the Turks early
in his career, was the main advocate of this point of view. While he re
jected the idea that the Turks should be scattered further inside China,
probably because he foresaw that local governments would have difficulty
controlling them, he suggested that the nomads be settled south of the
great loop of the Yellow River and be used as a force for defending Tang,
but without at first attempting to change their customs. However, he be
lieved, they could and should gradually be sinicized. Wen Yanbo argued
that the Son of Heaven should care for all creatures, show pity on the
Turks who had come to surrender, settle them south of the Yellow River
and provide them with means of livelihood, so they would not rebel.
He believed that the Chinese could make the settled Turks obey
Chinese orders, and teach them righteousness and laws, and that after a
few years the court should begin to select Turks for service in the Imperial
Bodyguard, just as the Later Han had done with the Southern Xiongnu.
The cause of the earlier Turkish rebellion, he believed, was to be traced to
the restoration of the Turkish qaghanate by Sui Emperor Wen. Now, if the
Chinese let the Turks settle at their own will, either south or north of the
Yellow River, their tribes would be scattered and their power split. They
could not possibly again become a menace.
4. The opinion expressed by Chief Minister Wei Zheng represented
a total rejection of the Turks. He would presumably have agreed with the
second opinion. His views were mainly in opposition to Wen’s proposed
policy of gradual assimilation. Wei argued that assimilation was not pos
sible because though the nomads had human faces they had “animal
hearts.” They plimdered when they were strong and submitted only when
weak and then only to regain their strength. He was worried that since the
Turks now numbered almost 100,000, within a few years, their population
would surely increase, and they would definitely begin to cause trouble
again. He cited the sad lessons of earlier times when Western Jin had
“barbarians” living inside China. Within a few years, he recalled, the
“barbarians” had caused the collapse of the dynasty.®^
From the historical precedents, the Tang Chinese saw that reset“ 2G2Y 9, pp. 18a-20a; JTS 61, p. 2361; pp. 2369-70; 194A, pp. 5162-3; XTS 91, p.
3782; 95, pp. 3848-9; 215A, pp. 6037-8; 22TJ193, pp. 6075-7; THY 11, pp. 1312-4.
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tlement of the nomads who had submitted might have two possible results:
their rebellion or their assimilation. Wen Yanbo’s opinions, drawing on
the Han experience, explicitly advocated that the Turks should be brought
within the Chinese frontier and gradually sinicized. The final decision
maker, Taizong himself, accepted Wen Yanbo’s view. In his arrangements
to resettle the Turks, Taizong thus showed some bias in favor of his Chi
nese side despite his aspiration to have equal regard for all the subjects of
his world empire.

The Resettlement of the Turks
The first step in the policy of resettlement was to deprive the
Turkish leaders of their native political titles and bring them into the Chi
nese system of official titles. Taizong did not want to let them retain their
own titles, as the Han ruler had done with the Xiongnu title chanyu, and
the Sui with the Turkish title qaghan. Xieli was appointed Prefect (cishi)
of Guozhou, even though this was an area inhabited by wild animals and
most suitable for hunting. When he chose not to go to his prefecture he
was given the office of General-in-chief of the Right Guard, with houses
and land in the Tang capital. Nevertheless, he was spiritually crushed by
memory of his defeat and died in 634. Tolish was given a dual appoint
ment as General-in-chief of the Right Guard, and Commandery Prince of
Beiping with an annual income from 700 households. When Taizong
gave Tolish yet another title as Area Commander of Shunzhou in 630, he
clearly stated to Tolish what he intended by the arrangement:
When your affairs came to an extremity, you came to surrender. The
reason why I do not make you qaghan is just because of the example of
Qimin. In changing the former way I wish to give China permanent
peace and your clan permanent security. I therefore make you an area
commander. You should follow our laws, discipline your people, and not
invade and plunder each other at will. If disobedience occurs, [the of^
67
fender] will be severely punished.
The tribal leaders were all given Chinese military official titles and re
sponsibilities. More than a himdred whose ranks were above the fifth, ac“TTS 194A, pp. 5159-60; JlcTS215A, p. 6036; ZZTJ194, p. 6099; p. 6105.
“ JTS 194A, p. 5161; XTS 215A, p. 6038; ZZTJ 193, p. 6073; CFYG 964, p. 11337.
CFYG says that the income was from the taxes on 1,000 households.
®’j7S’194A,p.5161.

188

Chapter 5
68

companied by as many as a thousand families, settled in Chang’an.
The second step was to resettle all the nomads into the system of
“subordinated area commands and prefectures,” or “area commands and
prefectures controlled by loose rein” (jimi fuzhou), the nature of which is
discussed below. Surviving records concerning the jimi area commands set
up to resettle the Turks are too inadequate and too confusing to yield a
clear picture. One opinion holds that by 634, the Eastern Turks were di
vided into two major groups. One was resettled inside the frontiers under
four area commands, namely, Shunzhou, Youzhou, Huazhou, and Chang
zhou. These were scattered south of the Yellow River in the area from
Youzhou (in modem Hebei) to Lingzhou (in modem Ningxia). Another
group was outside the frontiers under six prefectures, and all of them were
supervised by the Area Commands of Dingxiang and Yunzhong, both
north of the Yellow River. Dou Jing, well experienced in Turkish affairs,
was appointed Commissioner-in-chief (dashi) of Ningshuo to take charge
of the Turks.®^
The potential threat posed by the pacified Turks was sensed by
some Chinese officials right from the beginning. Despite Taizong’s deci
sion, some continued to advocate that Tang found a Turkish state north of
the Yellow River instead of settling the Turks inside China. Wen Yanbo
insisted, however, that since Tang had already accepted the Turks, it
would be a pity to send them away without reason. Apparently Taizong
accepted Wen’s advice. Nevertheless, opposition did not stop, and the de
bate about the proper way to deal with the Turks and other non-Chinese
who had surrendered went on.^°

Adjustments in the Turkish Settlement
The policy of resettling the Turks met with its first setback in 639,
nine years after it started. That year the younger brother of Tolish Qaghan,
who had joined the Imperial Bodyguard after submitting to Tang, made an
attempt to attack Taizong. He conspired with Tolish’s son, who became
the Area Commander of Shunzhou after Tolish. Though it ended in failure,
the incident aroused universal opposition at court to the resettlement of the
Tvirks south of the Yellow River. Taizong also voiced his deep regret for

J7S 194A, p. 5163; Y7S215A, p. 6038; THY13, p. 1311. ZZrJ 193 (p. 6078) says that
almost 10,000 families settled in Chang’an. That number seems too large.
Iwami 1987, pp. 510-6. For a different opinion, see Zhang Qun 1986, pp. 121-2.
’°y7S61,p. 2361.
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having neglected Wei Zheng’s warning. After reiterating the thesis that the
Chinese were like roots while the “barbarians” were like leaves, he
changed policy. All the Turks were to be moved north of the Yellow
River with headquarters set up in Dingxiang.^^ They were to be treated as
outer subjects, in essence, as a client state, responsible for the defense of
the Chinese frontiers. They were placed under Ashina Simo of the Turkish
royal clan, the former Area Commander of Hua2hou. He was granted the
royal surname, Li, and the title of qaghan. The titles of Wise King of the
Left and Wise King of the Right, which were titles used by the nomads,
were conferred on other Turkish chiefs.
This new arrangement was also partly motivated by a desire to
check the power of the Xueyantuo. With the defeat of the Eastern Turks,
the Xueyantuo took their place as the dominant power on the steppe land.
When Simo did not want to move because he feared an attack from the
Xueyantuo, Taizong had a letter sent to the Xueyantuo stating that they
were to occupy the territory north of the Gobi Desert, while the Turks
should stay south of it, and that Tang was ready to come to the aid of the
Turks in case any attacks were made on them by the Xueyantuo. Simo
then moved out to the north of the Yellow River in 641.^^ In 640, Tang
reestablished the position of the Commissioner-in-chief of Ningshuo, with
responsibility for Turkish affairs. In 641, the Xueyantuo crossed the
Gobi desert and attacked Simo. Tang sent troops to the rescue and suc
ceeded in forcing Yi’nan to make peace with Simo.^^
In 644 Simo’s people asked to be eillowed to move back to the Ordos region because Simo was unable to resist the attacks from the Xueyan
tuo, and could not maintain control over his people. Disregarding the ob
jections of his ministers, Taizong again resettled them inside China,
claiming that the “barbarians” should be treated as members of the Chi
nese family. He made a point of asking Chu Suiliang to record his exact
words in the court diary.^® Taizong’s real motive may have been to pre
serve Li Simo’s tribe so that they could continue to function as a force de
fending the Tang frontier.

Iwami 1987, p. 515.
^JTS\9AK, pp. 5163-4; Y7S 215A, pp. 6039-40; ZZTJ195, pp. 6148-9; 196, p. 6165.

Dou Jing was appointed to this position in 630, but when he moved on to another post,
the position appears to have been abolished. ZZTJ 195, p. 6154; CFYG 991, p. 11638.
JTIS 199B, pp. 5344-5; Y75217B, pp. 6135-6; ZZTJ 196, pp. 6170-2.
J7S 194A, pp. 5164-5; ATS215A, p. 6040; ZZTJ 197, pp. 6215-6.
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The Conquest of the Xueyantuo in 646
With the defeat of the Eastern Turks, the Xueyantuo grew to be an
important nomadic power on the steppe lands. Before moving Simo and
his people north of the Yellow River, Taizong had already decided on a
divide and rule policy to weaken the Xueyantuo. In 638 he despatched an
embassy to confer the title of “minor qaghan” on the two sons of Yi’nan
Qaghan, and gave them each drums and banners, “ostensibly to show favor but in reality to divide their power.”76
Then, when Yi’nan in 640 requested a marriage contract with
Tang, Taizong refused after a protracted discussion and careful considera
tion. Fang Xuanling, Taizong’s eminent Chief Minister, suggested that
Tang consent on the grounds that the dynasty had not yet fully settled its
frontier problems. Taizong initially agreed. At this time Qibi Heli, a for
mer chief of the Tiele who had submitted to Tang in 632 and been ap
pointed a general, was forced by his followers to go over to the Xueyan
tuo. Tang sent an envoy to the Xueyantuo with the promise of a Chinese
princess in marriage in exchange for Qibi, and Qibi Heli was as a conse
quence returned.
But soon after he returned Qibi strongly opposed the marriage to
the Xueyantuo, arguing that Yi’nan was already in a weak position, and
that by refusing his request Tang could further weaken him so that there
would later be an opportunity to defeat the Xueyantuo. He suggested that
Tang ask Yi’nan to come to court to receive the bride personally. Tang
should decline to go through with the marriage if Yi’nan refused to come
to court, for Qibi was sure that Yi’nan would not dare to expose himself
by coming to China.
Chu Suiliang, Grand Master of Remonstrance, on the other hand,
insisted that Taizong should keep his promise, not only because it was a
moral principle that an emperor should keep faith but also because history
had shown that there was no way for China to eliminate the nomadic peo
ples.
Chu was not alone in his opinion, but Taizong preferred to accept
Qibi’s suggestion. The emperor stated that the policy of marriage alliance
was to be used only as an expedient to further Chinese aims; the Xueyan
tuo ruler’s submissiveness was simply because he had recently become
ruler of various tribes who were not of his own clan and therefore wanted
Cen Zhongmian 1958, pp. 216-7. He is of the opinion that Tang conferred on Yi’nan’s
two sons the titles of qaghan and yabgu, respectively.
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to borrow Chinese authority to strengthen his own position. If Tang
stopped the marriage, the various tribes would know that the Chinese had
abandoned Yi’nan and would rebel against him. Taizong then declined to
go through with the marriage on the pretext that Yi’nan had not prepared
enough betrothal gifts and had not promised to come personally to receive
his bride.
Four himdred years later, Sima Guang severely criticized Taizong
for this breach of promise and concluded that even though Taizong even
tually destroyed the Xueyantuo, it was shameful to rely on one’s strength
to break a promise.^^ As an astute politician, a skillful military leader with
a good grasp of the nomadic situation, Taizong knew very well that poli
cies based on peace and moral principles simply did not work in most
cases in international affairs, where the decisive factor was the balance of
power.
Tang’s refusal of a marriage worked effectively to weaken
Yi’nan’s power. Seven years later, in 645, he died and was succeeded by
his son, Duomi Qaghan. While Taizong was occupied with his Korean ex
peditions Duomi made incursions into the Chinese frontier regions, and
there was a danger that Kogiiryo would attempt to bribe the Xueyantuo
into an alliance.^® This made Tang determine to eliminate the Xueyantuo
once and for all. In 646, when Duomi’s brutal rule provoked an uprising
by other Tiele tribes including the Uighxirs, Pugu (Buqu) and Tongluo
(Tongra), Tang immediately seized the opportunity to despatch Chinese,
Turkish and other non-Chinese troops to attack the Xueyantuo.
When Duomi was killed by the Uighurs, the Xueyantuo qaghanate
collapsed. Taizong went to Lingzhou to encourage the troops and to entice
the submission of Uighur and other Tiele tribes to forestall any chance that
one of them would replace the Xueyantuo as the dominant power on the
steppe. Through their envoys, the chieftains of these tribes expressed the
wish to be subjects of the Heavenly Qaghan.^®
Taizong was determined to subjugate all the nomads. In 649 he or
dered an attack on an Eastern Turkish tribe under Chebi Qaghan, who had
been attached to the Xueyantuo after 630, but since had become indepen-

JTS 80, pp. 2732-3; 109, pp. 3291-2; 199B, pp. 5345-6; XTS 105, p. 4027; 110, pp.
4118-19; 217B, pp. 6136-7; ZZTJ196, pp. 6179-80; 197, pp. 6199-202.
’’^JTS 199B, p. 5346; Y7S217B, pp. 6137-8; ZZTJ 198, pp. 6227-8.
J7S 199B, pp. 5346-8; JSTTS217B, pp. 6138-9; ZZ77198, pp. 6232-3; pp. 6236-40.
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dent and strong. The Tang attack succeeded in the following year.

80

Resettlement of the Xueyantuo and Other Tiele Tribes
In accordance with his grand design for a universal empire, Taizong in 647 established six area commands and seven prefectures for the
Xueyantuo and other Tiele people on their own territory, with their chieftains as area commanders and prefects. As in the Chinese bureaucratic
system, the offices of administrator and assistant were also set up for the
Tiele. These institutions were placed under the administration of the Pro
tectorate of Yanran north of the great loop of the Yellow River with a Chi
nese as Protector-general. Over sixty relay stations were set up along the
route stretching from south of the Uighurs to the Protectorate of Yanran.
82
Annual payments in the form of marten pelts were levied as tax.
It should be noted that instead of moving the non-Chinese who had
submitted inside the frontier, Taizong established a Chinese administrative
system in their own areas. In any case, it would have been physically im
possible to move so many of them inside China, and after 639, when the
Turks rebelled against Tang, there was not much political will at court to
adopt so radical a policy for dealing with the nomads. Even when the
Uighurs were brought under the jimi area command-prefecture system,
they continued to use the title of qaghan. The Chinese were aware of this
83
fact, but chose not do anything about it.
The aim of the Chinese resettlement of these nomads was to keep
them peaceftxl imder the Chinese jimi fuzhou system and to use them in
military campaigns. In 648, when an internal conflict occurred between the
Uighur chief Tumidu and his two pro-Turkish nephews, both sons-in-law
of Chebi Qaghan, the Vice Protector-general of Yanran had one of the
nephews executed. Fearful of the disintegration of the Uighurs, Taizong
sent Cui Dunli, the Minister of War, experienced in frontier affairs, as a
pacification missioner to the Uighurs. Tumidu’s son was appointed Gen
eral-in-chief, great iltabar {da silifa) and Area Commander of Hanhai, suc
ceeding his father, who had been killed by the pro-Turkish partyAfter
^JTS\9AK p. 5156; A7S215A, pp. 6041-2; ZZTJ199, p. 6265.

For their names, see Cen Zhongmian 1958, pp. 1066-73.
“ JTS 195, p. 5196; 199B, pp. 5348-9; XTS 217A, pp. 6112-3; 217B, pp. 6139-42; p.
6145; ZZTJ 198, pp. 6244-5; Ma Changshou 1957, pp. 57-8.
“T7S 195, p. 5196; JOT 217A, p. 6113; ZZTJ\9%, p. 6245.
JTS 81, p. 2747; 195, p. 5197; JOT 106, p. 4044; 217A, p. 6113; ZZTJ 199, p. 6262; p.
6263.
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resolving their own crisis, the Uighurs joined several Tang frontier expe85
ditions in 649 and during Gaozong’s reign.

Tang Expansion into the Western Regions
At the beginning of Taizong’s reign, the Western Turkish qaghanate was divided into a number of contending groups. Each of the various
rulers tried to obtain Tang assistance to strengthen himself, but Taizong
tried to keep friendly relations with them all. Because of their internal po
litical instability and power struggles, the Western Turks did not pose
much of a direct threat to Tang, but collectively they managed to maintain
their control over the Western Regions. 86
Right after the conquest of the Eastern Turks in 630, Taizong ap
pointed Li Daliang, the Area Commander of Liangzhou, as commissioner
to attract the submission of the Western Turkish tribes who were scattered
around Hami in the Western Regions. He was to accomplish this by pro
viding them with food supplies. Li objected in a memorial, saying that the
Chinese people were like the roots of the empire but the “barbarians” were
like branches and leaves, and that disturbing the root in an attempt to
strengthen the branches and leaves had never been a successful basis on
which to seek long-term peace. He criticized the Han and Sui attempts to
subjugate the Western Regions, and also disagreed with the settlement
policy as it was directed toward the Eastern Turks.
Some accounts state that Taizong accepted Li’s analysis. The
Zhenguan Zhengyao, on the other hand, says the opposite, which seems
correct, for in the same year, Hami, formerly a Sui commandery then un
der the Turks, submitted to Tang. Taizong established the prefecture of
Xiyizhou there, later changed to Yizhou. Control over Hami opened for
Tang a gateway to the Western Regions.
However, Taizong was not in a hurry to expand in that direction.
During early Tang, the king of Gaochang kept up a fnendly relationship
with China and acted as informant to China about other oasis states. But
the king gradually began to display a quite strong tendency toward inde
pendence. He devloped a close relationship with the Western Turks, which
See Table 3.
’^JTS 194B, pp. 5182-5;X71S215B, pp. 6057-60.
TD 197, p. 1071; JTIS 62, pp. 2388-9; XTS 99, pp. 3911-2; ZZTJ193, pp. 6081-2; THY
73, pp. 1311-2. THY and TD do not say whether Taizong accepted it or not.
** ZGZT9, pp. 20a-21b.
*’ATS215A, p. 6036; ZZTJ 193, p. 6082.
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is described in the work of Xuari2ang, the famous Tang monk then travel
ing through Central Asia,®° and he allied himself with the Western Turks
in an attack on Kami and another oasis state, detained Chinese who had
fled first to the Turks and then to Gaochang, blocked the way of the en
voys of other oasis states to present tribute to Tang, and sent an envoy to
the Xueyantuo asking their qaghan not to be subject to Tang.
When the Xueyantuo expressed the wish to guide the Chinese in an
attack on Gaochang, Taizong agreed. Ignoring strong opposition from
many court ministers Taizong ordered an expedition against Gaochang in
639. The Eastern Turks, the Qibi tribe of the Tiele, and Yanqi (Karashahr),
a state in the Western Regions, joined the campaign.
Following the success of this campaign in 640, Taizong established
a prefecture—^Xizhou—in Gaochang and the Protectorate of Anxi (Anxi
duhu fu), the first of a series of protectorates established during the Tang
dynasty, with more than 1,000 Chinese troops and ex-convicts stationed
there. At the same time the garrison of the Western Turks in Futu town (in
Jimsa) surrendered to Tang, and Futu was renamed Tingzhou.®^
Wei Zheng and Chu Suiliang objected strongly to the decision on
the grounds that a great number of Chinese troops and supplies would be
needed to keep control there, and China would not gain any benefit from
the expense. Both were typical Confucian scholar-officials and both held
fast to the conservative view that a line must be drawn between Chinese
and non-Chinese. Taizong ignored them. He seems to have understood
clearly that Gaochang occupied too strategically important a location for
gaining access to the Western Regions to be neglected.
Now that Tang began to press into the Western Regions, it encoun
tered the Western Turks directly. In 642, the Turks attacked Yizhou. Guo
Xiaoke, the Protector-general of Anxi and the Area Commander of
Liangzhou, drove the Turks back. Taizong expressed regret that he had not
listened to Chu Suiliang at the time of the establishment of Yizhou. But
if Tang was to defeat the Western Turks, it simply had to extend its influ
ence into the Western Regions, and once it was there, it had to deal with
the problems that arose.
In 644 Guo Xiaoke proposed an attack on Karashahr since its king

Lin Enxian 1988, p. 306.
JTS 198, pp. 5294-6; ATS 221 A, pp. 6221-3; ZZTJ195, pp. 6146-7; pp. 6154-6.
^JTSSO, pp. 2736-7; ZZTJ 195, pp. 6155-6; THY95, pp. 1702-3.
” JTS 194B, p. 5185; A7S215B, pp. 6059-60; ZZTJ 196, pp. 6177-9.
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had made contact with the Western Turks. Taizong agreed. Although Guo
94
had a success, after he left, Karashahr turned back to the Western Turks.
In 646 when the Western Turks asked for a marriage, Taizong
granted the request on condition that the Turks concede as betrothal gifts
the five oasis states: Kucha, Khotan, Shule (Kashgar), Zhujubo
(Karghalik) and Congling (Tashkurgan), then under Turkish control. No
marriage, however, was arranged.®^ In 647 Taizong ordered a campaign
against Kucha. The Chinese expeditionary force was under the command
of Ashina Sheer, a former Turkish chief who had submitted to Tang in
635, been married to a Tang princess and appointed a general. Troops
from Anxi and contingents from the Tiele, the Eastern Turks, the Tuyuhun
and the Tibetans, who had just contracted their first marriage alliance with
Tang, also joined the expedition. In 648 Kucha was captured.
Karashahr was also defeated by the Tang armies. The king of
Khotan sent envoys to Tang to give his allegiance. In the same year
Ashina Helu seized a chief of the Western Turks and submitted to Tang.
Taizong thereupon resettled Helu’s people in Tingzhou and made him an
98
area commander.
The seat of the Protectorate of Anxi was moved farther west to
Kucha.^^ Some sources say that to consolidate the Chinese foothold in the
Western Regions Ashina Sheer established garrisons in Kucha, Kashgar,
Suiye (Tokmak) and Khotan, thereafter known as the Four Garrisons. Due
to the conflicting and confusing accounts in the sources, the issue of which
oasis states constituted the Four Garrisons and the dates when Tang won
and lost control over them is controversial.
In any case we can say that
by the end of Taizong’s reign Tang influence had penetrated into the heart
of the Western Regions.

Gaozong’s Conquest of the Western Turks
Soon after the death of Taizong in 649, Ashina Helu broke away
from Chinese control and set up a regime that brought under his authority
775 198, p. 5302\XTS22\h, p. 6229; ZZTJ197, pp. 6211-3.
’^775 194B, p. 5185;7t75215B, p. 6060; ZZr7198, p. 6236; 77^^94, p. 1694. THTrec
ords the request as in 645 whereas ZZTJ has it in 646.
775 109, p. 3288; XTS 110, p. 4115.
”lse 1968, pp. 185-7; pp. 197-8.
’*775 194B, p. 5186; 2:75 215B, p. 6060; ZZTJ 199, pp. 6256-7; p. 6265.
”lse 1968, pp. 187-90.
'®®Ise 1968, pp. 190-1.
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the different tribes of the Western Turks and some oasis states in the
Western Regions. His power was also felt in the Tarim Basin and extended
beyond the Pamirs into present Afghanistan. Helu also made incursions
into Tingzhou. In 651 the court had to abandon the Four Garrisons and
move the seat of the Protectorate of Anxi back to Xizhou.^°^
Gaozong, however, was determined to continue his father’s force
ful foreign policy. He sent three expeditionary armies, including Uighur
units, to the Western Regions. Finally, in 657, Tang succeeded in defeat
ing Helu, who was captured and died soon after. Two years later, when
Zhenzhu, a Western Turkish leader, was killed by Ashina Mishe, who had
earlier submitted to Tang, the Western Turks were decisively defeated by
Tang.
The victory brought the Western Turks and the states in Central
Asia which had formerly been subjects of the Western Turks imder the
subordinated area command and into the prefecture systems. Between 658
and 661, over a hundred identifiable area commands and prefectures were
set up. The vast area under this Tang administration covered Central Asia,
reaching as far as the borders of Persia. For a brief period in Gaozong’s
time, Chinese suzerainty covered more territory than at any other time in
Chinese history.
To consolidate Tang administration over so large an area, the seat
of the Protectorate of Anxi was again moved from Xizhou west to Kucha
in 658, from which Tang authorities supervised all the oasis states. The
Protectorates of Kunling and Mengchi were established to supervise the
Western Turks.
Gaozong appointed as their Protectors-general two for
merly rival Turkish leaders, Ashina Mishe and Ashina Buzhen, both of
whom had submitted to Tang earlier, during the reign of Taizong. The title
of qaghan was conferred on both. Both were entrusted, along with a Chi
nese minister, with the power to bestow Chinese official titles on the tribal
chieftains in the protectorates.
In 662 the Protectorate of Jinshan was set
up in Tingzhou to consolidate Tang control over the Western Turks.
From 670 onward Tang control of the Western Regions was conIse 1968, pp. 201-4.
JTS 194B, pp. 5186-7;^215B, pp. 6060-4; ZZTJ199, pp. 6273-7; 200, pp. 6301-2;

pp. 6305-7; p.6311.
This is according to Chavannes 1969, pp. 55-8; pp. 192-202. See also Cen Zhongmian
1958, Xi Tujue Shiliao Buque ji Kaozheng, pp. 139-53; Ise 1968, pp. 207-16.
Chavannes 1969, p. 192; Ise 1968, pp. 207-16.
'“oTO 194B, pp. 5187-90;X7S215B, p. 6063; ZZTJ200, pp. 6307-8.
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tested by the Tibetans (Chapter 7). Following a period of Tibetan control,
the Protectorate of Belting was set up in 702, with its headquarters in
Tingzhou.^°^

The System ofjimifuzhou and the Protectorate
As we have seen, the Tang dynasty established the jimi fuzhou or
subordinated area commands and prefectures to organize the non-Chinese
who had submitted to Tang into the empire’s administrative apparatus.
This arrangement had its model in the Han dynasty when the Chinese gov
ernment brought the non-Chinese who had submitted to China under the
Chinese bureaucratic system in three ways: 1) by establishing dependent
states in which the non-Chinese maintained their traditional way of life
under their own chiefs; 2) by organizing them directly under the Chinese
“commandery” {jun) and “districf ’ (xian) system, with a xian to be called
dao in case there were non-Chinese under its jurisdiction; 3) by organizing
the non-Chinese under bu, a military subdivision of a commandery; it was
usually frontier commanderies that had such subdivisions. Over time,
many shuguo and bu were transformed into jun}^^
The Tang establishment of the jimi fuzhou started in Gaozu’s time.
For example, Shenzhou was placed over the Mohe tribes in the northeast
and Nanningzhou, Kunzhou, Lizhou etc. over aboriginal tribes in the
southwest.
After Taizong’s conquest of the Turks, more jimi fuzhou
were established. The Tang jimi system was more rationalized than the
parallel Han system and covered a larger area. Under the jimi system, the
non-Chinese, like the Chinese, were organized into districts, several of
which were placed under a prefecture, and in strategic areas, prefectures
were in turn attached to an area command. Tang systematized the practice
by designating these non-Chinese districts, prefectures and area commands
with the name “control by loose rein” (jimi) to clearly distinguish them
from regular Chinese ones and to make explicit the fact that China would
not impose direct control over the jimi institutions. At its height the jimi
fuzhou numbered at least eight hundred and fifty-six in all frontier regions.
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ZZTJ201, p. 6561; Ise 1968, pp. 237-9.
107 Y{j Ying-shih 1967, pp. 70-8. For shuguo, see also Zhang Qun 1990, pp. 25-31.
XTS 43B, p. 1127; p. 1140. For a survy of the langjimi fuzhou, see also Lin Chaomin
1985.
‘"’.Y7S43B.
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While the regular Chinese area commands and prefectures were di
rectly rmder the central government, the jimi fuzhou in the frontier regions
were placed imder “protectorates” {duhu fu), the highest office in charge of
the resettled non-Chinese. Copying the Han institution of the Protectorate
of the Western Regions, Taizong set up the Protectorate of Anxi in 640 for
administration of the Western Regions, and the Protectorate of Yanran in
647 for the control over the Uighurs and other Tiele tribes. The protector
ate combined civil and military administration, and had a civilian staff
backed by a standing army to supervise the non-Chinese prefectures and
area commands.
It was under the command of a Protector-general, who was either a
Chinese or a non-Chinese who had submitted and was serving in the Chi
nese office. He was to “be in charge of the various barbarians, to pacify
them, to take punitive actions, to keep record of their meritorious conduct,
to punish their failings and to have overall control of the affairs of the
A.

4.

A.

11

protectorate.
The protectorate did not rely totally on military force to maintain
control. Rather it followed the principle of “using barbarians to control
barbarians” and relied on the non-Chinese local chiefs to exercise most of
119
the control.
The jimi fuzhou system continued, with improvements, during
Gaozong’s reign. In 650, Chebi Qaghan, who had ruled the remnants of
the Eastern Turks, was defeated and Gaozong resettled his people under
the jimi fuzhou system in the area of the Otiikan Mountains. The court es
tablished the Protectorate of Hanhai in addition to Yanran to govern all the
jimi fuzhou over the Eastern Turks including the Tiele.
From then on
“the northern frontiers were free of problems for over thirty years,” the
Chinese sources claim.^^^
After the conquest of the Western Turks, many more jimi fuzhou
were established. Obviously now the area to be defended was greatly en
larged, and Chinese control lacked sufficient military force to back it up.
Yet Gaozong and Empress Wu made efforts to maintain the jimi system.
In 660 the Xi and Khitan in the northeast rebelled, and were suppressed.^
A7S’49B, p. 1317; Wechsler 1979, p. 226.
"^Hino 1984, p. 23.
The names of the two protectorates are confusing in Chinese sources. This is accord
ing to Cen Zhongmian 1958, p. 270.
‘‘^775194A, p.5166.
ZZ77200, p. 6320.
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From 659 to 663, the Sijie, Uighurs, Tongra, Buqu and other Tiele people
in the north also rebelled, but all were suppressed.”
After the final suppression of these rebellions in 663, Tang ad
justed the system of protectorates to strengthen its control over the no
mads. It moved the Protectorate of Yanran to north of the Gobi and
changed its name to Hanhai to exercise a close watch over the Uighurs and
other Tiele tribes; later, in 669, the name was changed again to Anbei. The
former Protectorate of Hanhai was moved to Yunzhong (present Tuoketuo
county. Inner Mongolia) and was renamed Yunzhong to exercise control
over the Tujue Turks south of the Gobi, and in 664 it was raised in status
to become the Grand Protectorate of Chanyu with a Tang prince as its
nominal Protector-general.”^
By early in the eighth century, a comprehensive system of protec
torates had been established in a loose chain surrounding China’s frontiers.
Altogether there were six protectorates of major importance plus several
others of less importance. The six were Anxi (mainly for dealing the
Western Turks, the Western Regions and Tibet), Beiting (set over the
Tiirgish of the Western Turks in the northwest), Chanyu (ruling over the
Eastern Turks), Anbei (placed over the Uighurs and other Tiele nomads in
the north), Andong (over the Koreans, Khitan, Xi and Mohe in the north
The Protec
east) and Annan (to rule over the non-Chinese in the south).
torate of Annan was formerly the Area Command of Jiaozhou which was
promoted to the rank of protectorate in 679.”^ Before the rise of the
Nanzhao kingdom in present Yunnan during mid-Tang, China’s southern
frontiers were relatively peaceful.
The jimi institutions were set up with the purpose of pacifying and
eventually sinicizing the submitted non-Chinese. Those on the northwest
ern frontiers had the additional task of “defending the frontiers.”
From
634 to 669, the submitted Eastern Turks and the Tiele joined Tang military
campaigns against the Tuyuhun, Gaochang, Koguryo, Kucha, Xueyantuo,
Xi and Khitan, and the remnants of both Eastern and Western Turks.
JTS 195, pp. 5197-8; XTS 217B, p. 6140; ZZT7 200, p. 6319; p. 6322; pp. 6327-9;

201, p. 6333.
Cen Zhongmian 1958, pp. 285-6; p. 1070; Lai 1986, pp. 96-8.
Zhang Qun 1955.
777773, p. 1320.
121, p. 3477.
See Table 3. One would assume that there would have been many more occasions
when the nomads participated in Chinese military activities which are not recorded .
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During Taizong’s and Gaozong’s reigns, the nomadic area commands not
only played an active role in Tang campaigns, but also formed an impor
tant defense line, acting both as sentries and as buffer areas within the
Tang frontier system.
The oasis states in the Western Regions were also
expected to participate in Tang battles or to provide provisions for Tang
123
military expeditions.
The jimi fuzhou differed from Chinese area commands and prefec
tures in that the non-Chinese were governed autonomously by their own
chieftains, who were appointed area commanders and prefects. Though
these were offices in the Tang bureaucratic system, the appointments were
hereditary. Normally, the registers of the tribute or taxation owed and the
household census records were not sent up to the Ministry of Revenue.
Those with noble titles, such as commandery prince, were given an annual
income comprised of the taxes from a fixed number of households. That
the Chinese often provided these officials with supplies of food is evident
from Taizong’s edict of 639 which says that the Chinese conferred offices
on the Turks, chose fertile land for them, established commanderies and
districts to settle them in, opened up granaries to relieve their hunger and
1
cold, and sent people around to inquire about their grievances.
To perform the bureaucratic duty of supervision, the Chinese
sometimes intervened in the internal affairs of the settled people. When the
Uighur tribe was in danger of attack from the Xueyantuo remnants in 648,
the Chinese provided military and political assistance.
And when the
Uighurs were endangered by an internal conflict in 648, Taizong, fearful
of the disintegration of the Uighurs’ dependent state, intervened to support
the pro-Tang ruler.
That the Turks in the Jimi fuzhou were subject to Chinese laws is
shown in Taizong’s statement in a speech to the former Turkish qaghan
that the Turks were to follow Chinese laws, discipline themselves, and not

Kang Le 1979, pp. 44-54.
'“ lsel968, p. 531-2.
XTS 43B, p. 1119. Hucker gives a brief definition of the jimi fii-hou, which shows its
basic nature: “Subordinated Prefecture, a category of administrative units into which
submissive foreign and aboriginal groups were commonly organized to fit into the Chi
nese governmental hierarchy, usually headed by hereditary native chiefs and subordi
nated to a Chinese Area Command (tu-tu Ju).” See his 1985, p. 132.
CFKG 964, pp. 11338-9.
’“CFPG 973, p. 11432.
JTS 195, p. 5197;XTS2MK p. 6113; ZZTJ199, p. 6262; p. 6263.
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invade and plunder each other. If disobedience occurred, Taizong said, the
offender would be punished.^^® In 648, Taizong personally settled a dis129

pute among the nomadic people over runaway horses.
The non-Chinese under the jimi system were subject to taxation,
corvee labor, and payment of tribute just like the Chinese, although in a
less regular and systematic way and at lower rates. In the surviving frag
ments of the Tang Taxation Statutes (fuyi ling) are articles concerning the
non-Chinese. These items were applicable to non-Chinese both in ihsjimi
fuzhou and in the regular prefectures, and contain no specific item con
cerning taxation of the nomads, the Turks and the Uighurs.’^° Nonetheless
we do read that in 644 the Turks and people of Gaochang who were at•
131
tached to the various Chinese prefectures were granted tax exemption.
In 647, when the Uighur and o^er Tiele tribes submitted to Tang and were
brought into the area commands and prefectures system, an annual pay
ment in the form of marten pelts was imposed as tax.^^^ The prefectures
and area commands in the Western Regions under the Protectorate of Anxi
paid tribute rather than taxes until the outbreak of the An Lushan rebellion
in 755.^^^ It is assumed that the jimi fuzhou in Eastern Turkestan would
have paid taxes.^^
Some prefectures changed their status from jimi to regular and vice
versa. For example, Weizhou (in present Sichuan) was first set up in 618
for the submitted Qiang people, and then in 627 was abolished because of
a Qiang rebellion. A year later, at the request of the Qiang chieftain,
Weizhou was again set up and brought under the control of the Area
Command of Maozhou as a jimi prefecture. In 665 it was promoted to be a
regular prefecture. After the suppression of the Qiang rebellion in 677
Weizhou again became a jimi prefecture until 687. Then it again became a
regular prefecture.^
Some jimi fuzhou, such as the Area Command of Bosi, and those
*'‘*77:S194A, p. 5161.
*^®7ra3,p.61

These fragments are collected and translated in Twitchett 1970, pp. 142-5.
’^‘aTS’2, p. 43.
JkTS 217A, p. 6113; ZZTJ198, p. 6245. Some modem scholars do not think of this as
a tax, but rather as a form of tribute. See Lin Chaomin 1985, p. 55; Yang Shengmin
1991, p. 61.
‘”T7S40, p. 1650.
Ise 1968, p. 531.
'”77S41,p. 1690; ATS 42, p. 1085.
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which were set up after the conquest of the Western Turks in 659, were
just nominally under Chinese control, a control soon weakened by competition from the Tibetans.
Tang also set up some prefectures in which
non-Chinese were administered by Chinese officials. For example, the six
Hu (Sogdian) prefectures, Lu, Li, Han, Sai, Yi, and Qi, which were organ
ized in 679 for submitted non-Chinese, all had Chinese as prefects and
were not included in the section of the jimi zhou of the Xin Tangshu.^^^

From the time it made its claim to replace Sui, the dynastic house
of Tang was faced with the reborn Eastern Turkish empire as well as with
Chinese generals as powerful as the Tang fovmder who had allied them
selves with the Turks. Faced with this awkward situation Gaozu demon
strated a remarkably pragmatic and flexible attitude. Soon after rising
against Sui, he sought the aid of the Turks, as well as the Tuyuhun,
through provision of large subsidies, and throughout his reign he followed
a policy of appeasement towards the Eastern Turks so as to deter them
from raiding and so as to weaken their support for his rivals. Meanwhile,
he made peace with the Western Turks and even attempted, albeit unsuc
cessfully, to win them over in his struggle against their Eastern cousins.
His policy won time for the newly established dynasty to consolidate its
frontier defenses and gradually go over to a course of empire building.
Taizong finally succeeded in conquering the Eastern Turks in 630.
The Tang success was first of all due to the internal problems faced by the
Eastern Turkish rulership: rebellions of the Xueyantuo and other subjects,
power struggles aroxmd the qaghan and natural disasters, all of which se
verely weakened their unity and hence their power. Taizong, himself a
great military leader with clear knowledge of the nomadic situation,
waited for the decline of the Turks to reach a critical level while making
alliance with Xieli Qaghan’s rival, Tolish, and the Xueyantuo. The final
defeat of Xieli was swift and decisive.
Taizong next took steps, using the strategy of “divide and rule,” to
prevent the Xueyantuo from consolidating their position as the new power
on the steppes. Taizong’s policy of expansion into the Western Regions
was carried out step by step despite strong opposition at court from Wei
Zheng and Chu Suiliang, and was eventually completed by Gaozong’s
Chavannes 1969, pp. 192-203.
*”^37,pp. 974-5.
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conquest of the Western Turks in 659.
After conquering the Eastern Turks, Taizong assumed the title of
Heavenly Qaghan to express his wish to be looked upon not merely as the
Chinese Son of Heaven but also as the universal ruler of the peoples of the
steppes, a claim that was taken over and continued by his successors. The
non-Chinese background of the Tang house and the non-Chinese social
and cultural legacy that Tang inherited from its non-Chinese maternal an
cestors enabled Taizong to conceive a vision of world empire in which
Chinese and nomads were equal subjects.
Nevertheless he also accepted Wen Yanbo’s concept of using the
jimi fiizhou, or subordinated area commands and prefectures, system as a
way of gradually converting the nomads to Chinese ways. This system,
with its over-arching protectorates, was extended under Gaozong and Em
press Wu. In practical terms, the jimi institutions provided China with a
frontier defense line, and the non-Chinese incorporated into that defense
line played an important role in Tang frontier campaigns.
These institutions could not, however, always maintain perma
nently effective control over the nomads. As we will see in chapter eight,
the Turks eventually broke away from the Tang administration and re
stored their empire.

Chapter 6
Tang and Korea: Expansion and Withdrawal
While the Turks, as the dominant contemporary nomad power in
Mongolia, were inescapably a major concern in Chinese foreign relations
until the mid-eighth century, Chinese rulers from Emperor Wen of the Sui
dynasty to Gaozong of the Tang dynasty were also obsessed with the con
quest of Koguryo. They launched massive and costly military expeditions
against Koguryo on a scale unprecedented in previous Sino-Korean rela
tions. The wars with Koguryo are a prime example of the use of aggres
sive force as an instrument of Chinese foreign policy. Although ultimately
successful tmder Tang Gaozong in the sense that Koguryo was destroyed,
the wars were of questionable long-term benefit to China and instead in
advertently contributed to the rise of a unified Korean state which deferred
to but was essentially independent of China.
As previous scholars have shown, there were pragmatic as well as
ideological reasons for the continued interest of the early Tang rulers in
Korea. Pulleyblank holds that the presence of strong separatist sentiments
in the Hebei region made the Tang court at Chang’an feel threatened by
the possibility of close relations between Hebei and its neighbor, Koguryo.^ Somers considers Tang Taizong’s campaigns into the border regions
of the Northeast as a necessary step for the extension of imperial rule into
the North China Plain and as an important coercive measure for the full
consolidation of dynastic power.^ Wechsler concludes that Tang feared
that Koguryo would unify the whole Korean peninsula, and so it wanted to
keep Korea divided and prevent its alliance with other non-Chinese in
eastern Manchuria and in Japan. He further suggested that Taizong, facing
a crisis following the succession dispute of 643, simply wanted to be away
from the court during this time.

’ Pulleyblank 1955, pp. 76-77.
^ Somers 1986, pp. 976-978; pp. 981-982. See also Walker 1965, p. 165.
® Wechsler 1979, pp. 233-234.
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On the other hand, ideology also played a major role. Wechsler
stresses Taizong’s dynastic ambitions, his insistence that Koguryo had
been a part of the Chinese empire under Han and therefore had to be
brought back under Chinese rule.^ Nishijima Sadao emphasizes more the
theoretical pattern of the Chinese world order. According to him, the trib
ute system and the system of investiture regulating Chinese relations with
the Korean states held together the East Asian world as an integrated in
ternational order, with China as suzerain at the center. Sui and Tang
mounted expeditions against Koguryo in order to punish the latter when it
disturbed the system, and it was China’s responsibility, as well as in its
interest, to maintain the orderly working of the system so as to sustain
peace within the East Asian world.^
Modem Korean works, imderstandably reflecting a Korean point of
view, consider the Sui-Tang wars with Koguryo as an invasion, a stage in
China’s grand imperial design to achieve hegemony over all of East Asia. g
The wars are seen within the context of the competition for control over
Southwest Manchuria and as a means to win over other non-Chinese peo
ples to the north and northeast of China.^
Jamieson draws attention to the important role that Silla played in
the Tang military campaigns against Koguryo. The three states on the Ko
rean peninsula were often in a state of mutual enmity, with two of them
sometimes forging an alliance against the third. During the early Tang pe
riod, tensions among the three grew more severe. Silla, which was the
most distant from China of the three states, persisted in a pro-Tang policy
because of its fierce competition with its rivals, taking the initiative to
form an alliance with the Chinese and skillfully maneuvering Tang to as
sist it in its final unification of Korea during the latter half of the seventh
Q

century.
Taken together, much of what these earlier scholars have said is
quite convincing in the same way as is the description of the elephant by
several blind men in the Indian fable. In what follows we shall see how the
various factors they emphasized simultaneously influenced the decision
making process of successive Tang rulers, the extent to which each factor
Wechsler 1979, pp. 233-234.
® Nishijima 1983, pp. 418-444.
® Lee Ki-baik 1984, p. 48.
^ Sohn Pow-key 1970, pp. 45-51.
® Cf. Jamieson 1969, part II: the Unification Wars.
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was important at different stages and how in the end, after succeeding at
great cost in saving face by conquering Koguryo and wdping out the dis
grace of Emperor Yang’s defeat, Tang had to withdraw from the Korean
peninsula, yielding the prize of victory to its ally, Silla.
Gaozu’s Peaceful Communication with Korea
While the newly founded Tang regime under Gaozu was largely
occupied by the Turkish problems in its frontier affairs, Gaozu maintained
peaceful relations with Koguryo and the other two Korean kingdoms. The
policy of Koguryo toward China also took a turn for the better. King
Yongyang died in 618 and his brother succeeded him as King Yongnyu.
During the eight years of Tang Gaozu’s reign, eight missions from Kogu
ryo arrived in Tang, of which six were tributary.® The mission of 624 was
to request the Chinese calendar, a gesture implying acceptance of vassal
status, and the one in 625 was to study Taoism and Buddhism.
In 622 Gaozu sent a letter, or “edict” in Chinese rhetoric, to King
Yongnyu, expressing good will, and requesting an exchange of people
displaced by the wars. Compared with the edicts issued during the Sui per
iod the tone of this missive was quite different. While insisting on the
mandate of the Chinese emperor it expressed the wish to maintain friendly
relations, 'with each side defending its own borders. Gaozu ordered that all
people of Koguryo origins inside China should be gathered and sent back
to their homeland. As a reciprocal gesture, £is many as ten thousand Sui
Chinese were returned from Koguryo.^ ^ In 624 Gaozu conferred on King
Yongnyu the titles of Supreme Pillar of State {shang zhuguo), Commandery Prince of Liaodong (Liaodongyww yvang), and King of Koguryo.
Paekche and Silla continued to maintain tributary relations with
China. The king of Paekche received from China the titles of Commandery Prince of Daifang and King of Paekche, and the king of Silla the titles
of Pillar of State, Commandery Prince of Lelang, and King of Silla. Su
preme Pillar of State was the highest honorific position in the Tang hierar
chy, and was equal to rank 2, upper class. Pillar of State was the second
highest and was equal to rank 2, lower class. The titles of nobility given to
® See Table 2.
^°ZZ77190,p. 5976; CFTG 977, p. 11479; 999, p. 11721.
” JTS 199A, pp. 5320-1; Y75220, p. 6187; ZZTJ \90, p. 5964.
'^JTS 199A, p. 5321; p. 5329; p. 5335; ATS 220, p. 6187; p. 6199; p. 6203; ZZTJ 190, p.
5976.
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the Korean rulers, which were associated with the names of commanderies
(jun) in earlier times, were raised from commandery duke (gong) to com13
mandery prince (wang), which was next to prince of a state (guo wang).
Gaozu approached the whole business of investiture and the tribute
system with clear-sighted pragmatism. He remarked to his ministers in
625:

Between name and reality there should be a concordance. Koguryo
called itself subject (chen) of Sui, but in the end opposed Emperor Yang.
What kind of subject was that? We respect all creatures and do not wish
to be haughty and superior. We only occupy and possess the land, striv
ing to bring peace to all the people. Why should we order Koguryo to be
our subject in order to acquire for us greatness and honor? You should
now make an edict to express this will of mine.^'*
Chief Minister Pei Ju, who had been expansonist policy adviser to the Sui
Emperor Yang, and Vice Director of the Secretariat Wen Yanbo were,
however, strongly opposed to Gaozu’s idea. Insisting on the principle that
“the king leaves nothing and nobody outside his realm” Wen argued:

The land of Liaodong (under Koguryo) was the state of Jizi in the Zhou
period, and the Commandery of Xuantu during Han. Before the Wei-Jin
[period], it was as close [to China] as though it was within the territory
divided into fiefs [granted by the Son of Heaven]. It carmot be allowed
not to be subject. If we allow ourselves to be put on an equal footing
with Gaoli (= Koguryd), how will the barbarians of the four directions
look up to us? Moreover, the Middle Kingdom is, for the barbarians, like
the sun to all the stars. There is no reason to descend from superiority to
15
be on a level of equality with those in the barrier zone.
In the face of such opposition, Gaozu had to give up the idea of not mak
ing Koguryo into a subject territory.^® We are presented in the above col
loquy with an interesting, if briefly stated, reflection of the tension be
tween restoring China’s former frontiers on the one hand, and the exigen
cies of political reality on the other. The practical-minded Gaozu not only
saw no point to insisting on an empty adherence to traditional forms and
Nishijima 1983, p. 441.
186, p. 992.
’®J7561,p. 2360.
TD 186, p. 992; yTS'61, p. 2360.
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titles supposedly buttressing superficial Chinese suzerainty, but also saw
how dearly it had cost Sui to attempt to make such claims stick. He neither
wanted to advance such claims nor could he afford to do so, given the po
litical situation in the early Tang. Pei Ju and Wen Yanbo, on the other
hand, who were more deeply influenced by the Confucian political ambi
tion to restore the Han empire, could not accept Gaozu’s aphilosophical
pragmatism. In hindsight we can see that, had Gaozu’s ideas been ac
cepted, this would, in fact, have saved the Tang Chinese from much sub
sequent trouble.
Gaozu’s policy towards Koguryo at that time was one of peaceful
coexistence. He wanted to stake out a neutral position vis-a-vis the con
tinuous conflicts among the three Korean kingdoms, and wanted the Chi
nese merely to try to maintain a peaceful order.
Taizong’s Peace with Korea, 627-640
Before 641, Taizong had mostly followed Gaozu’s principle of
maintaining peace and continued to preserve a neutral position in the
conflicts among the three Korean states. In 626, both Paekche and Silla
sent envoys to Tang to accuse Koguryo of blocking their way to pay trib
ute to Tang and to ask for Tang help. The court, by then under Taizong,
sent an envoy to mediate between them, upon which, it is recorded, all
three sent in an “acknowledgement of guilt.”’^ In 627, Taizong’s edict to
the king of Paekche expressed his hope for a peaceful order on the Korean
peninsula.^®
A sign of distrust between Tang and Koguryo appeared in 631,
when Taizong sent an envoy to Koguryo to bury the remains of the Sui
soldiers. The envoy destroyed the “triumphal mound” (jingguan), built by
Koguryo over the remains of the Sui soldiers in commemoration of the
victory of Koguryo over Sui, in order to give them a proper burial. This
act alarmed King Yongnyu, who then ordered the construction of a great
wall from Fuyu (in modem Jilin) all the way to the sea. From then until
the end of his reign in 642, King Yongnyu sent only three tributary mis
sions to Tang. Still, Taizong granted favorable treatment to a mission that
came in 640, led by the Crown Prince of Koguryo.
The major concern of Taizong had been problems inside China and
'’'JTS 199A, p. 5321; p. 5329; JO’S 220, p. 6199; ZZTJ192, p. 6030.
'^JTS\ 99A, p. 5329; XTS 220, p. 6199.
'^JTS 199A, p. 5321; ^220, p. 6187; ZZTJ 193, p. 6087.
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problems on the northern and northwestern borders. He took to heart the
disastrous lessons of the Sui. But unlike Wei Zheng who, in the historian’s
comment in the Suishu, implies that Liaodong had not been under the Chi
nese commandery-district system for a long time and Sui therefore should
have left it alone,Taizong seems to have believed that the lesson was not
that China should be restrained from extending itself into Liaodong and
beyond, but that there should be a well worked out strategy and a solid
economy and strong armies before undertaking any such campaign.
The Decision for War Against Koguryd, 641-643
Following his conquest of the Eastern Turks in 630, his assumption
of the title of Heavenly Qaghan and the establishment of the new admimstrative system for ruling the Turks who had submitted, Taizong next per
suaded the Xi and Shiwei, both formerly subjects of the Turks in Manchu
ria to submit to Tang.^^ After his successes on the western front Taizong at
last turned his attention to Koguryo.
From 641 on, Taizong’s intention to wage war against Koguryo
became ever more clear. An embassy returned from Koguryo in that year.
Its mission was ostensibly to return the visit of the prince of Koguryo, but
in fact it was to look for weaknesses in that country. On his return the en
voy made his report based on the information he had gathered during his
stay. Taizong then expressly stated his intention of imdertaking military
action against Koguryo, justifying his decision with the argument that the
territory of Koguryo had been placed under four Chinese commanderies
during Han, and was thus part of China.
Taizong had his strategy worked out; Chinese troops would attack
Liaodong, and when all the forces of Koguryo went to the rescue, Tang
would send its naval force from Shandong to attack P’yongyang, thus eas
ily conquering Koguryo. He was only prevented from putting this plan
into effect immidiately by his judgment that the Shandong region, an im
portant base for the seaborn wing of the military expedition against Korea,
had not yet returned to full economic health.^
In the following years, up until 644, when Taizong finally declared
war on Koguryo, political developments on the peninsula stimulated an
increasingly bellicose attitude by Taizong. A coup d’etat took place in
“Si7/S81,pp. 1828-9.
^'ZZrJ193,p. 6082.
^XTS 220, p. 6187; ZZTJ196, pp. 6169-70.
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Koguryo in the eleventh month of 642. King Yongnyu was killed by his
official Yon Kaesomun, who put the king’s nephew on the throne and set
himself up as the de facto ruler. The news soon reached the Tang court
through the report of the Area Commander of Yingzhou, located close to
Koguryo.^^
Concluding that Yon Kaesomun’s usurpation challenged Tang su
zerainty, since the former king had received Tang investiture, some Chi
nese officials felt it necessary to punish this unlawful act and suggested a
“punitive” attack. In 643, after returning from a mission to Koguryo, an
envoy requested an increase in the number of border troops in order to ex
ert pressure on Koguryo. Although Taizong refused to take any action on
the grounds that it was not righteous to attack a state in mourning nor to
burden the people, since the economy of Shandong was still in bad
shape,^'^ he nevertheless expressed the view that Tang had more than
enough military force and political legitimacy to punish Yon Kaesomun,
and intended to use Mohe and Khitan troops to do so.
For the time being he followed the suggestion of two of his major
advisers. Fang Xuanling and Zhangsun Wuji, to maintain peace. The
Chinese duly performed a mourning ceremony for the dead king. This was
a regular practice in the tributary relationship. An embassy was next sent
to Koguryo bearing imperial gifts. In the first month of 643, Koguryo
sent a tributary mission and Taizong conferred the title of king on the new

ruler.^^
Silla continued to pursue its pro-Chinese policy. In the ninth month
of 643 Silla sent a request for Tang military assistance to defend against
the joint incursions of Paekche and Koguiyo. The previous year Paekche
had attacked some forty towns of Silla, and entered into a marriage aliiance with Koguryo, while planning further attacks against Silla.
It
seemed possible that Koguryo would unify the whole Korean peninsula.
This news may have alarmed Tang, in whose own interest it was to keep
Korea divided and to prevent any Korean alliance with other non-Chinese

“ JTS 199A, p. 5322; ATS 220, p. 6187; ZZTJ196, p. 6181.
^*ZZTJ 196, pp. 6181-2; 197, p. 6198.
“ATS220, p. 6188; ZZTJ 197, p. 6202.
“CFFG 974, p. 11442.
^^T7S 199A, p. 5322; 2TS 220, p. 6188; ZZTJ 197, p. 6202.
“ JTS 199A, p. 5330; ATS 220, p. 6199.
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states in eastern Manchuria and in Japan.
Taizong responded to Silla’s request by suggesting three alterna
tives to its envoy for dealing with the situation: 1) sending Chinese fron
tier troops together with the Khitan and Mohe to attack Liaodong, which
was part of Koguryo; 2) providing several thousand red uniforms and red
flags to Silla to create the impression that Tang troops were being sta
tioned in Silla so as to dissuade the Paekche and Koguryo troops from
mounting an attack; 3) sending a naval force to attack Paekche to relieve
Silla and, since Silla was vulnerable and easily bullied since it was imder a
female ruler, Tang could send a royal family member to be the ruler in
Silla accompanied by a garrison of Chinese troops. When Silla was again
at peace, Silla could restore its own ruler to power.
On hearing these alternative plans the Silla envoy said he could not
make up his mind which to choose. His indecision must have been more
diplomatic than real. It must have been clear to him that any of the three
Tang strategies must have undermined if not directly threatened Silla’s
independence.
These three alternatives reveal the essentials of Taizong’s policy
towards Korea: the first one was to use “barbarians” against “barbarians,”
which might have resulted in an even more direct confrontation between
Silla and the other two Korean kingdoms; the second plan could not have
been expected to produce much effective relief for Silla and would have
set a symbolic precedent for an actual takeover of Silla by Tang forces; the
third alternative, which would have been the most effective for dealing
with Koguryo and Paekche, was fraught with danger for Silla itself. There
was a real possibility that Silla might be conquered by China.^^ No won
der that the envoy from Silla was unable to choose among the three. He
and his country were, as the American slang expression so aptly puts it,
caught between a rock and a hard place.
As an interim measure, Taizong sent an envoy to carry a letter to
Koguryo, in which was contained a threat: if Koguryo continued its incur^®Wechsler 1979, p. 233.
^ XTS22Q, p. 6188; CFYG 991, p. 11639. CFYG subdivides the third alternative. The
attack on Paekche, and the sending of a Tang prince and troops to Silla, are listed as al
ternatives three and four, respectively. XTS is probably correct in combining these alter
natives into one because Taizong probably planned to attack Paekche first, thus opening
a route to Silla via Paekche so that Tang could give Chinese assistance to Silla from the
sea.
Inoue 1972, pp. 196-8.
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sions against Silla, a dutiful subject of Tang, Tang would be forced to
mount a punitive attack the following year. In the second month of 644,
the envoy returned from his mission and reported back that Yon
Kaesomim refused to stop his incursions into Silla. Taizong took the re
fusal as a casus belli. From the Chinese point of view, this was a righteous
V 32
excuse to launch a war against a disobedient Koguryo.
In one of the court debates on whether to attack Koguryo, Chu
Suiliang expressed his doubt that a victory was possible. Later he pre
sented a memorial attempting to dissuade the emperor from taking per
sonal command. Strong support for a war policy came from the Minister
of War, Li Shiji. He cited an instance in 641 when Taizong had accepted
Wei Zheng’s advice not to pursue attacks on the Xueyantuo, thus losing
the opportunity to completely defeat them.^^ Another supporter of war was
Li Jing. Like Li Shiji, Li Jing had a strong military background and both
^
.
.
34
Li’s were important advisers to Taizong.
Taizong himself adopted a bellicose attitude, and stated his inten
tion to take personal command of the campaign. This evoked widespread
opposition from both military and civil officials of different backgrounds
who remonstrated in memorials or orally in the emperor’s presence. In
648, when the war was under way, a palace lady, Xu Hui, presented a
memorial opposing the war, for which Taizong duly expressed his appreciation.

36

Finally, a decision was made that Taizong would personally lead a
military expedition against Koguryo. War preparations of all kinds were
started and Taizong consulted experienced military officials for informa
tion and advice on strategies.^^ He spared no effort to make propaganda
through personal remarks and official edicts announced throughout the
country to persuade those officials objecting to the campaign and to en
courage common people to join his armies. He repeatedly emphasized as a
moral justification for the expedition that Liaodong had formerly been part
of China and that if Tang failed to act forcefully against this rebellious

^^JTS 199A, p. 5322; p. 5335; ATO 220, pp. 6188-9; ZZTJ197, p. 6204; pp. 6206-7.
JTS 80, pp. 2733-6; XTS 105, pp. 4027-8; ZZTJ 197, p. 6207.
JTS67, p. 2AU\XrS93, p. 3815; Wechsler 1979, p. 199.
JTS 59, p. 2334; 62, p. 2390; 68, p. 2500; 69, p. 2515; XTS 89, p. 3755; 91, p. 3792;
94, p. 3829; 99, p. 3912; ZZTJ 197, pp. 6216-7.

^*2277198, p. 6254.
”2277197, p. 6213.
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subject, China itself could not be well disciplined.
His expedition, he claimed, had several aims: to punish Yon
Kaesomun, to save the people of Koguryo from Yon’s cruel rule, and to
save Silla from the danger of invading enemies. Moreover, Taizong
claimed that now All-under-Heaven was at peace except for Koguryo. He
intended to undertake the conquest of Koguryo personally so as not to
leave a source of trouble for his descendants. He held that as suzerain it
was his responsibility to punish those who disturbed the order of the East
Asian world, which formed an international system centering around
China.
As a skillful and experienced war leader, Taizong had some idea of
what was disadvantageous and advantageous for the campaign. He recog
nized the difficulties involved. Yet he was confident of the inevitability of
victory on the grounds that Tang had a sound economic basis now, that
there was much stronger support from the people than in Emperor Yang’s
time, since Tang’s victories over the Turks, Tu3mhun and Gaochang had
encouraged people to think that additional rich rewards could be achieved
38
through battles, and that Tang was large while Koguryo was small.
The expectation of possible assistance from other non-Chinese, es
pecially from Paekche and Silla, also strengthened Taizong’s confidence.
In his edicts to Paekche and Silla in 644, Taizong ordered the troops of the
39
two Korean states to be placed under the command of Chinese generals.
That same year Silla had 50,000 troops attacking Koguryo from the south
and captured a town.'*° In the seventh month of 644, before the major ex
pedition began, the Chinese, the BChitan, Xi and Mohe attacked Koguryo in
order to reconnoiter the situation.'*’ In 645, Taizong asked the Xueyantuo
to join the Tang force. The Xueyantuo agreed, though as it turned out Tai
zong did not make use of the Xueyantuo troops. During 644 and 645,
Koguryo attempted to bribe the Xueyantuo into alliance but the Xueyantuo
did not dare to make any hostile move against Tang.'*^

“ XrS 220, pp. 6189-90; ZZTJ 197, p. 6207; p. 6214; pp. 6215-6; pp. 6217-8; TDZU
130, p. 703; pp. 703-4; Nishijima 1983, pp. 442-3.
^^Wenguan Cilin 664, pp. 261-5.
*°JTS 199A, p. 5335; XTS220, p. 6203.
XTS 220, p. 6189; ZZTJ 197, p. 6209.
*^JTS 199B, p. 5346; Jr7S’217B, pp. 6137-8; ZZTJ 198, pp. 6227-8.
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The Three Campaigns Against Koguryd, 644-648
There is little evidence of a hostile attitude on the part of Koguryo.
From 642 until Taizong’s death in 649 Koguryo sent six tributary missions
to Tang. In the ninth month of 644, before the Tang campaign started, Yon
Kaesomrm sent envoys to Tang carrying silver as tribute and asking to be
permitted to send fifty officials to be Imperial Bodyguards. Taizong re
fused the present and imprisoned the Korean officials.^^
In the winter of 644, Tang armies were mobilized to attack Kogu
ryo by land and by sea. The Tang court ordered Silla, Paekche, the Xi and
Khitan to join the attacks.'^ Taizong took personal command. Stopping in
Yingzhou (near present Chaoyang, Liaoning) on his way to the front in
645, Taizong tried to win over the Khitan tribal leaders. By 648 all the
^

45

Khitan were brought under Tang command.
In the 645 campaign the Chinese troops pushed as far as Anshi
town in Liaodong, but Taizong met with a humiliating failure when he was
unable to capture the town before he had to retreat due to lack of supplies
and the cold weather. The achievements of the campaign included the
taking of ten walled towns in the Liaodong area, the capture of 60,000
households and two generals-in-chief, 3,500 aristocrats and officials.
Taizong regretted his assumption of personal command, saying that if Wei
Zheng were still alive he would have prevented him from going.
The submitted people of Koguryo were incorporated into the Chi
nese empire. Tang set up three prefectures in three captured towns. Un
like the case of the Turks, where there were many objections to the idea of
settling the nomads inside the country, the Chinese did not hesitate to re
settle seventy thousand Koreans inside China.^® Taizong conferred titles
on Korean generals, aristocrats and officials who were resettled in China.
The year 646 saw Tang military activity concentrate on the Xueyantuo in the northwest. That year King Pojang and Yon Kaesomun sent an

^XTS22Q, p. 6189; ZZTJ197, p. 6212.
J7S 199A, pp. 5322-3; XrS 220, pp. 6189-90; ZZTJ 197, pp. 6214-5.
JTS 199B, p. 5350; ATO 219, p. 6168.
JTS 199A, pp. 5323-6; XTS 220, pp. 6190-1; ZZTJ 197, pp. 6216-21; 198, pp. 6222-

30;CFyC 117,p. 1400-6.
XTS 91, p. 3881; ZZTJ 198, p. 6230.
'“ATO43B, p. 1128; ZZTJ 197, p. 6221; 198, p. 6223; THY95, pp. 1705-6.
*^ZZTJ 198, p. 6230; THY95, p. 1706.
“ JTS 199A, p. 5325; XTS 220, pp. 6192-3; ZZTJ 198, p. 6226.
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embassy to Tang to “acknowledge guilt.Yet, unlike Emperor Wen,
Taizong did not consider a sincere submission sufficient. He issued an
edict stating that Tang would not accept tribute from Koguryo, clearly the
equivalent of a previous declaration of war being reaffirmed. The court
planned a major expedition using the excuses that Yon Kaesomun had be
come more arrogant in his behavior, as witnessed by the insolent manner
he had displayed to the Tang envoys and had continued his incursions into
Silla.“
The Chinese armies resumed their attacks in 647. This time Tai
zong did not go in person. At the end of the year. King Pojang sent his son
53
to pay homage to Tang carrying an offer of “acknowledgement of guilt.”
Nevertheless, in 648, Tang carried out a third expedition by sending a na
val force of 30,000 men to attack Koguryo. However, the Tang troops re
treated in the autumn without having won any decisive success.^
Taizong then decided to launch a fourth expedition the next year so
as to crush Koguryo with one decisive campaign. He believed that Kogu
ryo had already been brought to a state of exhaustion, but what he failed to
see was that China had also been disturbed by the wars. Even Sichuan, a
region remote from the northeast, was involved in and had its economy
upset by ship building for the war.®^ The non-Chinese Liao people in the
southwest rose in revolt when the Chinese officials imposed corvee on
them to build ships to be used in the campaigns against Koguryo. The
Chinese of Sichuan also suffered hardships from the ship building. Hard
pressed by the local officials to pay for the labor involved, people had to
sell their houses, land, and even their children. We are told that the price
56
of grain jumped greatly and disorders arose.
Aware of the troubled situation, the senior Chief Minister Fang
Xuanling was unable to keep silence, especially because at that time few
people dared to object openly to the campaign. His approaching death
gave Fang the courage to urge the emperor to abandon the war. He argued
in his memorial that Taizong should halt any further expansion since Tang

JI^ 199A, p. 5326; XrS 220, p. 6194.
ATS 220, p. 6194; ZZTJ198, p. 6241; CFYG 996, p. 11696.
“^75220, p. 6194; ZZTJ 198, pp. 6245-6; pp. 6247-8; p. 6251.
^ JTS 69, pp. 2518-9; 199A, p. 5326; XTS 94, p. 3832; 220, p. 6195; ZZTJ 198, p. 6252;
p.6256; p. 6261.
®®ZZry 199, pp. 6258-9.
^XTS 220, p. 6195; ZZTJ 199, pp. 6261-2.
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had already achieved enough prestige and territory, that the people of
Koguryo were but “barbarians” of a low sort, neither worth being treated
with benevolence and righteousness, nor capable of being held responsible
for their conduct. Fang did not think that the war was justified, arguing
that Koguryo had not failed to perform the duties of a subject, had made
no incursions into Chinese territory, posed no long-term danger to China,
and that it was not worthwhile to distress China just to wipe out the shame
of a former ruler within and take revenge for Silla without. But Taizong
did not alter his course of action.^^
During this period the situation on the Korean peninsula became
more difficult for Silla. While Tang and Koguryo were engaged in war
fare, Paekche did not keep its promise to assist Tang against Koguryo. In
stead, it initially captured several walled Silla towns, and in 648 took thir58
teen more. It also stopped sending tribute to Tang.
To deal with the threat from Paekche, Silla first tried to obtain as
sistance from Koguryo,^^ and failing that it decided to turn to Tang. In the
year 648 alone, Silla sent three missions to Tang, the third of which was
led by Kim Ch’imch’u (the future King Muyol), hoping to obtain Tang
Rn*
military intervention. To strengthen relations with Tang, Silla agreed to
adopt Tang’s reign title and Chinese official dress. The Korean history
says that in return Taizong promised Kim to send 200,000 Chinese troops
imder the command of Su Dingfang. The Chinese sources do not men
tion this promise. However, as seen above, in 648 Taizong did send a navy
to fight against Koguryo, but not under the command of Su Dingfang.
Finally, on his death bed, Taizong left an edict ordering abandon63
ment of the campaign against Koguryo.

The Conquest of Paekche in 660
At first, Gaozong did not attempt any direct attacks against Kogu-

JTS 66, pp. 2464-6; XTS 96, pp. 3855-6; ZZTJ199, p. 6260.
“jre 199A, p. 5330; ^220, p. 6199; ZZTJ 199, p. 6261.
SGSG 5, pp. 2-3; 41, “Biography of Kim Yusin, Part 1;” see also Miike 1974, pp. 1078.
^ The Chinese sources record only two missions, see Table 2. The Korean source records
three, cf. SGSG 5, p. 5.
XTS 220, p. 6203; ZZTJ 199, p. 6265; SGSG 5, p. 6.
“ SGSG 41, “Biography of Kim Yusin, Part I.”
^ ZZTJ 199, p. 6268.
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ryo. For its part Silla made continuous efforts to strengthen its ties with
Tang. Its court started to wear Chinese official dress in 649 and in 650 it
adopted Tang Gaozong’s reign title—Yonghui.^ In 650, Kim Pommin
(the future King Munmu) went to Tang as an envoy to report Silla’s vic
tory over Paekche, and presented an ode “In Praise of Peace” embroidered
on brocade, which attributed the victory to the glory and majesty of
Tang.®® In 651, when Paekche resumed its tributary missions to Tang,
Gaozong urged Paekche to make peace with Silla and threatened a military
attack if Paekche refused and if Koguryo assisted Paekche.®®
Military encounters with Koguryo resumed in 654, when Koguryo
attacked the Khitan, who were then under the jimi system. In the following
year, when Koguryo joined Paekche and Mohe to capture more than thirty
Silla walled towns. King Muyol (Kim Ch’unch’u) of Silla sent a request to
Tang for assistance. In response, Gaozong despatched his first expedition
against Koguryo.®^ The Tang-Silla alliance was thus formed on the initia
tive of Silla but for the benefit of both states.
The Chinese launched more attacks against Koguryo in 658 and
659 with some success.®® In 660, Silla requested that Tang troops be di
rected against Paekche after Silla had once again been invaded by Paekche
and Koguryo. It may be that Silla talked Tang into implementing the plan
to attack Paekche, but as mentioned above, it was also Taizong’s intention,
69
expressed in 643, to make such an attack.
In any event, this proved to be a strategically crucial plan, for it
eventually led to the conquest of Koguryo once Paekche fell. The Tang
court sent a huge navy of 100,000 under Su Dingfang across the Yellow
Sea to the coast of Paekche. Silla troops joined the campaign by land. Af
ter all attempts to resist failed, the Paekche King and Crown Prince Yung
finally surrendered.^®
The Korean sources show that even during the conquest of Paekche

^SGSGS, p. 6.

“ J75 199A, p. 5336; YTS 220, pp. 6203-4.
^JTS 199A, pp. 5330-1; YTS 220, p. 6199; ZZTJ199, p. 6277.
199, pp. 6286-8.
“ ZZ77200, p. 6309; p. 6319; CFYG 985, p. 11577.
® Jamieson (1969, pp. 44-5) says that Silla persuaded the Chinese that the first step for
the conquest of Koguryd was to subdue Paekche but he fails to notice a plan to conquer
Paekche in the Chinese sources for Taizong’s reign.
'’°JTS 199A, p. 5331; p. 5336; ATS 220, p. 6200; ZZTJ200, pp. 6320-1.
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signs of strain appeared in the alliance between Tang and Silla. In the Ko
rean history Samguk Sagi we read that in 660, during the war with Paekche, when Silla troops were late for a battle, the Chinese commander Su
Dingfang decided to execute a Silla general, but had to change his mind
when another Silla general threatened to attack Tang/^
Another chapter of the same work says that after the conquest of
Paekche, Su Dingfang suggested that the land of Paekche be divided up
among three Silla generals as rewards, but the three refused, on the
grounds that it was not righteous for them to accept such an offer. The Ko
rean work goes on to say that the Chinese then made a plan to invade Silla,
but had to give it up since Silla was too well prepared. When Su Dingfang
returned to the Tang court Gaozong supposedly asked him why he did not
attack Silla, to which Su replied that Silla was under a good government
and therefore it could not be subdued even though it was a small coimtry.
The Chinese sources, however, make no mention of the confronta
tion over a delay in the arrival of the Silla troops, or anything about an in
tention to attack Silla immediately after the conquest of Paekche in 660.
The Chinese sources do indicate that Tang had considered, at least for a
while, giving up the land of Paekche, as mentioned below.
The Chinese sources state that after the conquest of Paekche in
660, the Tang court decided to establish Chinese supervision in the area by
setting up in former Paekche five area commands which were further di
vided into administrative regions. A Chinese official was appointed the
Area Commander of Xiongjin (Korean Ungjin) and pro-Tang local chief
tains were assigned to other posts. To prevent further problems, Tang
transferred members of the royal family, including the King of Paekche
and Prince Yung, ministers and commoner men, amounting altogether to
more than ten thousand people, to China as captives. The King soon died
and an official title was conferred on Prince Yung.^^
The Chinese commander, Su Dingfang, withdrew from Paekche
and then started a major campaign against Koguryo in 661. Gaozong even
decided to assume personal command of the expedition but was dissuaded
by Empress Wu and his ministers.^^ The Tang armies penetrated as far as

SGSG 5, pp. 9-10.
^ SGSG 42, “Biography of Kim Yusin, Part II.”
JTS 199A, p. 5331;2!TS220, p. 6200; ZZTJ 200, pp. 6321-2; CFYG 986, pp. 11577-8.
XTS 220, pp. 6195-6; ZZTJ 200, pp. 6323-4.
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the capital, P’yongyang, which was an unprecedented success, but had to
retreat without any result early the next year due to the severe winter
weather/^
The quick withdrawal of Su Dingfang with some of the Chinese
troops made possible a restoration movement in Paekche. It was led by a
former Paekche royal family member named Poksin and a monk, Toch’im,
who sent for Prince P’ung of Paekche from Japan and established him as
king. They were determined to fight, knowing that Tang and Silla both had
ambitions to take over Paekche. When the revived Paekche forces were
successful in isolating the Chinese and in driving back the Silla troops, the
Tang court decided to withdraw from Paekche altogether.
Gaozong instructed Liu Rengui, then acting Prefect of Daifangzhou, who remained in the former territory of Paekche, to retreat to
Silla or even to China, since the Tang army had withdrawn from
P’yongyang, and therefore there seemed no point in staying in the town of
Ungjin which was the only place in Paekche still under Tang control.
However, Liu Rengui decided to stay, for he had made a clear assessment
of the situation: if Tang wanted to conquer Koguryo, it should maintain a
military base in Paekche.
At Liu’s request, Gaozong sent reinforcements across the sea. In
662, with the assistance of Silla, Liu Rengui opened up a supply route
from Silla. Then a conflict broke out within the ruling group of Paekche
pitting the king against Poksin, who had previously killed Toch’im. The
king sent envoys to Koguryo and Japan asking for military assistance. In
663 the joint forces of Tang and Silla fought fiercely with the Japanese
and won four major battles at the mouth of the Kum River. The Paekche
state was finally destroyed.^^ Had Liu obeyed the initial order of Gaozong,
the result would have been that either Paekche restored its state or that
Silla would have taken over Paekche’s territory.
In describing these events the Chinese sources pay much less at
tention to the role played by Silla than do the Korean sources, which have
detailed accounts of Silla’s part in the conquest of Paekche, in the sup-

ZZrJ 200, pp. 6325-7; CFYG 986, p. 11578.
JTS 199A, pp. 5331-2; XTS 220, p. 6200; ZZTJ 200, pp. 6323-4. For a detailed study
of the restoration movement see Ikeuchi 1960, pp. 97-245.
^ JTS 84, pp. 2790-4; 199A, pp. 5331-3; XTS 108, pp. 4082-3; 220, pp. 6200-1; ZZTJ
200, pp. 6323-4; pp. 6329-30; 201, pp. 6336-8. For Japan’s encoimter with the Chinese,
see Yu Yousun 1957.
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pression of Paekche’s restoration, and in the campaign against Koguryo in
6617®
Over and above Silla’s role, whatever it may have been, it was due
to the persistence of Liu Rengui that Tang maintained its base in Paekche.
Liu then made efforts to restore the local economy in order to enforce
Tang control in the area as a basis for the later conquest of Koguryo. In a
memorial to Gaozong, he reiterated the importance of the Tang garrison in
Paekche: if Koguryo was to be destroyed Paekche should not be abandoned, for Prince P’ung was waiting in Koguryo, and another prince was
in Japan. Either one or both would menace China’s position, if Japan or
Koguryo should make an alliance with Paekche.
The court agreed with Liu and in 664 it appointed the Paekche
prince, Yung, who was in Chang’an, as the Commandant of Xiongjin in
81
order to vvin over the remnants of Paekche.

The Conquest of Koguryd in 668
Now that Tang had a strong hold in Paekche, it could direct its
forces against Koguryo. In 666, Yon Kaesomun died. His death proved
decisive in changing the situation in favor of Tang. It not only ended two
decades of powerful military rule, but also caused dissension within the
ruling group. When his son Namsaeng succeeded to the throne, the other
son, Namgon, rebelled. Namsaeng sent his son to Tang with a request for
assistance. Yon Kaesomim’s brother offered to surrender to Silla. Taking
advantage of this excellent opportunity, Tang launched a massive cam
paign led by the esteemed commander Li Shiji, in alliance with Silla. After
a series of battles in which Koguryo was attacked both overland from
China in the north, and from the southern part of the peninsula by Silla and
Liu Rengui’s troops, P’yongyang fell into the hands of the Chinese in the
SGSG 5, pp. 9-12; 6, pp. 1-2; 7, pp. 1-8; 42.

P’ung fled to Koguryd after the final conquest of Paekche. ZZTJ 201, p. 6337.
®°J7:S84,p.2795.
JTS 84, pp. 2792-5; 199A, p. 5333; XTS 108, p. 4084; 220, p. 6201. ZZTJ (201, p.
6342) records that Yung was appointed “commandant” {duwei), instead of “area com
mander” {dudu) because Liu Rengui was the area commander.
“ ZZTJIQI, p. 6347; Dceuchi (1941, pp. 703-11) is of the opinion that Kaesomim died in
665.
^^XTS 220, p. 6196. XTS does not say clearly to whom Yon Kaesomun’s brother surren
dered. The SGSG says that he offered Silla 12 towns, 763 households and 3,543 people,
see SGSG 6, p. 5.
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ninth month of 668. King Pojang and Namgon were captured.®^
Tang transferred the captured Korean nobles to China. The king
and others were given official titles while Namgon and the former Paekche
Prince P’ung, who had taken refuge in Koguryo, were exiled to the far
south of China. To consolidate Tang control over the newly conquered
area the Protectorate of Andong, one of the six major protectorates, was
set up in P’yongyang. It was manned by 20,000 troops, with Xue Rengui
as the Protector-general, supervising nine area commands, forty-two pre
fectures, and a hundred districts. The area commands and prefectures set
up for Koguryo had both Chinese officials and local chieftains in their
administration.®^ In 669, a large number of Koguryo people were resettled
inside China. These arrangements were intended to dissolve any remaining
sense of the coimtry’s unity. To permanently eliminate any possibility of
reviving Koguryo even many of the Koguryo farmers were put to work in
86
agriculture inside China.
Though Gaozong was much less capable than Taizong, and had no
experience in military affairs, he was carried onward by the momentum of
the military conquests begun by his father and finally achieved his father’s
long cherished goal of the conquest of Koguryo. Using a strategy of indi
rection, he first attacked Paekche and backed Liu Rengui’s persistence in
the face of initial failure there, and this proved decisive in achieving the
final success.
More fundamental factors promoting the Tang success, however,
were the suicidal power struggles within Koguryo and the Chinese alliance
with Silla. Silla joined in all the major campaigns in the conquest of Paek
che and Koguryo. It was also responsible for the logistical support without
which Tang troops could not have survived much less prevailed so far
from home.®^

Tang’s Withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula in 676
By this time it seemed that Tang had finally succeeded in rebuild
ing the same degree control over the peninsula as enjoyed by the Han dy^ ZZTJIQX, pp. 6347-8; pp. 6350-6.
JTS 199A, p. 5327; XTS 220, p. 6197; ZZTJ 201, pp. 6356-7. XTS 220 says that Fuyu
Long (Korean Yung) was exiled. Long should be Feng (Korean P’ung). Hino 1984, pp.
26-7.
“ Hino 1984, pp. 56-64.

Details see SGSG 5-6.
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nasty. The success, however, soon degenerated into a series of troubles. In
670, when Xue Rengui was sent on a campaign against Tibet, a revolt in
Koguryo took place which installed the former king’s grandson, Ansung,
as king. Only in 673 did the Chinese succeed in crushing the revolt.®®
A more serious problem from the Chinese point of view was that
Silla ceased to be a Tang ally. It not only despatched troops to support
Koguryo‘s revolt and provided shelter to Ansung, but also conferred on
him the title of king in 670. Eventually, so as to win the allegiance of the
remnants of Koguryo, Silla established him in a dependent kingdom
known as Minor Koguryo (to be distinguished from the Minor or Lesser
Koguryo in the Liaodong area, see below) in the southwest of the penin
sula, on the former territory of Paekche. Minor Koguryo was eliminated
90
by Silla around 684 when it rebelled against Silla.
Signs of conflict of interest between Tang and Silla appeared soon
after the conquest of Paekche, but both maintained the alliance to achieve
their common goal—^the conquest of Koguryo. Once this was accom
plished, the allies became rivals. For their part the Chinese wanted to bring
all non-Chinese into submission. In 663, Tang established the Superior
Area Command of Jilin (Korean Kyerim) in Silla with King Munmu as the
Superior Area Commander.®^ Silla was thereby treated as a Tang subject.
Two years later, Tang sent the former Prince Yung of Paekche back to
Paekche as the Area Commander of Xiongjin, and ordered him to con
clude a covenant establishing a boundary with Silla. Silla, of course, re
sented this, considering it to be the restoration of its former enemy and a
check on its own expansion, which may, in fact, have been the intention of
the Chinese. This arrangement, however, did not go well since Yung was
too timid to coexist with so strong a neighbor as Silla and returned to
Chang’an.®^
Silla, for its part, now took as its goal resistance against Chinese
expansion into the peninsula and unification of Korea. Samguk Sagi con
tains a letter written in 671 by the king of Silla to the Tang Protector-

ZZTJ201, pp. 6363-4. For details of these events, see Ikeuchi 1960, pp. 267-393.
ZZTJ20\, pp. 6363-4; 202, pp. 6370-1.
^ SGSG 6, pp. 8-10. For details regarding the family background of Ansung and the es

tablishment of Minor Koguryo, see Murakami 1974, pp. 153-84.
JTS 199A, p. 5336; ZZTJ 201, p. 6335; THY 95, p. 1711. XTS (220, p. 6204) records
its establishment as as having occurred in 661, which may be mistaken.
JTS 199A, pp. 5333-4; XTS 220, p. 6201; ZZTJ20X, p. 6344; SGSG 6, pp. 4-5.
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general of Andong, Xue Rengui, who had demanded that Silla withdraw
from Paekche and cease its protection of the remnants of Koguryo. The
letter states that on the occasion of Kim Ch’unch’u’s mission to Tang in
648, Taizong had promised that when Tang had subdued Koguryo and
Paekche, the territory south of Pyongyang and the land of Paekche would
be given to Silla.^^ The Chinese sources nowhere refer to Taizong’s al
leged promise, nor do they refer to Silla’s letter of 671 or its contents.
Whether or not Taizong ever made such a promise, as a strong and virtu
ally independent state, Silla would naturally struggle to expand and try to
eliminate Chinese control of any kind on the peninsula.
Silla was at the peak of its ability to carry out expansion on the
peninsula. Within a few years after the revolt of Koguryo Silla had control
of all of Paekche and much of southern Kogmyo.®^ Considering Silla to be
a rebel against Tang suzerainty, Gaozong dismissed King Munmu from his
throne in 674, and sent his brother, who had been kept as a hostage in
Chang’an, to replace him. “Punitive” troops led by Liu Rengui were des
patched and inflicted a severe defeat on Silla. In 675 King Munmu offered
“an acknowledgement of guilt” as well as tribute. Gaozong thereupon re
stored him to his post.®® The Tang court planned another expedition in
678, but then gave it up after Chief Minister Zhang Wenguan rose from
his sickbed and went to see Gaozong. Zhang opposed the campaign on the
grounds that there was a more immediate danger of a Tibetan invasion on
the western border, and that Tang could not afford to fight two enemies at
the same time.®®
Tang had in fact stretched itself beyond its ability to exert effective
control. In 676, the seat of the Protectorate of Andong was moved all the
way back from P’yongyang to Liaoyang in Liaodong, a more secure place,
but well removed from the peninsula. All the Chinese officials formerly in
Koguryo withdrew as well. The Area Command of Xiongjin was moved to
Jian’an (in modem Liaoning). A year later, the Protectorate of Andong
was moved again, this time to Xincheng (modem Fushim in Liaoning),
thus completing the Tang withdrawal from the peninsula and its de facto
recognition of Silla’s expansion and its unification of most of Korea.
SGSG 7, pp. 1-7; Jamieson 1969, pp. 63-6.
^JCrSllO, p. 6204; THY95, pp. 1711-2.
^XTSllQ, p. 6204; ZZTJ2Q2, p, 6372; p. 6375.
“ JTS 85, pp. 2815-6; ^ 113, p. 4187; ZZTJ 202, p. 6385.
JTS 39, p. 1526; XTS 39, p. 1023; ZZTJ202, pp. 6378-9.
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The reasons for the withdrawal are not hard to find. In the first
place, the Chinese had to deal with a more acute border problem, one
caused by the Tibetans in the west. In 670, Xue Rengui was sent off on a
campaign against Tibet. His departure from the Protectorate of Andong
must have weakened Chinese control there, for in the same year the revolt
in Koguryo took place. Second, it was impossible to supply a military
colony on the peninsula when Silla could no longer be relied upon as a
logistical base.®® As a Chinese official pointed out in 661, Tang efforts at
conquering Koguryo were doomed, for if Koguryo was to remain con
quered, Tang had to station troops there. Tang’s dilemma was that if the
number of the troops was small, China would be unable to exert enough
force to retain control, but if the number was large China would be ex
hausted trying to supply that force.
With the seat of the Protectorate of Andong moved to Liaodong,
Tang decided in 677 to transfer the surrendered Korean royal family
members and their people who had settled inside China back to their for
mer land. It was probably hoped that they could impose a check on Silla’s
expansion. However, Prince Yimg of former Paekche was still too much
afraid of Silla to go back to the former territory of Paekche and remained
in the north. King Pojang of former Koguryo went to Liaodong, but once
he arrived there, he made contact with the Mohe, and prepared for a revolt.
101
He was recalled and sent into exile in the southwest.

JTS 83, pp. 2782-3; XTS 111, p. 4142; ZZTJIQI, pp. 6363-4. Hino Kaizaburo holds
that the Protector-general of Andong, Xue Rengui, left P’ydngyang for Xincheng as early
as 669, while the official seat remained in P’ydngyang. The seat was moved to Liaoyang
in 670 as a temporary expedient and formally moved there in 676. It was finally moved
to Xincheng in 677. The reason for this, Hino speculates, is that Xue Rengui had a differ
ent opinion from that of the central government: the court wished to control the whole of
the peninsula, and so tried to maintain the seat in P’yongyang, whereas Xue did not be
lieve that Tang was capable of maintaining its control over the peninsula. Xue decided
that it was best to have the seat in Xincheng where it could both defend against Silla’s
northern expansion smd watch over the Mohe people to head off any possible alliance
between them and the Turks. The court’s final decision to retreat from the peninsula rep
resented an implicit agreement with Xue’s opinion. See Hino 1984, pp. 29-32. We do
not, however, have much evidence to show how Xue Rengui evaluated the situation as a
whole.
Cen Zhongmian 1957, p. 127.
'®°A7S'220,pp. 6195-6.
Some accounts record the title given to them as Commandery Prince, see JTS 5, p.
102; JTS 199A, p. 5328; p. 5334; XTS 220, p. 6198; p. 6201, while some give it as King
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The Protectorate of Andong faced a great threat in 696 and 697
when the Khitan rose in revolt against Chinese control, attacking the Pro
tectorate and adjacent Chinese territory. In 697, Di Renjie, who had been
dealing with the Khitan rebellion first as Prefect of Weizhou and then as
Area Commander of Youzhou and was now a Chief Minister, suggested in
a memorial the abolition of the Protectorate and the appointment of mem
bers of the former royal family of Koguryo to take over the defense of Andong.
A year later, the Protectorate of Andong was abolished and the
Area Command of Andong was established. Pojang’s son became the Area
Commander.
The Protectorate of Andong was restored in 704, but its seat was
withdrawn further from the peninsula to near the present Beijing and its
function was changed from supervising non-Chinese on the peninsula to
firontier defense. It was finally abolished in 758 during the An Lushan re
bellion.
Silla managed to maintain its independence of Tang. During King
Munmu’s reign (661-681), Silla sent no regular tributary missions to Tang,
except on two occasions: one was in 665, when Silla sent officials to Tang
to join in the Feng and Shan ceremony;^the other was the mission of
675 mentioned above. Munmu’s successor resumed peaceful contacts with
Tang. In 692 Empress Wu sent an embassy to Silla, requesting that Silla
abandon the title T’aejong used by their late King Muyo (r. 654-661),
since T’aejong means Taizong in Chinese. Even though Silla did not take
any action along these lines. Empress Wu did not insist on the demand.
For the better part of a century, the Chinese made persistent efforts
to establish their administration on the Korean peninsula. After bloody

of Chaoxian or King of Daifang, see JTS 199A, p. 5328; ZZTJ 202, pp. 6382-3; THY 95,
p. 1709. Hino holds that the title was commandery king, see Hino 1984, p. 67.
‘“7TS89, pp. 2889-91;^ 115, pp. 4210-1; ZZTJ206, pp. 6524-5. THY13 (pp. 13189) records the date of Di’s memorial as 698.
It has been proposed by Hino that this man and his descendants were gradually able to
develop what Hino refers to as Minor or Lesser Kogiuyo in Liaodong, which switched its
allegiance to the revived second Turkish empire, then to Tang under Xuanzong, and was
annexed by the Parhae state during the An Lushan rebellion. See Hino 1984, pp. 74-6;
pp. 185-8; pp. 326-35. But it is questionable whether such a state ever really existed. See
FuruharaToru 1992.
Hino 1984, pp. 32-6.
^°^JTS 84, p. 2795; Y7S 108, p. 4084; ZZTJ201, p. 6344.
^°®SGSG8, p. 4.
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battles and at a cost of countless lives and economic resources they finally
gave up the attempt. The final winner in these wars was Silla, which es
tablished the first unified Korean state.
Curbing the Parhae State
Silla’s independence was reinforced by the emergence of another
state situated between itself and Tang. This was Parhae, at first called
Zhen (Korean Chin), established by Tae Choyong, who was of Mohe ori
gin and became Koreanized by the end of the seventh century.
The
Parhae state established relations with the Turks, who had restored their
second empire in 682. Parhae expanded to occupy a large area from mod
em Jilin down to the 39th parallel on the Korean peninsula. By filling
much of the space separating Silla from Tang, Parhae reduced Tang con
cern about Silla’s northern expansion. More significantly, Parhae consti
tuted a new element in the international balance of power, a force that
could threaten both Silla and China because it had the potential to become
an ally of the Turks.
Tang adopted a policy of preventing Parhae fi’om making incur
sions and from forming an alliance with the Turks. In 712 Chinese official
titles were conferred on the Parhae ruler, Choyong, and his territory was
given the jifni title of Huhanzhou.^^* From 713 to 755 Parhae sent fortyeight missions to Tang.
^
In 719, Choyong died and his son Muye took the throne. ° Muye
adopted a more independent attitude towards Tang: he honored his father
with the posthumous title King Ko, adopted his own reign title, and en
gaged in territorial expansion. In 726, when the Mohe of the Amur Valley
to the north of Parhae sent envoys to Tang and the Chinese set up Heishuizhou with a Chinese administrator to supervise them, Muye decided to
strike first at the Mohe, to head off any joint attack by the Chinese and
Mohe. However, his brother Munye, who had earlier been a hostage in
Chang’an, opposed this anti-Tang act. Dissension arose in the ruling group

This is according to Hino 1984, p. 176. The origins of Tae Choyong and the ethnic
group to which the majority of the people of Parhae belonged (whether they were from
the Mohe, or Koguryo, or composed of various peoples) remain controversial questions,
see Sun Jinji 1987, pp. 151-65.
^°®ZZ77210,p.6680.
‘“’Hino 1984, pp. 160-3.
“°ZZ7y212, p. 6735.
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and Munye fled to Tang.^^^ Though the attack on the Mohe did not pro
ceed, in 732 Muye crossed the sea to Shandong and attacked Deng2hou.
This was supported by the Turks.^^^
In retaliation, Xuanzong sought and obtained an alliance with Silla.
The two sides again joined forces to battle against Parhae.^^^ Silla’s own
strategic interest led it to compete with Parhae to prevent its expansion. In
his letter of 735 to the king of Silla, Xuanzong acceded to Silla’s request
to establish garrisons as far south as the Daedong River at the narrow
waist of northern Korea so as to resist the attacks of Parhae. In 736 Silla
sent envoys to express appreciation for Tang’s help.^^^
It is generally considered that this shows Tang’s final and formal
renunciation of opposition to Silla’s claim over the peninsula. From then
until the end of Tang, the two countries maintained peaceful relations.
China had to be satisfied with unified Silla as a tributary state which ex
plicitly acknowledged Chinese suzerainty, performed tributary duties, but
maintained its de facto independence, ruling its own state without Chinese
interference in its internal affairs.
The problems presented by Parhae seem to have subsided when
Bilga Qaghan of the Turks died in 734 and when the Xi and Khitan turned
to the Chinese. These developments left Parhae isolated as the only poten
tial member of any anti-Tang alliance. As a consequence, Xuanzong did
not have to contemplate launching any further costly wars.
Moreover,
with the death of Muye in 737, his son Hummu succeeded him and
changed to a pro-Tang policy, although maintaining his own reign title for
the calendar. In response to the new situation in East Asia, Parhae found it
advantageous to change its policy. In compensation for the change, it
could at least begin to learn from Chinese culture and develop trade with
Tang.
In 762, after the An Lushan rebellion, an edict was issued by
Tang recognizing Parhae as a state, and Hummu as its king.

JTS 199B, pp. 5360-1; ATO 219, pp. 6180-1; ZZTJ213, pp. 6774-5.
JTS 199B, pp. 5361-2; JOT’219, p. 6181; ZZTJ2U, p. 6799.
''^ZZTJ2U,p. 6800.
Qujiang Zhang Xiansheng Wenji 9, p. 51; CFYG 971, p. 11410; SGSG 8, p. 11; Pulleyblank 1955, p. 21.
For a detailed study of the conflicts between Tang and Parhae, see Furuhata 1986.
"®Hino 1984, pp. 164-5.
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Located in proximity to both agricultural China and the nomadic
steppe land, Liaodong and southern Manchuria had long been an area of
instability. During the Qin-Han period, the Liaodong area and part of the
Korean peninsula were organized under Chinese administration, but when
Chinese power weakened, this administration collapsed. The reunification
of China under Sui and Tang fundamentally changed the region’s balance
of power, and tempted the Chinese rulers to reassert the active hegemony
that had been exerted by Han.
Different rulers, constrained by the circumstances of their times
and by their own personalities, handled the Korean issue with different
policies. During Tang, Gaozu took an openly pragmatic attitude toward
relations with the Korean states, seeing no need to pretend to be superior
to the non-Chinese, but when his opinion was opposed by his ministers he
had to abandon it. Taizong’s three campaigns against Koguryo were partly
motivated by considerations of frontier security. At least in his imperial
edicts, he emphasized security as justification for military campaigns. On
the other hand, like Emperor Yang of Sui, Taizong also demonstrated a
desire for military glory, perhaps influenced by his northwestern aristo
cratic and inilitary background as well as by his ambition to build a uni
versal empire. He was not satisfied when Koguryo offered a nominal
submission. The ideological component, a need to tailor events to fit his
ideal of empire, made him insist on actual submission and led him to try to
reestablish Chinese administration on the Korean peninsula. He failed to
conquer Koguryo due to the practical difficulties of waging war in a harsh
climate at a distance, and because he mis-assessed both China’s own
strength and that of Koguryo.
Tang Gaozong succeeded in conquering Paekche in 660. This
proved to be a crucial step in the final conquest of Koguryo in 668, after
which Tang established the protectorate of Andong in P’yongyang. A de
cisive factor that contributed to the victory was the alliance with Silla.
Silla joined Tang forces in conquering both Paekche and Koguryo. What
made the alliance possible was their short-term common goal of achieving
the conquest of Koguryo and Paekche. The alliance could last so long as
the interests of the two did not conflict, but it was bound to break down in
the long run because the Chinese goal was to bring all non-Chinese into
submission no matter in which “barbarian” state they lived, while for Silla,
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the initial goal was to defeat Paekche and then Koguryo and later to ex
pand into their territory.
Once it lost Silla’s crucial cooperation, Tang had to withdraw its
administration from the peninsula. Once it withdrew, the final winner in
this costly series of wars was Silla, whose hard struggles for unification
pushed the Chinese off the peninsula and established the first unified Ko
rean state in history. China tiiereafter had to be satisfied with having Korea
merely as a tributary state which acknowledged Chinese suzerainty, per
formed tributary duties but maintained its independence, ruling its own
state without Chinese interference in its internal affairs.
After Parhae was founded at the end of the seventh century, even
though it too posed a potential threat, the Chinese treated it pragmatically,
eventually also accepting a tributary relationship with it and launching at
tacks only defensively. The Chinese rulers were never as aggressive
against Silla as their predecessors had been against Koguryo during late
Sui and early Tang. This change may in part have reflected the lesson that
the Tang rulers had learned from the Korean war.

Chapter 7
Competition Between Tang and Tibet
Before the An Lushan Rebellion
While the presence of nomadic powers on the northern frontier was
a perennial problem for China from Han until Ming, the rise of a powerful
kingdom in Tibet was a one-time phenomenon. During its period of
strength from early in the seventh century to about 840 Tibet posed a very
serious problem to China, as a direct threat to the security of its frontier as
well as to its ideological claims of superiority over its neighbors. Before
the An Lushan rebellion, Tang relations with the Tibetan kingdom focused
first of all on competition for control of the Tuyuhun kingdom, then on the
Western Regions and the southwest.

The Tibetan Challenge
Tibet, called Tufan in the Chinese sources, rose as a unified and
powerful kingdom rmder the Yarlung dynasty around the end of the sixth
century and the beginning of the seventh. The Yarlung dynasty had existed
previously for a number of generations as chiefs of a smaller tribal state.
During that period the main power lying between China and what became
Tibet was the Tuyuhim kingdom. In his study of the establishment of the
Tufan kingdom, Yamaguchi Zuiho describes how the hostile policy of the
Chinese towards the Tuyuhun during the Sui and Tang periods not only
provided the Yarlung dynasty with the opportunity of expanding and
evolving into the Tufan kingdom, but also planted in the minds of its rul
ers the desire to replace the Tuyuhun as an international power. As a re
sult, Tufan, by learning from the Tuyuhun, was able to absorb the latter
and eventually surpass it.^
No dates can be assigned securely to the history of Tibet before the
sixth century of our era.^ Some scholars have attempted to reconstruct an
earlier history,^ but it is clear that until the formation of the Tufan king-

' Yamaguchi 1983.
^ Stein 1972, p. 45.
^ See such works as Beckwith 1977 and Yamaguchi 1983.
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dom there is no record of any powerful political organization in Tibet
which could have attracted China’s attention or played a role in its foreign
policy. When it did finally arise, the Tibetan kingdom presented an un
precedented challenge to China.
In contrast to the nomadic peoples who typically refrained from
attempting to occupy the territory of settled peoples, the Tibetans were
noted for their territorial ambitions. To the Tibetan rulers, expansion
seemed ideologically necessary and economically profitable.^ Once in 822
a Tibetan marshal asked a Tang envoy why Tang treated the nomadic
Uighurs more favorably than Tibet even though the Uighurs were a
smaller country than Tibet and could be defeated very easily. The envoy
answered:
The Uighurs have the merit of having rescued the country (China) in
times of danger. Also they have never invaded and stolen even an inch
of our territory. Why should we not treat them favorably?^
It is impossible here to go into a detailed comparative study of the
political, military and economic structures of the nomadic and the Tibetan
powers. It should be pointed out, however, that basic differences in their
natural environment and economic structures made the nomads rely on the
Chinese more than the Tibetans had to, and also led the Tibetans to be
more ambitious in competing with China for territory. Ise Sentaro con
cludes that Tibet had a different economic structure from that of the Turks
or Uighurs, whose economy was based on imstable nomadism, thus ren
dering them vulnerable to military defeat and natural disaster. The no
mads, therefore, were more easily affected by Chinese influence, and
through contacts with China they would gradually lose their advantage as
a nomadic people. Ise further concludes that Tibet had a more solid eco
nomic structure which was based on three activities: 1) agriculture, ammal
husbandry, and mining; 2) foreign trade and taxation, applied both inter
nally and to subordinate countries; 3) pillage of people, ammal and grains,
mostly from the Tang Chinese. Culturally, Tibet absorbed elements from
the Chinese, Indians, and Western Turks and this cosmopolitanism helped
engender a strong sense of independence.
Ise’s comparison needs to be supplemented by other considera* Beckwith 1980, p. 30.
^ JTS 196B, p. 5265. See also ATS 216B, pp. 6103-4; CFYG 660, p. 7900.

* Ise 1968, pp. 373-418. For trade see also Beckwith 1977b.
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tions. The nomadic empires also had agriculture, engaged in mostly by
captured Chinese and sedentary local people who became their subjects in
the Western Regions. The nomadic empires imposed a taxation system on
their sedentary subjects and conducted very active trading activities be
tween east and west.^ But nomadic imperial power was based, to a large
extent, on exploiting the Chinese economy, and thus was dependent on
China. In his study of the nomadic empires, Barfield observes that the
ruling class of nomadic states in particular maintained themselves by ex
ploiting China’s economy, and not by exploiting the production of scat
tered sheepherders. In the early stages of their evolution they did not at
tempt to conquer Chinese territory, nor did they have the necess^ admin
istrative institutions to govern an agricultural society. By continuous raids,
plimdering or providing military assistance, however, the nomadic rulers
demonstrated their strength sufficiently to increase their bargaining power
for obtaining large quantities of Chinese goods as subsidies, and made
China accommodate their demands for trade.
The Tibetans also traded with China, but their economy was more
independent of China’s. The difference between the economic structure of
the Tibetan kingdom and that of a nomadic empire may have been a matter
of degree, and was determined primarily by their different ecological envi
ronment. The Tibetans, possessing less pasture and more arable land than
the nomads who occupied the steppes, could develop a more extensive and
solid agriculture. While the ruling classes of Tibet controlled the agricul
tural peasantry, they themselves, including both the btsan-po and the noble
families, led a nomadic life. Agricultural production was entrusted to the
peasantry, who served not only to supply agricultural income to their
masters but also as a source of military manpower.^ The more balanced
semi-agricultural and semi-nomadic economy of Tibet thus could be more
independent than that of the nomads. Rather than demanding subsidies as
the nomads did, Tibet competed with China for more of the same kind of
territory, and its expansion into agricultural land as well as pasture was a
natural process. Its collection of taxes in occupied areas was a natural ex
tension of its state’s power, a reflection of the nature of the state before
such expansion.
As Ise points out, Tibet enriched its culture and reenforced its po’’ Hayashi Toshio has studied the role of agriculure in Turkish society, see his 1985.

* Barfield 1981, pp. 46-7; 1989, pp. 8-9 and passim.
’ Sato 1959, English summary of the contents, p. 30.
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litical strength through contacts with India, China, and the several political
powers in Central Asia. Even though the Tibetans showed enthusiasm in
adopting certain aspects of Chinese civilization—its bureaucratic system,
religion, architecture and production skills—^unlike the Koreans, for whom
China was the sole foreign source of inspiration in matters pertaining to
the higher aspects of civilization as well as political and military assis
tance, Tibet could also draw many cultural elements from Central Asia and
India. Tibetan written script was from India, and this is significant since
written language is the most important single element of any culture.
There were also debates in Tibet between the different Buddhist sects of
China and India before Tibet finally developed its own variant of the Bud10
dhist tradition.
Since the Tibetan kingdom was more economically independent,
the Chinese could not as easily use their products to buy peace from the
Tibetans or to attract them to move and settle close to the frontiers imder
Chinese supervision as they could with the nomadic people. Nor could
they effectively use the political investiture system to persuade the Tibet
ans into so close a tributary relationship as existed between the Chinese
and the Koreans. Tibet, therefore, posed a different kind of challenge to
the Tang empire.
Taizong: Subduing the Tuyuhun
The Tuyuhun were the second major problem on the Tang frontiers
after the Eastern Turks during Gaozu’s time. Soon after Taizong assumed
the throne, the Tuyuhun Fuyun Qaghan sent an envoy to the court, but be
fore his return, the Tuyuhun raided the frontier. In contrast to Emperor
Yang, who eliminated the Tuyuhun kingdom, Taizong tried to make it into
a buffer state. A Chinese mission was despatched to reprove the Tuyuhun
for the raid and summon the qaghan back to the court. Sensing the danger
involved, Fuyun did not go. He then requested a marriage for his son
Zunwang. With the idea of keeping him under control, Taizong asked the
prince to come to the court to receive the bride, but the prince excused
himself on account of illness. The marriage did not materialize and the
Tuyuhun raids resumed.
Military force then was resorted to subdue the Tuyuhun. In 634
general Li Jing led an expedition army joined by the Turks and the Qibi
tribe against the Tuyuhun. In the following year two more military expe10

Demi^ville 1952.
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ditions campaigned across the whole of the Tu)mhun territory, ending
Fuyim’s life. Supported by Tang military force, the pro-Chinese prince
Shun became the next qaghan, but he was soon killed by his ministers for
his inability to rule effectively. His son Nuohebo succeeded him.^^ One
consequence of these expeditions was that the Tuoba tribe of the Dangxiang Qiang people, a former ally of the Tuyuhun, also submitted to Tang.
Most other Dangxiang Qiang had submitted to Tang earlier. The Qiang
were organized into jimi prefectures on their own land scattered in modem
Sichuan, Qinghai and Gansu.
Nuohebo adopted a pro-Tang policy. In return, Tang supported him
with grant of the titles of king and qaghan and military assistance. They
gave him the hand of a princess in 640. In 641, his Chief Minister planned
a revolt, to begin \vith a surprise attack on the Tang princess. The Chief
Minister hoped to capture Nuohebo and take him to the Tibetans. The
Tang troops intervened. The Chief Minister was killed and Nuohebo’s
position was maintained.^^ Obviously there was a pro-Tibetan group
among the Tuyuhun. It has been suggested that the pro-Tibetan faction
developed around Fuyun’s second son Zimwang, who had married a Ti
betan princess. After the death of Fuyun in 635, the Tibetans continued to
support Zimwang’s son by the Tibetan princess.^"^ Clearly, the Tuyuhun’s
complex interactions with Tang were influenced by their relations with the
Tibetans.

The First Encounter with Tibet and Achievement of Peace through
the Marriage of Princess Wencheng, 634-660
Official contact between Tibet and Tang started in 634, when the
Tibetan btsan-po, Srong btsan sgam-po, despatched a mission to the Tang
court. Taizong returned the visit by sending an envoy to Tibet.^^ When
Srong btsan sgam-po heard that both the Turks and Tuyuhun had con
cluded marriage alliances with Tang, he sent an embassy to Tang to ac
company the returning Chinese envoy, and make a marriage proposal, but
Taizong turned it down. The Tibetan envoy reported to Srong btsan sgampo that Tang at first had promised the marriage but later changed its deci-

" JTS 198, pp. 5298-300; ATS 221 A, pp. 6224-6.
198, pp. 5291-2; ATS 221A, p. 6215. See also Dunnel 1994, pp. 158-9.
JTS 198, p. 5300; ATS 221 A, p. 6226; Mole 1970, pp. 49-57.
Yamaguchi 1983, pp. 673-84.
JTS 196A, p. 5221; ATS 216A, p. 6073; ZZTJ194, pp. 6107-8.
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sion after the Tuyuhun qaghan arrived at the Tang court and fomented dis
cord. Srong btsan sgam-po then attacked the Tuyuhim, and subjugated the
Dangxiang and the Bailan tribes, who were located close to both Tibet and
the Tuyuhun.^®
Tang’s change of attitude may have been due to Taizong’s concern
with maintaining good relations with the Tuyuhun. In 634, when Tang and
the Tuyuhun were at war, Taizong would have welcomed an alliance with
Tibet so as to check the Tuyuhun from the rear. However, between 634
and 636 the situation in the Tuyuhim kingdom changed drastically with
the establishment of a pro-Tang regime headed first by Shun and then by
Nuohebo. When Nuohebo came in person to Tang in 636 to show his
loyalty and asked for a marriage alliance, he realized the great danger
implied by a Tang-Tibetan marriage alliance, and therefore endeavored to
stop it. Once the situation among the Tuyuhun became peaceful under a
pro-Tang regime, the necessity to ally with Tibet against the Tuyuhun dis
appeared. The 636 Tibetan envoy to the Tang court saw the Tuyuhun’s
interference and its consequences and upon his return to Tibet the follow
ing year, he reported this to the Tibetan btsan-po^^
Following his attack on the Tuyuhun, Srong btsan sgam-po sta
tioned a large number of troops on Tang’s western border at Songzhou in
modem Sichuan, and again despatched an embassy to the Chinese court
claiming the hand of a Tang princess. A Tibetan source says that Srong
btsan sgam-po sent a letter to Taizong, saying that if Tang did not assent to
the marriage request, he would lead 50,000 troops to attack Tang, kill the
emperor and obtain a princess directly.^® The year 638 saw the Tibetans
mount continuous attacks on Songzhou and subjugate two Izngjimi pre
fectures. Finally, as a result of Tang counterattacks, Srong btsan sgam-po
withdrew his troops. He petitioned again for a marriage contract in 640.
Even though Tang claimed a victory over the Tibetans, it finally had to
accommodate the Tibetan request so as to prevent Tibet from launching

JTO 196A, p. 5221; ^216A, p. 6073; ZZTJ195, p. 6139.
’’ Sato 1958, pp. 248-52. Without referring to Sato’s opinion, Beckwith questions the
account of Tuyuhun’s interference. He conjectures that Taizong “made a private agree
ment with the Tibetans to conclude a marriage alliance if they would fmish off the stilltroublesome ‘Azha (Tuyuhun).” See his 1987, p. 23, note 53. The fact that the Tibetans
launched an attack against the Tuyuhun and then brought pressure on the Chinese fron
tier to strengthen their demand for a Chinese princess does not support Beckwith’s con
jecture.
Wang Zhong 1958, p. 29.
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further attacks.’^

The Chinese princess, Wencheng, left for Tibet in 641, marking the
beginning of a period of peaceful and frequent communication between
the two states that lasted until 660, well into Gaozong’s reign. The Ti
betan Chief Minister, Ludongzan (Mgar Stong rtsan), who came to the
Tang court to receive the princess, was given the Chinese title of general.^^ The Tibetan sources say that after the confrontation between Tibet
and the Chinese in 638, Tang and the Tuyuhtm came to Tibet to pay tribute.^^ However, the Chinese records say that Tibet at this time did not ob
ject to taking on vassal status within the tribute system, at lezist not openly
to the Chinese.^^ During this period, thirteen Tibetan missions arrived at
the Tang court, eleven of them being tributary missions, according to the
record in the Cefu Yuangui?^ After the marriage, Tibet assisted Tang in
two wars. The first campaign was in 647, when Tang launched a
“punitive” attack on Kucha.^® The second time was in 648, when the Tang
envoy Wang Xuance was attacked while on a mission to northern India
and the Tibetans sent troops to rescue him and defeated the Indian attackers.
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Considering that the reign of Srong btsan sgam-po was for Tibet a
time of consolidating state power, one can see that it was in their own in
terest that the Tibetans joined Tang troops to attack India so as to demon
strate their strength, and cultivated friendship with Tang the better to en
gage in political, religious and cultural borrowings. Tibet sent yoimg aris
tocrats to Tang to study the Confucian classics and doctrines, and Chinese
scholars were invited to Tibet to compile official reports to the Tang em-

Sato 1958, p. 267.
Yamaguchi rejects the traditional view that Princess Wencheng was married from the
outset to Srong btsan sgam-po. He concludes instead that Princess Wencheng first mar
ried King Gung srong gung rtsan, who was the ruler at that time, bore him a son, Mang
slon mang rtsan, and only after the king’s death did she marry Srong btsan sgam-po
when he re-ascended the throne. Yamaguchi 1983, pp. 547-62.
JTS 196A, p. 5223; ZZTJ196, p. 6164.
^ Yamaguchi 1983, p. 683.
^ One example is the memorial of 646 to Tang by the btsan-po'% to congratulate Taizong
on his return from the Koguryo campaign. JTS 196A, p. 5222; XTS 216A, p. 6074;
CFYG 970, p. 11400. See also Kaneko 1974, p. 39; 1988, p. 96.
Su Jimen and Xiao Lianzi 1981, pp. 359-60.
ZZTJ 198, pp. 6250-1; CFYG 985, pp. 11571 -2.
“ JTS 198, pp. 5307-8; XTS 216A, p. 6074; ZZTJ 199, pp. 6257-8.
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peror on behalf of Tibet.^^ Marriage to a Chinese princess allowed the Ti
betan btsan-po to demonstrate to his own people the extent of his power,
to increase his prestige and reinforce his position vis-a-vis the nobles, who
posed a potential threat to the royal family’s hegemony.^®
In 649, at the beginning of Gaozong’sreign, Tang conferred on
King Srong btsan sgam-po the titles of Commandant-escort {fuma duwei),
which was the usual title for an imperial son-in-law, Commandery Prince
of Xihai and Precious King (baowang). This was, however, the only time
throughout the history of Tang-Tibetan relations when the Tibetan king
•

received Chinese political investiture.

2d

Confrontations with Tibet over the Tuynhun, 660-680
After the death of Srong btsan sgam-po in 649, his grandson suc
ceeded him. The real state ruler however was the competent minister Mgar
Stong rtsan. Taking over full control of the already consolidated kingdom,
Mgar Stong rtsan continued the expansion which had started in Srong
btsan sgam-po’s time. The Tibetans’ subsequent expansion in all direc
tions was bound to lead to confrontation with the Chinese. They also
challenged Chinese superiority by asking the Tang envoy to perform the
kowtow at their court. The envoy refused and was, as a consequence, de.

. .
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tained in Tibet for over ten years. He finally died m captivity.
The Tang court under Gaozong took a firm stand against this pow
erful new rival. In 658, the Tibetan request for a marriage produced no re
sult, perhaps because Tang was following a policy of supporting the
Tuyuhun, who would have hated to see a marriage contract between Tang
and Tibet.®^ Soon, in 660, the Tibetans launched their first attack on the
Tuyuhun.®^ When at war with each other in 663, both Tibet and the Tuyu-

JTS 196A, pp. 5221-2; XTS 216A, p. 6074; CFYG 978, p. 11496.
“ Sato 1958, p. 287.
” JTS 196A, p. 5222; XTS 216A, p. 6074; ZZTJ199, pp. 6269-70; CFYG 964, p. 11340.
Concerning the last title, the above sources say that the title is binwang or zongwang in
stead of baowang. But Wang Zhong holds that these are mistaken readings of baowang,
see his 1958, p. 35. Beckwith (1987 p. 25, note 71) also discusses these titles. He ques
tions the accuracy of Chinese historians who record the conferring of the title equivalent
to the imperial-son-in-law to the Tibetan king.
XTS2\6A, p. 6078; CFYG 138, p. 1675. Wang Zhong (1958, p. 50) believes the envoy
was detained aroimd 665.
^';iTO216A, p. 6075; ZZTJ200, p. 6310; Sato 1958, pp. 307-9.
ZZTJ 200, p. 6321.
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him sent in requests for Chinese military intervention. Gaozong at first re
fused, but Tibet allied itself with the Tuyuhun’s pro-Tibet faction, and in
flicted a disastrous defeat on the pro-Tang Tuyuhun qaghan Nuohebo.
This forced him to flee with his people to Liangzhou. Gaozong thereupon
ordered a Tang general to assist the Tuyuhun, while at the same time Tang
stationed troops in Liangzhou and Shanzhou to defend against Tibet.
When Mgar Stong rtsan followed up his occupation of the Tuyu
hun lands with an embassy to Tang, making accusations against the Tuyu
hun and petitioning for a marriage contract, Gaozong not only refused the
petition, but also sent an envoy to Tibet to deliver a sealed letter blaming
the Tibetans for their aggression. In the eyes of the Chinese at that time
Tibet could only be a vassal, not an equal. In 665 another Tibetan mission
arrived at the Tang court, this time with the purpose of restoring peace
with the Tuyuhun. As their reward, the Tibetans requested the land of
Chishui in Tuyuhun territory for raising livestock. Gaozong again refused. The demand of the Tibetans for Chishui may indicate either that
the area had not yet been subjugated, or that the Tibetans wished to as
suage Chinese fears and anger by requesting Tang recognition of the new
35
de facto situation.
In 669, a court discussion in Chang’an was held to consider a plan
for settling the Tuyuhun in the Southern Qilian mountains. General Qibi
Heli suggested waging war on Tibet rather than assisting the Tuyuhun.
Yan Liben, a Chief Minister but better known for his talent in painting,
argued against any war since China had suffered a severe famine the year
before. A third opinion, raised by Chief Minister Jiang Ke, was to aid the
Tuyuhun so that they would be able to remain a buffer state. However, no
decision was reached and the resettlement of the Tuyuhim was not imple
mented.^®
It turned out that the final decision was to be for war against the
Tibetans, with the Tuyuhun to be restored as a buffer state to check the
Tibetan advance into the Western Regions. The Chinese mounted a cam
paign against the Tibetans in 670, but Tang suffered a severe defeat, with
its entire army lost in battle near Koko Nor. All the territory of the Tuyu-

JTS 196A, p. 5223; 198, p. 5300; XTS 216A, p. 6075; 221A, p. 6227; 7ZTJ20\, pp.

6335-6.
" ATO216A, p. 6075; ZZTJ201, p. 6343.
Sato 1958, pp. 312-3; Beckwith 1987, p. 32.
^^XrS2\6A, p. 6075; ZZTJ20\, p. 6359; CFYG 991, p. 11642.
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him was brought under the control of Tibet.The Tuyuhun qaghan Nuohebo and his people had to be resettled within northwest China under Anlezhou and Lingzhou in 672. The Tuyuhun kingdom had disintegrated,
never to be revived. 38
Despite Tang’s weakness, Gaozong insisted on maintaining a firm
attitude toward the Tibetans. He refused the latter’s request for peace in
675.^^ In 676 and 677, the Tibetans raided China’s northwestern prefec
tures, causing Gaozong to plan a military campaign against them. Fin
ally, in 678,180,000 troops were despatched to do battle with the Tibetans
at Koko Nor. Again Tang was defeated.'*^
In a court discussion after Tang’s defeat, some suggested a cau
tious policy of strengthening defense but eschewing attack, while the em
peror, though aware of the fact that fighting on two fronts had exhausted
China, still insisted on a bellicose attitude: “These bandits are arrogant and
ferocious. They do not understand our benevolence and majesty, and ought
to be captured right away. Peace-making is obviously impossible.”^^ The
Chinese were caught in a dilemma. If they attacked the invading Tibetans
on the frontiers, they would simply waste their resources without solving
the problems. On the other hand, if they did not counterattack because they
deemed themselves not capable of penetrating into Tibetan areas, they
would not be able to root out the source of their problems. No final deci
sion was made.^^
The weakness of Tang as compared with Tibet at that time was not
merely a question of military force, but also stemmed from internal fac
tors. The defeat of 678 can be partly attributed to the internal conflicts
among Chinese high-ranking officials. In 677, Chief Minister Liu Rengui
was appointed Commissioner for Defending Taohe (Taohe zhenshou
dashi, in present Gansu) in preparation for the war ivith Tibet. His memo-

” JTS 83, pp. 2782-3; 196A, p. 5223; 198, p. 5300; XTS 216A, p. 6076; 221A, p. 6227;
ZZry201,pp. 6363-4.
ZZTJ202, p. 6368; Mol6 1970, xxi; p. 59.
^’A75216A, p. 6076; ZZTJ 202, p. 6368; p. 6375; CFYG 980, p. 11512. In the relevant
passage of CFYG, Suzong should be Gaozong.
ZZTJ202, p. 6379; pp. 6383-4; CFYG 991, pp. 11642-3.
*^JTS 196A, pp. 5223-4; XTS 216A, pp. 6076-7; ZZTJ 202, pp. 6384-6. The passage in
THY (97, p. 1731) records the year as “the second year of Shangyuan (675),” which is
wrong.
991, p. 11643.
'''77S5,pp. 103-4; 196, p. 5224; .IGS 216A, p. 6077; ZZTJ202, p. 6386.
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rials were often disputed by Li Jingxuan, Director of the Secretariat.
Knowing that Li was not good at military affairs, Liu planned to discredit
him by insisting that the frontier defense against Tibet must have Li as
commander. Taken in by this ploy, Gaozong sent Li to replace Liu in 678.
It was under the incapable command of Li that Tang troops suffered great
losses in the war. Li was demoted as a result.'*^
There were also problems concerning the general quality of leader
ship, as Wei Yuanzhong, a student from the National University, pointed
out in a sealed memorial: 1) those in military service placed their emphasis
on the martial arts and had no concern for strategy, and the court selected
officials from generals’ families and not for their abilities; 2) civil bureau
crats paid attention to prose style, but were not concerned vrith how to
make plans; 3) ever since the time of the Korean wars, the court had not
observed carefully the rule of reward and punishment. He suggested that
Tang should abolish ftie order that forbade people to raise horses, and
should raise revenues from taxation levied all over the coimtry to purchase
horses for a cavalry army of 200,000 to attack the Tibetans. People should
also be allowed to buy horses from the nomads, so that the nomads would
be weakened by a shortage of horses. Gaozong was impressed and ap
pointed Wei to a position in the Department of the Secretariat. Wei later
rose to the status of Chief Minister and led troops to defend against the
Turks and Tibetans.^^
In contrast, Tibet had a well-organized army and an efficient lead
ership. The Chief Minister, Mgar Ston btsan, was well-knovra for his tal
ent and skill in leadership. After his death in 670, the Mgar family contin
ued in actual control of the political and military power of Tibet, ensuring
the stability of the state to some extent. They were directly responsible for
the series of expansions which continued imtil 699^^ In 679, when he
heard of the death of the Tibetan btsan-po, Gaozong wanted to take advan
tage of the situation to attack, but was dissuaded from doing so on the
grovmds that the Tibetan ruling group was united and strong. When Prin
cess Wencheng despatched an embassy to inform Tang of the royal death
and to request the conclusion of a new marriage contract, Gaozong once

J7S 81, p. 2755; 84, p. 2795; XTS 106, pp. 4052-3; 108, p. 4085; ZZTJ202, pp. 63846.
JTS 92, pp. 2945-53; XTS 122, pp. 4339-44; ZZTJ 202, pp. 6386-8; CFYG 991, pp.
11643-6.
‘“Sato 1958, pp. 300-61.
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more refused.'*^ This time the Tibetans asked for Princess Taiping, Gaozong’s own daughter by Empress Wu, to marry their king. This was re
fused with the excuse that the Princess was a Taoist nun.^®

Competition in the Southwest and over the Western Regions, 670-705
The Tibetans advanced across China’s southwestern border by
capturing the Among Fortress on the western border of Maozhou (in pres
ent Mao county, Sichuan) in 680 with the help of the Qiang peoples of this
area. Among Fortress was built by Tang in 678 at a strategic spot on the
major route connecting Tibet and Sichuan. By maintaining control of this
point the Tibetans were able to exercise their influence over the many nonChinese peoples in the region. In 688 Empress Wu planned to open up a
route via Yazhou (in Sichuan) in order to attack the Qiang people and then
the Tibetans. This was strongly opposed by Chen Zi’ang, a native of Si
chuan, then holding the rank of proofreader in the palace library, on the
grounds that to attack the Qiang would smely lead them to make common
cause with the Tibetans, who would use the Qiang as guides to attack Si
chuan. Although in a minor position, Chen was on several occasions con
sulted by the empress.^° The plan was not carried out, perhaps because it
was obviously impossible given China’s position, and also because Chen’s
opposition represented the dominant opinion.
On the northwest front, after the Tibetans established a base on
Tuyuhun territory and thereby seemed closer access to both the Tang
frontier and the Western Regions, the Tibetans in 670, with the assistance
of Khotan, captmed eighteen Chinese jimi zhou and the Kuchean fortified
city of Aksu in the Tarim Basin. The Chinese had to abandon their bases
in the Tarim Basin, and move the seat of the Protectorate of Anxi back to
Xizhou.^^ As mentioned above, the Chinese unsuccessfully attacked Tibet
in 670.
Despite this loss the Chinese tried to maintain their control over
the Western Tmks north of the Tianshan after the deaths of Ashina Mishe
(in 662) and Ashina Buzhen (in 666 or 667), the Protectors-General of

JTS 196A, p. 5224; ZZTJ202, p. 6389; p. 6393.
3650; ZZTJ202, p. 6402.

Backus 1981, pp. 26-8.
JTS 190B, pp. 5021-4; XTS 107, pp. 4071-4; ZZTJ204, pp. 6455-6.
JTS 198, p. 5304; ATO216A, p. 6076; ZZ77201, p. 6363. See also Ise 1968, pp. 244-5.
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Kunling and Mengchi
Tang appointed tribal leader Ashina Duzhi as
general and Area Commander to control the Western Turks in 671.^^ Be
tween 676 and 678, however, Ashina Duzhi proclaimed himself qaghan
and allied with the Tibetans in attacks on the Protectorate of Anxi. Pei
Xingjian, a former Protector-General of Anxi back in 665 and familiar
with the situation there, devised a strategy to utilize the non-Chinese in the
Western Regions, and succeeded in capturing Ashina Duzhi in 679. Before
his return, Pei left a general behind to build a fortress in Suiye
(Tokmak).^ Some modem scholars are of the opinion, based on the narra
tive in the Cefu Yuangui, that in 679 Tang recovered the Four Garrisons in
Tokmak, Kucha, Khotan and Kashgar, but lost them again in 686 or 687.
Empress Wu wished to maintain Tang dominance in the Western
Regions. Around 685 she appointed the son of Ashina Mishe and the son
of Ashina Buzhen to succeed to their father’s titles of qaghan and Protector-General in order to make them side with Tang against the Tibetans.
When, in 689, the Tibetans captured Kashgar she sent out an expeditionary
army which suffered a severe loss.^^ In 692, on the advice of Tang Xiujing. Area Commander of Lingzhou and former Vice Protector-general of
Anxi, Empress Wu ordered another major campaign against the Tibetans
under the command of Wang Xiaojie. As a result, the Chinese recovered
the Four Garrisons of Tokmak, Kucha, Khotan and Kashgar, thus ensuring
Chinese influence over the area until the mid-eighth century. Thirty thou
sand Chinese troops stationed under the Protectorate of Anxi with its seat
in Kucha, enhanced Chinese control over the Western Regions and inten58

sifted the competition with Tibet.
In 697, when Chief Minister Di Renjie presented his memorial
suggesting the abolition of the Protectorate of Andong (see Chapter 6), he
also suggested abolishing the Four Garrisons in the Western Regions, and
using the Western Turks to take over the region’s defense on the grounds

194B, pp. 5198-9;vtTO215B, pp. 6064-6.
“A7S215B, p. 6064.
^ JTS 84, pp. 2802-3; Chavannes 1969, pp. 60-1; Ise 1968, pp. 254-6.
Ise 1968, p. 256, pp. 260-2; Wu Yugui 1987, pp. 91-3.
JTS 194B, pp. 5188-90; ATS 215B, pp. 6064-6; Ise 1968, pp. 258-9.
ZZrJ 204, p. 6459; Sato 1958, pp. 350-2. The army was led by Wei Daijia. Based on
the various accounts in Chinese, Ise (1968, pp. 259-60) thmks that Wei went to the West
ern Regions twice, in 686 and 689, to fight with the Tibetans.
JTS 93, p. 2977; pp. 2978-9; I96A, p. 5225; 198, p. 5304; XTS 111, p. 4148; p. 4149;
216A, p. 6078; 221A, p. 6232; ZZTJ205, pp. 6487-8.
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that the “four barbarians” were outside the boundaries established by
China’s previous rulers. They were separated from the Middle Kingdom
by such natural boundaries as the sea to the east, the floating sands to the
west, the desert to the north and the Wuling mountains in the south.
On the other hand, Cui Rong, a court historian, forcefully argued
against Di, insisting that abandoning the Four Garrisons would give the
Turks in the north and Tibetans in the south opportunities to impose their
rule over the oasis states, which would in turn expose the Chinese Hexi
area to danger and would in the long run cost China more when the time
came to defend that region. The situation was like that during the Han dy
nasty: whenever Han abandoned the Western Regions, the Xiongnu would
take over and from there threaten the Hexi region. Di’s opinion was rejected.^®
The Tibetans, allied with the Western Turks, continued their fight
for the Western Regions. They also raided China’s northwestern frontiers.
After a major victory over the Chinese in 696 in Taozhou (in modem
Gansu),®° Qinling (Mgar Khri ‘bring, Mgar Stong rtsan’s son), who be
came the Chief Minister in 685,®’ sent an embassy to the Chinese court
with a peace proposal. Empress Wu agreed and sent Guo Yuanzhen, a
military officer, to the Tibetan minister to conduct negotiations, which did
not produce much of a result. Since both were focusing on the Western
Regions, neither was willing to compromise.
The negotiations are recorded in detail in the Tongdian. When
Mgar Khri ‘bring met Guo Yuanzhen, he demanded that Tang should
abandon the Four Garrisons and let each state of the Tarim and the West
ern Turks become autonomous so that they would be subject neither to
Tang nor to Tibet. He also demanded border trade in Yizhou (in present
Sichuan). Guo Yuanzhen refused on the grounds that the Four Garrisons
were there to ensure peace in the Western Regions, and that the Western
Turks had long since been made subjects to Tang. He pointed out that the
Tibetan request was intended to establish their own control over the West
ern Regions at Tang’s expense.
Mgar Khri ‘bring argued that his demands were based on two conJTS 89, pp. 2889-91; XTS 115, pp. 4210-1; 216A, pp. 6078-9; THY 11,, pp. 1326-9;
ZZrJ206, pp. 6524-5; Ise 1968, pp. 423-5.
“ Beckwith 1987, pp. 55-7.
This is according to Sato 1958, p. 301; p. 344; Beckwith 1987, p. 50. Wang Zhong
(1958, p. 38) holds that Mgar Khri ‘bring was the grandson of Mgar Stong rtsan. How
ever, Tibetan and other Chinese sources provide no evidence to support this supposition.
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siderations: 1) the Chinese frontier generals in the Western Regions often
started offensives to further their own interests, so their withdrawal would
bring about peace; 2) the Western Turks were a major worry to Tibet for
they were separated from Tibet only by a desert, thus being in a position to
make quick hit and run raids. Denying any intention of acquiring territory,
Mgar Khri ‘bring said that if he wanted Chinese territory and Chinese
goods, he would make trouble in the Ganzhou and Liangzhou areas within
China proper itself, and not contend with the Turks so far away. He in
sisted that it was China that wanted to extend its territory.®^ Mgar Khri
‘bring was in fact threatening that Tibet could, if it came to that, make
constant incursions across the Tang frontiers in Ganzhou and Liangzhou if
that was what it took to force Tang to give up control over the Western
Regions.
Upon his return, Guo Yuanzhen presented a memorial to Empress
Wu suggesting that Ganzhou and Liangzhou were more important to
China than the Western Regions and therefore that particular efforts
should be made to guarantee stability there. China should reply to Tibet
that the Four Garrisons were set up to control the Western Regions and
divide the Tibetan forces so they could not join for invasions of China. If
Tibet did not have any territorial ambitions, it should return to China the
Koko Nor lands and the Tuyuhun people. In return, China would give up
the five Nushibi tribes of the Western Turks. In another memorial, he fur
ther suggested that the Tibetan people were exhausted by constant wars. If
Tang pressed peace proposals every year and Mgar Khri ‘bring refused,
the people would reject him.®^
The negotiation did not result in any agreement. Guo Yuanzhen’s
observation of the Tibetan internal situation was correct. From late 698 to
early 699, the Tibetan btsan-po, Khri ‘Dus srong, now a grown man, sup
ported by the minister Lim Yan (Mang nyen bzhi-brtsan®^) and other min
isters, staged a successful purge of the Mgar clan. Mgar Khri ‘bing com
mitted suicide and his younger brother Zanpo fled to China with a thou
sand people. Khri ‘bing’s son Gongren, along with 7,000 households of
the Tuyuhun who were imder his control, also went over to China.
Empress Wu immediately ordered her officials to receive them and
conferred official titles on Zanpo and Gongren. Zanpo was sent to
“ TD 190, pp. 1023-4; ZZTJ205, pp. 6508-9.
TD 190, p. 1023-4; JTO 97, pp. 3043-4; Y7S 122, pp. 4361-2; ZZTJ205, pp. 6508-9.
^ Identified by Beckwith 1987, p. 60, note 34.
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Hongyuangu (in Gansu), in command of his own troops, and charged with
guarding the Chinese frontiers. Lou Shide, as Vice Commander-in-chief
of the Tianbing Army and Commissioner of the various armies of
Longyou, was charged specifically to watch over the affairs of the submit
ted Tibetans.®® In 700, the Tibetans attacked Hongyuangu, where Zanpo
stationed his troops, probably with the purpose of punishing the rebel Ti
betans. However, the Tibetan troops were newly recruited, and their per
formance reflected the weakness of the Tibetan military after the Mgar
brothers were purged. The Tibetans engaged in six battles with the Chi67
nese and lost all of them.
In between frontier confrontations, Khri ‘Dus srong sought peace
with Tang. In 702 a Tibetan mission arrived at the Chinese court to request
a peace settlement.®® In 703 another mission arrived with a thousand
horses and 1,000 hang of gold to negotiate a marriage alliance. Empress
Wu agreed to the latter.®® In a subsequent series of campaigns against
Tang and other neighboring countries, Khri ‘Dus srong died during the
winter of 704-705.^° Empress Wu abdicated in 705. Both sides were ready
for peace.

The First Treaty with Tibet and the Marriage of Princess Jincheng,
706-710
After 705 the Tibetan royal family and nobles were engaged in a
fierce struggle over the succession until 712, when Khri Ide gtsug brtsan
ascended the throne. During this period, while his grandmother was in ac
tual control,^^ China’s frontier problems with Tibet seemed less pressing.
In China, where Emperor Zhongzong had just restored the rule of the Li
royal family, priority was given, among all the frontier issues facing the
new government, to halting the Turkish incursions. A peaceful policy was
adopted towards Tibet and in 707 it was agreed to give the hand of Prin-

“ Wang Zhong 1958, pp. 55-6; Beckwith 1987, pp. 60-1.
“ ZZTJ 206, p. 6540. Lou Shide died either that year or in 699, see ZZTJ 206, p. 6541.
There is no mention of anyone having been appointed to be in charge of Tibetan affairs
after him.
JTS 196A, p. 5226;XTS2\6A, p. 6080; ZZTJ207, p. 6549; Wang Zhong 1958, p. 56.
“ZZTJ207, p. 6560.
ZZTJ 201, ■p. 6562.

™ Wang Zhong 1958, pp. 57-8; Beckwith 1987, pp. 63-5.
Wang Zhong 1958, pp. 58-9; Beckwith 1987, pp. 69-70.
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cess Jincheng to the Tibetan btsan-po. Tibet had requested this in 703.
The princess left for Tibet in 710.
The emperor gave her an emotional send-off and in some farewell
poems by the court ministers are lines lamenting that “Because there is
lack of counsellors [who can provide a better solution to the problem], the
sage ruler still has to worry [and adopt this expedient],” and “Even though
the western barbarians are not on the same level as we are, the enlightened
73
ruler impartially preserves them [by marrying the princess to the chief].”
Princess Jincheng played an active role in diplomacy and politics as we
will see below.
Tang concluded a peace treaty with Tibet in 706. Details of the
treaty text and the formal ceremony are not available, but from extant
sources we can see that the essential items of the treaty were 1) the
boundaries of the two coimtries were to be settled in accordance with con
venience; 2) the Chinese had ten participants, including the Chief Minister
Doulu Qinwang, and the Tibetan Chief Minister also took part in the oath
taking.^"* A letter from the Tibetan ruler in 781 quotes a Tang edict of 708
which stipulates that when the Tang envoy arrived in Tibet, the Tibetan
btsan-po was to first swear an oath witnessed by the envoy, and when the
Tibetan envoy arrived in Tang, the Chinese emperor would personally
conclude the covenant.^®
The relationship between the edict and the treaty of 706 is not
clear. But since this edict was issued only two years after the treaty, it is
possible that it was repeating a provision in the treaty of 706. In any case
this reference demonstrates a remarkable degree of reciprocity and equal
ity in the oath-taking ceremony by requiring that each ruler should con
clude the ceremony in person in his own territory. To be sure, there is no
evidence that such a practice ever did actually take place during the Tang
dynasty.
The practice of concluding treaties was not new to the Chinese.
There was a traditional Chinese view, however, that the conclusion of a
sworn covenant reflected a siftaation of instability and deterioration of the
state. Sworn covenants were concluded most often when trust was in

^ JTS 196A, p. 5226; XTS 216A, p. 6080; ZZTJ2Q1, p. 6562; 208, p. 6610; CFYG 979,
p. 11498.
^ Kuang Pingzhang 1935, pp. 34-5.
’'* Pan Yihong 1992a, pp. 127-8.
’’ JTS 196B, p. 5246; ATS 216B, p. 6093; CFYG 981, p. 11528.
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doubt. It was also the custom of Tibet to use sworn covenants to ensure
stability. The Chinese records say that the Tibetan btsan-po made a minor
covenant with his ministers every year and a major one every three
years.^^ In the traditional Tibetan sources, especially the Old Tibetan An
nals and the Old Tibetan Chronicle, there are records of sworn treaties
among the Tibetans themselves. There is, however, no record of any
Tang-Tibetan treaties in these two histories. It is not clear why. It seems to
be a particular Tibetan custom to erect stone tablets with inscriptions of
treaty texts. Among the thirteen Tibetan inscriptions of the Tufan period,
one was the sworn treaty between Tang and Tibet, four were sworn treaties
between the Tibetan btsan-po and his subjects, and three were sworn
texts by the btsan-po and Tibetan nobles to declare their support for Bud80
dhist temples.
It was hoped that the marriage alliance and the peace treaty with
Tibet would help bring about peace on the frontiers, and would also en
courage the Tibetans to cooperate in dealing with the Ttirgish, a Western
Turkish tribe. But the peace policy was not adhered to in a consistent way
by the Chinese. In 710, only four years after the conclusion of the pact,
China breached it.
In the southwest, Li Zhigu, Acting Investigating Censor {she jiancha yushi), suggested an attack on the “barbarians” in Yaozhou (in
modem Yuiman), who had formerly been subjects of Tibet. The court
agreed. After bringing them into submission, Li Zhigu further asked to
build walled towns establish prefectures and districts there and to impose
heavy taxes on the local people. Li’s harsh attitude forced the local chief
tains to obtain assistance from Tibet and they killed Li. The route from
Yaozhou to Suizhou was cut off.
In the northwest, Zhang Xuanbiao, Protector-General of Anxi,
plundered the northern borders of Tibet. Though furious, the Tibetans did
not immediately retaliate. They bribed the Area Commander of Shanzhou,
Yang Ju, who had escorted Princess Jincheng to Tibet and, through him.
Pan Yihong 1992a, pp. 125-6.
'^JTS 196A, p. 5220; Y7S216A, p. 6073; THY91, p. 1730.
™ For example, in the Old Tibetan Annals, from 650 to 763, there are 66 years when the

Tibetans made covenants among themselves, see Wang Yao 1979, pp. 1-29. According
to the Dunhuang documents, when the Tibetans occupied Sha2hou they also concluded
sworn treaties with the local Chinese, see Ma De 1987, p. 59.
” Wang Yao 1982, pp. 1-128.
Wang Yao 1982, pp. 151-81.
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asked for the land in the Jiuqu area of Hexi (near modem Xining, Qinghai
province) as a bathing place for Princess Jincheng. It was a place suitable
for pasture. Upon learning of Yang’s proposal the court agreed. The Tibet
ans soon built fortresses south of the Yellow River and a bridge over the
81
River, thus securing a convenient base for raiding Tang.
Conflicts and Negotiations, 712-719
After Xuanzong’s assumption of power, Tibetan missions arrived
82
at the Tang court in 712 and 713, the second time with a peace proposal.
Again in 714 the Tibetan Chief Minister Bendayan (‘Bon-da-rgyal, =
nephew king? ) asked to fix the borders on each side and to conclude a
sworn covenant based on the earlier one. In response to his request, Xie
Wan, an official experienced in frontiers affairs, went to Heyuan to nego
tiate, bearing with him the treaty with Tibet of 706.
Before Xie Wan left, he had suggested that the court deploy troops
in preparation for Tibetan incursions. This proved to be necessary. Even
though a Tibetan minister arrived at the Tang court with a treaty text, be
fore any peace agreement was confirmed, ‘Bon-da-rgyal had launched at
tacks on the Chinese Lintao Army, and on Lanzhou and Weizhou, where
he plimdered Chinese livestock. Hearing this, Yang Ju took his own life,
because he felt responsible or perhaps because he expected to be made a
scapegoat by the court for allowing the Tibetans to have the land of Jiuqu,
which provided with easy access to Tang lands. Xuanzong immediately
ordered a counter-attack.®® In the tenth month of 714 Xuanzong declared
his intention of assuming personal command of a major campaign against
the Tibetans, with over 100,000 troops including 20,000 non-Chinese. The
plan was not carried out, for soon the already present Chinese troops
86
claimed major victories in battles with Tibet.
After the war was over, Tang sent an envoy to Tibet to console
JTS 196A, p. 5228;Xra216A, p. 6081; ZZTJ210, p. 6661. Sato (1958, pp. 427-32) is
of the opinion, based on the dates given in the Basic Annals of Zhongzong in the JTS and
XTS, that the acts of Li Zhigu and Zhang Xuanbiao occurred in 707. I follow the dates
given in the ZZTJ.
“ CFYG 971, p. 11405; 980, p. 11510.
Thomas II, 1955, p. 163. He was the king of Tuyuhun and married Khri ma lod’s
daughter. He was in actual control of state power in Tibet. Wang Zhong 1958, pp. 62-3.
77S 100, p. 3113; ATS 130, p. 4501; 2777211, pp. 6699-700; CFYG 981, p. 11526.
“ZZ7/211,p. 6704.
** JTS 196A, p. 5228;XTS2\6K, p. 6081-2; ZZTJ2W, pp. 6704-6; CFYG 118, p. 1407.
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Princess Jincheng.®^ When a Tibetan minister was sent to the Tao River to
mourn the Tibetan soldiers and then to the Tang borders to ask for peace,
Xuanzong refused. The Zizhi Tongfian gives as the reason for the refusal
that the Tibetans “used the protocol of an equal coimtry” when asking for
peace, and the Xin Tangshu says that the Tibetans “relying on their power,
asked to be on equal terms with the Son of Heaven and used arrogant IanOQ
guage.” This was an open challenge to Chinese superiority. To the Chi
nese, the Tibetans could only be an outer subject. Such an attitude was re
flected in the edict of 714 and in all the official letters from Tang to Tibet
before 780.^^
In 715, Tibet allied itself with the Arabs for the first time and es
tablished a new king in Ferghana, a tributary state to the Tang court. They
launched an attack against the former king, who then fled to Kucha, the
headquarter of the Protectorate of Anxi, asking for rescue. A Tang Investi
gating Censor who was on a mission there, joined with the ProtectorGeneral of Anxi in a military action, fighting successfully all the way from
Kucha to Ferghana.®^
From 716 to 719, Tibet made several requests for a peace agree
ment which Xuanzong did not reject, but no specific treaty was concluded
until 732. There were two reasons for the delay. First, border conflicts
between the two countries remained active, such as the one in Songzhou in
716 and the clashes in Qinghai and the Western Regions in 717.®^ The
second obstacle was Xuanzong’s refusal to place his personal signature on
a treaty text. To the Chinese, signatures on a treaty agreement may not
have seemed so important as they did to the Tibetans. Also, it was consid
ered demeaning for the Chinese emperor to personally sign an agreement.
It was a Tibetan custom to have signatures of the sovereigns on a treaty.
"XfS'216A, p. 6082; 2777211, p. 6706.
** XTS 216A, p. 6082; ZZTJ 211, p. 6706. Wang Zhong holds that this reason does not
seem right since, having been recently defeated, the Tibetans would not have been likely
to use arrogant language when asking for peace. The JTS 196A (pp. 5228-9) has a differ
ent version of this story, stating that the Tibetans’ request for equal terms was raised sev
eral years after the peace proposal. Wang Zhong surmises that the reason for Tang’s re
fusal may lie in the fact that the Tibetans continued to make incursions even after they
had proposed a treaty agreement. Wang Zhong 1958, p. 64.
*’Kaneko 1974; 1988.
ZZTJ211, p. 6713; Beckwith 1987, pp. 81-3. An inscribed stone tablet was erected to
commemorate this campaign, see Cen Zhongmian 1964, pp. 166-7.
ZZTJ 211, p. 6716; p. 6728. Regarding the battle in Qinghai, JTS (103, p. 3190) says
that Guo Zhiyun was in command during the 718 battle.
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Princess Jincheng presented a memorial in 717 urging a signed treaty:
The Chief Ministers here have told me that the btsan-po very much
wants a peace treaty, and that it is also proper that the emperor should
personally sign the sworn treaty text. In the past you did not agree to do
so personally. When I came to wed, it was for friendship. But now, there
are disturbances. The situation is becoming uneasy. Please show pity on
me, far away in another country. Your personal signature will not estab
lish a regular practice. It will achieve the long-term friendship of the two
*-• 92
countries.

In 718 the Tibetan btsan-po sent a letter to Xuanzong, pressing further his
demand for a new sworn treaty bearing the signatures of the emperor and
Chief Ministers. The letter stated that it was because the Tang officials
Zhang Xuanbiao and Li Zhigu attacked the Tibetan people that Tibet had
despatched troops. It accused Tang of violating the treaty by building a
fort in Baishui, which was stipulated in the treaty to become a no-man’sland between Tang and Tibet, and said that Tibet had therefore also built a
fort in Baishui. The letter also requested that neither Tang nor Tibet should
communicate with the Turks.^^ Obviously, Tang did not agree to write
another treaty, for in 719 Tibet made yet another request for one, which
Xuanzong refused on the grounds that if there was no good faith, there was
no use in having a sworn covenant.

94

Conflicts from 722 to 729
Competition continued in the Western Regions, especially over
Little Balur (present Gilgit in northern Kashmir), which was a crucial pas
sageway from Tibet to the Tarim Basin. Tang had a father-son relationship
with its king and established the Suiyuan Army there around 712. This
effectively checked the advance of the Tibetans.®^ Tang also gave the title
of king to the ruler of Great Balur (Baltistan) in 717,®® southeast of Little
Balur. Little Balur had split off from Great Balur some time earlier. The
Tibetans several times remarked to Little Balur’s king that “It is not that

CFYG 979, p. 11500; QTW100, pp. 1289-90.
” XTS 216A, pp. 6082-3; ZZTJ 2\2, p. 6734; CFYG 981, pp. 11526-7; QTW 999, pp.
13078-9.
^ZZTJ2\2, p. 6736; CFTG 980, p. 11511.
Sato 1958, pp. 442-3.
^ Beckwith 1987, p. 87.
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we want your coimtry. We just want to pass through to attack the Four
Garrisons.”
In 722, the Tibetans laid siege to Little Balur. The king asked for
assistance, saying that if Little Balur fell into Tibetan hands, the whole of
the Western Regions would belong to Tibet. Accordingly, the ProtectorGeneral of Belting sent an army made up of Chinese and non-Chinese to
drive the Tibetans back.®^ The micertainties of politics at the Tibetan court
placed Princess Jincheng under considerable pressure. In 724 Tegin, the
king of Zabulistan, sent an envoy to Tang bearing a report that in 723
Princess Jincheng had sent a secret letter to the king of Kashmir, asking
for asylum. The king of Kashmir had gladly assented to that request, but
was afraid of Tibetan attacks, and therefore had asked for military assis
tance from Tegin. Tegin consented and sent the envoy to Tang for advice.
Xuanzong expressed appreciation and awarded him silk. The princess
did not, however, go to Kashmir.
In 724, clashes with Tibet again broke out along the northwestern
border. Wang Jvmchuo, the Military Commissioner of Longyou, reported
success in battles with Tibet and presented captives to the court. Sup
ported by Wang Junchuo, who was an advocate of a strong-arm policy to
wards the non-Chinese, Xuanzong became more interested in a bellicose
policy even though other officials such as Chief Minister Zhang Yue urged
a peace policy. In the winter of 726-727, follo\ving a Tibetan raid on
Ganzhou, Wang Jxmchuo fought successfully west of Koko Nor.^°° Unfortimately, Wang was killed in 727 by the Uighurs.^°^ About the same time,
the Tiirgish, allied with the Tibetans, attacked the headquarters of the
The period between 727 and 729 saw a
Protectorate of Anxi in Kucha.
series of encounters between Tang and Tibet. Tang recaptured the Fortress
103
of Shibao from Tibet near Koko Nor and set up an army there.

The Second Treaty with Tibet in 732
In 730, Tibet made a peace proposal. Xuanzong was going to ref
use the request, the reason still being the Tibetans’ previous use of arro”^216A, p. 6083; 221B, p. 6251; ZZrJ212, p. 6752; see also Sato 1958, pp. 444-6.
ZZTJ212, p. 6762; CFYG 979, p. 11501.
”CF7G 42, p. 480.
'“ZZ77213,pp. 6776-7.
JTS 103, p. 3192; ATS 133, p. 4547.
JTS 194B, p. 5191; ATS 215B, p. 6067; ZZTJ2U, pp. 6775-6; p. 6779.
Sato 1958, pp. 459-61.
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gant language. Huangfli Weiming, then Companion of Prince Zhong, tried
to persuade the emperor to agree to the peace request, blaming the Tibetan
frontier generals, who had sought to gain merit through military success,
for the arrogant attitude. He pointed out the great losses Tang had suffered
from the constant wars and suggested that Tang send envoys to comfort
Princess Jincheng and discuss peace vvith Tibet. This may have been an
attempt to use Princess Jincheng to intercede. Xuanzong then despatched
Huangfu to Tibet.
Huangfu was later promoted to the position of the
Military Commissioner of Longyou and led battles against the Tibetans.
According to the Chinese sources, the Tibetan btsan-po was very
pleased to see the Chinese envoys and showed them all the letters sent by
Tang since Taizong’s time. He sent a high-ranking official, Lim Mingxilie
(Blon Mye-slebs ), who had a good command of the Chinese language,
to go to Tang with Huangfu. In the tenth month of 730 Mye-slebs arrived
at the Tang court with a letter from the btsan-po to Xuanzong, which was
carefully worded in accordance with the proper rhetoric that the Chinese
had established, while stating clearly that it was the Chinese who had vio
lated the peace agreement and started hostilities on the border. The btsanpo said he had sent envoys to Tang several times, but that they had been
obstructed by the border generals, and that the btsan-po had already or
dered the border generals to make no incursions and to return any Chinese
who had earlier defected to Tibet.^°^
In reply, Xuanzong gave Mye-slebs favorable treatment and of
fered him Chinese official dress. Xuanzong despatched Cui Lin, Chamberlain of the Court of State Ceremonial and Censor-in-chief, to Tibet to con
firm the peace agreement. Cui Lin left in early 731, bringing with him let
ters from Xuanzong to the btsan-po and to Princess Jincheng, imperial
gifts and Confucian classics and literary works. These works had earlier

1(W

It IS not clear when Tibet made the peace request and when Huangfu Weiming went to
Tibet. JTS 196A (p. 5230) and THY 97 (p. 1733) record the year as 729, while 2777213
(p. 6789; pp. 6790-1) records it as 730. JCTS 216A (p. 6084) gives no specific time. Ac
cording to a Tibetan source, in both 729 and 730 there were Tang envoys to Tibet, see
Wang Zhong 1958, pp. 72-3.
’“A7S5,p. 143.
Francke 1914, p. 39.
JTS I96A, pp. 5230-1; XTS 216A, pp. 6084-5; ZZ77 213, p. 6791; CFYG 979, pp.
11502-3.
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been requested by Princess Jincheng. 108
In 731, another Tibetan mission arrived at the court. Tang agreed
to the Tibetan request to set up a border market at Chiling in modem
Qinghai.^°® A peace treaty was concluded in 732.^^° Both Tang and Tibet
erected steles to mark the borders as discussed below. The Chinese text of
the treaty is preserved. ^ ^ ^
The Chinese treaty text refers to China as imcle and Tibet as
nephew. It also says: “We shall establish a calendar,” and “The law up
holds the principle of having a single calendar, and does not recognize the
ritual of two beginnings of the year.” This implies that the Chinese at
tempted to impose the superiority of the Son of Heaven on Tibet by the
introduction of their calendar to Tibet. This made the treaty more like a
declaration of incorporation from the Chinese point of view rather than a
mutual agreement between equals, because in the Chinese hierarchical
political system only the Son of Heaven had the right to issue the calendar.
This symbolized the relations between Heaven and the Son of Heaven,
who was to mle the world on behalf of Heaven, and between the Son of
Heaven and the various lords, who were his chief subjects. The Zhouli
says that at the end of each year, the Son of Heaven “distributes the calendar to the feudal states.”
On several occasions during the Sui-Tang pe113
riod the Chinese calendar was received by foreign countries.
Through a Chinese envoy. Princess Jincheng in 733 requested that
the two sides should establish a stone stele in Chiling to mark the demar-

JTS 196A, p. 5231; XTS 104, p. 4007; 216A, p. 6085; ZZ77 213, p. 6794. When the
request was first received, Yu Xiulie, with the rank of proofreader, objected, saying that
Tang could give the “barbarians” large quantities of material goods but should not give
them the classics for fear that the Tibetans would learn from them tactics and military
stratagems. But Chief Minister Pei Guangting and other ministers argued that these
works would also teach loyalty, faith, proper conduct and righteousness and would
gradually “civilize” the Tibetans. Xuanzong agreed with Pei.
'"^XTS2\6K, p. 6085; ZZTJin, p. 6796.
There is confusion about whether the date was 732 or 733. In his study of the treaty.
Tan Liren (1988, p. 132) convincingly argues that the year should be 732.
For the treaty text, see CFYG 979, p. 11503; QTW 990, pp. 12962-3. For a translation,
see Pan Yihong 1992a, pp. 153-4.
Zhouli Zhushu 26, “Taishi,” p. 953.
For example, the Sui calendar was issued to the Eastern Turks in the first month of
586 (SUIS 1, p. 23); Nanzhao in 794, after concluding a covenant with Tang, received
the Tang calendar for the tenth year of Zhenyuan (794) {Manshu Jiaozhu 10, pp. 251-2).
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cation line between their territories.^In the same year, a Tibetan mission
arrived at the Tang court with a letter from the btsan-po to Xuanzong. The
letter refers to China and Tibet as both being great countries and to the
peace agreement. It expresses the wish that in order to maintain peace as a
long term policy, the border generals should be informed of the agreement
to prevent them from provoking trouble.^
On the day when the stone stele was erected in 733, both sides had
officials present, with Zhang Shougui, a Military Commissioner, and Li
Xingyi, a general, on the Chinese side, and Mangbuzhi (Mang po-ije, =
“great lord”^^®) on Tibetan side. Afterwards, the three went to Jiannan and
Hexi to inform the various border prefectures that “the two countries are at
peace. You must not attack each other.” And they went on to the territory
of Tibet to proclaim the peace.
Tibet also set up its own stone stele.
In 822, when a Tang envoy passed Chiling on his embassy to (or from)
Tibet, he saw that the stele set up by Tibet in 733 was still there, while the
one set up by the Chinese had already been destroyed.^
Confrontations from 737 to 753
Peace was preserved between the two states imtil 737,^^° when
conflict broke out again. Early in 737 Cui Xiyi, Military Commissioner of
TTS 112, p. 3336; AYS’78, p. 3531; 2777213, p. 6800; CFYG 979, p. 11503.
"^7fra216A, p. 6085; CF2G 979, pp. 11503-4.
Identified by Beckwith 1987, p. 114.
JTS 112, p. 3336; THY6, p. 76; 97, p. 1733; CFYG 979, p. 11503. The two Tang his
tories differ from these sources in their accounts of these events: in 734 Xuanzong sent Li
Quan, General of the Left Imperial Insignia Guard to erect the stele in Chiling. See JTS 8,
p. 201; 196A, p. 5233. XTS 216A (p. 6085) says that following the erection of the stele,
Zhang Shougui, Li Xingyi and Mangbuzhi went to make known the agreement. Tan
Liren conjectures that, whether the stele was erected in 733 or in 734, Zhang Shougui
could not have been present, since in 733, he left his post in Longyou, went to Hebei and
was involved in battles with the Khitan there. He concludes that Xuanzong ordered that
Zhang Shougui and Li Xingyi go to erect the stele in 733 but what in fact happened
thereafter is not clear, see Tan Liren 1988, pp. 132-3.
"*77S196,p. 5231; CFTG 981, p. 11527.
"’A7S'216B, p.6103.
120 qpyg 358 (p. 4245) and 396 (p. 4699) state that in 733 the Tibetans made an incur
sion but were defeated by Wang Zhongsi, who was then promoted to be General of the
Left Imperial Insignia Guard. But ZZTJrecords Wang’s promotion as being made in 738
after battles with Tibet under the command of Du Xiwang, which is more likely to be
true. ZZ7/214, p. 6835. See also JTS 103, p. 3198; XTS 133, p. 4552; CFYG 384, p.
4571.
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Hexi, went into Tibetan territory, mounted an offensive against the Tibet
ans west of Qinghai and killed over 2,000.
Before the attack two events were the prelude to this clash. In 737
the Tibetans attacked Little Balur again, and its king immediately called
for Tang intervention. Tang asked Tibet to stop the incursion but without
success.
This made Tang feel entitled to act on the grounds that Little
Balur was a Tang subject, an attack on which was a violation of the peace
treaty.

122

The other incident occurred not long after the peace agreement of
732, when Cui Xiyi suggested to the Tibetan border general Qilixu (Khrigzigs) that since the two countries were at peace the tree-palisade and de
fense patrols should be moved away in order to not hinder people from
ploughing. Despite Khri-gzigs’ objection, Cui insisted. Consequently the
two concluded a local covenant sealed vrith the sacrifice of a white dog,
and removed the palisade and border guards. Soon Tibetan livestock cov
ered the border fields.
After the Tibetan attack on Little Balur, Sun Hui, a retainer of Cui
Xiyi, who was on a mission to the court, proposed to make a sudden attack
on Tibet, taking advantage of its vmpreparedness. Xuanzong despatched
Zhao Huicong, a eunuch, to the frontiers to observe the situation. Upon his
arrival in Liangzhou, Zhao Huicong forged a decree ordering an attack on
the Tibetans. Cui Xiyi then had to carry out the offensive into the Tibetan
land early in 737.
The fact that Zhao Huicong and Sun Hui were generously re
warded by Xuanzong after the Tang victory showed Xuanzong’s approval
of the attack. The attack put an end to the peace between the two coimtries
which had been shaky from the start. It is recorded, however, that Cui Xiyi
became morose because he had broken the covenant and he was removed
to another post. He and Zhao Huicong both saw a bad luck omen—a white
dog—^which was the sacrificial animal with which Cui had made his cove
nant with the Tibetans. They both died soon after. Sxm Hui is said to have
been executed for some other imspecified crime.
The Chinese histonan
appears to be drawing a moral by implying that the three deserved to die.
The breaking of the treaty does not, however, seem to have been an
accidental event that occurred on some officials’ own initiative. Rather it

JTS 196A, p. 5233; AT:S216A, p. 6085; ZZ77214, pp. 6826-7.
Qujiang Zhang Xiansheng Wenji 11, pp. 68-9.
JTS 196A, p. 5233; ATS216A, pp. 6085-6; ZZTJ2U, pp. 6826-7.
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may have been intended by the court. After the Tibetans had taken control
of Little Balur, Tang felt it necessary to attack the Tibetans on their eastern
borders in order to prevent a possible Tibetan alliance with the Turgish.^^"*
The prevalent idea was that Confucian norms could be applied only to in
siders, that is, to the Chinese, and not to outsiders, the non-Chinese. In
Xuanzong’s time Liu Kuang said that courtesy and deference were used
only in communications between gentlemen and should not be used when
125
dealing with “barbarians.”
A Chinese general offensive against Tibet was launched in 738 by
the Military Commissioners of Hexi, Longyou and Jiannan. The stele
bearing the Chinese sworn treaty of 732 was destroyed.
From then rnitil
the end of Xuanzong’s reign, the Tibetan frontier remained a principal fo
cus of Tang concern. The continual wars brought gains and losses to both
sides. In 740, Tang recaptured the Among Fortress (in Sichuan). It was
besieged by the Tibetans later in the year and attacked again the following
year, but the Tibetans were driven off
In 741, when after the death of
Princess Jincheng in 739 (or 740), the Tibetans sent in a request for a
128
peace settlement, Xuanzong refused.
The military expedition of 747 led by Gao Xianzhi, Vice ProtectorGeneral of Anxi, into the region west of the Pamirs not only resulted in
Tang taking over control of Little Balur, which had formed a marriage al
liance with Tibet in 740, thus enabling Tibet to subdue the nearby states,
♦ 129
but also reenforced Tang influence in the regions west of the Pamirs.
Despite the opposition of Wang Zhongsi, the Military Commissioner of
Hexi and Longyou, Xuanzong insisted on recapturing Shibao, which had
again been lost to Tibet in 741. After Wang was purged by Li Linfu in the
power struggle at the Tang court, Xuanzong appointed Geshu Han Mili
tary Commissioner of Longyou. In 749 Geshu captured the strategic fortress, but his armies lost half their soldiers.
The area of Jiuqu, handed
131
over to Tibet in 711 as we have seen, was recovered in 753.

Beckwith 1987, pp. 114-5.
'“A7S'215A, p. 6025.
TTS 196A, pp. 5233-4; ATO216A, p. 6086; ZZ77214, p. 6833.
ZZTJ 214, p. 6840; p. 6842; p. 6844.
J7S 196A, p. 5235-,XTS2\6A, p. 6086; ZZTJ214, p. 6843; Sato 1958, p. 478.
Chavannes 1969, pp. 215-6; Beckwith 1987, p. 123.
'^°JTS 103, pp. 3199-200; ZZTJ215, pp. 6878-9; p. 6896.
For a summary of the events in this period, see Twitchett 1979, pp. 432-3.
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From Supporting Nanzhao’s Unification
to Aggression against Nanzhao
To deal with the Tibetan power, Tang encouraged the unification
of the Nanzhao kingdom in Yuiman. From early Tang the Chinese had es
tablished jimi administration there, but from the 650’s onward the border
areas in Yunnan as well as Sichuan had been sites of contention between
Tang and Tibet for the allegiance of that region’s various non-Chinese
peoples.
The establishment of the Military Commissioner of Jiannan in
719 had the clear purpose of resisting the Tibetans in the west and pacifying the “barbarians” in the south.
Under Xuanzong, the allegiance of the
various non-Chinese peoples in Yunnan was an issue often discussed in
the correspondence between Tang and Tibet.
In 738, Xuanzong conferred the title of King of Yunnan on Piluoge
of Nanzhao to encourage the existence of a buffer state between Tang and
Tibet. The formation of the Nanzhao kingdom was a complex process in
which both Tang and Tibet exerted influence, but it seems clear that at this
time it was the positive support of China that ensured the consolidation of
Nanzhao.
In 738 the Military Commissioner of Jiannan led an attack on
the Anrong Fortress, but failed to take it. Xuanzong, however, persisted,
being encouraged by an officer in Jiannan who was made Military Com136
missioner and finally recaptured Anrong in 740.
Later, this well-thought-out policy was abandoned, due mainly to
the power struggle at the court. An occasion for Chinese intervention was
provided when, provoked by excessive demands and abusive treatment by
the Governor (taishou) of Yuiman Commandery, the king of Nanzhao at
tacked and killed the governor and seized the commandery. In 751, despite
the king’s apologies and offers of amends, the Military Commissioner of
Jiannan, Xianyu Zhongtong, made this a pretext for a major offensive
against Nanzhao, pushing the latter into an alliance with the Tibetans.
Xianyu’s aggression may not have been the result of his own deci
sion. His patron, Yang Guozhong, then the dictator at the Tang court, was
eager for military success to increase the prestige of the army in Sichuan,
where his power base was, and thereby strengthen his position in the
Wang Jilin 1976, pp. 125-37; Backus 1981, pp. 22-3.
2277212, p. 6738; 215, p. 6850.
Wang Jilin 1976, pp. 166-9.
In his extensive study of the Nanzhao kingdom Backus (1981, chapter 3) discusses the
rise of Nanzhao and the roles of Tang-Tibetan rivalry in the process.
Wang Jilin 1976, pp. 169-72.
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power struggle vis-a-vis An Lushan. Xianyu suffered a severe defeat, but
Yang Guozhong tried to cover it up and in the follovsdng year, having
made himself the Military Commissioner of Jiaiman, launched a further
campaign against Nanzhao which ended in disaster. Wars continued dur
ing the next two years, in the course of which the Chinese continued to
suffer great losses.
Nanzhao became a vassal of the Tibetans, and to
gether they menaced China’s southwestern borders for the next forty
years.

While Chinese conflicts with the Turkish peoples who dominated
Mongolia during Tang were a continuation of an age-old problem, and the
wars with Koguryo were also conditioned by traditional attitudes inherited
from earlier times, the emergence of a strong military power based in the
Tibetan highlands was unprecedented and also unrepeated in later centu
ries. It therefore presented new problems for Chinese foreign policy. The
relatively self-sufficient economic structure of the Tibetan kingdom
strengthened the country’s independence and reduced the effectiveness of
the traditional Chinese policy of using silk and other products to purchase
peace from the nomads. Another important factor was the location of Tibet
to the west of China and the geographic situation which placed it in con
tact with other literate civilizations, especially that of India, which, in
contrast particularly with Korea, gave it an alternative source for cultural
influences. This was no doubt one reason why the traditional Chinese use
of political investiture to exert control over non-Chinese polities was inef
fective in the case of Tibet.
While Tang gave political titles many times to the rulers of other
non-Chinese peoples, nomadic or sedentary, throughout the history of
Tang-Tibet relations the conferment of political titles only took place
twice and only at the very beginning of the relationship: once in 641 to the
Tibetan Chief Minister Ludongzan and once in 649 to the Tibetan btsanpo. Moreover, in contrast with the nomadic peoples, the Tibetans demon
strated their interest in occupation of territory, and were thus bound to
clash with the Tang empire.
The frequent military encounters between Tang and Tibet began
with competition over the land of the Tuyuhun, and then, after Tibetan oc
cupation of the Tuyuhun lands in 670, Tang had to cope with Tibetan in137

Backus 1981, pp. 69-77.
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cursions across China’s own northwestern frontiers. Tibet and Tang also
competed for control over the Western Regions, each side trying to win
over the Western Turks and the oasis states. One decisive success was
China’s recovery of the Four Garrisons in the Western Regions in 692,
thus ensuring Chinese influence in that area until the mid-eighth century.
To deal with the Tibetans’ ambitions on its southwestern frontiers, Tang
attempted to win the allegiance of the various non-Chinese peoples in
Yunnan. In 738 Xuanzong recognized the king of Nanzhao to encourage
the existence of a buffer state between Tang and Tibet, but Tang’s aggres
sion towards Nanzhao eventually pushed its king into the arms of Tibet.
Between military encoimters, the two sides made efforts to estab
lish peaceful relations. One Chinese policy that had some success was the
sending of Chinese princesses to marry the Tibetan kings in 641 and 710.
Each marriage played an important role in maintaining some degree of
peace. Sworn treaties were concluded in 706 and 732, but they meant dif
ferent things to the two sides and were not very effective. While the Tibet
ans demanded an equal footing and reciprocity with Tang, the Chinese in
sisted on acceptance of their claims of superiority. Xuanzong refused to
sign his name on any treaty, and from China’s own point of view the Chi
nese sworn treaty text of 732 was rather a declaration of incorporation.
Moreover, each treaty was violated first by the Chinese. The prevailing
idea was that Confucian norms could be applied only to insiders and not to
outsiders, the non-Chinese. The changed situation during the second half
of the dynasty, when China was riven by civil war and on the defensive, is
discussed in Chapter 10.

Chapter 8
China, the Second Turkish Empire and the Western Turks,
679-755
Even as the Tang royal power was passing into the hands of Em
press Wu and her family, as always, internal political dissension in China
provided the opportunity for nomadic power to reemerge in Mongolia. In
this chapter we will examine Chinese relations with the revived Eastern
Turkish power, known as the second Tmkish empire (682-745), as well as
with the Khitan and Xi on their eastern flank, and with the Turgish, who
became the leading force among the Western Turks. A new factor in the
far west were the Arabs, who first made their appearance in Central Asia
during this period. Other complicating factors that weakened China’s abil
ity to respond were the exhausting campaigns in Korea (Chapter 6) and the
emergence of Tibet as a major power (Chapter 7).

The Restoration of the Second Turkish Empire
In 679, the Eastern Turks, then under Chinese sovereignty, began a
movement to restore their independent power. Chieftains subject to the
Grand Protectorate of Chanyu revolted and set up a descendant of the
royal Ashina clan as qaghan. Almost all the Eastern Turks who had for
merly submitted joined in and the jimi fuzhou administrative structure
quickly broke down. The court under Empress Wu acted immediately by
despatching troops to put down the rebellion. However, after initial suc
cesses the Chinese general became overconfident and suffered a serious
defeat.
The following year, another Chinese general, Pei Xingjian, in
flicted a major defeat on the Turks, who put to death their newly created
qaghan and offered his head as a sign of their submission. They were not
yet ready to return to their subject status, however, and in 681 they set up
another scion of the royal clan, Ashina Funian as qaghan. Pei Xingjian
succeeded in persuading Funian to surrender with the promise that he
would not be punished. In the court, however. Chief Minister Pei Yan,
who was jealous of Pei Xingjian’s military merit, insisted that Funian be
executed. The fact that Funian and other Turkish chiefs lost their lives as a
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result of Chinese court politics,^ led to even stronger anti-Chinese senti
ment, and the following year saw yet more forceful military attacks on the
Tang frontiers led by the new Turkish qaghan Guduolu (Qutlugh). It is
generally considered that the second Turkish empire began in 682, when
Qutlugh became the qaghan.
As in the Former Han dynasty, when the resettlement of the South
ern Xiongnu eventually helped restore the nomadic power, the Turks who
had been brought under the Tangyz/ni administration were able to recover
their strength. Chinese control over such people was inherently vulnerable
because it was sustained by only a small number of troops and depended
mainly on the willingness or cooperation of the non-Chinese themselves.
Under the jimi system, the Turks had kept their customs, their military or
ganization and their own cultural identity. The period from 630 to the re
vival of the Turkish empire in 682 was considered by the Turks as a time
of national subjugation and humiliation. The Turkish inscriptions present
the perspective of the Turks on their relations with China all too clearly:
Since the lords and peoples were not in accord, and the Chinese people
were wily and deceitful, since they were tricky and created a rift be
tween younger and elder brothers, and caused the lords and peoples to
slander one another, the Turkish people caused the state which they had
established to go to ruin, and their kagan (= qaghan), whom they had
crowned, collapse. Their sons, worthy of becoming lords, became
slaves, and their daughters, worthy of becoming ladies, became servants
to the Chinese people. The Turkish lords abandoned their Turkish titles.
Those lords who were in China held the Chinese titles and obeyed the
Chinese emperor and gave their services to him for fifty years. For the
benefit of the Chinese, they went on campaigns up to (the land of) the
Biikli kagan in the east, where the sun rises, and as far as the Iron Gate
in the west. For the benefit of the Chinese emperor they conquered
countries.^

The inscriptions also describe the ways in which the Chinese lured the
Turks into acceptance of at least loose control by the Chinese: the Chinese
gave the Turks gold, silver and silk in abundance so as to cause them to
come close to China’s borders. Once the Turks settled close in, the Chi
nese treated them harshly. Some Turks were deceived by being told that if
' JTS 84, p. 2804; ATS 108, p. 4088; ZZTJldl, pp. 6404-5.
^ “The Kill Tigin Inscription.” See Tekin 1968, translation, p. 264. His translation,
slightly modified, is used here.
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a people lived far away, the Chinese gave them cheap goods, but if a peo
ple lived close to them, then the Chinese gave them valuable goods, and so
they moved close to the Chinese. Subsequently they were killed in great
numbers.^
The ineffectiveness of settlement policy was pointed out by some
Tang Chinese. In his memorial in about 696, Xue Qianguang, a remon
strance official, pointed out that it was for the sake of an empty name with
no substance behind it that Chinese rulers had adopted the practice of let
ting non-Chinese settle close to China. He also opposed the practice of ac
cepting the non-Chinese into the Tang court as hostages on the grounds
that the non-Chinese thereby gained strategic geographical information
and intelligence about how the Chinese frontiers were guarded. Even when
non-Chinese were nominally given Chinese official titles of general, there
were few among them who did not make incursions into Chinese territory.
He suggested that China should refuse permission for any additional nonChinese to come to the court and not allow those already in China to re
turn home. His opinion, however, was not given much notice.'^
Liu Kuang, an official historian in Xuanzong’s time and the eldest
son of the famous historian Liu Zhiji, was sharply critical of the resettle
ment of non-Chinese inside China. He summed up succinctly the sad di
lemma the policy caused: when the “barbarians” were strong, China ex
hausted its manpower in attacking them. When they became submissive
China suffered the expense of nourishing them. The Chinese had been put
to work in this fashion by the “barbarians” for thousands of years.® Liu
Kuang accurately captured the essence of both the “outer frontier” and
“inner frontier” strategies of the nomads. Though the Chinese aimed to use
the submitted nomads as a military force to keep peace on the borders and
reinforce the legitimacy of the Son of Heaven, in actual fact the Chinese
government was not strong enough to effectively control them. Once an
opportunity presented itself, the nomads would again rebel. This was the
state of affairs that led to the breakdown during Empress Wu’s reign of the
jimi system controlling the Turks.

^ “The Kul Tigin Inscription.” See Tekin 1968, translation, pp. 261-2.
“ TD 200, pp. 1085-6; CFYG 544, p. 6522. Cen Zhongmian (1958, pp. 337-8) is of the
opinion that Xue presented his memorial in 697.
* TD 200, pp. 1086-7; ^ 215A, pp. 6023-4.
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Empress Wu: Compromise for Peace
Until his death in 691, the Turkish Qutlugh Qaghan waged a series
of battles against the Khitan and Tiele, succeeded in driving the Uighurs
away from the Otukan Mountains and in setting up his headquarters there.
The Turkish inscriptions record these military campaigns and the Turkish
efforts to reestablish and consolidate the second empire.® He also lavmched
constant attacks on the Chinese frontier. In 683, so intense was his attack
on Fengzhou that the court considered abolishing the prefecture in order to
concentrate on the defense of Lingzhou and Xiazhou. Tang Xiujing, Adju
tant (sima) of Fengzhou, expressed strong opposition to this in a memo
rial, arguing that abandoning Fengzhou would actually open up China
even wider to nomadic incursions. The court agreed with him.
In the competition between China and the Turks, the various tribes
of the Tiele people followed different strategies for self-protection, some
being pro-Turk, others pro-Tang, and thereby influenced the balance of
power. In 686,® the Buqu and Tongra of the Tiele north of the Gobi rose in
revolt against Tang. Tang despatched troops from both Hexi and Western
Turks under the Protectorate of Jinshan in the Western Regions and in
flicted a crushing defeat on them. The Western Turks, however, also at
tacked the Uighurs, thus causing chaos in the region.
The court brought those Tiele who submitted under the supervision
of the Protectorate of Anbei, the seat of which was then moved to
Tongcheng south of the Gobi, but as punishment for their attacks on the
Uighurs it refused the request of the Western Turkish chiefs to come to the
Tang court. The Tiele, as a whole, were in a weak position. Chen Zi’ang,
then a low ranking clerk under the Army Supervisor (jianjun) of the Hexi
troops, presented a memorial on behalf of the Army Supervisor urging the
court to attract the Tiele people and to accept the Western Turkish chiefs’
request.®
While no specific measures were taken by Empress Wu with re
gard to the Tiele, around 685 she appointed the son of Ashina Mishe and
* See the translations of the “Kill Tigin inscription,” the “Bilga Kagan inscription” and
the “Tonyukuk inscription” in Tekin 1968, pp. 261-90. See also Ma Changshou 1957, p.
66.

’ J7S 93, p. 2978; JfTS 111, p. 4149; ZZ77203, p. 6414.
* ZZTJ (203, p. 6435) states that the rebellion occurred in 685, but Cen Zhongmian’s
study shows it should be dated 686. See Cen 1958, p. 312.
® Chen Boyu Wenji 4, pp. 32-4; 8, 8, pp. 73-5; ZZTJ203, p. 6435; Cen Zhongmian 1958,
pp. 310-20; Xue Zongzheng 1992, pp. 458-61.
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the son of Ashina Buzhen of the Western Turks to succeed to their father’s
titles of qaghan and Protectors-General in order to maintain some control
by the Ashina clan over the scattered Western Turks. Both Mishe and
Buzhen had attached themselves to Tang during Taizong’sreign, and had
been appointed qaghan and Protectors-general by Gaozong. The titles were
10
later passed on to their sons.
While Empress Wu tried to suppress the revival of the Eastern
Turks, she had other preoccupations internally. Having assumed power as
Empress Dowager in 684, she was faced with the immediate task of con
solidating her own position in the face of a revolt against her by supporters
of the Li royal house. Cheng Wuting, an excellent general in charge of
Turkish military affairs, was accused of involvement with the anti-Wu
group and was executed. The Turks were overjoyed.^^ In 688 another
short-lived revolt staged by Tang princes challenged Wu’s rule. Empress
Wu, however, prevailed and proclaimed herself emperor of the Zhou dy
nasty in 690.
Her assumption of the rulership and the death of Qutlugh in 691
made possible restoration of peace between China and the Turks. The
new qaghan, Mochuo (Bag Chor), the younger brother of Qutlugh, in 695
despatched an embassy to China to ask, in the Chinese wording, to
“surrender.” Empress Wu responded by conferring the title of general and
duke on Bag Chor Qaghan. The actual relationship, however, was obvi
ously between two essentially equal adversaries (diguo)}^
Between 696 and 697, the Khitan, who had been brought under the
jimi system in 648, broke away from China, provoked by ill treatment
from the Chinese Area Commander of Yingzhou. With Yingzhou as their
base, they launched an invasion, pressing southward to the present Beijing
area and into the Hebei region.^® Bag Chor Qaghan volunteered to attack
the Khitan on the condition that China send a prince to marry his daughter,
and return the Turks who had formerly surrendered ^d had been resettled
in the Hexi area. Obviously, he had his own agenda: to win back his for'^JTS 194B, pp. 5188-90;

215B, pp. 6064-6; Ise 1968, pp. 258-9.
" J7S' 83, p. 2785; ATS 111, pp. 4147-8; ZZTJ203, pp. 6432-3.
For details concerning the uprising and battles and the date of Guduolu’s death, see
Cen Zhongmian 1958, pp. 289-307; 8, pp. 308-25; TD 198, p. 1073; JTS 194A, pp.
5166-8;2(7:S215A, pp. 6042-5.
JTS 194A, p. 5168; ZZTJ205, p. 6503.
Mori Masao 1967, pp. 188-9; 1978, p. 119.
yZS 199B, pp. 5350-1; ATS 219, pp. 6168-70; ZZ77205,206.
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mer subjects.
Empress Wu had to compromise with the Turks so that China
could concentrate its forces against the Khitan. She conferred the title of
qaghan on Bag Chor. This recognized the independent power of the
Turks, even though the Chinese wording defined the Turks as subjects. In
697 Empress Wu sent two envoys, Yan Zhiwei and Tian Guidao, on a
mission to the Turks. It is interesting to see how the two envoys’ differing
attitudes towards the Turks showed the vacillation of the Chinese in their
treatment of their newly revived enemy. While Yan Zhiwei, at Bag Chor’s
headquarters, performed a ritual dance before Bag Chor, which etiquette
prescribed as due only to an emperor, and went so far as to kiss the tip of
Bag Chor’s boot, Tian Guidao, on the other hand, still believed that the
Turks should be subject. He did not kowtow to Bag Chor Qaghan and in
stead only made a respectful bow. Bag Chor was furious and imprisoned
Tian. He was even going to kill him, and was only dissuaded from doing
so by his ministers.
After attacking the Khitan, Bag Chor in 697 made further requests:
1) that he send his daughter to marry a Chinese prince; 2) that China return
the surrendered Turks who had settled inside six prefectures, and also re
turn the land under the Protectorate of Chanyu;^® 3) that China provide
farming tools, seed-grain and iron to the Turks. At the Chinese court a
bellicose response was proposed by some, while others argued in favor of
making an agreement because the Khitan were still a major force to con
tend with on the frontier.
Empress Wu decided to accommodate Bag Chor’s requests. The
court moved several thousand households of non-Chinese back to the
steppe, provided 40,000 hu of seed grain, 50,000 duan of silks, 3,000 farm

JTS 194A, pp. 5168-9; XTS 2\5A, p. 6045; ZZTJ 205, pp. 6509-10; CFYG 964, p.

11341.
^^JTS 185A, pp. 4794-5;XTS 197, p. 5624; ZZ77206, p. 6515.

There is ambiguity about which six prefectures Bag Chor demanded. According to the
“Biography of Tian Guidao” (775 185 A, p. 4794; ATS 197, p. 5624), he requested the six
Hu prefectures, which, as Pulleyblank concludes, refer to the prefectures of Lu, Li, Han,
Sai, Yi and Qi. See Pulleyblank 1952, p. 330, note 1, and Cen Zhongmian 1964, pp. 1234. Another opinion is that the six refer to the prefectures of Feng, Sheng, Ling, Xia, Shuo
and Dai. See TD 198, p. 1073; JTS 194A, pp. 5168-9; ATS 215A, p. 6045; ZZTJ 206, p.
6516; THY 94, p. 1691; Zhang Qun 1955, pp. 275-9; Hou Linbo 1976, pp. 24-7. Zhang
Qun (1955, pp. 327-8) also holds that the six prefectures were under the supervision of
the Protectorate of Chanyu.
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formed an integrated international order holding together the East Asian
world with China as suzerain at the center. It was to maintain this system
that Sui and Tang mounted expeditions against Koguryo.
Concentrating on the realism and pragmatism that then lay behind
certain imperial foreign policy decisions, China among Equals edited by
M. Rossabi (1983), an important collection of essays on Chinese foreign
relations focusing on the tenth to fourteenth centuries, challenges the
myths that, from the Han dynasty onward, the Chinese uniformly and rig
idly applied a single ideology in their foreign relations, that they lacked
interest in foreign commerce and that they were ignorant of foreign lands.
It concentrates on the realism and pragmatism that lay behind Song impe
rial foreign policy decisions.
Larry W. Moses, in his article “T’ang tribute relations with the In
ner Asian barbarians” (1976), stresses that the nomads of the Tang period
had a history of their own and evolved their own foreign policy mecha
nisms. Their acceptance of vassal status in the tribute system was deter
mined by their own political needs. This insight is further elaborated by
Thomas Barfield (“The Hsiung-nu imperial confederacy: organization and
foreign policy,” 1981; The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and
China, 1989) as the “inner frontier strategy,” that is, submission to China
when the nomads were weak so as to use Chinese assistance to recover
their strength. According to Barfield, this was in contrast to the “outer
frontier strategy,” which was to force the Chinese into accommodating
their demands for subsidies and trade when the nomads were strong.
Articles by Kaneko Shuichi (1974; 1988) and Wang Zhenping
(1994) also deal with the tribute system from the point of view of the nonChinese. Kaneko examines changes in the protocols of correspondence
between Tang and Tibet as Tibet pressed its demands for equality. Wang
shows how before 608 Japan’s letters to Sui similarly attempted to assert
equal status.
The Nomadic Peoples and Sui-Tang China
The long and fascinating history of the nomadic peoples and their
relationships with the sedentary societies have attracted great interest
among generations of modem scholars and stimulated numerous works.
The bibliographies of Lin Enxian’s book Tujue Yanjiu (1988) and in the
chapters on the Turks by Denis Sinor and the Uighurs by Colin Mackerras
in The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia (1990) list important works
in Chinese, Japanese and Western languages, most of which deal more
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with the origins, culture, and internal evolution of the nomadic peoples
than with their external relations with the Chinese agricultural society.
For my purposes, the Inner Asians’ interactions with and their im
pact on China as well as the effects on the nomads themselves are the cen
tral issues. Xiao Qiqing’s article “Beiya youmu minzu nanqin gezhong
yuanyin de jiantao” (1972) is a very useful survey of the various theories
that seek to explain the constant nomadic invasions of the agricultural so
ciety. Owen Lattimore’s Inner Asian Frontiers of China (1951; first edi
tion 1940) remains a basic work for its study of the cyclical patterns of
interaction between China and its nomadic and semi-nomadic neighbors to
the north and west in contrast to the agricultural south. It provides an in
sightful firamework of analysis in terms of ecological systems, and its main
contribution is to treat the non-Chinese on their own terms. Building upon
Lattimore’s work, Thomas Barfield (1981, 1989) explores the history of
non-Chinese powers on the northern fi-ontiers of China from the Xiongnu
to the Manchus, developing the theory that in order to sustain their state
power, the nomads could not rely solely on their own pastoralism but de
pended on obtaining goods firom China by trading, raiding or extracting
subsidies, so that their states often rose and fell in parallel with changes in
Chinese politics.
A. M. Khazanov, in his excellent work. Nomads and the Outside
World (1994; first edition 1984), a comprehensive study of the nomadic
societies of various types in Eurasia and Afiica, points out that it was the
highly specialized economy of pastoralism that made the nomads depend
ent on neighboring agricultural societies for economic survival and for
political stability, and that made the nomads use trade, submission, raids
and pillage to acquire the agricultural goods they needed. Works by Mori
Masao (1978) and Hilda Ecsedy (1968; 1974; 1981) deal with the impor
tance of trade and the different perspectives on trade of the agricultural
and nomad peoples. Works by Jagchid and Hyer (1979), and Jagchid and
Symons (1989) also stress the importance of trade for nomadic society,
and insist that Chinese disruption of the smooth working of mechanisms
for trade stimulated the nomads to launch raids or wars. Nicola Di
Cosmo’s recent article (1994) further argues that Xiongnu nomadic power
was based on a mixed economy and depended on trade relations and con
trol of settled populations on all sides.
For the study of China’s relations with the Turks, Edouard Chavannes’ Documents sur les Tou-Kiue [Turcs] Occidentaux and Cen
Zhongmian’s Xi Tujue Shiliao Buque ji Kaozheng and Tujue Jishi are
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comprehensive in their collections of materials and detailed annotations.
Mori Masao in his Kodai Toruko Minzokushi Kenkyu (1967), a collection
of previously published articles, provides an insightful discussion on the
relationship between China and the Turks. His work Kodai Yuboku Teikoku (1978, 2nd ed.) is a narrative history of the Turks and their interac
tions with neighboring agricultural society. Iwami Kiyohiro’s “To no
Tokketsu imin ni taisuru sochi o megutte” (1987) investigates Tang’s re
settlement of the Turks after its conquest of the Eastern Turks in 630. Lin
Enxian’s Tujue Yanjiu (1988) is a general history, with chapters on the
Sui-Tang policies of divide and rule, and marriage alliance. It also has an
interesting chapter on how the Turks themselves adopted the policy of us
ing the Chinese against the Chinese during the rise of the Tang dynasty.
Another chapter is on the influence of Turkish culture on Tang China. Ma
Changshou’s Tujueren he Tujue Hanguo (1958) provides a succinct and
useful narrative history. Hayashi Toshio’s survey (1985) documents the
evidence of agriculture in Turkish society.
Zhongguo Beifang Minzu Guanxishi (1987) is a general history of
the non-Chinese peoples in the frontier regions from ancient Xia-Shang
times until the Qing period. The book follows the orthodox Communist
view that treats early histories of the nomads on the Mongolian steppe and
the non-Chinese in the Western Regions and in Manchuria as part of Chi
nese history, and their relations with the Chinese government as those of
local regimes with the central court.
Xue Zongzheng’s Tujue Shi (1992) recognizes the danger of the
above view in that, as he says, it in fact treats the justified wars of the Chi
nese against nomadic invasions as internal struggles between different
ethnic groups. But Xue does not succeed in resolving the contradiction,
since he remains bound by the modem political assumption that historical
China must include all the territories now comprising the People’s Repub
lic. Xue’s book is the most comprehensive study so far in mainland China
of the history of the Turks from their origins to the collapse of the second
Turkish empire in the mid-eighth century. The book reflects the revival of
Chinese historical scholarship after the Cultural Revolution.
For the study of the Uighurs and their interactions with China in
the Tang period, Haneda Tom’s “Todai kaikotsushi no kenkyu” (1957) is a
valuable general discussion based on critical textual study of Chinese and
Turkish sources. Wang Jingm’s annotated translation of the Uighur in
scription with introduction (1938) provides the Uighur perspective. Colin
Mackerras’ The Uighur Empire According to the T’ang Dynastic Histories
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(1972), an annotated translation of the Uighur chapters in the two Tang
official histories, on the other hand, provides the Chinese point of view.
Weiwuerzu Shiliao Jianbian by Feng Jiasheng and others is a collection of
selected primary materials on Uighur history.
Mackerras’ article “Sino-Uighur diplomatic and trade contacts
(744 to 840)” (1969) and his chapter on the Uighurs in The Cambridge
History of Early Inner Asia (1990) are also important in English scholar
ship. Duan Lianqin’s Dingling, Gaoche yu Tiele (1988) is a narrative his
tory of these peoples from ancient times until the mid-eighth century when
the Uighurs founded their empire. Yang Shengmin’s Huihe Shi (1991),
also a general history of the Uighur people, begins with the Northern Di in
Shang-Zhou times, treated as ancestors of the Uighurs, and ends with the
Uighur settlement in the Western Regions after the collapse of the Uighur
empire in the 840’s. It is an introduction to the Uighurs’ life, society, eco
nomic development, religious and political evolution, and interactions
\vith China, Tibet and other peoples. In his dissertation (1986), “The writ
ings of Li Te-yii as sources for the history of T’ang-Iimer Asian relations,”
Michael R. Drompp presents a detailed study of Tang relations with the
Uighurs in the 840’s, focusing on the process of Chinese policy formation
and implementation.
Minorsky’s “Tamim ibn Bahr’s journey to the Uyghurs” (1948)
and Von Gabain’s “Steppe und Stadt im Leben der altesten Turken”
(1949) are important for the light they shed on the Uighurs’ transformation
from a nomadic into a sedentary society as a result of frequent interactions
with China. Such interactions particularly involved the horse-silk trade
between the Tang China and the Uighurs. Many works deal with this
topic. For example, see Yang Shengmin’s work and the articles by Jagchid
Sechin (1971), Liu Yitang (1974), Fu Lecheng (1977; first published
1953), Cui Mingde (1986), Zhang Qiin (1990: chapter 4) and Christopher
I. Beckwith (1991). The marriage alliance between Tang and the Uighurs
is discussed by Lin Enxian (1970) and by Jagchid (1989).
Western Regions
On the Western Regions, Ise Sentaro’s Chugoku Seiiki Keieishi
Kenkyii (1968) is comprehensive and critical in its treatment of primary
sources, covering the period from the Han dynasty to the ninth century.
Also valuable is Edouard Chavannes’ Documents sur les Tou-Kiue [TurcsJ
Occidentaux. Ise’s is still the most important work on the subject, al
though one could add other works published in recent years, such as Mori-
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yasu Takao (1973; 1977), Wu Yugui (1987), Lin Chaomin (1985), and
Beckwith (1987).
Korea and Sui-Tang China
For China’s relations with Korea before the end of the Tang period,
the two Korean histories Samguk Sagi compiled in the twelfth century by
Kim Pu-sik and the Samguk Yusa compiled by Iryon towards the end of
the thirteenth century are studied by modem scholars as primary sources.
Jamieson examines the sources of these histories in his dissertation “The
Samguk sagi and the unification wars” (1969) and his 2irticle “Collapse of
the T’ang Silla alliance—Chinese and Korean accounts compared” (1970),
and shows from the way in which parallel events are recorded that the
Chinese and Koreans had different perspectives on their relations with
each other. K.H.J. Gardiner’s “The Samguk-sagi and its sources” (1970)
discusses the Chinese and early Korean sources and points out the Chinese
influence in the compilation of the Samguk Sagi. The Chosen Shi, com
piled by Chosen Shi Henshu Kai of Japan (the first four volumes covering
the period to the Unified Silla were published in 1932-1933), is a collec
tion of highlights from all available materials in Chinese, Korean and
Japanese traditional sources arranged in chronological order. The editor
notes discrepancies when they occur but does not go into detailed discus
sion of them.
For general history, Hatada Takashi’s A History of Korea (1969)
provides a concise and valuable survey from prehistory to 1950. K.H.J.
Gardiner’s The Early History of Korea: the Historical Development of the
Peninsula up to the Introduction of Buddhism in the Fourth Century AD
(1969) is a short history which pays attention to interactions between
China and Korea. It has an appendix of sources in Chinese, Korean and
Japanese. The History of Korea (1970) by prominent Korean scholars,
Sohn Pow-key, Kim Chol-choon, and Hong Yi-sup, centers aroimd politi
cal developments from prehistory to 1961. Lee Ki-baik’s A New History of
Korea (1984) describes political, social, economic and cultural features in
different periods from prehistory to 1960.
For specific aspects of Sino-Korean interactions, there are Ikeuchi
Hiroshi’s Man-Sen Shi Kenkyu (1960, including articles published earlier),
and Hatada Takashi and Inoue Hideo’s Kodai no Chosen (1974). John
Charles Jamieson’s dissertation (1969) discusses in detail how Silla took
the initiative in forming the alliance with Tang China, and so succeeded in
unifying the Korean peninsula. The Sui-Tang invasions of Korea are also
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an important issue in Cen Zhongmian’s Sui-Tang Shi (1957) and Arthur
Wright’s The Sui Dynasty (1978). The intricate relations between Tang
and Korea are placed in the larger context of East and Inner Asian interna
tional politics in the works of Hino Kaizaburo (mostly in the 1950’s),
Sakamoto Yoshitane (1978) and Nishijima Sadao (1983: part II). Hugh D.
Walker’s “Traditional Sino-Korean diplomatic relations” (1965) argues
that Chinese expansion into Korea in the Han, Tang and Yuan periods
stimulated the internal political development of Korea, and that Korea’s
acceptance of the Chinese tribute system before the foundation of the Yi
dynasty in 1392 was just a diplomatic strategy having as its primary goal
preservation of the independence of Korea. Chtm Hae-jong’s articles
(1966; 1968) provide a brief survey of the different patterns in the SinoKorean tributary relationships from the Han period to Qing.
Peoples of Manchuria
The existence of the Khitan, Xi and Mohe (to the latter of which
the Jurchens are related ) people in Manchuria, and the rise of the Parhae
state in Manchuria in the seventh century further complicated the relations
between China and Korea. Hino Kaizaburo and Furutata Torii (1986) have
articles on Parhae. Ishii Masatoshi (1984) examines the four letters written
by Zhang Jiuling on behalf of Xuanzong to the king of Parhae. A recent
work, Dongbei Minzu Yuanliu (1987), by a Chinese scholar. Sun Jinji,
deals with the early evolution of these and other peoples in present north
east China.
In English scholarship, Barfield (1989) discusses how the Xianbei,
Khitan, Jurchens and Manchus founded their states. Herbert Franke’s
chapter “The forest peoples of Manchuria: Kitans and Jurchens” in The
Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia (1990) devotes some pages to the
histories of the Khitan and Jurchens before the founding of their dynasties.
The recently published The Cambridge History of China, Volume 6: Alien
Regimes and Border States, 907-1368 (1994) also deals briefly with the
predynastic history of the Khitan. It has very useful bibliographical essays
that summarize the studies of the various peoples in Manchuria.
Tibet and Sui-Tang China
Several collections of Chinese sources in official histories are
available: Su Jinren and Xiao Lianzi, Cefii Yuangui Tufan Shiliao Jiaozheng (1981), Chen Xiezhang and others, Zangzu Shiliao Ji (1982), and Su
Jinren, Tongjian Tufan Shiliao (1982). In addition to the studies of pri-
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mary materials for the Tufan period mentioned in the Introduction, there
are numerous other works mentioned in Beckwith’s The Tibetan Empire in
Central Asia (1987), which has a critcial summary of modem studies of
Tibet and of traditional sources.
For Tibetan interactions with Sui-Tang China, Sato Hisashi’s Kodai Chibetto shi Kenkyu (1958-1959) is the first major history of the inter
nal evolution of Tibetan politics, military organization and economic
stracture, and how all these factors affected its relations with China. The
Xin Tangshu Tufanzhuan Jianzheng (1958) by Wang Zhong is an aimotated work with references to, Tibetan and other Chinese sources. Kolmas’s
“Four letters of Po Chu-i to the Tibetan authorities (808-810 A. D.)”
(1966) is a substantial study, with translation, of these letters as compared
with other sources. The article sheds light on how specific issues regarding
territory were dealt with in official communications between Tang and Ti
bet. Ise Sentaro, in his Chugoku Seiiki Keieishi Kenkyu (1968), analyzes
the rapid development of the Tufan kingdom, and how this made Tibet
play an important role in the Western Regions in opposition to both China
and the Arabs. Ren Yucai’s Tufan yu Tangchao Guanxi zhi Yanjiu (1971)
outlines the relationship between Tang and Tibet and studies the impact of
each culture on the other. Yamaguchi Zuiho in his Toban Okoku Seiritsu
shi no Kenkyu (1983) reviews earlier studies on the founding of the Tufan
kingdom and has carried further the analysis of the sources with emphasis
on the impact of Chinese policy towards the Tuyuhim. Christopher
Beckwith’s dissertation, “A study of the early medieval Chinese, Latin,
and Tibetan historical sources on pre-imperial Tibet” (1977), and his The
Tibetan Empire in Central Asia (1987), drawing fi-om sources in Tibetan,
Arabic, Old Turkish, and Chinese, present a narrative history of Tibet be
fore and during the Tufan period. His book examines the history of Ti
betan expansion and confrontations with the Chinese, Turkish, and Arab
powers with a view to placing Tibet in the contemporary international
scene. As mentioned above, Kaneko Shuichi (1974; 1988) has a detailed
examination of the changes in official correspondence between Tang and
Tibet, which shows the pragmatism of the Chinese side.
In the recently published The Cambridge History of Early Inner
Asia (1990), H. Hoffman has a chapter “Early and medieval Tibet,” which
focuses on the origins and political history and religious development of
Tibet imtil the fourteenth century. The most recent work listed in his bibli
ography was published in 1973.
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Nanzhao
Charles Backus’s The Nan-chao Kingdom and Tang China’s
Southwestern Frontier (1981) is a comprehensive study of the history of
Nanzhao, including a full bibliography of previous works of both Eastern
and Western scholarship. Wang Yongxing’s article (1988) discusses the
role of Wei Gao in Tang relations with Tibet and Nanzhao. Hayashi
Ken’ichiro in his article of 1990 deals mainly with the founding of
Nanzhao and how this affected Tang policy towards that state. His 1992
study examines the relations of the Nanzhao kingdom with Tang China in
the latter half of the ninth century vvith emphasis on Nanzhao’s expansion.
For a study of works compiled in Tang on Nanzhao such as the Manshu,
see Xiang Da’s article (1957) and his annotated study of the Manshu
(1962). An English translation of the Manshu is available by G. E. Luce
and Ch’en Yee Sein (1961).
The Frontier Military System in Sui-Tang China
Tang foreign policy was closely related to the frontier military
system. E. G. Pulleyblank, in chapter 5 of his The Background of the Re
bellion of An Lu-shan (1953), presents a clear description of the military
situation, especially as involving the fubing or militia system, during the
Tang period up to the An Lushan rebellion. Gu Jiguang’s Fubing Zhidu
Kaoshi (1962) examines in detail the fubing system from its beginning in
the sixth century to its collapse in the eighth century. Chapters in The
Cambridge History of China, Volume 3 (1979) provide further discussion
of the evolution of the military system based on previous studies in Japa
nese, Chinese and Western languages. Kang Le’s Tangdai Qianqi de Bianfang (1979) specifically deals with the frontier system of the first half of
the Tang period. Liu Yat-ming’s dissertation, “The Shen-Ts’e Armies and
the palace commissions in China, 755-875 A.D” (1970), is useful particu
larly for the frontier and domestic military system in the post-An Lushan
period. Lai Swee Fo’s dissertation “The military and defense system under
the T’ang dynasty” (1986) investigates the changes in
fubing, the pal
ace armies and the Shence Annies, and the frontier defense system. Zhang
Qun in his Tangdai Fanjiang Yanjiu (1986) and Tangdai Fanjiang Yanjiu
Xubian (1990) provides a voluminous and comprehensive examination of
non-Chinese generals under Tang. He illustrates placement of the nomadic
peoples in the frontier regions as defending forces with useful maps
(1986), and also addresses changes in frontier systems.

Table 1:
Sui-Tang Emperors and Major Events During Their Reigns
SUI
581-604
Eastern Turks make peace with Sui.
Conquest of Chen
Expedition against Kogmyo
Princess Guanghua married to the Tuyuhim qaghan.
Princess Anyi married to Zamqan Qaghan of the Eastern Turks.

Emperor Wen
584
589
596
597
599

602
603
603 or 604
Emperor Yang
604-5
608
609
610
612
613
614
615
Emperor Gong
617
TANG
Gaozu
618-625

Princess Yicheng married to Zamqan (Qimin) Qaghan.
Jiaozhou brought xmder Sui control
Major defeat of the Western Turks by Sui
Expedition against Champa
605-617
Expedition against Champa
Kami brought imder Sui control
Sui defeats the Tuyuhun.
Expedition against Liuqiu
Western Turks brought imder Sui control
Expedition against Koguryo
Expedition against Koguryo
Expedition against Koguryo
Princess Xinyi married to the Western Turkish Qaghan
Eastern Turks' siege of the Emperor at Yanmen
617-618
Tang alliance with Eastern Turks
618-626
Wars with anti-Tang forces

Sui-Tang Emperors and Major Events
618
Taizong
627

Succession of King Yongnyu in Koguryo, peace with Tang
627-649
Eastern Turks besiege Chang’an
Conquest of the Eastern Turks
First official contact between Tibet and Tang
Tang defeats Tuyuhtm.
Gaochang brought imder Tang control
Establishment of Protectorate of Anxi

630
634
634-5
640

641

Princess Honghua married to the Tuyuhun Qaghan
Princess Wencheng married to the Tibetan btsan-po.
Expedition against Koguryo

644-5
646
647

Conquest of the Xueyantuo
Expedition against Koguryo
Expedition against Koguryo
Tang capture of Kucha

648

650-683
Conquest of Western Turks

Gaozong
659

Conquest of Paekche

660
668
670
676
679
682

Conquest of Koguryo
Tibet annexes Tuyuhun.
Protectorate of Andong withdrawn from Pyongyang to Liaodong
Tang recovers the Four Garrisons in the Western Regions.
Restoration of the Second Turkish Empire

Zhongzong
Wu-Zhou (Empress Wu)
684
686-7
688
692
696-7
696

377

684

684-705
Anti-Wu revolt
Tang loses the Four Garrisons in the Western Regions.
Anti-Wu revolt

Tang recovers the Four Garrisons in the Western Regions.
Khitan invasion of Hebei
Recognition of the qaghan of the restored Turkish empire

Table I

378
703-5
Zhongzong
706
708
709
710
Wen Wang
Ruizong
Xuanzong
732
744
745

Tibet makes peace with China.
705-710
The first Tang-Tibet treaty
Building of the three Shouxiang Fortresses
Tang recognition of the Turgish qaghan
Princess Jincheng married to the Tibetan btsan-po
710
710-712
712-756
The second Tang-Tibet treaty
Assumption of the title of qaghan by the Uighur chief
Collapse of the Second Turkish Empire
Tang's defeat by the Arabs at the Talas River

751
755
Suzong
756-7
758
758-9

An Lushan rises in rebellion.
756-762
Uighurs assist in the suppression of the An Lushan rebellion.
Princess Ningguo married to the Uighur qaghan.
Uighurs assist in the suppression of the An Lushan rebellion.

762
Daizong
762-3

The third Tang-Tibet treaty
762-779
Uighurs assist in the suppression of the An Lushan rebellion

763

Final suppression of the An Lushan rebellion
Tibetan invasion of Chang’an
764 Pugu Huaien's revolt and alliance with Tibet and the Uighurs to attack
Chang’an

765

The fourth Tang-Tibet treaty
Pugu Huaien's alliance with Tibet and the Uighurs to attack Chang’an

767
Dezong
781-6
783

The fifth Tang-Tibet treaty
780-805
Revolts of Military Commissioners
The sixth Tang-Tibet treaty

Sui-Tang Emperors and Major Events
ni

379

The "false treaty of Pingliang" between Tang and Tibet

788
Princess Xian’an married to the Uighur qaghan.
The treaty between Tang and Nanzhao
794
Shunzong
805
805
Abortive reform movement
Xianzong
806-820
806-19
Partial restoration of Tang authority over autonomous provinces
Muzong
821
821 -2
Jingzong
Wenzong
829-30
Wuzong
840
After 842
Xuanzong
Yizong
868-9
Xizong
874-884
880
Zhaozong
902
Emperor Zhaoxuan
907

821-824
Princess Taihe married to the Uighur qaghan.
The seventh Tang-Tibet treaty
825-827
827-840
Nanzhao’s invasion of Chengdu
840-846
Collapse of the Uighur empire
Disintegration of the Tibetan kingdom
847-860
860-874
Rebellion of Pang Xim
874-888
Rebellion of Wang Xianzhi-Huang Chao
Tang's recognition of Nanzhao as an equal
889-904
End of the Nanzhao kingdom
905-907
Abdication of the last Tang emperor

Table 2
Tribute Missions of the Three Korean Kingdoms to Sui and
Tang (from 581 to 712)
(Sources: SUIS, BS, JTS, XTS, CFYG.)
Year
581
582
583

Koguryo
1
2
3

584
588
591

1

592
594
597
598
600
607
608
609
611
614
615
Tang
619
621
622
623
624

Paekche
1
1

Silla

1
2
1
1
1

2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1
1

1

Korean Tribute Missions to Sui and Tang
Year
625
626

Koguryo
1

Paekche

Silla

1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1

627
628
629
631
632

1
1

635
636
637

1
1
1

638
639
640
642
643

1

644
646
648
650
651
652
653
656
665
675
686
699
703
705
707

1
1
1
1
2

1
1
1
1

1
1

1
1
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1
1
1
2
1

1
1

1
1
1

1
1

1
3
1

Table 2

382
Year
709
710

Koguryo

Paekche

Silla

711

1
1
1

712

1

Table 3
Participation in Tang Expeditions
by Non-Chinese (618-669)
Year
618
620
621
622
634-5
639
641
644
645
646
647
648

Expeditions
Xue Ju
Liu Wuzhou
Dou Jiande
Liu Heida, Gao Kaidao
Liu Heida
Tuyuhun
Gaochang
Xueyantuo
Koguryo
Xueyantuo
**
Kucha
Xueyantuo

Those Paricipating
W. Turks^
Tujue^
W. Turks^
Mohe"**
W. Turks^
Tujue, Qibi, Qiang^
Tujue; Yanqi^
Xi, Khitan, Tujue*
Xi, Khitan, Mohe, Hu^
Tujue'®
Tujue, Qibi, Hu, Mohe"
Tiele,Tujue,Tibet, Tuyuhun'^
Tiele'*

‘ These were the Western Turks under Danai who had submitted to Sui in 611. JTS
194B, p. 5180; Chavaimes 1969, p. 22.
^ JTS 194A, p. 5154;2OT215A, p. 6029; ZZTJ188, pp. 5884-5.
^ The Western Turks under Danai, see JTS 194B, p. 5180; Chavannes 1969, p. 22.
^ JTS 55, pp. 2259-60; 199B, pp. 5358-9.
^ The Western Tiu'ks imder Danai, see JTS 194B, p. 5180; Chavannes 1969, p. 22.
® JTS 198, p. 5298; JWS221A, p. 6225; ZZTJ 194, p. 6108; Zhang Qun 1986, pp. 230-1.
’ JTS 198, p. 5295; XTS 221 A, p. 6221; p. 6229.
* ZZTJ 196, pp. 6171-2.
’ ZZTJ, 197, p. 6209; CFYG 117, p. 1398.
*®;i7S 110, p. 4116; 217B,p. 6138; ZZTJ 198, pp. 6232-3; CFTG 991, p. 11640.
" JTS199B,p. 5347; ZZTJ 198, p. 6237; CFTG 985, pp. 11570-1; 991, p. 11640.
The JTS 198 (p. 5303) records this event as in 646 while other sources record it as in
647, seeZTS221A, p. 6231; ZZTJ 198, pp. 6250-1.
" CFTG 973, p. 11432; 985, p. 11573.
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Year
649
651-652
656-657
658
660
661
662
668
669

Table 3
Expeditions
Chebi Qaghan
Western Turks
Western Turks

Those Paricipating
Huihe, Pugu'"^
Huihe^^
Huihe'^

Koguryo
Xi, Khitan

Khitan*’

Koguryo
Rebelled Tiele
Koguryo
Xueyantuo

Tujue, Xueyantuo 18
Huihe
Shatuo^°
Huihe^*
Tujue^^

J7S 194A, p. 5165; AT5215A, pp. 6041-2; ZZTJ199, p. 6265; THY9A, p. 1690.
JTS 194B, p. 5186; JST7S215B, p. 6061;ZZ77199, pp. 6274-7.
TD 199, p. 1078; JTS 194B, p. 5187; 195, p. 5197; XTS 111, pp. 4137-8; 215B, p.
6062; 217A, p. 6113; ZZTJ2QQ, p. 6301; p. 6306; CFYG 973, p. 11433.
” ZZ77200, p. 6309.
** XTS 3, p. 60; 219, p. 6174; ZZZJ200, p. 6320; CFYG 986, p. 11577.
JTS 195 (p. 5197) says that the campaign was in 655 but Tang did not launch any
campaign that year. A7S'217A, p. 6113; ZZrJ200, p. 6323; CFTG 986, p. 11578.
^ They were Western Turks. AT5 218, p. 6154.
JTS 109, pp. 3293-4.
THY 96, p. 1728.
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academician
Hanoi, 342,343
Heavenly Qaghan (tian kehan), 2,3,15,
140; Taizong’s assumption of the title,
179-83, 191, 210; 306, 307, 347, 361
Heichi Changzhi H®
147
Heishuizhou
227
Helan ^ B Mountains, 328
Helou Zigan
99
Helu^#, 141, 195, 196
heqin fn^, see marriage alliance
HerongfOiic. 147
Hexi MB, 155, 156, 245, 250, 256,265,
315, 322, 323
HeyuanM^. H8, 146, 147, 250
Hezhong M 4’. 300, 326, 331
Honglu Qing |E|SS!®I, see Chamberlain of
the court of state ceremonials
Honglu Si ?S8lS^. see Court of state
ceremonials
Hongwu emperor, 362, 363
Hongyuangu
247
Hostel for Tributary Envoys (sifang guan).

76, 80, 81
Hu
23, 24, 30
Hu Si, see Sogdians
Huangfu Weiming
155, 253
Huangmen Shilang
see
Gentlemen! attendant at the palace gate
HuazhouIblHi. 188, 189
Hubu p g|5, see Ministry of revenue
Huhanzhou
227
Hui Shi SJI, 28
Huichao
90
Huihe [U IS, 304
HuihulUfl, 304
Huining#^, 121
Huisheng WA, 89
Huiyao ^§,8
Hummu, 228
Hun#, 291
Hun Jian #g, 332, 334
Hushi 5 rfJ, see tribute trade
Hushi Jian S
see Directorate of
tributary trade
HushuMid, 291
Husi Zheng
123
Huyan
Valley, 293
iltabSr, 192
Imperial Diarist (qiju long, qiju sheren), 70
India, 25, 30, 31, 37, 57, 82, 88, 89, 90,
144, 183, 235, 238, 303, 335
iimer court (neiting), 69, 72, 98,158,161
Inspector of the Armies (guan junrong shi),
159
Inspectorate General of Water Works
(dushui tai, dushuiJian), 129
Investigation Commissioner (caifang shi),
153
Irydn^^, 14
Ishbara (Shabolue), 100-4, 352
Istami, 48
Japan, 4, 26, 87,92, 111, 125,126,204,
212,220,221,365
Japanese pirates, 364

JiChu’naEl^^,271

JiaDanMSt, 85, 86
JiaYiMII,61,312
Jian’an
224
Jiang Ke#t&> 240
Jiang Xingben
142
Jiangdu^SI, 113
Jianjun g#, see eunuch supervisor
Jiarman
154, 155, 256, 259, and
throughout

Index
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Jianyi Dafu
see Grand master of
remonstrance
Jiaozhou5^fli 111, 113,199
Jiaozhou Yiwu Zhi 55 ;)'l'|
91
Jiedu Shi SSiSU) see Military
commissioner
Jilin iiW(Kyerim), 223
jimi fu2hou
(see also
subordinated area commands and
prefectures), 145, 192, 262, 283, 354
jimi ^ii, 140, 192, 236, 237, 243, 259,
263, 264, 266, 267, 279, 349
Jimsa, 194
Jinbu ^ pi3, see Treasury bureau
Jin dynasty, relations with Song, 353, 361
jingguan
see triumphal mound
Jingliie Dashi/ Jingliie Shi
see
military commissioner
Jingxi IPDf, 152
Jingxing Ji Mf-ylg, 85
Jingyuan
162, 330
Jinhe^j^, 106, 115
Jinwei #0, 293
Jishi Its, 146
Jishi Zhong
see Supervising
secretary
Jiuqu;lLffi, 250, 258
Jiu Tangshu
7, 8, 9, 15; and
throughout
Jiuxing Aitt, see Nine Surnames
Jumo^jj?, 119
Jun
see Armies
jun iP, see commandery
Junior Messenger {xiao xingren), 75
Kang
see Samarkand
KangTaij^^, 82
Karakhoja (Gaochang), 52, 53
Karashahr (Yanqi), 53, 140,143, 194,195,
311
Karghalik (Zhujubo), 195
Kashgar (Shule), 195,244, 284
Kashmir, 116, 253
Kaya (Mimana), 125
Kesch, 116, 282
Khitan, 3; in Sui, 99-103, 109-114; in Tang,
146, 150, 152, 153,156, 168,176,177,
179,198,199; relations with Taizong,
211-15; in Gaozong’s time, 218, 226,228;
relations with Turks and Empress Wu,
265-9; relations with Xuanzong and the
Turks, 273, 276, 277, 279-80, 290; under
the Uighurs, 295-6; 304; assistance to

Tang, 316; 318; later development into
Liao, 357-8; and throughout
Khitan-Liao, relations with Song, 353, 35960
Khotan (Yutian), 45, 54, 195, 243, 244, 293
Khri ‘Dus srong, 246, 247
Khri gtsug Ide brtsan, 341
Khri-gzigs (Qilixu), 257
Khri Ide gtsug brtsan, 247
Khubilai, 361, 362
Kim Ch’unch’u
217, 218, 224
Kim PSmmin
218
Kim Pu-sik
14, 15, 84
Kirghiz, 85, 86, 88, 269, 276,295, 304,
305,315,318,319, 355
Koguryd, 4, 15,16, 55-6, 79, 82, 83, 85;
relations with Sui, 108-11,121-30; in
Tang, 138, 139,140, 141, 142, 143, 144,
145,147, 191,199; reasons for Tang
campaigns, 203,206-7; peace with Gaozu,
207-9; relations with Taizong, 209-17;
Tang conquest, 221-2,223, 224, 225
Koko Nor, 45, 145, 240, 241, 246, 253, 357
Kdm river, 220
Kucha (Qiuci), 53, 140,141, 195, 196, 199,
238,244, 251, 253,271, 311, 315
Kumarajiva, 53
Kumedh, 283
Kunzhou SilW'l! 197
Lanzhou
149, 250
Lelang^jg, 55,207
li
see propriety
LiAo^iSl, 82
Li Baiyao
185
Li Chengcai
293
Li Chenghong
324
Li Daen
143
Li Daliang^;*:^, 193
Li Deyu
, 11, 70, 71, 86,166, 340,
341, 342; role in Tang policy toward the
Uighurs and Kirghiz, 315-9
LiFan^Sg, 10,91,304
Li Fuguo
74, 158,159, 160
Li Guangbi
159,160, 292, 325
Li Gui ^fi, 175
Li Guochang (Chixin)
g, 356
Li Huaiguang
162,331
Li Jiancheng
138, 176
Li Jiang
165, 307, 308

LiJifu^^S,337

Li Jing ^ Si, 142, 179, 213,235
Li Jingxuan
147,242

Index
Li Keyong
356
Li Linfu
7, 72, 155, 156, 258
Li Mi
10, 91, 303, 304, 310, 332, 335
Li Sheng^^,332, 333, 334
Li Shiji
142, 179, 213, 221
Li Shimin
see Taizong
Li Xian $5g, 268
Li Xingyi^fT^,256
Li Yuan
see Gaozu
Li Yuanzhong
305
LiZhigu$a*,249,252
Li Zhuo
342
Liang Shidu
172,173, 174,176,
179
Liangzhou
331
Liangzhou
52, 53, 99,136, 137, 147,
175, 193, 240, 246, 257, 291
Liao
216
Liao river
54, 110, 122, 123
Liaodong
54, 55, 108,123,138,144,
146, 208,210,212,213,215, 223, 224,
225
Liaodong Jungong ®
see
Commandeiy Duke of Liaodong
Liaodong Junwang
see
Commandery Prince of Liaodong
Liaoxi
110
Liaoyang^^, 224
Libin Yuan
see Foreign relations
office
Libu ni5, see Ministry of Rties
see Vice Minister
Libu Shiliang
of Rites
Liguo Zhuan S ffl 1$. 89
Lin En
10
Lingnan
111, 153
Lingwu®^, 156, 158,292
Lingzhou fifH, 144,149,188,191,241,
265, 305, 326, 328
Lintao Army
250
Lintun Egtfe, 55
Linyi
(Champa), 112, 139
Linyu E§?|u, 100
Linzhou
332
Little Balur, 252, 253, 257, 257,258, 284
LiuAnS!!^, 30
Liu Boying §!)f0143-4
Liu Chang §!| H, 104
Liu Fang §1);^, 111
Liu Gongquan
15
LiuHuanSy^, 154, 282
Liu Hun
334
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Liu Kang
325
LiuKuangS!)ia,258, 264
Liu Rengui HlHHill, 147, 148; role in
Korea, 220-2, 224; 241
Liu Shirang SJ1SS, 144
Liu Wenjing
169, 170
Liu Wuzhou ® ® )^, 173
LiuYuanf!)Ji,33,44, 183
Liu Yuxi |?i] S
163
LiuZhif!]^,8
Liu Zhiji S|^264
Liu Zongyuan g) ^tc, 163
Liugu
307
liuhou
see deputy commander
Liuqiui^^, 116
Lizhou ^)'H, 197
Local Regional Commands {zongguanfu),
136
Longyou
155,156,160,310,322,
323
Longzhou
337
Lou Shide
149,247
LoufanftM, 121, 169
Loulan (also Shanshan) ® SB, 53, 54
Lu Cheng
90, 91
Lu Sui if§®, 337
LuZhi^®, 11,74, 158,161,162, 331,
332
Ludongzan
see Mgar Stong rtsan
LulongjS ft, 157,316,318
Lun Kongre US IK), see Blon Gung bzher
Lun Mingxilie Ire ^
see Blon Myeslebs
Lun Yan |w Jg, see Mang nyen bzhi-brtsan
Luoyang QielanJi ^ filll MIB, 89
Lu Guang S it, 52, 53
Lukua S^(Kualii), 107, 108
Ma Chongying ,H
324
Ma Sui ,11^, 332, 333, 334
MaYu,^^, 10
madhyadesa, 30, 31, 183
Mang nyen bzhi-brtsan (Lun Yan), 246
Mang po-ije (Mangbuzhi), 256
Mangbuzhi
see Mang po-ije
Manichean religion, 301
Manichean temples, 165, 318
Manicheanism, 314
Afons/iu
86
Maozhou ^)‘H, 201, 243
Maritime Trade Commissioner {shibo shi),
81
marriage alliances, 29, 35,44, 46,47,48,
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49, 61, 62, 74, 77, 86, 100, 105, 108, 140,
142, 173, 211, 236, 237, 240, 258; be
tween Tang and the Uighurs, 292-5, 299,
303-4, 307-9; negotiations between Tang
and Nanzhao, 344; 351, 352; Song and
Liao, 360; marriage, negotiations between
Sui and the Turks, 105-6, 121; nego
tiations between Tang and the Eastern
Turks, 173-4, 179; request from the
Western Turks, 175, 195; negotiation with
the Xueyantuo, 190-91; request from
Tuyuhun, 235; request from Tibet, 236-7,
239, 242, 247; request from the Eastern
Turks, 266, 267, 268, 269,272, 276,278;
between Tang and the Khitans, 279;
between Tang and the Xi, 279; Turgish,
281
Mawei ,1^, 156, 292
Mayi.lg, 143, 173, 174
Menxia Sheng
see Department of
chancellery
Mgar Khri ‘bring (Qinling), 8, 245, 246
Mgar Stong rtsan (Ludongzan), 238,239,
240, 242, 245
Migu
338
Military Commissioner (jiedu shi),
development of, 151-6; in post-An Lushan
time, 157-8, 162, 164, 165, 166, 350
Military Commissioner {jinglue dashi,
jinglueshi), 152, 153, 154
Militia (fubing, also militiamen), 10,137,
141, 146, 151,348, 350
Mimana (Kaya), 125
Ming dynasty, foreign relations of, 362-4
Mingjia ^
see School of Dialecticians
Minguo furen JR. g ^ A, see Consort of
the Min state
Mingzhou^;)'!'!, 144
Ministry of Justice (xingbu), 80
Ministry of Receptions (zhuke bu), 79
Ministry of Revenue (hubu), 79, 200
Ministry of Rites (libu), 75, 79, 80
Ministry of War (bingbu), 80
Minor Koguryd, 223
Mochuoi^ Ig, see Bag Chor
MohelS¥|, 99,100, 109, 110, 122,136,
177,197, 199,211, 212,214,218,225,
227,228
Momen
146
Mongols, 50; rise and the Yuan dynasty,
361-2; relations with the Ming dynasty,
362-64

Index
Mouyu ^33, see Bogii
Moyanchuo
see Bayan Chor
Munmu, 223, 224, 226
Munye, 227, 228
Murong Wei ^ ^ ^, 33
Murong, 33, 44, 45, 55
Muye, 227, 228
Muy6, 226
Muzong, policy, 338
Naghid Chor (Najiechuo), 315, 316, 317 '
Najiechuo f PSIIS, see Naghid Chor
Namgdn, 221, 222
Namsaeng, 221
Nanhai Jigui Neifa Zhuan
n, 90
Nanning
143
Nanningzhou, 197
Nanzhao ]geS, 3, 4, 57, 86, 157, 166;
relations with Xuanzong, 259-60; alliance
with Tibet, 322, 323, 327; alliance with
Tang against Tibet, 303, 335-6; relations
with Tang from 820, 341-4; and through
out
Nanzhou YiwuZhi
91
National History (guoshi), 92
Neifu Ju
see Palace freasury
Neishi Sheng
see Secrateriat
Neishi Sheng
see Palace domestic
service
neiting
see inner court
Nine Surnames (Jiuxing), 274, 276, 290
Niu Sengru
, 318, 340, 341
Niu Xianke4^ftlj^, 154
NongjiaM^, see Agricultural school
Northern Wei, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 46, 47, 50,
52, 53, 54
Nuohebo
, 236, 237, 238,240, 241
Nushibi
246
Oga, relations with Tang, 315-9; 355
Office (or Department) of the Secretariat
(zhongshu sheng), 67, 70, 88
Office of Daoist Worship {chongxuan shu),
76
Office of General Management (Zongli
Yamen), 365
Office of Receptions {dianfan shu, dianke
shu), 76, 77
Official Interpreter (yiguan), 92
Old Tibetan Annals, 14, 15, 249
Old Tibetan Chronicle, 14, 15, 249
Ormizt (Wamosi), 315, 316, 317, 318, 354
outer court (waiting), 72
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Index
Pyongyang, 16, 82,122, 147, 210, 220, 221,
222, 224
Paekche, 4, 16; in the Period of Disunion,
55-6; relations with Sui, 110-1, 125-6; in
Tang, 145; relations with Gaozu, 207-9; in
Taizong’s time, 209-14; Tang conquest,
217-21, 223, 224, 225
Palace Armies, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163,
325, 350
Palace Domestic Service {neishi sheng), 80,
81
Palace Secretariat (shumi yuan), 74
Palace Secretary {shumi shi), 74, 164
Palace Treasury {neifu Ju), 80, 81
Pang Xun
343, 344, 356
Parhae, relations with Tang and the Turks,
227-7, 358
Parthia, 25
Peroz, 283
Pei Ju
85, 87; role in policy-making,
116-21; 124, 127, 129, 175, 208, 209
Pei Xingjian
147, 244, 245, 262
Pei Yan
147,262
Pei YunHH, 130
Persia, 31, 48, 84, 116, 168, 196, 283

Piluoge^S®,259

Pingliang
303, 334, 337
Pingliangchuan
J11,334
Pinglu^H, 153, 157,279
Piti Spring ^
307
Pojang, 215, 216,222, 225, 226
Poksin, 220
Policy Adviser {sanqi changshi), 70
Precious King {baowang), 239
Prefect (czs/h), 187
prefecture{zhou), 98, 99, 111, 120, 136,
153, 197, 267
Prince of Guangping
293, 294
Prince of Yong
297
Prince P’ung g (Paekche), 220, 221, 222
Prince Yung g, 218, 219, 221, 223, 224,
225
Princess Anyi
105,106
Princess Bilgd, 293
Princess Chonghui ^
299
Princess Dayi
(also Princess Qianjin),
103-5
Princess Gu’an 0 279
Princess Guanghua
108, 118
Princess Huarong ^^,119
Princess Jiaohe 5^}^, 281,282
Princess Jieyou
86

Princess Jincheng
87,247, 248, 249,
250,251, 252, 253,254, 255,258, 324,
351
PrincessNingguo
294, 352
Princess Pingyang
36
Princess Qianjin
49, 82, 100-2, 351
Princess Taihe
308, 317, 318, 352
Princess Taiping
73, 243, 272
Princess Wencheng
87, 91, 236, 238,
242,351
Princess Xian’an
304, 352
Princess Xinyi
121
Princess Yicheng^fiX, 86, 106, 115, 127,
128, 172,173, 174,179, 351
propriety (//), 19, 23
Protector-general of Anbei $:|t, 78, 153
Protector-general of Anxi
(Aryw duhu),
85,140,143,153,251; and throughout
Protector-general of Beiting ;jk®, 153, 253,
272, 273
Protector-general ofChanyu, 153
Protector-general of the Western Regions
{Xiyu duhu), 84, 180
Protector-general, responsibilities of, 153,
198
Protectorate {duhu fu), 145, 153, 197-9, 354
Protectorate of Anbei, 199, 265
Protectorate of Andong
145,146,
147,199,222, 223; changes in location,
224-6; 244
Protectorate of Annan
199, 342, 358
Protectorate of Anxi, 141, 149,194,195,
196,197,198,199,201, 243,251, 253,
271,281, 282; and throughout
197,199, 282
Protectorate of Beiting
Protectorate of Chanyu
78,199, 267
Protectorate of Hanhai^jg, 198, 199
Protectorate of Jinshan ^ ill, 196, 265
Protectorate of Kunling ft |^, 196, 244
Protectorate of Mengchi
196,244
Protectorate of Western Regions {Xiyu duhu
Ju), 51,198, 354; and throughout
Protectorate of Yanran
192,198, 199
Pugu ^0, see also Buqu, 315, 316
Pugu Huaien P0^S, 159, 293, 294,
296,297, 298,299, 325, 326,352, 357
Puye
see Deputy head of the
department of state affairs
Puy6, 55
Qarluq, 278,281, 284,295,305, 315
qi^, 169,171

QianDaxin^;^5ff.

422
Qiang
45, 51, 56, 201, 243, 324, 340
Qibi
143,194,235, 291, 318
Qibi Hell
143, 181,190, 240
Qieshi, see Kashgar
Qifii Hui'§:f^,^,99
45, 46
Qiju Lang SggP, see Imperial diarist
Qiju Sheren S® #A. see Imperial diarist
Qiju Zhu
> see Court diary
Qilixu
see Khri-gzigs
Qimin^g,92, 106-7,114-5, 118, 119,
121, 187
Qing dynasty, foreign relations, 364-5
Qingshui
329, 332,333
Qingzhou Jgii'H, 357
Qinling
see Mgar Khri ‘bring
Qinzhou^j.H,337
Qiuci
see Kucha
Qiulong -g-ll, 342
qiuyan
68
Quart Tangshi ^0^, 11
Quart Tartgwert
11
Qulligh Boila (Guli Peiluo), 278,287,291
Qutlugh (Guduolu), 263, 265,266, 290
Rangan
see Zamqan
Rectifier of Omissions (Jbuque), 70
Regional Command (fartzhert, also
fartgzhen), 152, 153, 157-8, 350
Regional Military Command {zortgguart fa),
98,99, 114, 349
Regional Military Commander (zongguan),
98,99
Reminder (shiyi), 70
Ren Fang ft
90
Ren Yaxiang ftf|^, 148
Rili B ®, see Daily calendar
RongYujgS, 299
Rouran
35,46, 47,48,49, 50, 53, 56,
287
Ruizong, power struggle, 145,150
Samarkand (Kang), 139,140,283
5amgwA5agi
14, 15, 16, 219,
223
Sarrtguk Yusa
Sang Hongyang ^54#, 59, 61
Sanqi Changshi
see Policy
adviser
Sansheng ft #, see Three Departments
Scholars of the Northern Gate {Beimert
xueshi), 73,147
School of Dialecticians (Mirtgjia), 28
School of Yin and Yang and of Five Phases,

Index
28
Secretarial Receptionist {tortgshi sheng), 70,
80
Secrateriat {neishi sheng), 129
Secretariat Director {zhongshu ling), 69
Secretariat Drafter {zhongshu sheren), 317
Secretariat-chancellery {zhongshu menxia),
67
Senior Messenger {da xingren), 75
settlement, 42, 46; policy, 62; debate in
Taizong’s time, 183-7; resettlement of the
Turks, 187-9; oftheTiele, 192-93; Han
resettlement, 197; of the Koreans, 215,
222; Tang resettlement policy, 262-4;
Xuanzong’s resettlement of the Turks,
274-6; 353, 354
Shaanan
157
Shaanzhou ^ jjj, 160, 324
Shabulue, see Ishbara
ShangBeibei j^^#,341
Shang Jiexi
see Zhang rGyal-zigs
Shang Jiezan
see Zhang rGyal
tshan
Shang Zhuguo _h;|4S, see Supreme pillar
of state
Shangguan Wan’er
73
Shangshu Ling
see Director of the
department of state affairs
Shangshu Sheng
see Department
of State Affairs
Shanshan (Loulan)
53, 54, 119
Shanzhou ^ jjj, 240
Shaofu Jian
see Directorate for
imperial manufactories
Shatuo
305, 315, 318, 337, 356
Shazhou^^^'j■H, 137, 341
She Jiancha Yushi
. see Acting
investigating censor
Shegui Itg, 120,121
ShenceArmyWSI, 160, 161, 162, 163,
164,165, 325, 350
Shengzhou J® j'H, 270
Shenyi fengbo
70
Shenzhoutlffl, 197
Shetu §10,49
Shi Chaoyi
156, 296, 297, 298
Shi Danai
169
Shi Fasheng
89
Shi Shuhuxi
127
Shi Siming 5^ S ^, 156
ShiTanjingPSS, 89
Shi Zhimeng
S, 89

Index
Shibao5@,253, 258
Shibi$S#, 86, 115, 127, 128,168, 169,
170, 172
Shibo Shi
see Maritime trade
commissioner
Shiguan 55 Hj see Bureau of
Historiography
Shijia Fangzhi^M^l^'~, 183
Shilong±St, 342, 343, 344
Shilu Sf
see Veritable records
Shine-usu inscription, 14, 306
Shishi Xiyu Ji ^ M ^1? f£ > 89
Shiwei
109, 168, 210, 304, 318, 319,
357
Shiyi Jd jS, see Reminder
Shizheng
see Administrative
record
Shizhong cfi, see Director of the
chancellery
ShiziguoS®-?-^ (Srilanka), 150
Shouxiting § ^ Fortresses, the building of,
269-70; 275, 277, 296, 307
Shu#, 137, 169, 172
shuguo ® S. see Dependent state
Shule
see Kashgar
Shumi Shi ®
see Palace secretary
see Palace secretariat
Shumi Yuan
Shun mi of the Tuyuhun, 118, 176, 236, 237
Shunzhou HIWI. 187,188
Shunzong, reform, 163-4
Shuofang ^ ^ Army, 78
Shuofang, 153, 156, 158, 270, 278
Shuozhou
106
Sifang Guan E3
see Hostel for
tributary envoys
Sijie,!^, 199, 291
Silla, 4, 16, 55-6, 83; relations with Sui,
111, 125-6; pro-Tang policy, 206; relation
with Gaozu, 207-8; envoys to Taizong,
209; pro-Tang policy, 211-4,217; alliance
with Gaozong, 218-22; conflicts with
Tang, 223-7; relations with Parhae, 227-8
SimaGuang
9, 16, 117,191
Simen P^, see Transit authorization
bureau
Sinocentrism, 22-3
Siyi Shu
86
Siyi Shu E3H?, see Ceremonial office
Sogdians (Hu), 150,161, 177, 202, 275,
276, 295, 301,302,314
Song dynasty, foreign relations, 358-9;
relations with Liao, 353, 358-60; with
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Western Xia, 360-1; with Jin, 353; 361
Song Jing
150,272, 274
Song Minqiu
9
Song Yun 5^*, 89,90
Songzhou tefl'l, 237, 251
Srong btsan sgam-po, 236, 237,238, 239
Su Chuo ^1$, 34
Su Dingfang
217, 218,219, 220
Su Mian
8
Su Wei
130
subordinated area commands and
prefectures (Jimi fuzhou), 8, 188, 196;
system, 197-202; 361
Suiye 5|, see Tokmak
Suiyuan Army ^ la, 252
Suizhou
143, 249, 323,336
Sulu
281,282
Sun Hui
257
Suoge^S,271
Supervising Secretary {jishi zhong), 70, 185
Supreme Pillar of State (shang zkuguo), 207
Surveillance Commissioner (guancha shi),
153
Suzong, 67; assuming the throne, 156;
eunuchs in government, 158-9; relations
with the Uighurs, 292-6; relations with
Tibet, 322-3
T’aejong, 226
Tae ChoySng, 227
Taichang Si
see Court of imperial
sacrifices
Taichang Boshi
see Erudite of
the chamberlain for ceremonials
Taishi Ling
see Grand astrologer
Taizong, 2, 7, 8,15,16, 36,67, 70, 72,74,
83, 88,100,138; government 138-9;
foreign policy, 139-41; decision-making,
141-44,170; conquest of the Eastern
Turks, 140,174,176-9; conquest of the
Xueyantuo, 190-2; policy towards the
Western Turks and Western Regions, 1935; peace with the three Korean states, 20910; decision for war j^ainst Koguryfi,
210-14; Silla and Paekche in Taizong’s
time, 211-7; wars with Koguryd, 215-7;
campaigns against Tuyuhun, 235-6;
relations with Tibet, 236-9; and
throughout
Talas River, 8, 85, 284
Tamim ibn Bahr, 313
Tang Da Zhaoling Ji ® S ^, 9
Tang Huiyao^^'^, 8, 85

Index

424
Tang Jian^^, 83
Tang Liudian
Tang Tongji^^tt, 10
Tang Xiujing
149, 150,244, 265,
270
Tangut, 57, 357
Tanshihuai
43, 44
Tanwujie
89
Tao river
251,357
Taohe Zhenshou Dashi
^
,
see Commissioner for defending Taohe
Taozhou
245
Tardu (Datou), 101, 107
Tashkent, 282, 284
Tashkurgan (Congling), 195
Taxation Statutes {fuyi ling), 201
Tegin, 253
Territorial Representatives (chaoji shi), 68
Three Departments (sansheng), 69, 72,129,
139
Tian Guidao ffl KjI, 267,268
Tian Mou EB^, 315,316
Tian Kehan
see Heavenly Qaghan
Tianbing Army
152
Tiande Army
315, 316,317
Tibet, 3, 4, 10,11, 16, 38, 50, 56, 84, 91,
92, 119, 140, 145, 146, 150; expansion,
156-7; 160, 165, 166, 199,231,233;
compared with the nomadic powers, 2335; relations with Taizong and Tuyuhun,
236-9; relations with Gaozong and with
Tuyuhun, 239-43; competition with Tang
in southwest and in the Western Regions,
243-8; treaty with Tang in 706,248-50;
marriage of Princess Jincheng, 247-8;
relations with Xuanzong, 250-58;
relations with Turgish, 281-282; relations
with Suzong, 292; 322-23; with Daizong,
323-7; with Dezong, the Uighurs,
Nanzhao, 303, 305-6, 323, 327-36; with
Tang in 806-51, 337-41; end, 341; and
throughout
Tibetan inscriptions, 14, 15,249
Tibetans, 9,10, 78, 79, 147,161,162, 195,
225; and throughout
Tiele^^, 49, 50, 107,118,119,140,149,
152,168,176,177,191; resettlement
under Tang, 192-3; assistance to Tang
campaign, 194, 195; under the jimi
system, 199, 201; revolt against Tang,
199, 275; conflicts with the Turks, 265,
273,276; Uighurs and the Tiele, 287, 290,

291, 295; and throughout
tingyi
see Court conference
TingzhoujgiH'l, 194, 195, 196, 197
Tolish (Tuli), 174, 176,177, 178, 179, 181,
187, 188
Toch’im, 220
Tokhara, 283, 284, 293
Tokharestan (Tuhuoluo), 85, 283
Tokmak (Suiye), 195,244, 270
Ton Bagha Tarqan (Dun Mohe Dagan), 301,
302, 303, 304,315
Tongdian A, 8, 85, 245
Tongdingil^, 123
Tongra, 156, 191, 199, 265, 275, 293, 295
Tongshi Sheren 38^’#A. see Secretariat
receptionist
Tonyuquq (Dunyugu), 274, 313
Toquzoghuz, 290
Touring Brokerage (xunyuan), 68
Transit Authorization Bureau (simen), 80
Transoxiana, 271, 283, 284
Treasury Bureau (jinbu), 79
Treaty of Kiakhta, 364
Treaty of Nerchinsk, 353, 365
tribute (or tributary) trade, 27, 40, 79
tribute system, 5, 9, 12,18,21,22, 24-8, 32,
58, 104, 115, 116,171, 174, 180, 206,
208,238, 362-3, 364, 365
triumphal mound (Jingguan), 209
Turgish, 199, 249, 253, 258; relations with
Tang and the Turks, 269-72; with
Xuanzong, 277, 281-4
Tudong5IM, 302
Tufa
45
Tufan Huanghe ia Pi ^ ^
, 86
Tuli, see Tolish
Tulishu±Sffi, 334
Tumidu PiSH®, 192

TuobaGuiJEI^iS,45
Tuoba Sigong
357
Tuoba
31, 36, 44, 45,46
Turfan, 11, 362
Turkish inscriptions, 13, 14,15, 263,265,
290,312-3
Turks, 2,3, 4, 8, 9, 14, 48, 49, 50, 78, 82,
83, 85, 98, 99,100,122,138, 143, 147,
and throughout
Tutu Chengcui PiJ^^iS, 308
Tuyuhun Pi@#, 4, 45,46, 53, 57;
relations with Sui, 98, 107-8, 117-20; with
Tang, 140, 168, 195, 199; with Gaozu,
175-6; Taizong’s campaign, 235-6;
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relations with Tang and Tibet, 231, 237-8,
239-43, 246, 315, 316, 318,324, 325,
357; and throughout
Uch-turfan (Dashicheng), 281
Uighurs, 3, 9,10, 14, 71, 77, 78, 92,144,
156, 157, 161,166; relations with the
Turks, 176-7; against the Xueyantuo, 191,
290; under the Tang jimi system, 192-3,
196, 197-202,290; conflicts with Tang,
253; early development before Tang, 287,
290; relations with Tang and the Turks
before 745, 265, 278, 290-2; relations
with Suzong, 292-96; horse-silk trade,
295, 300, 302, 309-11, 352; the Khitans
and Xi under the Uighurs, 295-6; relations
with Daizong, 296-301, 325-326; relations
with Dezong, 301-6, 335-6; conflicts with
Tibet, 305-6, 307, 311; relations with
Tang in 805-840, 306-15, 341; reasons for
the alliance with Tang, 309-15; end, 3159; and throughout
Ungjin (Xiongjin), 220
Veritable Records (shilu), 92
Vice Director of the Secretariat (zhongshu
shilang), 80, 185
Vice Minister of Rites {libu shiliang), 185
Waiguo Shi ^4®V>89
WaiguoZhuan ^fg'^,89
waiqi
72
waiting
see outer court
see Ormizt
Wamosi
Wan Zhen MM, 91
Wang Chengzong 3E ^ ^ > 3 07
Wang Jun i®, 78,274,275
Wang Junchuo iSw , 253, 291
WangMingshengiBft®, 16
Wang Mingyuan
85
Wang Mo 3ER, 90
Wang Pu 3E?S. 8
Wang Qinruo
8
Wang Shichong
173
Wang Xianzhi and Huang Chao rebellion 3E
166, 344,357
Wang Xiaojie
149,244
Wang Xuance
83,238
Wang Zhongsi
78,155,258
WanshoufortlHSl^S;, 115
Wei Chong
99
Wei Daijia$#<g, 149
Wei Gao
86, 335, 336
WeiHongji#gi,ti,83
Wei Jie^|6,84, 85

Wei Lun^fi,327, 328
Wei Man
54
Wei Shu
83
Wei Xiang ^^,59_
Wei Yuanzhong itTClS. 242
Wei Zheng
139, 142, 143, 186, 189,
194, 209,213,215
WeiboSllf, 157
Weizhou?lf|'|, 250
Weizhou mW, 165, 201, 336, 340, 341
WenDayaJS:^?!, 7, 170, 171
Wen Yanbo140,141, 186,187,
188,208, 209
Wenguan Cilin
7
Western Regions, 4, 26, 37, 42, 52-4, 82,
83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88; in Sui, 116-20; in
Tang, 138, 139,140, 145,146, 153, 157,
168, 175, 180, 193-5; Tibet and Tang
competition over, 243-7, 251-3, 305, 332;
and throughout
Western Turks, in Sui, 101-7, 117,118,
120-1; in Tang, 140, 141, 145, 168, 175,
193-5; Gaozong’s conquest, 195-7;
situation under Empress Wu, 243-7, 265,
266, 269; and throughout
Western Xia, relations with Song, 360-1
White-clothed Turks, 305
Wu Chonggui
268
WuJing^^,7
Wu Yanxiu
268, 269
Wu Zetian
see Empress Wu
Wuhuan43,44,46
Wukonglg^, 90
Wushi Waiguo Zhuan
82

WusunJ^^, 86

Wuwei
119
WuyuanS®, 106, 136, 172
Wuzhile MnW], 270, 271
Wuzong, government, 165; policy toward
the Uighurs and Kirghiz, 315-9
Xi
3, 99, 102,109, 152, 153, 156, 176,
177,198,199, 210; assistance to Taizong,
214-5; relations with Xuanzong and the
Turks, 228, 273-4; 276, 279-80; under the
Uighurs, 295-6; 304, 315, 318,357, 358;
and throughout
Xian
see district
Xianbei
31, 33, 34, 35,43,44,45, 46
Xiangwei^^, 157
Xianyu Zhongtong ^
259
Xianzong, government, 164-5; relations
with the Uighurs, 307-8; with Tibet, 337
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XiaoSiye|HP*_,78
Xiao Xingren /jNfr A> see Junior
messenger
Xiao Yu
141, 178
Xiazhou S jii 143, 185,265, 300, 332,
333, 334, 357
Xichuan Hill. 86
Xidamou
340
Xie Wan
250
Xieli
relations with Tang, 173-9, 187
Xietie^
see Adiz
XifanJi
85
XihaiHS, 118, 239
Xin Tangshu
^. 7, 8, 9, 15, 251
Xinan Beibian L« H H ^ ^ , 86
Xincheng
224
Xing Tang Temple |S)g, 326
Xingbu JPJ gC, see Ministry ofjustice
Xingjun
see expeditionary armies
Xinluo Guoji gffSSIfi. 83-84
Xiongjin f|#(Ungjin), 219, 221, 223, 224
Xiongnu®, 3, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 33, 38,
41,42, 43,44, 49, 50, 51, 55, 61, 62, 74,
101,171,183,186, 245,263,311,312;
and throughout
Xirong Jiaowei HjScKfef. see
Commandant of Western Rong
Xiyizhou H'Hi'li. 193
Xiyu Duhu H 115 S, see Protectorgeneral of the Western Regions
Xiyu Guozhi
83
A'lyw Ji H^f£, 85
Xiyu Jiaowei
see Commandant
of Western Regions
Xiyu Tuji
85,117
Xiyu Zhangshi
see Aide of the
Western Regions
Xiyu Z/ii
85
Xizheng JiH tE f£. 83
XizhouHffl, 140, 194,196, 243, 311
XuHui^l[,213
Xu Huiyao ^
,8
Xu Jingzong
7, 170
Xuantu^^,55,208
Xuanwu Gate
138
Xuanzang
88, 89,194
Xuanzong, 67, 72, 73,74; poicy, 150-1;
frontier system, 151-4; relations with
Parhae and Silla, 227-8; relations with
Tibet, 250-8; treaty with Tibet in 732,
253-6; relations with Nanzhao, 259-60;
relations with the Turks, 272-9; with the

Khitans and Xi, 273, 276, 277, 279-80;
with the Turgish, 281-84; encounters with
the Arabs, 283-4; and throughout
Xue Naif ^,273
Xue Qianguang
264
Xue Rengui
222, 223, 224, 225,
273
Xueyantuo
140, 141, 142, 143;
relations with the Turks and Tang, 176-8,
189,194, 200, 214; Tang conquest, 190-2,
199; resettlement, 192-3; and throughout
Xunbian Shi
see Frontier
patrolling inspector
Xunyuan
see Touring brokerage
Xunzi
21
Xuzhou ^ j'lj, 343
Yan Liben 05.^. 240
185
Yan Shigu
YanZhiweiR5a®,267,268
Yang Fu^:?;, 91
Yang Gongren
136
Yang Guang
see Emperor Yang
Yang Guozhong
72, 73, 154,155,
156,259, 260
Yang Jian
see Emperor Wen
Yang Ju#^6, 249, 250
YangQin^j^, 104
Yang Shaofu
8
YangSu^^, 123
Yang Xigu
305
Yang Xuangan
123
Yang Yan ^2^8,161, 328
Yang Yi^M. 8
Yang Yuhuan^5.^> 73, 155, 156
YangZhengdao
172, 179
Yanmen HiPl 127,130, 168
Yanqi
see Karashahr
148
Yanran
Yanying Dian
see Yanying hall
Yanying Hall (Yanying hall), 67
Yanzhou
136
Yanzhou HiHi, 332, 333, 334, 336, 356
Yao Chong
150,272, 273
YaoZi’angil4^fli, 297
Yaozhou ^ jjj, 249
Yazhou
243
Yehou Jiazhuan
10,304
YelU Abaoji
358
Yi’nanim, 176,177,178, 189, 190,191
Yiguan PS, see Official interpreter

Yijing^jf, 90
Yimouxun

335, 336

Index
Yingzhou##i, 85, 99, 100,114, 144,150,
211.215, 266, 273, 279
Yinzhou ^j{\, 332, 357
Yiwu
see Kami
Yizhou^#!, 140, 193, 194
Yizhou
245
Y6n Kaesomun
211,213, 214,
215.216, 221
Yongji
canal, 114, 122
Yongle emperor, 362, 363
Younger Princess Ningguo
294
Youxing Waiguo Zhuan
89
Youzhou fc#|, 188
Youzhou
99,157, 162,188, 273, 279,
296, 316; and throughout
Youzhou
275, 357
159,160, 325
Yu Chaoen ||
Yu Shiji
130
Yuan Junzhang^g^, 174,177
YuanXiuj^'(7(c, 301
Yuan Zai tcIS, 160,161, 326, 327
Yuanzhou
;H'|, 326, 337
Yuchi Jingdelf^lfe®, 142
Yuezhi ^ ft, 50, 89
Yugong ii| M , 21
Yulintt^, 172
Yunzhong
188,199
Yunzhou ff ;H'|, 99
Yushi Tai
see Censorate
Yutian
see Khotan
Yuwen Tai
33, 34, 181
Yuwen Yong
49
Zabulistan, 253
Zaixiang
see Chief ministers
Zamqan, 105-6
Zanpo
246, 247
Zhang Changxun
136
Zhang Guangsheng
301, 302
Zhang JiajR J, 77
Zhang Jian
85,144
Zhang Jiuling
11, 70,154,155,
277
Zhang Liang 51%, 142
Zhang Qian !!*, 25, 50, 57, 82
Zhang Renyuan 5Rf_S, 270
Zhang rGyal tshan (Shang Jiezan
A, 328, 329,331, 332,333,334, 336
Zhang rGyal-zigs (Shang Jiexi
328
Zhang Shougui
154,256, 279, 280
Zhang Wenguan
224
Zhang Xuanbiao
154, 249, 252
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Zhang Yanshang
333
Zhang Yi?IM, 329
Zhang Yichao
jH, 341
Zhang Yue^liS, 151,253
Zhang Zhiyun sR;i3i, 275
Zhangshi SIS; see aide
Zhangsun Sheng
82, 83; role in
Turkish policy, 100-7, 116, 117, 127, 129
Zhangsun Wuji
72,100, 141,
178,211
Zhangye?R^^, 85, 116, 117, 118
zhao IS, 137
Zhao Huicong ®
257
Zhao Yi HE, 16
Zhechong Fu JFf ® IT?. see assault-resisting
garrisons (intrepid militias)
Zhenfan^#, 55
Zheng He jlPfn, 363
Zheng Yuanshu ^76 SI, 78
Zhengdian
8
Zhengshi Tang
see Administration
chamber
Zhengtong emperor, 363
Zhenguan Zhengyao ^H©[^, 7, 193
Zhenwu
301, 302, 304, 357
Zhenzhu
196
Zhi Sengzai
89
Zhifang Si
see Bureau of
operations
Zhong Tianzhuguo Xingji 4" A ^ S fT 13 >
83
Zhonghang Yue
312
Zhongshu Ling 14
see Secretariat
director
Zhongshu Menxia cf’^HT. see
Secretariat-chancellery
Zhongshu Sheng 4"
see Office (or
Department) of the secretariat
Zhongshu Sheren 4’#'^A> see
Secretariat drafter
Zhongshu Shilang
see Vice
director of the secretariat
Zhongzong, power struggle, 144-5, 150;
treaty and alliance wiht Tibet, 247-50;
relations with the Turks and the Turgish,
269-72
zhou )‘|'|, see prefecture
Zhou Yao^^, 99
Zhou Yiti^J)('^, 271
Zhouli
21
Zhu Cl
161,163, 330, 331, 332
Zhu Fawei
89
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ZhuTao^®, 161,302, 303
ZhuYing^]®, 82
Zhudao Jinzou Yuan
see
Capital liaison office of various regions
zhuhou
19
Zhujubo
see Karghalik
Zhuke Bu
see Ministry of
receptions
Zhuke Qingli Si
see Bureau
of receptions
Zhuke Si i § 1], see Bureau of receptions
Zhuojun^i^, 114,122
Zizhi Tongjian Kaoyi
31 ^ ^, 9,
10, 16, 86, 251
Zizhi Tongjian ^'<^31^, 9, 10, 11, 15, 17,
304,313
ZongChuke^3^^,271
Zongguan, see regional military commander
Zongguan Fu
see regional military
command, area command, local regional
command
Zongli Yamen
see Office of
general management
Zou YanfS^g, 28, 59
Zunwang
235, 236
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